Belarus Security Update – 2 October – 8 October 2023
Analysis of main political-military developments in Belarus
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BLUF
No major changes in the Belarusian Armed Forces’ posture occurred last week.
Executive summary
Last week can be considered quite noteworthy when it comes to the military-political situation in Belarus.
Firstly, representatives of the Belarusian leadership provided several significant statements linked to the current international military situation. Secondly, military officials presented visible international and domestic activities, while some military personnel departed to participate in the joint Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) exercises.
Thirdly, the Belarusian Armed Forces started another phase of their combat readiness check and the annual mobilisation readiness Territorial Defence Forces classes. In addition, noteworthy data linked to the manning of the Belarusian military formations and the creation of new military infrastructure appeared in the media.
On the other hand, elements of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in Belarus were almost completely inactive.
That can’t be said about the members of the Wagner PMC, who participated in joint training sessions with Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops servicemen. Wagner’s presence in Tsel is estimated to include 1,000 vehicles, of which about 800 are passenger cars, but only eight armoured vehicles.
Political developments
5OCT2023 – Possible act of railway sabotage
On Thursday (5OCT), the Belarusian MotolkoHelp team provided data about a possible explosion reported in Kolodischi.
After a few hours, several sources confirmed this information. According to the Belarusian Hajun, they occurred at 11:20 PM, several kilometres from Minsk.
Interestingly, these explosions were heard from about eight kilometres from their location and caused an increased activity of the law enforcement agencies in the area. Unofficially, Belarusian servicemen were looking for potential saboteurs responsible for destroying unspecified railway infrastructure.
On Friday (6OCT), the Belarusian Union of Railway Workers said explosions occurred at the Ozerische Railway Station. As noted, despite the strength of the explosion, the infrastructure likely suffered no major damages.
6OCT2023 – Belarusian President visits the “Khrenin’s line”
On Friday (6OCT), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited the fortification complex near Saki village in the Zhabinkovsky region. Belarusian fortifications in the south are often called the “Khrenin’s line” in honour of Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin. Name-wise, they are directly linked to Russian fortifications in the south of Ukraine, called the “Surovikin Line”.
During his visit, he was accompanied by the highest representatives of the Belarusian military apparatus: Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, his First Deputy, Maj. Gen. Pavel Muraveiko, Minister of Defence Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin and Commander of the Western Operational Command, Col. Vladimir Bely.
After his arrival, Lukashenko visited the complex’s interior to check “how infantry lives”. He got acquainted with platoon-level command and observation posts, including their placements and training locations.
Later, with the Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex, the Belarusian President inspected the exhibition of Belarusian military equipment used to conduct counter-battery fire. This display included Belarusian modernisation of BM-27 Uragan MLRS, a 2A65 howitzer and 2S5 guns, and reconnaissance and command vehicles.
Later, jointly with the Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex, the Belarusian President inspected the exhibition of Belarusian military equipment. The Belarusian President paid particular attention to the Belarusian counter-battery warfare assets (2A65, 2S5, BM-27, and reconnaissance and command vehicles) and a communications system. Lukashenko expressed his satisfaction after presenting the Belarusian communication asset allowing remote internet access. He praised Belarusian products for achieving what Elon Musk had but with minimal funds.
Lukashenko also watched an exercise presenting the defence of a reinforced mechanised company using recently created fortifications.
At the end of his visit, Lukashenko answered questions from Belarusian journalists.
He spoke about the current political-military situation in the state, noting its “colossal improvement’ compared to 2022 when the Belarusian Armed Forces increased the level of their combat readiness. According to him, there was no need for any “presidential level” decisions regarding the military sphere.
He said several fortification complexes were being built on the country’s borders to train troops during peacetime and delay potential adversaries during wartime. He emphasised that Belarus had no intentions of attacking anyone but needed to protect itself due to the actions of neighbouring countries.
As noted, the decision to build such military infrastructure was influenced by the course of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the experiences of the Wagner PMC personnel. The Belarusian President thanked mercenaries for sharing their experiences with the Belarusian Armed Forces servicemen and pointed out that the Belarusian Armed Forces learned a lot from the war. Lukashenko said that the Belarusian army was undergoing intense development in communications, reconnaissance, and UAVs (including kamikaze UAVs). He said the Belarusian Armed Forces would “have everything necessary” in mid-2024.
