Belarus Security Update – 15 – 21 January 2024
A summary of key political-military events in Belarus
BLUF
The posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained unchanged over the past seven days.
Executive summary
Last week, military-political developments in Belarus were centred on the upcoming new strategic documents - military doctrine and national security concept.
Although the documents will be officially adopted in the coming months, they were already discussed in the Belarusian Security Council, where the most important provisions had been presented.
In the meantime, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko provided some statements related to the state's current security situation. He also referred to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus.
The general activity of the Belarusian military officials remained slightly above the average. Aside from summarising events on activities held in 2023, high and mid-rank officials participated in at least two international meetings and one training gathering and, more importantly, conducted two readiness inspections of Belarusian military formations.
The general number of training events held last week remained significant. However, most of them pertained to formations and units subordinated to a single operational command.
Several dozen Belarusian service members departed to Russia, where they are undergoing a training course to prepare them for the military instructors’ role.
Activities of Russian soldiers in Belarus remained minimal. However, Wagner PMC personnel continued participating in training sessions organised for Belarusian Internal Troops.
Political developments
16-19JAN2024 – New Belarusian strategic documents
Last week, Belarusians continued implementation measures related to the new Belarusian Military Doctrine and Belarusian National Security Concept.
On Tuesday (16JAN), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko participated in the Belarusian Security Council meeting to discuss both drafts.
At the outset, he remarked that the directions of modern risks, challenges, and the development of threats had already been detailed in Belarusian strategic documents, and many of them were now becoming a reality. As an illustration, the Belarusian leader cited the ongoing hostilities in the Middle East. He underscored that these should be viewed as a humanitarian disaster. Lukashenko explicitly pointed out that military power had become the primary determinant in interstate relations in contemporary times.
Later, Lukashenko went on to discuss new legislation. He observed that the new acts considered the dynamic changes in the political-military situation and new military threats to the state. He also stated that they incorporated updated approaches to providing military security based on contemporary armed conflicts.
After the Belarusian State Security Council meeting, its secretary, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, and the Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, shared some thoughts. Due to the division of responsibilities, Volfovich addressed the national security concept, while Khrenin focused on the new military doctrine.
Volfovich primarily discussed the ongoing deliberations concerning the new strategic documents, which, apart from leadership representatives, also allowed for the involvement of Belarusian citizens. He asserted that Belarusian citizens were seeking peace and security, as reflected in the drafts under discussion.
Conversely, Volfovich highlighted recent "militaristic" statements from the Polish leadership representatives, requesting the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in Poland. According to him, this compelled Minsk to adjust its assessment concerning potential military conflicts involving nuclear weapons. Additionally, Volfovich disclosed that certain aspects of social security and even responsibilities within the business sector had been altered in the new Belarusian National Security Concept. Moreover, he informed that the meeting participants had decided to forward the document to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly for consideration.
Moving onto the new Belarusian Military Doctrine, Khrenin noted the document underscored Belarus's commitment to peace without designating any single state as its adversary. Khrenin stated that the new draft would be more specific than its previous version, directly identifying sources of threats to Belarus. The new doctrine is to be closely aligned with the Belarusian National Security Concept. It would outline detailed tasks for state bodies in the event of potential threats to the military security of the state. The Minister of Defence also highlighted that the Belarusian Military Doctrine would address issues related to the possible use of Russian nuclear weapons and those about Belarus's responsibilities to its allies.
Speaking about the exact provisions of the document, it is important to note that three days later (19JAN), the Belarusian Minister of Defence organised an official media briefing about the new military doctrine.
Initially, Khrenin addressed the reasons behind the event, emphasising the multitude of conflicts worldwide that necessitated informing not only Belarusian citizens but also neighbours and other states about Belarusian security policy. He aimed to clarify why Belarus had decided to implement the new military doctrine.
The Belarusian Minister of Defence explained that the work on the new doctrine commenced as a response to various developments, including significant geopolitical and internal political changes. Khrenin observed a rapid transformation in the military-political situation in Europe, with the confrontation between "East and West" evolving into a more heated phase. He added that this, coupled with reforms to the Belarusian constitution and the development of the new Belarusian National Security Concept, necessitated a revision of the military doctrine.
Later, the Head of the Belarusian MoD delved into the document's provisions, highlighting its wide-ranging discussion and verification with representatives of Belarusian authorities. He claimed that the new doctrine, devoid of considering any nation as a Belarusian enemy, represented peaceful aspirations and could serve as the foundation for launching a peaceful dialogue to resolve the situation in Europe. Khrenin emphasised Belarus's interest in restoring the influence of international organisations such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), noting the country's readiness for military cooperation with any state.
