Belarus Security Update – 12 – 18 February 2024
A summary of key political-military events in Belarus
BLUF
The overall stance of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained unchanged last week.
Executive summary
The previous week brought several noteworthy developments regarding the political-military situation in Belarus. This included decisions on preliminary Military Doctrine and National Security Concept drafts. However, the key event pertained to a reported infiltration of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border by saboteurs operating on behalf of Ukrainian special services, who sought to prepare to conduct sabotage acts in Russia and Belarus.
Regarding the activities of the Belarusian Armed Forces, the heightened engagement of their high-rank officials particularly stood out. Beyond ceremonial events, they actively participated in training initiatives and events of an international nature. Moreover, the Belarusian Army received a small batch of new military equipment.
The training activity of Belarusian military units remained notably discernible. During drills, particular attention was paid to using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and utilising recently built fortifications. Notably, elements of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) conducted command-staff training, likely focused on defending Minsk.
In general, no notable activities involved elements of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in Belarus, albeit a few sorties of Russian Aerospace Forces’ aircraft were observed.
Regarding Wagner PMC activities, having completed their sixth special-tactical training course dedicated to servicemen of the Belarusian Internal Troops in the penultimate week, “Wagnerites” presumably were involved in any noticeable actions over the past seven days.
Political developments
12FEB2024 – Presidential decisions on military-related affairs
Last week, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko officially approved three drafts affecting the state’s security sphere.
This occurred on Monday (12FEB) when he signed draft No. 48, “On transfer to the reserve and conscription for military service, service in reserve”, and simultaneously approved drafts of the new Belarusian National Security Concept and Belarusian Military Doctrine.
The first Lukashenko decision is routine as such a draft is published annually and regulates the spring conscription (FEB-MAY period).
The latter also should not be surprising because drafts of new strategic documents were presented to Lukashenko during the recent meeting of the Belarusian State Security Council (16JAN).
Next, the All-Belarusian National Assembly will review both documents. The Secretary of the Belarusian State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, as well as the Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, will be responsible for their legislation process and will be obliged to submit new drafts (with possible updates) along with the decision of All-Belarusian National Assembly back to Belarusian President by 25MAR.
15-16FEB2024 – Ukrainian reported saboteurs
Over the past seven days, information about the infiltration of the Belarusian border by Ukrainian saboteurs dominated the informational sphere in Belarus.
On Thursday (15FEB), the Belarusian KDB (KGB) introduced a counter-terrorism operation (CTO) regime in the Lelchytsy region.
According to the Belarusian law, such measure imposes several restrictions, including temporary limitations on the movement of vehicles and citizens. It also gives representatives of law enforcement agencies the authority to detain individuals entering the area of CTO and conduct inspections of citizens and their houses, as well as allows them to utilise civilian communications assets and vehicles if necessary.
On that particular day, local authorities confirmed the implementation of the CTO regime in response to ongoing exercises. The Ukrainian State Border Service representative, Col. Andrey Demchenko, also claimed that Minsk planned to conduct “regular endless exercises” and that they might have been described as CT drills.
According to the Belarusian Hajun monitoring team, five military helicopters were dispatched to the area to support the drill. Altogether, four Mi-8 helicopters belonging to the Belarusian Air and Air Defence Forces and one Mi-8 from the Ministry of Emergency Situations deployed special forces subunits from the Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops. Hajun highlighted the “non-classic” character of the operation, suggesting that it could indeed result from the non-standard situation instead of exercise.
At that time, no further information was provided about the situation in the area. However, on Friday (16FEB), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that several “saboteurs” had been detained near the Belarus-Ukraine border. He added that they attempted to cross swamps using drones and were carrying explosives to carry out diversionary attacks in Russia and Belarus. The group reportedly consisted of both Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens.
The Belarusian President also stated that the counter-terrorist operation regime was already in effect. However, he emphasised that similar incidents usually occurred twice or thrice weekly.
Following that, the Belarusian leader underscored the importance of staying vigilant, especially considering the prevailing political-military circumstances. He highlighted that Belarusians were uninformed about certain developments in that realm. He asserted that, aside from Western nations, elements within the Belarusian opposition were also among those hoping for Russia’s defeat in a potential conflict with Ukraine. Lukashenko even cited various statements alleging that opposition figures had engaged in discussions with Western diplomats to surrender territories in western Belarus to Poland in exchange for certain Russian territories, including portions of the Smolensk, Bryansk, and possibly Pskov oblasts.