The Belarusian leader reportedly stated that their military equipment near the borders with Poland and the Baltic States was for defensive purposes only. As noted, Belarusian posture would have active character, but it would not based on “buying thousands of tanks”. Lukashenko stressed that Belarus could not afford it but could always utilise “other” (nuclear) means. According to him, potential Belarusian enemies should understand that an attack against Belarus would trigger a strong reaction and inflict “unacceptable damage” on them. Lukashenko mentioned that the Belarusian Armed Forces had been monitoring the Russo-Ukrainian conflict for over a year, particularly the Russian defensive operations during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. He stated that Belarus had already implemented similar measures.
The Belarusian President also discussed the Ukrainian counteroffensive and emphasised Ukrainian reliance on the United States. He commented that the new American budget plans did not allocate funds for military aid to Ukraine, which he believed was a signal for Ukrainians to increase their offensive actions and achieve political success. The Belarusian leader acknowledged that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had some tactical victories but struggled with their counteroffensive overall. Lukashenko expressed his opinion that the first phase of the Ukrainian offensive failed. Kyiv is preparing for its second phase, presumably starting in 4 to 8 weeks.
The Belarusian leader also spoke about Poland. He stated that Belarusians and Poles had always been good neighbours and would continue to be. Lukashenko emphasized that he did not want the Polish people to view their Belarusian neighbours as strangers or enemies since they never intended to worsen their relationship.
According to the Belarusian President, representatives from the United States and European countries had promised Zelensky their full support if he were to fight against the Russians. Lukashenko spoke highly of the actions taken by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stating that they were both accurate and just. However, the Belarusian leader believed that Zelensky made an incorrect decision by agreeing to such a role and starting the war. Lukashenko added that Zelensky was right to demand additional support at this time, as Western officials had already promised it.
Despite official declarations, the Belarusian President also stressed that European states had no unity regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war. He stated that Europe, unlike the United States, did not desire war. Additionally, he mentioned that the Ukrainian youth were reluctant to participate in combat due to the loss of over 500,000 men. Therefore, Ukraine sought its citizens in neighbouring countries and employed foreign mercenaries for combat roles on the frontline. He emphasised that this situation must be stopped, especially since the Russians had started actively defending themselves and were winning the conflict. As the Belarusian President noted, within a few months, it would be too late, and Westerners would see Russians directly near their eastern borders.
Referring to the actions of Poland and the Baltics once again, the Belarusian leader expressed his opinion that the United States was purposefully escalating the situation to force Russians to use “the most terrible” (nuclear) weapons. According to him, providing missiles with a range of 300 kilometres to Ukraine was an example of strong escalation, which might force Russian leadership to react and “push the red button”. Speaking about the arrival of the Abrams tank to Lithuania, Lukashenko noted the new trend among Russian soldiers participating in the Russian Special Military Operation, who wanted to “hunt” modern Western weapon systems, such as Abrams or Leopard tanks. After that, Lukashenko claimed that the Belarusian Armed Forces were actively monitoring the situation in Ukraine and preparing to deal with those tanks if necessary.
Later, Lukashenko provided additional statements about Poland. Belarusian President pointed out recent mistakes of the Polish leadership, including “betting everything on the United States” and arguing with Ukraine, which most likely occurred due to the upcoming elections in Poland (15OCT).
Lukashenko, after expressing his support for the existence of the European Union (“which remains one of the economic foundations of the planet” – along with the United States, China, India and Russia), claimed that he was looking forward to potential cooperation with European states – Germany, France and even Poland after 15OCT. However, Lukashenko also noted that Belarusian neighbours refused to cooperate with Belarus in the migration sphere, so they should “deal with” new waves of migrants on their own.
Lastly, Lukashenko stressed the significance of maintaining government continuity in the upcoming Belarus elections (parliamentary elections scheduled for 25FEB2024) and declared there would be no interference from the West.
7OCT2023 – Belarusian President calls Vladimir Putin
On Saturday (7OCT), the Belarusian President spoke with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. According to the official statement, Lukashenko called Putin to wish him all the best on his birthday (7OCT) but also discussed the current “most pressing issues”.
As official sources noted, both presidents would meet on 13OCT during the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) meeting and continue detailed talks in person.
Military developments
2OCT2023 – New Head of the Organisational-Mobilisation Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff
On Monday (2OCT), the Belarusian President appointed the new Head of the Main Organisational-Mobilisation Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff.
