Belarus Security Update – 22 – 28 January 2024
A summary of key political-military events in Belarus
BLUF
Over the past seven days, we reported no changes regarding the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Executive summary
Last week, the general military-political situation in Belarus remained mostly unchanged.
The presidential approval of the decision regulating the protection of Belarusian borders in 2024 was the most noteworthy political event of the week. Nevertheless, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also departed for Russia to participate in the meeting of the Union State Supreme State Council (29JAN).
The officials of the Belarusian Armed Forces presented relatively standard activity, both domestically and internationally. The armed forces also received new equipment, but its quantity was small.
Regarding training activities, Belarusian military formations and units maintained a significant training tempo. Aside from numerous “small-scale” training events, a few noteworthy drills were also organised. This refers to the joint staff training of the Belarusian Armed Forces and at least a single combat readiness inspection involving elements of a mechanised battalion. It should be added that exercises were also more evenly distributed among functional components of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
The general activity of the Russian Armed Forces’ elements was visibly limited. However, Wagner PMC mercenaries were still actively involved in the training process of the Belarusian Internal Troops’ personnel.
Political developments
23JAN2024 – The meeting on border protection
On Tuesday (23JAN), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko hosted a meeting with key defence and security officials to discuss the issues related to border security. The meeting, which is organised annually, included the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, the Chairman of the State Border Committee, Maj. Gen. Konstantin Molotov and Chief of General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich.
At first, Lukashenko acknowledged the meeting's annual nature and underscored its significance, particularly in light of the prevailing political-military situation around the state. He specifically cited the ongoing war "to the south" and the mobilisation of armed groups "to the west". Despite expressing satisfaction with the results of Belarusian border protection activities, he noted that Belarusian servicemen "can't afford to miss anything". He emphasised the importance of remaining vigilant at all times.
Molostov then took to the floor. He provided details related to the situation in various border areas. He noted an increased number of Latvian attempts to bring illegal migrants to the Belarusian side of the border. Lithuania also deployed additional military units near the Belarusian border, including foreign contingents from the United States and Germany. He claimed that these countries also hosted up to 12 tactical-operational exercises in 2023.
Upon hearing this, the Belarusian President referred to the Belarusian Minister of Defence, emphasising the necessity of monitoring and responding adequately to the situation. Notably, Khrenin likely informed about the presence of the Belarusian tank battalion near the border.
Lastly, Molostov informed about creating a border wall on the Polish side of the Polish-Belarusian border and constant reconnaissance activity conducted along it. However, both Lukashenko and Molostov doubted the efficiency of the former measure. According to Lukashenko, data that he received from various sources (“military and border guards”) confirms that the wall was ineffective.
The other parts of the meeting were held behind closed doors. However, official sources noted that the Belarusian president approved reports from security officials and the border protection plan.
27-28JAN2024 – The visit of the Belarusian President to Russia
Four days later (27JAN), the Belarusian leader left to participate in several events in Russia. The most important ones included the Union State Supreme State Council (29JAN) gathering and ceremonies dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the ending of the Leningrad blockade.
Shortly after his arrival, Lukashenko went to Gatchina, where he participated in the opening of a memorial dedicated to the Soviet Union citizens killed during World War II.
After the event, Lukashenko observed that certain individuals lacked interest in preserving historical memory. He asserted they had already embarked on the misguided "battle with memorials" evident in Poland, the Baltic States, and Ukraine.
Lukashenko then participated in the requiem performance dedicated to the commemorations hosted at the Gazprom Arena. There, Lukashenko delivered a speech, emphasising the role of ending the blockade of Leningrad and highlighting the contemporary peaceful intentions of the Union State. However, he also declared that Belarus and Russia would uphold their historical truth and stand against Nazism.
On Sunday (28JAN), Lukashenko participated in a series of events with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. However, they were unrelated to the military-political situation.
Initially, both leaders were engaged in a video conference with members of the Russian Vostok station in Antarctica. Lukashenko and Putin then visited the "SKA Arena" sports complex, where they conversed with local sportsmen. In the final segment, officials participated in an extensive eight-hour round of talks.
Lukashenko once again noted the significance of recently commemorated events. He conveyed regret over the absence of representatives from Ukraine. However, he acknowledged that the Ukrainian leadership had chosen "another course" and anticipated their eventual "return" in the future.
