Belarus Security Update – 19 February – 25 February 2024
A summary of key political-military events from Belarus
BLUF
Over the past seven days, we reported no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Executive summary
The previous week in Belarus was marked by a significant number of political and informational advancements. While Western sanctions expanded to encompass more Belarusian entities and individuals, the electoral campaign came to an end with the election of deputies for the Belarusian House of Representatives (25FEB). Additionally, Belarusians celebrated the annual Day of the Fatherland Defender (23FEB), which involved promotions of new Belarusian generals and high informational activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ leadership representatives. Military officials also actively participated in various international events.
Nevertheless, the abovementioned developments likely reduced Belarusian military formations’ training tempo. Exercises mainly engaged forces of the Western Operational Command (OC).
At the same time, reports surfaced about Belarusian military procurement, infrastructure development, and rather unconventional Belarusian Armed Forces training methods.
The general number of Russian troops’ movements minimally increased. Nevertheless, they still engaged only a single vehicle moving in previously known locations.
On the other hand, the amount of information regarding the actions of the Wagner PMC operatives was minimal. According to unverified data, some mercenaries may have left Belarus two weeks ago.
Political developments
19-25FEB2024 – The security-related activity of Belarusian President
In the past week, the actions of the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko were closely linked to the country’s security sphere. Aside from promoting three new Belarusian Armed Forces generals, he led a briefing for numerous security sector representatives, addressing the state’s current military and political developments. Additionally, towards the week’s end, Lukashenko made brief comments about the international situation.
Presidential decree on the general’s promotion was approved on Monday (19FEB) and pertained to three colonels of the Belarusian Armed Forces. This refers to the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, the Head of the Main Operational Directorate (MAO) of the Belarusian General Staff, Col. Sergey Lagodyuk, as well as the Commander of the Western Operational Command, Col. Vladimir Bely.
Maj. Gen. Valery Revenko is a Baku Higher Combined Arms School graduate and Belarusian Military Academy student who served in various positions of the 120th Mechanised Brigade for six years. After that, his career had more scientific/staff character as he served as an officer at the Belarusian Military-Scientific Institute and the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff. Revenko also headed the Main Information Technology Security Center of the Belarusian Armed Forces and, since 2015, served in the IMCD.
Data about Maj. Gen. Sergey Lagodyuk’s career is limited. It is known that he graduated from the General Staff Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy in 2015 with a gold medal. Since at least 2019, he has been an officer of the MAO. Jointly with Revenko, he was included in the 12th European Union’s sanction package (18DEC2023).
On the other hand, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Bely served in formations and commands of the North-Western OC and Special Operation Forces (SOF). In the latter, he became the First Deputy Commander (Chief of Staff) of SOF Command. He also headed the General Staff Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy. Since APR2023, he has been commanding Western OC forces.
Delivering the promotional speech, Lukashenko praised Belarusian service members for their efforts in maintaining peace and highlighted the soldiers’ role as a strong barrier against external threats. He acknowledged the security personnel’s relentless efforts in countering terrorism, disrupting weapon supply channels, and thwarting espionage activities. He also credited the collective efforts of the security forces for preventing hybrid attacks from escalating into full-scale conflict, expressing gratitude for their vigilance and cooperation.
Speaking about Lukashenko’s involvement in military-related affairs, it is essential to note his “extended” meeting with representatives of Belarusian state agencies responsible for the state’s security that occurred on Tuesday (20FEB). The event in the Central House of the Officers engaged hundreds of high and mid-rank officials from the Belarusian Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies – KDB (KGB), Ministry of Interior, Border Guards, Ministry of Emergency Situations, etc.
Starting the event, the Belarusian President highlighted that no country or people had felt entirely safe in recent decades. He mentioned the return of military force as a leading solution to global issues despite the losses and horrors of the First and Second World Wars. He also highlighted the widespread concern due to predictions of an impending third world war, creating a global atmosphere of apprehension.
Speaking about the situation in Europe, the Belarusian leader mentioned the presence of a significant NATO forces grouping near Belarusian borders. He expressed his disappointment in the forecasts, noting that the “appetites” and activity of the collective West were expected to increase. What is more, Lukashenko quoted Belarusian intelligence data, according to which special services of Poland and the United States were about to conduct large-scale provocation against the Polish civilians and accuse Russia and Belarus of it. According to him, Warsaw even tried to recruit high-ranking Belarusian officials and use them to replace the current members of the Belarusian opposition remaining in the West.