This refers to Col. Andrey Rasyuk, who replaced Maj. Gen. Vladislav Budik transferred to the military reserve (due to his age) on 14AUG. The amount of data linked to Rasyuk’s career is currently limited.
He commanded the 361st Security and Maintenance Base in 2019 when elements of the formation actively participated in the “Union Shield-2019” exercise.
One of the articles provided some basic details linked to his actions as the Commander of the 361st Security and Maintenance Base. According to the text, Rasyuk promoted contacts between conscripted soldiers and their families during their military service and paid particular attention to the food received by his subordinates.
02-06OCT2023 – Belarusian military equipment and infrastructure
A few military formations started to transfer their military equipment to the winter mode of operations. This process includes regular maintenance and service work, including changing fluids in the vehicle.
On Monday (2OCT), soldiers of the 30th Railway and 15th Air Defence Brigades started such measures. Two days later (4OCT), also servicemen of the 38th Air Assault Brigade joined them.
Subsequently (4OCT), the 51st Artillery Brigade hosted the visit of an unspecified commission of the Belarusian MoD, which arrived to check the condition of military vehicles remaining in long-term storage. This refers mostly to artillery assets (2S5 Giatsint-S SPG, BM-27 Urugan MLRS) and reconnaissance and command vehicles operated by the brigade. It seems that the inspection resulted from (already started) readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces, which was also meant to check such assets and conduct training marches to assess their actual readiness.
Regarding the military infrastructure, Belarusian sources provided two noteworthy pieces of data.
On Wednesday (4OCT), the Флагшток news outlet reported that works on a “training-material base” in Kalinino commenced. According to the procurement data, the process will last until 3DEC.
Two days later (6OCT), the Belarusian Hajun team confirmed that the (partial) restoration process of the runway of the 50th Mixed Aviation Base (Machulischy) was still ongoing. As noted, the 83rd Airfield-Engineering Regiment soldiers were likely directly involved in ongoing works.
02-06OCT2023 – Belarusian military diplomacy
Last week, most of the international effort of the Belarusian military officials centred around working meetings with Kazakh counterparts.
On Monday (2OCT), Belarus hosted the delegation of the Kazakhstan Armed Forces, which arrived at the Belarusian Military Academy (BMA). It included about eight senior officers led by the Kazakhstan Military Attache in Belarus, Col. Kuat Kurmyshev.
The Head of the General Staff Faculty of the BMA, Maj. Gen. Igor Demidenko officially welcomed guests to the facility and acquainted them with the structure, tasks and system of military training of the BMA.
A day later (3OCT), an unspecified Belarusian delegation started its inspection of Kazakhstan’s military infrastructure. The process lasted until Wednesday (4OCT) and was carried out in accordance with the Vienna Document. According to the Head of the Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces and other OSCE members visited one of the Kazakhstan Armed Forces airbases and unspecified military facilities.
Interestingly, on Tuesday (3OCT), the Belarusian MoD published an extensive interview with the Deputy Head of the Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department (Head of the 1st Directorate), Col. Dmitry Ryabikhin, who provided some insight into Belarusian military diplomacy.
At first, Ryabikhin talked about the “Combat Brotherhood-2023” exercise and the different tasks carried out by CSTO forces. He mentioned that only a few countries worldwide could perform parachute jumps from 150-200 meters. Furthermore, he praised Belarus for being transparent about the drills. The Deputy Head of the IMCD also emphasised the participation of 17 foreign observers, including three NATO members (Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria), and how international drills offer an excellent opportunity for mutual exchange of experiences.
Regarding the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ryabikhin expressed his hope that there would be no more fighting. He added that Belarus always encouraged other countries to seek peaceful resolutions to any conflicts.
The possibility of joint military exercises between Poland and Belarus was also discussed by Ryabikhin, who mentioned previous similar initiatives by Belarus. However, he also noted that Western countries did not seem interested in such exercises, which may result from upcoming elections affecting their international policies.
Regarding a recent incident where Belarusian helicopters entered Polish airspace, the Deputy Head of the IMCD commented that Belarusian agencies are objectively investigating the incident before making any potential claims against other states.
Moving on to the recent visit of African military attaches to Belarus, Ryabikhin expressed that the event allowed Belarus to showcase its true self to diplomats rather than the impressions created by other states. This approach seems to be paying off.
Lastly, Ryabikhin highlighted the IMCD’s intense activity in the international arena, stating that there have been no days without any international activity from department members in recent years.