Military developments
22-27JAN2024 – Various activities of Belarusian military officials
Last week, the number of noteworthy events engaging the highest representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces was small.
On Monday (22JAN), the Head of the Information-Analytical Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff, Col. Artem Butorin, shared his insights about the new Belarusian Military Doctrine.
Butorin discussed the intricacies associated with crafting such a document. According to him, its complexity primarily arose from the need to encompass future developments, necessitating a detailed analysis of state threats and accurate predictions. He emphasised that citizens often possessed a limited understanding of using military force. Butorin highlighted that, beyond fire exchanges, bombings, and missile usage, it also involved other measures, such as executing military exercises, demonstrating power, and increasing reconnaissance activity.
He said the new doctrine also addressed unclear situations arising from certain provocations. Using the example of a border-fire exchange, he stated that even if no one was killed, and there were no plans to seize Belarusian territory, the incident should be considered a use of military force against the state. Butorin also conveyed that the new document communicated Belarusian perspectives on acquiring nuclear weapons to the international community. He noted that this step should be viewed as a measure of strategic deterrence intended to prevent conflicts.
However, Butorin clarified that the actual use of the warheads would be determined in other lower-level documents, which would not be publicly available. He also underscored the importance of Belarusian relations with its allies, dedicating a separate chapter in the new Belarusian Military Doctrine to regulate that any attack against a Belarusian ally would be treated as an attack against Belarus.
Also on Monday (22JAN), the Belarusian delegation headed by the First Deputy Chief of Armaments, Col. Vitaly Shestak, participated in the international UAV exhibitions “UMEX-2024” and “SimTEX-2024” held in Abu Dabi. During the event, Shestak took part in a conference on the development of UAVs.
On Wednesday (24JAN), Deputy Minister of Defence for Military Economics and Finance, Maj. Gen. Igor Mozhilovsky visited the Military-Technical Faculty of the Belarusian National Technical University.
A day later (25JAN), the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, took part in the meeting with Kazakhstan Military Attache to Belarus, Col. Kuat Kurmyshev. The meeting sought to summarise Kurmyshev’s contribution to developing Belarusian-Kazakh military relations as his diplomatic mission in Belarus ends soon.
On Saturday (26JAN) official Belarusian sources informed about the departure of the Belarusian Minister of Defence to Cuba for an official visit. No additional details were provided.
23JAN2024 – Local defence spending
Over the past seven days, new data appeared linked to the defence spending of Belarusian oblasts and the delivery of military equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
On Tuesday (23JAN), the Belarusian Hajun team provided a general overview linked to the planned military budgets (funding of “National defence, mobilisation and mobilisation training”) of five Belarusian oblasts for 2024.
Based on the chart above, Belarusians noted increases in three areas: Minsk, Vitebsk and Gomel Oblast.
In Minsk, the budget rose from BYN1.866 million in 2023 to BYN2.540 million in 2024, a 27% increase.
The Vitebsk Oblast budget grew from BYN1.832 million to BYN3.144 million within the same period, marking a 42% increase.
Lastly, the growth in the Gomel Oblast was 44%, from BYN2.837 million to 5.028 million.
The Brest Oblast noted a decrease from BYN1.436 to BYN1.031 (39%), while the Minsk Oblast saw a 36% cut (from BYN2.540 million to BYN1.866 million).
While it is likely that the increased spending in the Gomel Oblast is linked to the establishment of the Southern Operational Command, the reasons behind the surge in the Vitebsk Oblast are unclear. It is not the first time such increases were reported, though. We assess that it is likely that a significant part of the funds will be allocated to mobilisation readiness and civil defence exercises.
27JAN2024 – Deliveries of new equipment
On Friday (27JAN), the UAV Detachment of the 6th Mechanised Brigade received two new simulators, allowing for the training of UAV and FPV UAV operators.
At the same time (27JAN), the 22nd Spetsnaz Company adopted an unspecified number of new snowmobiles. According to available data, such vehicles were also recently introduced to the reconnaissance battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade.
Military exercises
Last week, the Belarusian Special Operation Forces displayed the smallest training tempo across the Belarusian Armed Forces components.