The President of Belarus pointed out three possible scenarios for the future development of the political-military situation in the region, mainly focusing on the issue of Western influence.
The first (most desirable for the West) would involve organising a coup or violent seizure of power during electoral campaigns;
The second (most probable) would utilise the ongoing election campaign as a rehearsal to prepare for a coup during the 2025 presidential elections;
The third (“backup one”) would entail a continuous “long game” with soft power tools in case the initial scenarios failed;
That said, the Belarusian Commander-in-Chief outlined the priority tasks for the country’s power bloc, emphasising the need “to be as ready as possible to neutralise risks and threats”. Nevertheless, he also asserted confidence in the defensive capabilities of the state, noticing that Belarus had everything necessary to inflict unacceptable damage on its enemies. After that, Lukashenko underscored the nation’s commitment to enhancing its military potential. He mentioned the delivery of Polonez MLR system, two Iskander-M missile systems battalions, and two S-400 air defence systems that entered service over the past two years. He also reminded that Belarus hosted tactical nuclear weapons.
During the speech, Lukashenko also mentioned Wagner PMC personnel. According to him, they generally praised Belarusian soldiers’ training level. However, they were (negatively) surprised by the fitness level of some servicemen. Setting forth the objectives for the MoD, the Commander-in-Chief outlined the need to qualitatively transform the army and further enhance the country’s defence system. Emphasising the importance of prioritising combat training for military units, he articulated the primary focus on improving the overall preparedness and capabilities of the armed forces. Besides, Lukashenko ordered representatives of the military leadership to pay additional attention to the physical training of soldiers instead of teaching them military drills.
Lastly, the President of Belarus highlighted the importance of the tasks fulfilled by meeting participants. He stressed that their mistake could cost the state significantly since the law fell short of alleviating tensions, and attitudes of the collective West became more straightforward and even infuriating.
On Sunday (25FEB), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke with journalists on the single voting day in Belarus. Although the voting to elect deputies to the Belarusian House of Representatives was theoretically not correlated with the military sphere. The Belarusian President received some questions about the current security situation in Belarus and the region.
Initially, the Belarusian leader commented on the statement of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashynian, who recently noted that Armenia “has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation” (CSTO). According to Lukashenko, his reaction to such words was calm, mainly since he recently spoke about this issue with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. Belarusian leader claimed that Armenia did not implement any official measures to leave CSTO. He also stated that Armenian politics should “wake up” to prevent the risk of losing what they currently possess, especially considering the changing nature of the global situation. Lukashenko also suggested that Pashynian claims had an emotional character and that his state should refrain from making unnecessary moves.
Referring to the almost 25-year existence of the Union State, Lukashenko stated that there were two independent states with somewhat differing economies, but they had preserved much that both highly valued. He observed that despite varying relations between Belarus and Russia, the two states actively cooperated and made security issues one of their main priorities. According to him, future cooperation within the Union State should be evolutionary and carried out step by step.
Lukashenko also spoke about the collective West’s actions to change Belarus’s leadership. According to him, Belarus remained aware of Western plans and, due to its experiences from 2020, had already worked out respective scenarios to counter any foreign influence.
Lastly, the Belarusian President was questioned about the possible peaceful resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. He mentioned the possibility of reaching an agreement, noting that he saw the Russians taking a path towards such a resolution of the hostilities. Lukashenko emphasised that the country could only be recovered if negotiations with Russia were pursued.
22-23FEB2024 – New sanctions against Belarusian enterprises and citizens
In connection with the second anniversary of the outbreak of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian Federation was subjected to additional sanctions by Western countries. Some of them also targeted Belarusian entities.
On Thursday (22FEB), they were announced by the United Kingdom and included two Belarusian enterprises. This refers to Precise Electro-Mechanic Plants and Planar JSC, operating in Belarusian sectors of strategic significance. The first produced “various defence products”, while the latter provided semiconductors and other electronics.
A day later (23FEB), the United States also announced its sanctions against the Belarusian 558th Aircraft Repair Plant. According to the U.S. State Department, the facility retained close ties to the Russian defence sector. Aside from the enterprise, new sanctions also personally included its former director – Pavel Pinigin.