The activity of the IMCD officers was indeed reported later in the week.
On Thursday (5OCT), Ryabikhin and his subordinates visited mass graves of Belarusian citizens (WWII) located at the Uruchcha Training Ground.
Also on Thursday (5OCT), unspecified IMCD representatives started a series of meetings in Moscow. Officially, they engaged military attaches from African states and diplomats from the Egyptian Armed Forces. These meetings lasted until Saturday (6OCT).
03-05OCT2023 – “Ideological work” of the Belarusian Armed Forces
Last week, the Deputy Minister of Defence for Ideological Work, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky participated in several events promoting the Belarus and Belarusian Armed Forces.
On Tuesday (3OCT), he participated in the forum of the Union State, “Russia and Belarus – common history, common destiny” held in Minsk. Officially, the event was dedicated to the issues of historical memory preservation and unification of the joint efforts to counter attempts to falsify history.
During the event, Kasinsky delivered his speech, noting that humanity once again came extremely close to the new world war, which would only benefit the United States and other NATO members.
On Thursday (5OCT), the Head of the Main Ideological Work Department arrived at the “Logoysky” recreation centre, where he met with Belarusian youth.
The gathering engaged youth trade union activists and discussed the state’s current situation. During the event, Kasinsky discussed the spread of fake information and the current political-military situation. Additionally, an MoD representative answered questions from activists.
04-05OCT2023 – The manning of the Belarusian Armed Forces
Possibly on Wednesday (4OCT), the Belarusian MoD updated the list of vacancies among formations and units of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Interestingly, the list also includes some more “notable” service offers for Belarusian servicemen. For instance, the 153rd Separate Purpose Brigade (responsible for SIGINT and operationally subordinated to the Main Reconnaissance Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff) is currently looking for soldiers speaking Lithuanian to serve in one of its subunits deployed in the vicinity of the Lithuanian border (Ozerki).
A day later (5OCT), the Belarusian Hajun team provided an interesting analysis based on the abovementioned list. According to the text, the Belarussian MoD tries to cover the problem of the military formations’ staffing shortages by limiting available data related to personnel needs.
Below are vacancies offered across selected units:
8th Radiotechnical Brigade – 38 vacancies;
6th Mechanised Brigade – 29 vacancies;
11th Mechanised Brigade – 29 vacancies;
19th Mechanised Brigade – 18 vacancies;
120th Mechanised Brigade – 17 vacancies;
1146th Air Defence Regiment – 12 vacancies;
83rd Airfield Engineering Regiment – 11 vacancies;
740th Air Defence Regiment – 10 vacancies;
51st Artillery Brigade – 9 vacancies;
111th Artillery Brigade – 8 vacancies;
8th NBC Protection Brigade – 7 vacancies;
Notably, the same source informed that the number of Belarusian reservists called up for planned reserve training camps exceeded 9,000, which was the official plan set up by the Belarusian MoD
(and often announced by military officials). According to Hajun, at least 9,820 citizens took part in such classes this year. Hajun believes the actual number will be 25-30% higher by the end of the year.
On Tuesday (3OCT), 43 reserve servicemen departed to participate in such a training. Ten of them arrived at the 25th Arsenal.
Two days later (5OCT), the 557th Engineering Brigade inducted ten reservists. Officially, to assist in maintaining the pontoon-bridge battalion military equipment remaining in long-term storage.
05-06OCT2023 – The CSTO gathering
On Thursday (5OCT), a two-day-long gathering of the CSTO working group dedicated to the joint training of military personnel and scientific work took place in Belarus.
The event occurred in Grodno and engaged delegations from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Deputy Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Andrey Zhuk represented the Belarusian side.
On the first day of the event (5OCT), participants visited the Military Faculty of the Grodno State University. Notably, Belarusian Maj. Gen. Viktor Lisovsky, currently the CSTO Joint Staff Deputy Chief, also attended the event.
Military exercises
03-07OCT2023 – Another phase of the Belarusian Armed Forces combat readiness check
On Tuesday (3OCT), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko initiated the next stage of the combat readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces (following the bilateral exercise of the Belarusian Armed Forces held between 22SEP and 26SEP – the issue covered in the last BSU)
According to the official statement, all activities were meant to determine the readiness of Belarusian military formations and units to perform their intended tasks. The Secretariat of the State Security Council was pointed out as the body responsible for their supervision.
