Belarus Security Update – 08 – 14 January 2024
A summary of key political-military events in Belarus
From now on, BSUs will be published on Tuesdays.
BLUF
No changes in the general posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces were reported last week.
Executive summary
Over the past seven days, the military-political situation in Belarus remained unchanged.
There were no noteworthy political decisions affecting the security area. At the same time, the highest-rank military representatives presented limited activity, mostly restricted to the provision of comments about the security situation in the region.
Nevertheless, new data about the cooperation between the Belarusian and Russian Armed Forces appeared. Aside from providing Russia with small-arms ammunition, Belarus reportedly ordered Krasukha-4 electronic warfare complexes.
Internally, Minsk continued infrastructure work to support the new Southern Operational Command.
Last week, the Belarusian military formations displayed a high exercise tempo. Some events had a centralised character (sniper and divers drills), but, in general, the land forces are still involved in specialists’ training. Some training actions were dedicated to the senior officers and engaged operational-level commanders.
Elements of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in Belarus were almost entirely inactive.
On the contrary, members of the Wagner PMC participated in the Belarusian Army training events. “Wagnerites” also took part in summarising events of the Belarusian Internal Troops.
Political developments
09JAN2024 – Presidential awards for Belarusian servicemen and military institutions
Last week, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s influence on the military sphere was limited to participation in a single ceremonial event.
On Tuesday (09JAN), Lukashenko presented state awards “For Spiritual Revival” to personnel of the Belarusian Honor Guard (subordinated to the Minsk Military Commandant’s Office) and the Polotsk Cadet School.
During the event, Lukashenko also spoke about the security in Belarus. He emphasised the need to avoid war and claimed there would be no war if Belarusians would remain in “their place and fulfil their duties”. According to him, Belarusians shouldn’t give their enemies a chance and should focus on growing the country’s economy.
Military developments
07-11JAN2024 – The Russo-Belarusian military cooperation
Over the past seven days, several pieces of data related to the military cooperation of Belarusian and Russian Armed Forces appeared in public.
On the previous Sunday (07JAN), the Wall Street Journal published an article on the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus. The text included earlier statements from the Belarusian President and claims of an undisclosed Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) official accompanied by earlier research by the Federation of American Scientists. In general, it suggested that Russian nuclear weapons might have already arrived in Belarus and were stored in the Lida Air Base.
However, the article did not provide “hard” any evidence supporting confirming the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus.
Also on Sunday (07JAN), a Ukrainian military expert, Konstantin Mashovets, referred to the presence of Russian air assets in Belarus. He claimed that three Russian Su-30SM fighters were still stationed at the Baranovichi Air Base at the beginning of 2024 (03JAN) (Previous reports indicated all Russian airframes left Belarus)
On Monday (08JAN), the Belarusian Union of Railway Workers informed about a Belarusian ammunition transport to the Russian Federation in late 2023. According to the text, it occurred on 10DEC2023, when three Belarusian wagons (operated by TRANSRAIL-BC) left Golynets Railway Station and moved towards Barnaul Railway Station.
Based on available data, the transport likely moved about 110 tons of small-arms ammo (the equivalent of 4-4,5 million of 7.62×39 mm or 8,5-9 million of 5.45×39 mm rounds) from Belarusian 2783rd Combat Equipment and Materiel Storage Base, which could have arrived to the Barnaul Cartridge Plant.
Three days later (11JAN), the Western Operational Command (OC) said that military personnel of an electronic warfare unit left for training to Russia to learn to operate the latest electronic warfare complex, Krasukha. Belarus is set to receive the system in the second half of 2024. The unit in question likely refers to the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion, which reports to the WOC HQ.
The 1RL257 Krasukha-4 Krasukha-4 is a multifunctional jamming station designed to hinder operations of Low-Earth Orbit satellites, ground-based radars, and airborne radars (AWACS).
Russians utilised Krashukha-4 in Ukraine, but how well it performed is unclear. However, an undamaged system was captured by Ukrainian troops early in the war, so it is likely that NATO countries have already assessed its specifications and capabilities.
08JAN2024 – Infrastructure for the Southern Operational Command
On Monday (08JAN), the Radio Svaboda news outlet confirmed unofficial claims that the Belarusian Armed Forces had started building a military camp near Gomel.