Speaking about activities of other states in Belarus, it is worth mentioning that on Monday (19FEB), the Latvian Office for the Constitution Protection (special service) published its report about the situation in this state. It was noted that Belarusians continued to express significant dissatisfaction in the political sphere, primarily attributing it to the overall political climate and the repression faced by media and non-governmental organisations. The analysis indicated that Belarusians generally held an unfavourable view regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war and the presence of Wagner PMC mercenaries in their country. However, the Office for Constitution Protection noted that despite these concerns, Russia had heightened its influence across all aspects of Belarusian functioning. Additionally, it conveyed that the Belarusian “hybrid war” against its neighbours (utilising immigrants) was likely to persist in the foreseeable future.
Military developments
19-21FEB2024 – New equipment, infrastructure and training of the Belarusian Armed Forces
As noted in the summary, the past week brought some new data regarding the functioning of the Belarusian Armed Forces, particularly concerning their equipment, infrastructure, and training.
On Monday (19FEB), the Western OC informed about the start of the modernisation of its BM-27 MLR systems. Provided materials confirmed that the process likely involved two launchers of the 111th Artillery Brigade, which departed from garrison to receive new 4-cylinder diesel engines, digital communications means, and a new GLONASS topographical reference system.
A day later (20FEB), the same source informed that the training grounds of the Western Operational Command received new “simulators” (buildings) allowing for simulation of combat in urban conditions. At the moment, the exact location of such facilities requires additional clarification. However, it seems likely that at least one of them appeared at the Gozhsky Training Ground.
On Wednesday (21FEB), the Belarusian Hajun team noted unusual public procurement of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces (AFADF). According to available information, the AFADF Command ordered neuro-linguistic programming courses likely for its service members. As noted, training should be held between FEB and JUN, costing at most about USD1,300.
19-21FEB2024 – The international activity of Belarusian military officials
The international activity of Belarusian military personnel last week was characterised as a “diplomatic offensive”. In addition to more frequent meetings with representatives from other countries, Belarusian military diplomats organised a briefing and a study trip for accredited military attaches. Furthermore, the Belarusian delegation also departed to Zimbabwe as a part of the official working travel.
The visit started on Monday (19FEB) and was led by the Deputy Head of the IMCD, Col. Alexander Vengura. It lasted until Thursday (22FEB) and included the gathering of the Joint Belarusian-Zimbabwean Standing Commission on Cooperation, as well as a working meeting with the Commander of the Zimbabwean Defence Forces, Gen. Philip Sibanda. During its course, both states signed the bilateral Plan of Activities of Military Cooperation between their MoDs.
On Tuesday (20FEB), foreign military attaches accredited in Belarus visited one of the Belarusian-Lithunian border posts. The visit engaged military diplomats from 21 states, who arrived at Kamenny Loh, where they got acquainted with the activities and infrastructure of the Belarusian Border Guard service members. Later, they also visited the Dog Training Center of the Belarusian Border Guard.
A day later (21FEB), foreign officials also participated in the annual informational briefing led by the Head of the IMCD Maj. Gen. Valery Revenko. According to the official statement, the gathering highlighted Belarusian approaches to military policy, including information on the future development of the Belarusian Armed Forces. During the event, Revenko emphasised that the Belarusian Armed Forces’ posture remained defensive and aimed exclusively at providing security for the state. The Head of the IMCD also noted that, contrary to Western states, Belarus was not being drawn into an arms race. Nevertheless, it implemented measures allowing the Belarusian Armed Forces to repel aggression. Besides, Revenko informed that Belarus shifted its focus to military cooperation with Asian, African and Latin American states, but it continues to comply with obligations and restrictions provided by the international arms control system. Bilateral meetings held last week seemed to only partially confirm Revenko’s statements because they involved representatives of the following states:
Monday (19FEB)
Switzerland – Swiss Military Attache to Belarus, Col. Christoph Gertsch, met with at least three IMCD officers to exchange views on the current international security issues.
Tuesday (20FEB)
Armenia – A representative of the Armenian Military Diplomatic Corps, Col. Garegin Meliksetyan, met with Revenko to speak about the bilateral cooperation between states.
Wednesday (21FEB)
Egypt – Egyptian Military Attache, Maj. Gen. Vaele Elesavi talked to Revenko about the “interests of both states” and the upcoming visits of Egyptian Armed Forces commanders to Belarus.
Thailand – Thai military diplomat Col. Gomolman Pittay took part in his accreditation meeting led by Revenko’s deputy, Col. Dmitry Ryabikhin.
Malaysia – Malaysian Military Attache met with IMCD representatives to discuss the “mutual interests of both states”.
19-23FEB2024 – The informational activity of Belarusian military officials
Throughout the previous week, along with the Belarusian President, Belarusian Armed Forces members and the State Security Council actively shared their comments on current political-military developments.