The Belarusian Minister of Defence also underscored that the new doctrine prioritised preventing military conflicts, including the potential use of force in peacetime. He pointed out current situations (“provocations”) at Western and Southern Belarusian borders, leading to the active demonstration of the Belarusian Armed Forces' high combat readiness as a strategic deterrence measure.
According to Khrenin, the new Belarusian Military Doctrine introduced a new typology of military conflicts, considering only "interstate" and "coalition" wars instead of "local" and "regional" wars. This indicates Belarus's readiness to fully utilise its capabilities, independently or with allies, to protect national interests. The document emphasised that ensuring military security involved military representatives and citizens, from the President to public organisations.
The Belarusian Minister of Defence also discussed the document's role concerning Belarusian allied obligations, mentioning a separate chapter addressing actions in case of armed aggression against allies within the Union States or Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). He added that the document included provisions related to Belarusian participation in potential peacekeeping activities under international security organisations. Moreover, the new doctrine introduced a gradation of state responses to threats against Belarusian military security, focusing on preventing the escalation of the military-political situation and deterring the initiation of military conflicts. Khrenin pointed out that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus should be seen as a preventive step to discourage opponents from starting a war.
Furthermore, the Belarusian Minister of Defence referred to the economic aspect of the state's military security, stating that Belarus would focus on developing its defence industry and enhancing military-technical cooperation with allies. Strengthening the state's military potential extends beyond forming and equipping new military bodies to encompass issues such as the preparation of state bodies, mobilisation training, and readying the state's territory for potential conflict.
Finally, Khrenin addressed Western "pseudo-analysts, talkers, and extremists" who had provided various prognostic scenarios and assessments related to the new document, Russo-Belarusian military cooperation, or even the potential use of nuclear weapons. Khrenin reiterated that Belarus had no enemies but would not "look back at anyone and adjust". He declared that the state would act in the interest of the Belarusian people and fulfil mutual allied obligations.
19JAN2024 – Alexander Lukashenko’s view on Belarus security situation
Last week, the Belarusian President also referred to the current security environment.
Initially, he remarked that "peace is expensive" and asserted that every Belarusian citizen should express gratitude to Moscow, who had genuinely assisted Belarus the previous year. According to him, the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons had enabled the stabilisation of the situation in the region and had "calmed down" Belarusian neighbours.
The Belarusian President conveyed that Russia financed the arrival of Iskander missile systems and the associated "dozens" of warheads. He also mentioned that documents regulating the system's potential use had already been prepared and approved (Lukashenko informed that using Iskanders requires decisions of the Belarusian President, Minister of Defence, and the Chief of General Staff).
Later, the Belarusian leader recollected that "peace is expensive" and claimed each citizen was responsible for contributing to it. Nevertheless, he also emphasised that this was a matter for the "state people", and addressing the gathered workers, he highlighted that Belarus had never been as well protected as it is now.
According to him, the state was prepared for a potential outbreak of war. Lukashenko stated that the mobilisation reserve of the Belarusian Armed Forces comprises 500,000 servicemen. He added that Belarus had also readied its Territorial Defence Forces and People’s Militia for any scenario.
That being said, Lukashenko affirmed that the world's situation had changed. He also emphasised that Belarus updated its legislation and doctrinal documents. After referencing the new military doctrine, the Belarusian President noted that he had initiated certain measures to increase public awareness about security issues. According to him, citizens should not "get emotional" about it because if they contribute enough economically, Lukashenko could ensure peace himself, he added.
Military developments
15-19JAN2024 – Various events on the training of the Belarusian Armed Forces
Last week, several events more or less directly related to the combat training of the Belarusian Armed Forces took place.
On Monday (15JAN), the Belarusian MoD informed about the departure of Belarusian soldiers to Russia. According to the official statement, Belarusian service members would undergo training based on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict experiences. After its completion, they would transfer their experiences to the other servicemen of the Belarusian Armed Forces as instructors.
The Head of the Combat Training Directorate, Maj. Gen. Alexander Bas claimed that the training of Belarusian soldiers would be focused on the most complex subjects of combat training. Bas also highlighted that more soldiers would be sent to Russia in the future.
Based on available data, the Belarusian group included at least 50-60 soldiers (likely a company) who departed from Machulischy Air Base using the Il-76 aircraft (EW-005DE) to the 333rd Combat Training Center (CTC, Western Military District) located in Mulino.