Belarusian reportedly allocated RUB500,000 for the works on the camp in 2023, and RUB10 and RUB40 million in 2024 and 2025, respectively. The base is likely to be ready by the end of 2027.
10-14JAN2024 – The international activities of the Belarusian military officials
Last week, Belarusian military officials presented relatively meagre activity in the international sphere. However, four events that occurred should be mentioned.
On Wednesday (10JAN), the Belarusian State Security Council Secretary, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, briefly commented on the current political-military situation around Belarus.
Volfovich claimed that Belarus did not threaten anyone but mentioned that the state was prepared to react to any challenges and threats from its neighbours – Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic States. The representative of the Belarusian State Security Council also pointed out the significant military activity of NATO states, including numerous exercises, increased intelligence activity, and increased military budgets. Furthermore, he highlighted the worsening situation at the Polish-Belarus border. Volfovich stated that these actions indicate an unfriendly attitude towards Belarus, which is why the state has been forced to take “appropriate steps” to develop its military capabilities.
Two days later (12JAN), the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Valery Revenko, provided data about two more practical examples of Belarusian foreign activities. He informed about his earlier meeting with the Chairman of the African States Association (accredited to the Russian MoD) and subsequent Zimbabwean Military Attache, Capt. Kingsley Zimbudzana and his meeting with the Belarusian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in India, Mikhail Kasko.
According to the official statement, Revenko and the representative of the Zimbabwean Armed Forces spoke about joint cooperation. On the other hand, his meeting with Kasko was focused on the priority measures of international military cooperation with India and the political-military situation around Belarus.
It should be mentioned that on Sunday (14JAN), the Belarusian military television VoenTV published a weekly episode of the Арсенал program, which included an interview with the Head of the IMCD.
During the discussion, Revenko initially referred to the general situation in the world and noted the significant number of ongoing conflicts and incidents affecting the security of other states, including Belarus. According to him, this did not stop his state from building relations with other countries based on peaceful intentions.
Revenko pointed out that Belarus was ready for dialogue with everyone to maintain or establish peace and brought examples of recent Belarusian Armed Forces activities in this area. He precisely mentioned bilateral meetings with the Vietnamese and Indian officials and specifically noted the visit of the Belarusian Armed Forces delegation to China.
Speaking about the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Head of the IMCD stressed that the organisation remains the guarantee of Belarusian security in Europe. However, he also claimed that his state was supporting other CSTO members. This was possible because forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation have carried out their tasks according to the same standards, he added. That said, Revenko noticed that observers from other countries and those who are NATO members attended CSTO drills held in Belarus.
Regarding military cooperation with Russia, Ravenko highlighted its strategic character resulting from joint training and preparations of military personnel and the use of the same modern military equipment. According to Revenko, more than 300 events organised or attended by the IMCD representatives in 2023 (from a total of 623) pertained to the Russo-Belarusian relations. Nonetheless, Revenko also noted that 2023 was a “busy year” due to the other events resulting from Belarusian membership in the Commonwealth of the Independent States and the CSTO and upcoming participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Besides, Revenko informed that Belarus reached a mutual understanding with Iran and will significantly develop its relations with the mentioned state in the future.
Lastly, he expressed his sadness that Western states were not interested in military cooperation with Belarus and were introducing new restrictions and sanctions. Nonetheless, the Head of the IMCD noted that Belarus had new allies in Southwest and Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America and would focus on developing military relations with them in 2024.
Military exercises
08-14JAN2024 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Last week, Belarusian formations and units of central subordination presented a visible training tempo.
On Monday (08JAN), the 188th Engineering Brigade organised an annual training gathering of military divers from various formations. The event continued through Thursday (11JAN) and Friday (12JAN) and included underwater reconnaissance drills. Such exercises are usually organised at the 188th Engineering Brigade or the 72nd Joint Training Center. As per Belarusian military regulations, divers must spend 60 hours underwater annually.
A day later (09JAN), the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground hosted centralised training classes for T-72 crews from all Belarusian mechanised formations to prepare them for the upcoming competition for the best T-72 crew in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
On Wednesday (10JAN), the 72nd Joint Training Center’s cadets participated in BMP-2 firing classes. On the same date, data on the continuation of sniper drills (the issue covered in the latest BSU) appeared in open sources.
A day later (11JAN), battery and platoon-level commanders of the 51st Artillery Brigade took part in demonstration classes on topographic training. The head of the formation’s topographic service led the drills to improve soldiers’ orientation skills.