On Monday (19FEB), the Chief of General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich met with members of the Belarusian Council of the Republic and lectured them about the update of the Belarusian Military Doctrine. During the event, he emphasised that the revisited document provided a groundwork for addressing the European situation and promoting peaceful dialogue.
Two days later (21FEB), Secretary of the Belarusian State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, visited the Civil Protection University of the Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations. Volfovich spoke mainly about the military-political situation around the state. He observed that the so-called collective West had unleashed an informational war against Belarus and was trying to do everything to demonise the state. According to him, aside from distorting historical facts, western actions seek to form a common opinion about both Belarus and Russia and present them as an “axis of evil”.
Still, the most crucial informational event of the week occurred on Thursday (22FEB), when the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company published an interview with the Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin.
Initially, Khrenin received a question about NATO forces’ drills directly near Belarusian borders. He observed that despite the lack of fulfilment of international measures regarding arms control, the Belarusian Armed Forces were aware of the purpose of such drills. He mentioned that 60,000 American soldiers were currently deployed in Europe and jokingly referred to them as “occupation forces”.
According to the Head of the Belarusian MoD, about 18 battalion tactical groups (BTG) were mainly deployed in Poland and the Baltic States. It was noted that NATO also constantly conducted various reconnaissance measures against the Belarusian Armed Forces, sometimes directly along the Belarusian borders. Khrenin pointed out strategic aviation training flights, the constant development of military infrastructure, and the armed forces in the eastern flank. He indicated that such measures should be considered direct indicators that the alliance’s forces were preparing for a potential conflict with Belarus.
Clarifying the subject of NATO aviation activity, the Belarusian Minister of Defence noted that since AUG2023, six violations of Belarusian airspace had been recorded. He said the Belarusian Armed Forces responded to each violation, alerting their combat aircraft and air defence assets when necessary. He pointed out that if such incidents escalated beyond control, Belarus would decide to shoot down airspace violators.
Moving to the ground domain, Khrenin remarked that Belarus was currently monitoring active movements of NATO forces, emphasising the Commander-in-Chief’s responsibility to stay alert. He confirmed that they could create offensive groupings under the guise of exercises. However, he pointed out that the Belarusian Armed Forces closely observed and evaluated the location and composition of forces involved in the drills. He also added that in the event of the creation of actual combat groupings, Belarus would respond adequately.
The Head of the Belarusian MoD also received a question about the reaction of the Polish leadership to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. According to him, this measure was forced by the political-military situation in the region, especially as Belarus did not want to participate in an arms race with the West. As noted, the arrival of nuclear weapons should not be considered a threat because it had a purely defensive character and would be used only against military aggression against Belarus. Referring to the potential deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland, Khrenin noted that Poland had such a right but added that Belarus would closely observe such a step.
Regarding the southern Belarusian borders, the Belarusian Minister of Defence pointed out that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already organised a grouping of forces (“North”) against Belarus, which included about 112,000-114,000 troops. According to him, the Belarusian Border Guards faced dozens of provocations from the Ukrainian side. However, he also noted that the number of Belarusian forces deployed near Ukrainian borders was adequate, especially since Ukrainians were also preparing defensive infrastructure nearby. Khrenin mentioned the recent incident on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and pointed out that, at the moment, the risk of diversionary actions was more significant than the risk of an actual military conflict, especially considering the presence of the Kalinouski Regiment in Ukraine.
Later, Khrenin spoke about the military-technical cooperation with Russia. After highlighting its intensity and planned character, he stressed that it occurred without delay. The Head of the Belarusian MoD noted that he could contact his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu anytime. According to him, the Belarusian Armed Forces were involved in joint training with soldiers of the Russian Army, which was visible recently when the Russian 333rd Combat Training Center trained more than 100 instructors of the Belarusian Armed Forces based on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict experiences. Notably, Khrenin also announced a joint exercise of the Regional Grouping of Forces that would be held in Belarus in 2025.
Lastly, the Belarusian Minister of Defence spoke about contemporary military conflicts. He emphasised the role of UAVs and noted that the Belarusian Armed Forces were actively adopting both Russian and Ukrainian experiences from the ongoing war. After mentioning the types of Belarusian-made drones introduced into service, he added that the Belarusian Armed Forces also created dedicated UAV subunits. However, he provided no additional details on that. Khrenin also underscored the role of electronic warfare (EW), which neutralised enemy UAVs. He informed that Belarusian enterprises owned adequate capabilities in that area and mentioned that the Belarusian Army was actively developing mobile (“trench”) EW assets.