Elements of the 103rd Airborne Brigade were the only ones training among SOF units. Specifically, soldiers attended combat training classes held between Monday (22JAN) and Wednesday (25JAN) at the Losvido Training Ground. The drills involved military-speciality training and included various firing exercises – using weapons and vehicles. The final stage of the classes also included a non-parachute landing using a Mi-8 helicopter.
22-26JAN2024 – Training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Training events for snipers of various military formations continued as of Monday (22JAN). The drill was still held at the 103rd Airborne Brigade’s base and involved the 22nd Spetsnaz Company servicemen and the 11th Mechanised Brigade reconnaissance battalion.
On Tuesday (23JAN), the Belarusian MoD informed about the start of the Belarusian Armed Forces staff training held under the Chief of General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich. According to the official statement, it lasted until Friday (26JAN). It sought to work out issues related to using troops based on experiences from modern military conflicts and possible forecasts of military developments in the European region.
Between Wednesday (24JAN) and Thursday (25JAN), at least a single BM-21 battery of the 51st Artillery Brigade participated in a tactical exercise held at the Osipovichi Training Ground. During its course, the subunit conducted night live-ammo firing.
23-24JAN2024 – Training activities of the North-Western Operational Command
Last week, a certain increase in the training tempo of the North-Western Operational Command formations was observed.
On Tuesday (23JAN), an unspecified mechanised subunit of either the 19th or 120th Mechanised Brigade conducted a field exit as a part of the combat readiness check. According to the Belarusian MoD, the inspection included a training march to an unspecified area, followed by the completion of various combat training tasks – from preparing and camouflaging positions to completing training tasks.
Because a day later (24JAN), the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground hosted tactical training classes of a mechanised platoon/company of the 120th Mechanised Brigade, it is possible the unit, which undertook the readiness inspection indeed came from the 120th Mechanised Brigade.
23-27JAN2024 – Training activities of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces
Over the past seven days, Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces (AFADF) units underwent various training actions.
They started on Tuesday (23JAN) when most likely flying personnel underwent survival training classes led by 223rd Aviation Medical Center servicemen. During the classes, soldiers were trained on how to survive on enemy territory after being ejected from their aircraft. Practical actions were held near Machulischy.
A day later (24JAN), a fire protection squad of the 147th Air Defence Regiment participated in the fire extinguishing exercise.
Also, the 377th Air Defence Regiment underwent firing classes, but it is unclear when. On Thursday (25JAN), the 147th Air Defence Regiment’s personnel trained (re)deployment of command posts as a part of the planned training classes. Also, on Friday (26JAN), servicemen of the unit undertook technical maintenance measures.
Besides, unofficial sources reported significant Belarusian aviation activity on the same day (26JAN) when all Belarusian bases hosted training flights.
What is more, presumably, two Belarusian fighter aircraft from Baranovichi Air Base conducted patrolling flights in border areas on Saturday (27JAN).
23-27JAN2024 – Training activities of the Western Operational Command
On Tuesday (23JAN), command forces actively participated in firing classes. Such training engaged officers of the command (Gozhsky Training Ground) and 230th Combined Arms Training Ground (Obuz-Lesniovsky Training Ground), servicemen of the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion (presumably Brestsky Training Ground), and soldiers of the anti-air battalion and a single mechanised company of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (Chepelevo Training Ground).
On the same day, service members of presumably 52nd Tank Battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade took part in the engineering training classes, while commanders of the motor rifle, reconnaissance and tank companies of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in training related to artillery fire control. Moreover, service members of the 22nd Spetsnaz Company started control classes related to combat training, which lasted until Thursday (25JAN).
On Wednesday (24JAN), the 6th Mechanised Brigade servicemen took tactical training classes based on experiences of modern military conflicts. Practical actions also likely involved soldiers of the 202nd Mechanised Battalion, who participated in BMP-2 firing classes, and the 2S1 Gvozdika and 2S3 Akatsiya SPHs subunits of the 350th Artillery Group, who were involved in comprehensive special training sessions.
Besides, GMZ minelaying and bridge subunits of the 557th Engineering Brigade took part in planned military specialty-related control classes. Servicemen of the formation’s pontoon-bridge battalion simultaneously participated in fire training. It should be mentioned that firing classes also involved personnel of the 111th Artillery Brigade.
On Thursday (25JAN), an unspecified mechanised battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade was put on standby (peacetime) by the Commander of the Western Operational Command, Col. Vladimir Bely. After that, it underwent a readiness review executed by officers of the formation and likely left the home garrison, moving to the area of its combat-training tasks.