When it comes to saboteurs, they were captured. Images showing these alleged diversionists appeared in several unofficial Belarusian news outlets simultaneously. It was comprised of three members (two Ukrainians and a single Belarusian) and was organised by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). Based on Belarusin reports, shortly before crossing the Belarusian border, the group received explosive devices to use for terrorist attacks in both Russia and Belarus.
Another Belarusian news outlet, Flagshtok, reported on Saturday (17FEB) that both Ukrainian citizens (father and son) were earlier likely involved in smuggling and possibly drug trafficking and were waiting for another court session in their case planned on 21FEB in their place of residence of Stara Wyzhva village of the Volyn Oblast. Despite this, they attempted to cross the border between Ukraine and Belarus, probably to smuggle some contraband.
Military developments
13-18FEB2024 – The domestic activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces officials
As noted, Belarusian military representatives were quite active last week. Domestically, this activity was primarily focused on informing the public about updates on new strategic documents.
On Tuesday (13FEB), the Deputy Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Dmitry Ryabikhin, led an official discussion about the new Belarusian Military Doctrine that engaged ideological activists of the Minsk oblast. During its course, he mainly addressed the innovations of the document, which, aside from military affairs, also referred to international security and peace.
A day later (14FEB), the Secretary of the Belarusian State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, met with students and cadets of the Belarusian State University. In general, the meeting was devoted to the provisions of the new National Security Concept. Still, due to its open character, Volfovich also addressed the issues of upcoming elections, spiritual and moral values, historical memory, and deferrals from conscription.
Last week’s ceremonial events mostly engaged high-rank officials.
On Saturday (18FEB), the weekly Arsenal program of the Belarusian VoenTV provided an interview with Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky is the Deputy Minister of Defence for Ideological Work (Head of the Main Ideological Work Department). Kasinsky initially discussed the establishment of ideological work bodies in the Belarusian Armed Forces. He underscored that the creation naturally evolved as part of the reforms within the Belarusian Armed Forces, focusing on personnel training, scientific-methodological and material-technical support, and counter-propaganda in response to emerging challenges and threats. According to him, the ideological system of the Belarusian Armed Forces constituted a cohesive collective of professionals resilient to external influences, contributing significantly to fulfilling the Armed Forces’ tasks, notably evident during the 2020 crisis. Kasinsky observed that military news outlets like Vayar or VoenTV were producing informational products not only for the armed forces but also for the state and the international community. He also noted that Belarus had deployed sufficient forces and means to counter foreign influence on its military personnel, highlighting adversaries’ priorities to affecting the Belarusian soldiers’ consciousness.
14-15FEB2024 – The training-related activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces officials
In the previous week, Belarusian military officials were also involved in three different events that pertained to the training of the Belarusian troops.
On Wednesday (14FEB), the Head of the Main Combat Training Directorate, Maj. Gen. Alexander Bas arrived at the Machulischy Air Base, welcoming Belarusian servicemen who had returned from their training in Russia. This refers to at least 45-60 servicemen from various military formations and units who trained at the 333rd Combat Training Center. After completing the training cycle (finished with a control exercise), they will serve in instructor roles in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
A day later (15FEB), Deputy Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Andrey Zhuk led instructor-methodical classes on fire training dedicated to the university representatives responsible for preparing military personnel. The event was held at the Belarusian Military Academy and included other tactical medicine, engineering and NBC protection training drills. It occurred for another year in a row and was enhanced with changes in the initial military training that will be introduced on 01SEP.
Also, on Friday (15FEB), the Commander of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces (AFADF) Maj. Gen. Andrey Lukyanovich led an annual conference on the safety of military flights. According to Lukyanovich, the event also engaged officers of the Russian Aerospace Forces, whose experiences were also taken into account during the conference.
14-17FEB2024 – The international activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces officials
On Wednesday (14FEB), an unknown senior officer of the Belarusian Armed Forces, jointly with representatives of the Belarusian military media outlets, participated in a briefing organised by the Chief of Joint CSTO Staff, Col. Gen. Andrey Serdyukov. The conference, conducted in a videoconference format, focused on the activities of the CSTO Collective Security System in 2024. Serdyukov, while addressing the current military-political situation in the organisation’s area of responsibility, outlined priorities for future training efforts, including the Unbreakable Brotherhood, Interaction, Echelon, Search, and Rubezh exercises. He conveyed that the CSTO would pay special attention to the collective security of the Central Asian region.
Simultaneously (14FEB), the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, blamed certain countries for not fulfilling their obligations resulting from the Vienna Document.