The 333rd CTC functions as the third joint Russo-Belarusian training centre (aside from those responsible for training Su-30 and S-400 crews – both located in Belarus) and trains Belarusian motor rifle and tank subunits’ personnel. It has already hosted a training session for servicemen of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (NOV2022), 11th Mechanised Brigade (APR2023) and possibly 120th Mechanised Brigade (AUG2023).
Two days after the departure (17JAN), the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj Gen. Viktor Gulevich, initiated “a readiness review” of the 6th Mechanised Brigade’s tank battalion.
According to the official statement, the event sought to assess the readiness of the subunit, but also the condition of military and special equipment remaining in his subordination. Gulevich, jointly with the Commander of the Western Operational Command (OC) Col. Vladimir Bely, arrived at the garrison of the 6th Mechanised Brigade, where they inspected most likely the 52nd Tank Battalion. The event probably lasted for several hours. It included discussions with commanders and soldiers (to assess their knowledge) and the evaluation of the subunit’s equipment and its condition.
Interestingly, another such event occurred a day later (18JAN). However, it was likely led by the Commander of the 120th Mechanised Brigade, Col. Igor Gegelskyi and held at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground. Based on the provided data, it seems it involved at least a single BTR-82-equipped company or possibly the whole 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade.
16-21JAN2024 – The internal activities of the Belarusian military officials
Last week, aside from the abovementioned readiness inspections, representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces military leadership also participated in summarising gatherings. One officer also gave an interview for a Belarusian news outlet.
The latter refers to the Head of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Alexander Bas, who took part in the weekly PRO Армию project of the SB TV news outlet (published on 16JAN).
After stating that the current political-military situation around Belarus was difficult, Bas highlighted that the Belarusian Armed Forces consistently analysed the ongoing military developments in the region. He referred to both the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the ongoing “militarisation” of Poland and the Baltic States. According to him, the analysis was followed by specific conclusions, which directly translated into the planning of combat training of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Bas informed that Belarusian soldiers had the opportunity to participate in more than 1,000 various training events in the previous military academic year (2022/2023). He noted the number of drills in the current year would be similar. However, training in 2024 will be slightly different because some Belarusian (sub)units will be deployed at the state border, and the Belarusian Armed Forces will be engaged in celebrations of the 80th anniversary of Belarusian liberation from German occupation.
Bas also informed that military leadership decided to extend the period of individual training, focusing on the military speciality of each Belarusian soldier. He added that commanders of Belarusian formations and units had also been given the right to independently modify training periods based on the training level of their subordinates.
Later, the Head of the Main Combat Training Directorate briefly referred to the training actions of the previous military academic year, providing some general information related to the combat readiness check of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (APR2023) that included the induction of reserve servicemen.
After that, Bas spoke about the conclusions related to combat training arising from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Belarus rearranged its earlier training plans and “certain legal aspects” to be able to react to changing situations quickly. Aside from changes in methodological recommendations, the Belarusian Armed Forces also updated their manuals for military specialists – snipers, machine gunners, grenade launcher operators, etc. Speaking of details, Bas brought indirect fire from covered positions using UAVs as an example. According to him, such use of tanks and IFVs had been tested and was already implemented in combat training plans for 2024.
Notably, a representative of the Belarusian General Staff informed that each Belarusian mechanised company was equipped with UAV(s). Moreover, certain platoons already had trained their personnel to utilise such capabilities. On the other hand, Bas stated that Belarus would continue to develop new fortification nodes because they proved themselves during the Russo-Ukrainian war. In 2024, they will be used to conduct military drills and exercises. Moreover, the creation of another node in Grodno Oblast is expected shortly, Bas added.
Besides, Bas confirmed that the Belarusian Armed Forces introduced the military speciality of “combat training instructors” (they most likely appeared in brigade-level formations). He said their appearance was meant to “relieve” platoon-level commanders from conducting specialised combat training, specially dedicated to soldiers with more sophisticated military specialities.
Interestingly, the Belarusian General Staff representative said the instructors will be trained under the Russian 333rd Combat Training Directorate. He claimed that the group of Belarusian service members that departed for Russia on Monday (15JAN) included instructors from all mechanised brigades, the Command of Belarusian Special Operation Forces, the 72nd Joint Training Center and the Belarusian Military Academy. According to Bas, their training in Russia would last for a month. Those who pass the final exam will be tasked with training Belarusian soldiers in the future.
On the subject of Belarusian lessons learnt from the war, Belarusian sources claimed that technical subunits of the 6th and 11th Mechanised Brigades, jointly with personnel of the 815th Technical Support Center (all subordinated to the Western OC), continue to equip their tanks with “cage armour” reinforced with reactive armour – Kontakt-1 blocks.
Returning to the internal actions of the Belarusian high-rank officials, it is important to note two summarising gatherings dedicated to the officers of the personnel bodies.