At the same time (11JAN), the Belarusian Hajun team informed about a sudden combat readiness check of the 30th Railway Brigade. According to the source, the Belarusian MoD Transport Support Department initiated the inspection and included the organisation of personnel and equipment reception points.
08-11JAN2024 – The training activity of the Special Operation Forces’ formations
Last week, elements of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces (SOF) presented significant training activity.
The most notable event occurred between Monday (08JAN) and Tuesday (09JAN) at the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade’s base when the Commander of the Belarusian SOF, Maj. Gen. Vadim Denisenko led a training gathering for subordinated battalion-level commanders and their deputies. The training had a comprehensive character and included various drills related to tactics, command, live fire drills, physical training and UAV use. Officially, it included lessons based on the Russo-Ukrainian war experiences.
On Wednesday (10JAN), the personnel of the 103rd Airborne Brigade participated in military speciality-related training classes. They were held in their home garrison (Vitebsk) and presumably at Losvido Training Ground, where they engaged soldiers of artillery and air defence subunits.
A day later (11JAN), mortar subunits of the 38th Air Assault Brigade underwent combat training classes at the Brestsky Training Ground. Initially, they likely included drills on subunit redeployment, coordination, camouflage, and counter-battery warfare. Practical firings from 2B23 and 2B24 mortars were probably held the next day(s).
08-13JAN2024 – The training activity of the air force and air defence forces
Only a few training events involving Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces personnel occurred over the past seven days.
On Wednesday (10JAN), VoenTV published a video material informing about training flights of the 50th Mixed Aviation Base (Machulischy) that engaged the commanding staff of the Belarusian Air Force (flying on both helicopters and aircraft). However, the exact dates of the flights were not specified.
According to the Belarusian Hajun team data, aside from a single fighter flight from 61st Fighter Aviation Base (Baranovichi) that patrolled the Polish-Belarusian border, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters operated from Machulischy on Monday (08JAN).
On Thursday (11JAN), service members of the 56th Communications Regiment underwent firing classes at the Uruchcha Training Ground. On Thursday, other helicopter and aircraft flights from Machulischy Air Base were reported.
A day later (12JAN), elements of the 6th Air Defence Battalion of the 15th Air Defence Brigade (S-400- equipped) conducted a field exit as a part of the planned combat readiness check of the air defence duty forces. Moreover, at least a single fighter and at least three Mi-24 and a single Mi-8 helicopters departed from Baranovichi and Machulischy Air Bases, respectively.
The last training flight of Belarusian air assets was reported on Saturday (13JAN). It engaged a single Mi-24 helicopter that departed from Machulischy.
08-15JAN2024 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Last week, forces subordinated to the Western OC presented the highest training activity among all Belarusian Armed Forces components.
On Monday (08JAN), the BTR-82A equipped battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (likely 78th Mechanised Battalion) departed from the home garrison (Grodno) to participate in joint training classes with Wagner PMC personnel. A day later (9JAN), the unit arrived at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground, where servicemen began their training actions. On Thursday (11JAN), they undertook a battalion-level special-tactical training session. During its course, servicemen conducted defensive actions using various UAVs, for which they received a “good” mark.
On Tuesday (9JAN), the Commander of the Western OC, Col. Vladimir Bely, initiated a training gathering dedicated to commanders (and their deputies) of battalion-level subunits. As in the case of the abovementioned SOF drills, Bely intended to improve commanders’ effectiveness and training level using the experiences from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and included classes related to tactical, reconnaissance, live fire, and physical training. The drill was held at the Gozhsky Training Ground.
According to the Deputy Commander of the Western OC, Col. Dmitry Bitny, during the gathering, commanders learnt about the importance of fighting in winter conditions, various aspects of military training (including a new bilateral counter-battery tactical exercise organised with an artillery battery) and non-standard ways of using their subordinated forces (including ambushed with the use of engineering equipment). On the last day of their training (11JAN), officers likely discussed issues related to using engineering munitions and conducting mine ambushes. Western OC Commander directly supervised all practical actions.
Moving beyond Western Operational Command’s forces, between Tuesday (09JAN) and Sunday (14JAN), personnel responsible for simulating explosions from the 111th Artillery Brigade, 147th Air Defence Regiment, 74th Communications Regiment and 250th Security and Maintenance Battalion participated in a dedicated gathering held at the 557th Engineering Brigade.