According to him, Revenko referred to Poland, which failed to provide annual data about its armed forces and official information about the upcoming Dragon-24 exercise. He stressed that Warsaw did not respond to Minsk’s concerns. Besides, the Head of the IMCD also observed that Canada excluded Belarus as a participant in its recently organised conference about the verification centres working under the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Three days later (17FEB), Revenko met with his Iranian counterpart, Brig. Gen. Seyed Galandari, who arrived in Minsk. During the meeting, officials spoke about the interaction of their states and the upcoming events of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
On the same day, a Belarusian delegation headed by Revenko’s first deputy, Col. Alexander Vengura, departed for Zimbabwe as a part of a working visit.
15-18FEB2024 – New equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces
On Thursday (15FEB), an unspecified unit of the Western OC (most likely the 108th Logistics Regiment) received another batch (unspecified number) of ATSIP-6 military cisterns for water transfer.
At the same time, the 350th Artillery Group of the 6th Mechanised Brigade started to operate 2S12 Sani mortar mock-ups. Moreover, the same formation continued its work to equip fielded T-72 tanks with additional cage armour.
Touching on the subject of the Belarusian Armed Forces development, the Hajun team published an analysis of the results of the previous year’s autumn conscription in the Belarusian Armed Forces. They noted that about 3,200 Belarusian citizens choose contract service (two-year-long but paid) instead of “standard” (at least six months shorter but unpaid) conscription, which can be indirect proof of the creation of personnel reserves for the needs of the Southern Operational Command.
Military exercises
12-17FEB2024 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Over the past seven days, Western Operational Command forces demonstrated quite high training activity. The exercises primarily focused on the personnel of mechanised brigades, who interestingly also trained against stationary fortifications near the western Belarusian borders.
On Monday (12FEB), training actions were observable only in the 6th Mechanised Brigade. They engaged soldiers of possibly 78th Mechanised Battalion, who continued combat training classes at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground, and UAV operators who finished participating in the competition for the best UAV crew. According to available data, the contest likely involved five participants. An analogical event was probably organised in the 11th Mechanised Brigade.
A day later (13FEB), the Belarusian MoD informed about the start of combat training classes of the 11th Mechanised Brigade at a fortification node in Saki. They lasted at least until Thursday (15DEC) and focused on active defence using artillery, UAVs and ATGMs.
Also, on Tuesday (13FEB), the 11th Mechanised Brigade organised other training events. Soldiers of the formation’s repair company and likely a UAV detachment jointly underwent special training classes on restoring damaged military vehicles in field conditions. Moreover, unspecified soldiers of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in urban combat tactical classes. Analogical drills engaged personnel of an unspecified mechanised battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade. Simultaneously, snipers of the same formation also participated in the planned mountaineering training.
A day later (14FEB), three R-142N crews of the 74th Communications Regiment underwent preparational training before the upcoming “Confident Reception” episode of the International Army Games-2024 contest.
On Thursday (15FEB), the Belarusian MoD informed about the end of the complex tactical exercise with live ammo firing of the 6th Mechanised Brigade at the Gozhsky Training Ground. Simultaneously, three more training events took place. Firstly, UAV operators of the 11th Mechanised Brigade underwent tactical classes using simulators. Secondly, the 111th Artillery Brigade inducted at least two reservists who underwent firing classes. Thirdly, personnel of the Pontoon-Bridge Battalion of the 557th Engineering Brigade (at least one pontoon-bridge company) participated in special-tactical training. The 22nd Spetsnaz Company soldiers probably continued their combat training classes in urban conditions.
On Friday (16FEB), the 11th Mechanised Brigade organised training classes on the service of fuel and lubricants. Soldiers of a mechanised battalion of the same formation were also involved in control firing classes. At the same time, an unspecified UAV subunit of the Western Operational Command conducted planned training flights. Possibly another UAV subunit also participated in grenade-dropping classes in night conditions. It should also be added that soldiers of the 250th Security and Maintenance Battalion independently worked out the issues of protecting designated facilities. The classes occurred in Grodno.
During the weekend, the training activity of the Western Operational Command forces was limited. However, on Saturday (17FEB), servicemen of possibly the engineering-sapper battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade took special training classes on using explosives.
12-18FEB2024 – The training activity of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces (AFADF)
Last week, ground training actions of the Belarusian AFADF engaged presumably only three military units: the 56th, 115th and 147th Air Defence Regiments.
Soldiers of the first unit likely underwent firing classes on Tuesday (13FEB).
Moving to the 115th Air Defence Regiment, personnel of a S-300-equipped air defence battalion continued its field exit between Monday (12FEB) and at least Thursday (15FEB). In this period, servicemen worked out proper marching techniques, assets redeployment, the use of NBC protection equipment, and hand-to-hand combat. They likely also participated in tactical control classes at the Brestsky Training Ground, including tactics, communications, engineering, and medical training drills.