The first event occurred on Thursday (18JAN) in the Central House of the Officers and was supervised by the Head of the MoD, Lt. Gen. Viktor Chrenin and the Head of the Main Personnel Directorate, Col. Ivan Mitin.
The second occurred three days later (21JAN) and was held by the Commander of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces (AFADF), Maj. Gen. Andrey Lukyanovich.
17-20JAN2024 – The international activities of the Belarusian military officials
Over the past seven days, three “major” events related to the international military cooperation of the Belarusian Armed Forces appeared.
Between Tuesday (16JAN) and Wednesday (17JAN), the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, led a training-methodological gathering for officers responsible for implementing international arms control treaties.
According to the official statement, the event sought to prepare service members from operational commands, Special Operation Forces, Air Force and Air Defence Forces and other formations (units) for potential resumes of foreign inspections held in Belarusian. During its course, participants got acquainted with provisions of topical international agreements and learnt about the procedure of foreign inspectors’ activity.
On Saturday (20JAN), the Belarusian Deputy Minister of Defence for Armaments (Chief of Armaments), Maj. Gen. Andrey Fedin participated in a working meeting with Kyrgyzstan Deputy Minister of Defence for Logistics, Col. Emil Osmonov. At the same time (20JAN), the Head of the IMCD took part in negotiations with the Deputy Minister of Defence of Equatorial Guinea, Engono Nchama Candido Nkogo.
The first event sought to discuss the state of bilateral relations in the sphere of military-technical cooperation. The latter was held as a measure intended to develop Belarusian military relations with African countries.
Military exercises
16JAN2024 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Last week, military formations and units of central subordination underwent no noteworthy training actions.
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that on Monday (16JAN), snipers from various military formations (sub/units) continued participating in the training gathering at the 103rd Airborne Brigade’s base.
15-19JAN2024 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Last week, formations (units) of the Western Operational Command once again displayed a very high training tempo, dominating the other functional components of the Belarusian Armed Forces in this regard.
On Monday (15JAN), at least six drivers of the 250th Security and Maintenance Battalion underwent a 50-kilometre training march summarising the training of military drivers.
Also on Monday, the 111th Artillery Brigade started combat training classes, presumably lasting until Wednesday (17JAN). They were likely held in the formation’s garrison and included simulated firing using 2S5 (first day) and 2A65 (second and third day) guns equipped with an additional armour cage.
On Tuesday (16JAN), the personnel of demining subunits of the Western OC continued to participate in the training gathering. On this day, drills pertained to the medical training. Besides, the 557th Engineering Brigade hosted a training gathering for drivers of the GMZ minelayers. At the same time, the personnel of the 108th Logistics Regiment started two-day-long training classes related to the organisation of communications.
Also on Tuesday, reconnaissance personnel of the 6th Mechanised Brigade took practical classes on using reconnaissance assets, likely held at the home garrison.
Personnel of the brigade’s artillery subunits participated in field exit, most likely to the Gozhsky Training Ground. Based on available data, it was likely related to combat training and could have included firing classes. The exact training range also hosted engineering training classes of an unspecified mechanised battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade.
Analogical drills also occurred with the personnel of the 11th Mechanised Brigade at the same time. Moreover, BMP-2 crews participated in firing classes, most likely held at the Chepelevo Training Ground.
On Wednesday (17JAN), the 6th Mechanised Brigade continued its drills. Firstly, servicemen of an unspecified mechanised battalion participated in engineering training classes related to using OZ-1 (entrenching) charges. Secondly, the brigade's reconnaissance subunits (s) underwent combat training drills. What is more, at least a single Supercam S350 UAV crew (at least three soldiers with a UAZ) of the same formation took part in planned training flights to prepare them for the “Falconry” competition (for best UAV crew) of the International Army Games 2024.
A day later (18JAN), the 6th Mechanised Brigade organised a training gathering dedicated to BTR-82A (BTR-80K) drivers, the competition for the best sniper of the formation, and the planned flights of UAV operators. Notably, the latter drills were focused on accurate grenade dropping.
Also, on Thursday (18JAN), personnel of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in engineering training classes (an unspecified mechanised battalion) and classes on the organisation of communications (communications subunits).
On this day, personnel of the 22nd Spetsnaz Company underwent firing classes, while servicemen of the Krasny Dvor military camp participated in their training. It refers to soldiers of the 111th Artillery Brigade who took part in combat training classes, including firing engineering, combat medicine and NBC protection drills and their colleagues from the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion involved in tactical medicine and first aid training. It should also be mentioned that Western OC’s demining subunits continued their training as a part of a centralised training gathering. At the same time, personnel of the pontoon-bridge battalion of the 557th Engineering Brigade took part in the training related to the building of pontoon bridges.