On Friday (23FEB), the Belarusian SB TV news outlet also provided an interview with the Deputy Commander of the Belarusian SOF for ideological Work, Col. Vadim Lukashevich.
In general, the interview pertained mainly to the aspects of ideological work but also provided details about the training of SOF servicemen, their involvement in protecting state borders, and the conscription to the SOF formations.
Initially, Lukashevich spoke about the role of the Belarusian state’s ideology, emphasising its significance as the nation’s foundation. He claimed that the ideology, rooted in national unity, tolerance, and the preservation of historical memory, distinguished Belarus from Ukraine, where the Soviet past was forgotten, which led to consequential challenges. Highlighting the role of national ideology in maintaining the state’s security, Lukashevich noted its primary objective – to ensure peace and constant development of the state.
Referring to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the Deputy Commander of Belarusian SOF discussed the ideological innovations within the conflict. He remarked that war demonstrated that measures employed by the Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces, such as “propaganda shells” or acoustic devices, effectively influenced the enemy. Lukashevich noted that the Belarusian side had analysed the use of social media, acknowledging its also proven efficacy.
After addressing strategies to counter enemy influence on military personnel, he further spoke about the patriotic education of Belarusian youth. He emphasised that this had remained one of the main priorities for the Belarusian state and was actively realised through the functioning of military-patriotic clubs cooperating with military formations and those from Belarusian SOF.
Referring to the involvement of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces in protecting the state’s border, Lukashevich emphasised the role of such engagement, which allowed Belarusian citizens to “sleep easy.” He recounted a recent attempt to infiltrate the Belarusian border and informed that personnel from the Belarusian SOF had also participated in detaining saboteurs.
Later, he discussed the preparation of Belarusian military correspondents as part of the annual exercise “Voenkor” (military correspondent) organised at the base of the 103rd Airborne Brigade. Lukashevich noted the uniqueness of courses dedicated to Belarusian journalists and their necessity. The Deputy Commander of the Belarusian SOF also referred to the words of the Belarusian President regarding the need to reduce the time spent on military drill training and intensify combat training measures. He fully agreed with this statement and observed that such a stance had already been implemented in the Belarusian SOF, which did not have time to undertake military drill activities.
In the end, Lukashevich invited Belarusian conscripts to consider serving in the Belarusian Special Operation Forces due to their elite character, modern military equipment, and the highest level of training.
Military exercises
19-22FEB2024 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Last week, the Western OC’s forces dominated other components of the Belarusian Armed Forces in terms of training activity. However, compared to previous weeks, it was noticeably reduced.
On Monday (19FEB), training was limited to a single grenade-throwing classes organised for the 147th Air Defence Regiment service members.
A day later (20FEB), the 6th Mechanised Brigade hosted a competition for the best T-72 crew, likely including indirect T-72 firing. Also, personnel of the unspecified mechanised battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade continued their training based on the fortification node near Zhabinka. Simultaneously, soldiers of the 111th Artillery Brigade took part in firing classes.
On Wednesday (21FEB), UAV operators of the 11th Mechanised Brigade and 111th Artillery Brigade participated in training classes on dropping grenades from UAV. In the first formation, they occurred directly in the eastern part of its garrison. In the latter, they were combined with firing classes.
On the same day, technical personnel of the 11th Mechanised Brigade were involved in special training classes on the repair of tanks. Moreover, the communications subunit(s) of the 111th Artillery Brigade continued their preparational training for Army Games 2024.
On Thursday (22FEB), soldiers of the 11th Mechanised Brigade’s UAV detachment participated in classes on the defence of the home garrison. During their course, UAVs were used to find and detain violators in the military camp. An analogical training also engaged personnel of the 74th Communications Regiment simultaneously. Moreover, battalion commanders of the 6th Mechanised Brigade underwent artillery fire control training in their home garrison. It was dedicated to the use of reconnaissance and surveillance equipment. On the other hand, Grodno garrison hosted a competition to find the three best radiostation crews that would represent the command during the abovementioned “Confident Reception” contest. Independently, the 74th Communications Regiment soldiers took special-tactical training classes at nighttime.
19-24FEB2024 – The training activity of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces
Last week, no direct data about the drills of the Belarusian AFADF appeared.
Nevertheless, data on air assets activity provided by the Belarusian Hajun team suggested that Belarusian Mi-24 helicopters conducted patrolling flights along the Belarusian-Polish border on Monday (19FEB) and Saturday (24FEB).