The 147th Air Defence Regiment organised two training events. On Thursday (15FEB), its soldiers trained the deployment of the units’ command post as a part of the special-tactical training drills. Three days later (17FEB), some of them underwent fire training.
Besides, the Belarusian Air Force presented significant activity on Wednesday (14FEB) and Friday (16FEB) when all Belarusian air bases (Machulischy, Baranovichi and Lida) hosted training flights.
13-15FEB2024 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Between Tuesday (13FEB) and Wednesday (14FEB), the Minsk TDF bodies were involved in command-staff training initiated by the Head of the Territorial Defence Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff, Col. Dmitry Streshinsky. According to the official statement, the event was a “logical continuation” of the recent Belarusian Armed Forces Staff training, which began on 23JAN.
Drills also engaged Minsk Military Commandant’s Office personnel. Also, on Wednesday (14FEB), its officers and ensigns participated in firing classes at the Uruchcha Training Ground. On Thursday (15FEB), soldiers of the Patrol Company (Commandant’s Battalion) participated in the classes on using multi-rotor UAVs. Drills occurred in the home garrison to prepare soldiers to utilise UAVs to search soldiers who went AWOL.
14-18FEB2024 – The training activity of the North-Western Operational Command
On Wednesday (14FEB), servicemen of the 120th Mechanised Brigade underwent combat training classes with live ammo firing at the Uruchcha Training Ground. Another firing class engaged the 60th Communications Regiment personnel at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground. At the same time, soldiers of the 7th Engineering Regiment participated in control classes on special-tactical training, which most likely occurred at the unit’s garrison.
A day later (15FEB), the 120th Mechanised Brigade soldiers most likely continued their combat training classes. Analogical drills also occurred on Friday (16FEB). However, they were dedicated to the mechanised battalion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade and likely held at the Lepelsky Training Ground.
Lastly, on Sunday (18FEB), soldiers of the 310th Artillery Group (120th Mechanised Brigade) participated in firing classes.
15-17FEB2024 – The training activity of Special Operation Forces
Last week, formations of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces presented presumably the lowest training activity among all functional components of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
On Thursday (15FEB), at least 35 servicemen of the 38th Air Assault Brigade conducted parachute jumps from MI-8MTV5 helicopter over the Brestsky Training Ground.
Two days later (17FEB), 103rd Airborne Brigade personnel attended combat training classes held at the Losvido Training Ground.
12-18FEB2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Over the past seven days, no noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment were reported.
Russian military activity in Belarus
As we have already noted, the activity of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus remained minimal last week.
Nevertheless, aside from a single ground movement reported on Wednesday (14FEB – a single microbus moving in Gomel), it is essential to note the activity of Russian air assets. On the same day, Baranovichi Air Base hosted Russian fighter aircraft training flights. However, the number of both flights and air assets was not specified.
A day later (15FEB), a single Russian An-12 arrived at Gomel Airport. According to the Belarusian Hajun team, it left the airport on Saturday (17FEB), where it flew to Machulischy Air Base in the morning. However, after about 2.5 hours at the later location, it departed for Rostov-on-Don.
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Throughout the past week, no significant signs of the Wagner PMC mercenary’s presence in Belarus appeared.
Rochan’s comment
Legislative changes were a natural continuation of recent actions to update Belarusian strategic documents. Both documents may be approved by Lukahsneko by mid-2024.
It is unclear whether the situation on the Ukraine-Belarus border was a setup or a genuine effort to stop smugglers. We assess it highly unlikely that the Minsk narrative of stopping saboteurs seeking to conduct terrorist attacks in Russia and Belarus was genuine. Likewise, the announcement of the CTO regime and the deployment of dedicated special forces was an over-the-top reaction but likely purposefully designed for internal purposes to highlight the constant dangers emanating from Ukraine.
The return of Belarusian servicemen from training in Russia to serve as instructors confirms emphasis on Russian lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine. Considering previous announcements, it is likely that another group of Belarusian soldiers will soon attend similar training in the Russian Federation. An immediate manifestation of the implementation of the Russo-Ukrainan conflict’s experiences is the increasingly frequent exercises of the UAV subunits, which, in addition to “ordinary” reconnaissance flights, now directly involve drills on grenade-throwing at enemy targets. The “wide” use of drones is also worth noting, even during vehicle evacuation or personnel searching drills.
Despite the lack of direct information regarding Wagner PMC activity in Belarus, mercenaries likely continued to train Belarusian Internal Troops.