Friday’s (19JAN) training activity of the Western Operational Command started with firing classes of the command's officers. However, it also included firing training of the reconnaissance subunits of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (Chepelevo Training Ground), and the continuation of engineering training classes started earlier by soldiers of an unspecified mechanised battalion of the formation.
On the same day (19JAN), service members of the 350th Artillery Group of the 6th Mechanised Brigade continued their field exit. It is also likely that servicemen of the 6th Mechanised Brigade’s UAV detachment continued their training on UAV grenade dropping.
16-19JAN2024 – The training activity of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces
Last week, the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces were inactive.
Nevertheless, on Tuesday (16JAN), the 116th Assault Aviation Base (Lida) held its first “command flights” in 2024. They engaged commanding personnel of the formation that conducted flights using Yak-130 (confirmed) and presumably other unit’s air assets.
Subsequently (16JAN), servicemen of the 120th Air Defence Brigade underwent fire training at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground.
According to the data of the Belarusian Hajun team, training flights also occurred on Friday (19JAN), when at least one Mi-8 helicopter and Su-25 jet took off from Machulischy and Lida air bases, respectively.
18JAN2024 – The training activity of the North-Western Operational Command
Over the past seven days, we reported no notable training actions engaging personnel of the North-Western Operational Command aside from the “readiness inspection” of the 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade.
18-20JAN2024 – The training activity of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces
Last week, noteworthy training actions occurred within the 103rd Airborne Brigade.
According to available data, aside from training gathering for snipers, the 103rd Airborne Brigade also hosted an event for servicemen responsible for airborne training. It included at least 20 service members from various units and subunits (including 22nd Spetsnaz Company). It is unclear when the event took place.
On Thursday (18JAN), the 103rd Airborne Brigade soldiers underwent combat training classes at the Losvido Training Ground. It included drills linked to firing and tactics and likely lasted at least until Saturday (20JAN).
The same training ground also hosted live ammo firing of unspecified anti-air subunit(s) reported on Friday (19JAN).
18-19JAN2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Last week, two noteworthy ground transfers of the Belarusian military equipment occurred.
This refers to the movements of the four covered MAZ trucks in the area of Vitebsk reported on Thursday (18JAN), as well as the eight S-300/S-400 system launchers moving from Dzyarzhynsk towards Stolbtsy a day later (19JAN).
Russian military activity in Belarus
Last week, Russian soldiers in Belarus showed minimal activity.
According to available data, it included training flight(s) of Russian air asset(s) from Baranovichi Air Base (17JAN), as well as a single movement of a Russian truck near Baranovichi, reported three days later (21JAN).
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Over the past seven days, two pieces of data related to the Wagner PMC activity in Belarus appeared.
On Friday (19JAN), the Telegram channel associated with mercenaries suggested that they continued joint training with servicemen of Belarusian Internal Troops.
Two days later (21JAN), the same source confirmed that “Wagnerites” continued training with Internal Troops service members.
Comment
The introduction of new strategic documents in Belarus reflects changes in the Belarusian security environment. As such, they should not be seen as a revolution or a sudden departure from previous assessments but rather as an evolution or adjustment of military posture due to the war in Ukraine. This necessitates an update to legal documents related to national security and the use of armed forces. The documents have not been approved yet, and some parts could still undergo certain changes. However, generally, despite the “grand” announcements regarding the peaceful nature of the new military doctrine and the intentions for international cooperation, one of the reasons behind the update is the legitimisation of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. It is unlikely that the political-military leadership of the country will have a real influence on its use, though.
Belarusian MoD activities directly indicate that Belarusians are making maximum efforts to leverage Russian experiences from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Aside from the specific adaptation of their military equipment, expansion of fortifications, and using Wagner PMC’s experiences, Belarusians established a military speciality of “combat training instructors” and sent them to Russia to train. Previously, such drills in Russia mostly involved personnel from combined arms brigades or special forces. Currently, soldiers from various units were selected, allowing Minsk to significantly increase the effectiveness of utilising Russian experiences. Such an approach, in turn, will lead to a widespread distribution of lessons learnt from the war across the armed forces.
Changes to Belarusian training are already evident. Since the beginning of the new military academic year, a noticeable emphasis has been placed on trench fighting and engineering training and the use of UAVs and first aid provision.
The activity of Russian troops and Wagner PMC mercenaries on Belarusian territory remains consistently low. No indicators are suggesting this will change in the near future.