On this day (3OCT), personnel of at least two military formations left their home garrisons and marched to designated areas. Such movements occurred in Minsk and Vitebsk Oblasts, which suggests the active involvement of the North-Western Operational Command formations. Also, the Belarusian air assets took part in the drills.
On Tuesday (3OCT), air assets of the Belarusian assault aviation performed close air support (CAS) missions (hitting specified coordinates) at the unspecified training ground (most likely 210th Aviation Training Ground). Subsequently, helicopters provided cover to the ground forces during their movements.
Notably, the Acting Deputy Commander for Ideological Work of the 120th Mechanised Brigade, Maj. Igor Kislyi confirmed that elements of his formation were also left from the permanent deployment area.
Subsequently, elements of an unspecified airborne battalion of the 103rd Airborne Brigade (at least 15 BTR-80 APCs, a Kayman vehicle and a single MAZ truck) departed to the Lepelsky Training Ground, where they started their combat readiness classes. A day later (4OCT), at least one airborne company from the 103rd Airborne Brigade started fire training control classes at the training ground.
Presumably, on Tuesday (3OCT), an unspecified mechanised battalion (likely 202nd) of the 6th Mechanised Brigade started battalion-level tactical exercise at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground. The exercise followed an inspection of the formation held a day earlier (2OCT) by the Western Operational Command Deputy Commander, Col. Dmitry Bitny. Officially, the brigade’s mechanised and presumably artillery subunits conducted manoeuvre defence until Thursday (5OCT).
On Friday (6OCT), they were loaded onto an echelon at the Polonka Railway Station and returned to their home garrison on Saturday (7OCT). However, their correlation with the ongoing combat readiness check currently remains unclear.
Unverified data suggested that the 19th Mechanised Brigade may participate in another phase of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ combat readiness check.
03-04OCT2023 – Annual mobilisation readiness classes
Jointly with the inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces, the Belarusian MoD initiated the annual mobilisation readiness classes linked to the formation of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) held in all Belarusian oblasts (3OCT).
They lasted until Friday (6OCT) and involved representatives of the military commissariats and mobilisation resources reception points led by the chairmen of the local executive committees.
During their course, soldiers worked out issues of the formation of TDF (sub)units across the state. Also, reserve servicemen were called for one-day-long training camp.
For instance, the Deputy Military Commissar of the Brest Oblast (Head of the Territorial Defence Department), Col. A. Rudakov, personally led such classes with representatives of the local Regional Defence Council (RDC) and officials responsible for the formation of the TDF from the Brest Oblast Executive Committee on Tuesday (3OCT).
A day later (4OCT), the Minsk Military Commissariat also hosted theoretical and practical training classes. Twenty-two representatives of the regional executive committees attended the events. According to the Deputy Military Commissar of the Minsk Oblast (Head of the Mobilisation Directorate), Col. Dmitry Volfovich, participants of the drills studied requirements and regulatory acts of the Belarusian General Staff in this area and were clarifying their official duties. This refers to organising TDF cooperation and preparing various specialist documents. After that, they participated in the multi-stage training held under the Deputy Chairman of the Minsk Oblast Executive Committee.
03-04OCT2023 – Training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Last week, formations and units of central subordination presented a visible level of training activities. Nevertheless, not much data about their course appeared in public.
On Tuesday (3OCT), soldiers of the 30th Railway Brigade personnel underwent control exams related to their military specialities.
A day later (4OCT), control classes occurred in the 36th Road and Bridge Brigade. They likely engaged unit leadership and checked the preparedness of junior officers.
Also, on Wednesday (4OCT), military speciality exams occurred in the 72nd Joint Training Center. They engaged cadets of driver speciality, who performed training rides using MAZ-543, MAZ-537, BAZ-5921 trucks and MT-LB vehicles.
04-05OCT2023 – Training activity of the mechanised formations
Putting aside the battalion-level tactical exercise of the 6th Mechanised Brigade and the possible involvement of the 19th Mechanised Brigade in the readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces, it seems that elements of the 11th Mechanised Brigade were also involved in other exercises.
On Wednesday (4OCT), the Chepelevo Training Ground hosted special training classes linked to the explosive use and fire training of the formations’ reconnaissance battalion.
A day later (5OCT), the leadership of the formation participated in the solemn officers’ meeting.