Besides, the 841st Artillery Group personnel of the 11th Mechanised Brigade held firing classes (artillery battalion) and tactical medicine classes (MLRS battalion).
At the same time (25JAN), T-72B crews of an unspecified tank battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in control firing classes held at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground.
During the drills, tankers utilised tanks’ main guns and the PKT and NSVT machine guns.
Besides, servicemen of the 6th Mechanised Brigade mechanised battalion(s) continued their tactical training classes. Soldiers participated in the BMP-2 firing drills but were also trained in trench fighting, assaulting, and defending buildings. The 2S1 and 2S3 subunits of the 350th Artillery Group independently continued their training.
A day later (26JAN), the 11th Mechanised Brigade service members continued their firing classes at the Chepelevo Training Ground. Personnel of the formations’ reconnaissance battalion underwent control classes on using recently introduced snowmobiles.
Soldiers of the 557th Engineering Brigade communications platoon participated in practical training classes related to the organisation of communications, which engaged at least a single R-142N radio station.
Subsequently, the 1134th Military Clinical Medical Center hosted a “clinical conference” on new approaches to diagnosing and treating military personnel’s diseases and the issues of military medical support based on the experiences of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
It should be mentioned that an unspecified UAV subunit of the Western Operational Command also participated in practical training classes on FPV UAVs.
Lastly, on Saturday (27JAN), an unknown subunit of the 6th Mechanised Brigade took part in the tactical medicine training classes held in the formation's home garrison.
22JAN2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Last week, only a single noteworthy movement of Belarusian military equipment occurred. It involved up to four S-300/S-400 launchers, three trucks with trailers and two more covered trucks moving between Sokol and Privolnyy on Monday (22JAN).
Russian military activity in Belarus
Last week, elements of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in Belarus were still not particularly active.
Throughout the week, the Belarusian Hajun military monitoring team reported only two ground movements and several training flights.
They occurred on Wednesday (24JAN) and Saturday (27JAN) and presumably involved the same Ural truck moving in Mozyr.
On Friday (26JAN), an unspecified number of Russian fighter(s) conducted training flights from the Baranovichi Air Base.
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Over the past seven days, several pieces of data suggested that the Wagner PMC mercenaries continued training with Belarusian Internal Troops.
On Thursday (25JAN), these drills involved using explosives, grenades and anti-personnel mines. As noted, its participants were provided practical information based on Wagner’s experiences.
A day later (26JAN), the Wagner operatives led tactical medicine classes for Internal Troops. Two days later (28JAN), Belarusians were assessed on tactical medicine knowledge.
Rochan’s Comment
The approval of another border protection plan was a routine occurrence. Despite the absence of specific details, it seems likely that due to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the “militarisation of western borders", the Belarusian Armed Forces will continue actively participating in the border protection measures. This will likely be coordinated with an adjustment to the training plans to mitigate the adverse effects of border protection tasks on combat training.
The initiation of the Belarusian Armed Forces staff training, coupled with ongoing high military training activity and at least a single readiness inspection, was likely a direct Belarusian response to the ongoing NATO "Steadfast Defender 2024" exercise. From the Belarusian perspective, such drills served as deterrence at the tactical or operational level, illustrating the military's readiness and determination to defend the state border (concurrent relocation of units from their home garrisons to potentially more favourable field areas).
The increase in local defence budgets is a logical consequence of recent military-political leadership actions to enhance overall military financing. Although no indications suggest that Belarusians are growing the armed forces and establishing new military units (apart from the Southern Operational Command), it is likely that the increase in regional defence spending is linked to efforts to improve mobilisation readiness.
While the current rise in the Vitebsk Oblast budget requires further clarification, the resolution of this matter will likely be straightforward and not necessarily correlated with the creation of new military formations and units.
The samples of new Belarusian Armed Forces’ military equipment once again highlight the practical implementation of the Russian experiences from the “Special Military Operation”. Based on them, Belarusians started to pay more attention to executing combat training tasks at night and in adverse weather conditions. This trend is also observable in the training of Belarusian Internal Troops conducted by Wagner PMC troops.
Russian Armed Forces elements remained almost invisible for another week on Belarusian territory. Presently, there is no indication that this situation will change in the near future.