19FEB2024 – The training activity of the Special Operation Forces
Over the past seven days, only a single piece of data about the training actions of SOF formations appeared.
It pertains to information about continuing special-tactical training classes of the 38th Air Assault Brigade service members classes at the Brestsky Training Ground. The Belarusian MoD provided it on Tuesday (20FEB).
21-22FEB2024 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Analogically, the number of centralised training events was also significantly limited.
According to available data, cadets of the 72nd Joint Training Center likely participated in live ammo firing classes on Wednesday (21FEB). It seems that they occurred at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground and engaged crews of 2S1 Gvozdika and 2S3 Akatsiya SPHs and D-30 guns.
A day later (22FEB), data suggesting the continuation of centralised training gathering for snipers from various military units appeared. According to them, snipers of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (Western OC) likely still were actively involved in the drills organised by the 103rd Airborne Brigade.
12-18FEB2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Last week, the amount of Belarusian military equipment observed on the move increased, possibly attributed to three independent factors – training activity, involvement in border protection, and ceremonial events.
Regarding the first group, it is possible to link movements reported on Monday (19FEB). They included a single MAZ and three Ural trucks with personnel moving in Minsk (possibly 120th Mechanised Brigade), as well as five MAZ trucks with two R-434MT antenna masts moving in the area of Berezovka.
Moreover, the Belarusian Hajun team reported the creation of two military echelons between Wednesday (21FEB) and Thursday (22FEB). According to the source, they appeared at Ozerische Railway Station and included elements of at least two mechanised and two tank companies. Their location can indicate that they engaged equipment of the 120th Mechanised Brigade (tank and mechanised battalions), which could left its home garrison likely as a part of the upcoming military drills.
Also on Wednesday (21FEB), the same source reported a convoy movement with at least 40 vehicles (including 15 BTRs with red squares, five Kayman vehicles and about seven various trucks with trailers and mortars) moving between Kobryn and Bereza. It should not be ruled out that the transfer was linked to the “second group” and included forces rotated from the Belarusian border. However, this claim still requires additional clarification.
On Friday (23FEB), unofficial sources informed about the presence of several various military systems (S-300/S-400, BM-27 Uragan MLRS, BTR-80, Kayman, Drakon, ZU-23-2, D-30, 2S12 Sani and 2B23 Nona-SVK mortars, as well as trucks and other vehicles) in Brest. However, it was most likely linked to the Day of the Fatherland Defender celebration.
Russian military activity in Belarus
Over the past seven days, four Russian ground movements and a single aircraft arrival were reported.
Transfers of the ground were reported on Monday (19FEB), Wednesday (21FEB), Thursday (22FEB) and Saturday (24FEB). They respectively engaged three MAZ fuel trucks (Baranovichi), a single Ural truck (Mazyr), a single PAZ bus (Gomel) and presumably the same Ural moving again in Mazyr. Interestingly, Russian fuel trucks were spotted directly at the territory of the 2657th Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Base in Baranovichi, which suggests they arrived to replenish their fuel supplies.
Besides, a Russian Tu-134 aircraft landed at Minsk National Airport on Friday (23FEB).
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Last week, no direct data about the activity of the Wagner PMC mercenaries appeared.
Nevertheless, the already quoted Belarusian Hajun team suggested that the recent arrival (17FEB) of Russian An-12 aircraft could be linked to the potential withdrawal of some Wagner PMC mercenaries from Belarus. However, we were unable to verify such a claim independently.
Comment
The promotions of new Belarusian generals are likely to have followed a standard protocol, influenced by the officers’ current positions and their contributions to the functioning of both Belarusian and indirectly Russian Armed Forces. The extent of their involvement is underscored by the sanctions imposed on some by Western countries.
The combination of election-related events and the commemoration of the Day of Fatherland’s Defender directly contributed to a decrease in the training activities of Belarusian military units. This is particularly noteworthy considering the active agitation efforts conducted among Belarusian soldiers in the lead-up to the elections. However, recent movements of Belarusian military equipment suggest the potential for exercises involving even two battalions of the likely 120th Mechanised Brigade. While this could respond to ongoing NATO exercises in Europe, it may also stem from the planned training measures.
Despite a marginal uptick in the movements of Russian troops, the overall stance of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus remains unchanged. The situation regarding the number of Wagner PMC mercenaries may have shifted, but independent confirmation is still necessary.