On Saturday (6OCT), the 11th Mechanised Brigade hosted a notable event dedicated to the Belarusian law enforcement agencies. It pertained to responding to information about explosive objects. According to the Deputy Head of the State Forensic Examination Committee of the Grodno Oblast, Col. Dmitry Grinevich, it was the first such seminar in the region. Interestingly, the event included a practical part, during which soldiers of the engineering-sapper battalion demonstrated the detonations of various explosive devices.
04-05OCT2023 – Training activity of the Western Operational Command units
Last week, training tempo remained partially heightened among supporting (sub)units of the Western Operational Command.
On Wednesday (4OCT), personnel of the 74th Communications Regiment participated in control classes held at the Gozhsky Training Ground.
A day later (5OCT), the same range hosted firing classes of the 250th Security and Maintenance Battalion.
These drills were not coincidental and were interlinked. The 250th Security and Maintenance Battalion is responsible for preparing and securing Western Operational Command command posts, while the soldiers of the 74th Communications Regiment provide communications to these posts and subordinated forces. It is, therefore, likely that the Western Operational Command HQ was also in the field training.
05-07OCT2023 – Training activity of the Belarusian Air Force
In the latter half of the week, the Belarusian Air Force presented a high training tempo.
On Thursday (5OCT), soldiers of the 56th Communications Regiment underwent combat training classes with Wagner PMC personnel. They included drills linked to tactical, firing and engineering training and most likely took place in the garrison of the 120th Mechanised Brigade.
A day later (6OCT), firing classes engaged also personnel of the 16th Electronic Warfare Regiment.
Subsequently (6OCT), helicopters from the 50th Mixed Aviation Base (Machulischy) performed several training flights. Notably, a single Mi-8 helicopter landed on the territory of the 1405th Artillery Munitions Base in Bolshaya Gorozha. Moreover, two Mi-24 helicopters arrived at the deployment area of the 2284th Radiotechnical Battalion in Kamieniuki.
06OCT2023 – Training activity of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces
On the other hand, the Belarusian Special Operation Forces presented limited activities last week.
The only training took place on Friday (6OCT) when soldiers of the 38th Air Assault Brigade participated in a special-tactical exercise held at the Brestsky Training Ground. Officially, drills focused on combat in small groups in various terrains, including urbanised areas.
06-07OCT2023 – Foreign training activity
It must be noted that during the week, elements of the Belarusian Armed Forces also trained abroad.
On Friday (6OCT), soldiers of the Peacekeeping Company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade departed to Kyrgyzstan to participate in the “Unbreakable Brotherhood-2023” exercise. The Belarusian contingent included officers of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces Command and personnel of the Belarusian Internal Troops.
They arrived at their destination a day later (7OCT), while the drill’s main phase will occur between 9OCT and 13OCT.
Also on Friday (6OCT), the Belarusian MoD informed about the return of the 120th Mechanised Brigade soldiers, who finished training activities in the Russian Federation. This likely refers to a company-sized subunit of the 355th Tank Battalion, which completed the training program based on the course of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. This type of training lasted a month.
02-08OCT2023 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Tuesday (3OCT):
Three MAZ-5316 trucks with two Drakon and a single Bogatyr vehicle, and a single Kamaz-4310 truck with a trailer were moving towards Brest from Kobryn.
Thursday (5OCT):
Two MAZ trucks and a single Kamaz were moving from Dzerzhinsk towards Stolbtsy.
Friday (6OCT):
Two BM-21 launchers were moving from Zhabinka towards Kamenets.
Two Ural trucks with 2A65 guns were moving from Kobryn towards Zhabinka.
Russian military activity in Belarus
Last week, the arrival of Russian An-148 aircraft to the Baranovichi Air Base reported on Tuesday (3OCT) was the only example of Russian activity.
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
On the other hand, more data linked to the Wagner PMC actions appeared.
On Wednesday (4OCT), the Wagner PMC mercenaries were spotted in the Belarusian Internal Troops training centre in Minsk.
The abovementioned Belarusian Hajun provided some noteworthy data linked to the mercenaries’ activity in Belarus a day later (5OCT).
According to this source, despite the ongoing process of dismantling tents in the camp located in the Tsel village, there are still more than 1,000 Wagner vehicles there. This refers to about 800 passenger cars (UAZs, Gazel or Lada cars), ~100 trucks, eight armoured vehicles, 11 heavy trucks, about 20 tractors, and ten busses.