Also, on Tuesday (09JAN), the Western OC organised a gathering for servicemen of demining squads. It lasted at least until the end of Saturday (13JAN), when soldiers began practical actions related to mine clearing.
Presumably, simultaneously (09JAN), BTR-82A and Kayman vehicle drivers from formations (units) subordinated to the command started their own training. The theoretical part finished on Thursday (11JAN).
The 111th Artillery Brigade hosted independent retraining classes for drivers between Tuesday (09JAN) and Friday (12JAN).
On Wednesday (10JAN), personnel of the Western Operational Command underwent control classes to check their knowledge of foreign armed forces (their structure and equipment) and the use of reconnaissance assets. At the same time, elements of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in combat training classes held at the Chepelevo Training Ground.
On Thursday (11JAN), a duty subunit of the 11th Mechanised Brigade underwent a readiness inspection. It was likely held in the home garrison and finished with an “excellent” mark.
It should be mentioned that about ten other soldiers of the same formation also participated in theoretical classes linked to fire control.
A day later (12JAN), signallers from the 6th and 11th Mechanised Brigades took practical communication organisation classes. They were held in home garrisons, but whether they were somewhat correlated remains unclear.
Between Friday (12JAN) and Saturday (13JAN), the 11th Mechanised Brigade soldiers underwent practical classes related to using OZ-1 entrenching charges at the Chepelevo Training Ground.
On the latter day (13JAN), an unspecified subunit of the 11th Mechanised Brigade underwent another combat readiness check.
12JAN2024 – The training activity of the North-Western Operational Command
Last week, only one “training” activity among forces subordinated to the North-Western OC was reported.
It refers to the planned maintenance of the 120th Mechanised Brigade’s T-72B3 tanks held on Friday (12JAN).
10JAN2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Over the past seven days, only a single ground movement of Belarusian military equipment was noteworthy.
It was reported on Thursday (11JAN) and included a single UAZ vehicle with two Wagner PMC mercenaries likely moving in Baranovichi. It was most likely related to 6th Mechanised Brigade elements drills occurring nearby at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground.
Russian military activity in Belarus
Last week, the activity of Russian soldiers remaining in Belarus was limited to a single transfer of military equipment.
On Monday (08JAN), likely the same Ural fuel truck was moving from Lesets to Polesye and then from Dudichi towards Kalinkovichi.
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Aside from joint training with elements of the 6th Mechanised Brigade and movement in Belarusian military UAZ, members of the Wagner PMC participated in the official ceremony of the Belarusian Internal Troops on Saturday (13JAN).
The event summarised the results of “Tornado” Special Forces Detachment training activities and notably engaged the Belarusian Internal Troops Deputy Commander, Col. Sergey Grebennikov.
Comment
Currently, based on open sources, we cannot independently verify whether nuclear weapons have been deployed to Belarus. However, given both Lukashenko’s and Putin’s comments and data released by the Belarusian Union of Railway Workers, we must consider that it is indeed possible that such warheads are in Belarus.
The purchase of Krasukha-4 electronic warfare complexes will be another practical manifestation of the deepening integration of Belarus’ and Russia’s Armed Forces. Information suggesting that the system will be operated by the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion (Western Operational Command) is significant in that Minsk decided to deploy the system at an operational-level (not subordinated to the General Staff). Secondly, the North-western command will likely also receive Krasukha-4 in the future.
We explain last week’s high number of training activities by the fact that most military formations (units) were in the phase of specialists’ training, which generates the necessity of organisation a large number of events dedicated to soldiers of individual military specialities. Particular attention should be paid to the training gatherings devoted to the battalion-level commanders (led by operational commanders). The Belarusian Armed Forces adapt Russian experiences from the war not only at the level of a single soldier but also pay attention to officers’ training regarding organising new forms of training and combat.
The activity of Russian forces remained minimal. The latest data confirm that the Russians had withdrawn almost the entire aviation component from Belarus’s territory. The remaining Su-30SM fighters were most likely related to the joint Russo-Belarusian combat training centre (for training Su-30 pilots) operating at the Baranovichi Air Base.
Presumably, for the first time, Wagner PMC mercenaries participated in battalion-level training of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Previously, they were mostly responsible for training selected soldiers on small subunits (platoons, companies).