BLUF
There were no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces last week.
Executive summary
Over the past seven days, the political-military situation in Belarus remained unchanged.
This resulted mostly from the ongoing Christmas period in Belarus. Even though more than 80% of Belarusian citizens belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church (they celebrate Christmas on 7JAN), the Catholic Christmas commemorated on 25DEC is also a public holiday. With New Year’s Eve in the middle of this period, there is a larger hiatus in Belarusian Armed Froces activities. Last week, they mostly pertained to visiting schools, social-pedagogical centres and orphanages. Soldiers and higher command structures also participated in their local military Christmas celebrations.
That said, it is important to highlight the notable activity of Belarusian political leadership. Over the past seven days, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited Moscow, where he participated in several international events and provided some noteworthy statements, among others, on the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus.
The Belarusian military formations presented quite an intense training tempo. Most of the training effort centred on conscripted drivers and summarising their additional training. However, more diverse training events also took place. Interestingly, some could indicate the creation of new subunits (s) within the Belarusian military structures.
The activity of the Russian Armed Forces remained minimal. The same pertains to the presence of Wagner PMC in Belarus. Unofficially, the company’s members likely participated in the training of Belarusian Military Academy cadets.
Political developments
25-26DEC2023 – The visit of the Belarusian President to Russia
On Monday (25DEC), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko departed for Russia for a two-day-long working visit.
The meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC) held in Sankt Petersburg was the main event of the first day of his visit.
Nevertheless, Lukashenko first participated in the narrow circle meeting in Yeltsin’s Presidential Library. Aside from the Belarusian leader, the event engaged Presidents of Russia (Vladimir Putin), Kazakhstan (Kassym-Jomart Tokayev) and Kyrgyzstan (Sadyr Japarov), as well as the Armenian Prime Minister (Nikol Pashinyan. Talks occurred behind closed doors.
Lukashenko then proceeded directly to the SEEC meeting. However, en route to the gathering, he also articulated his views, primarily in response to various queries posed by journalists. Initially, he addressed the substantial potential of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), asserting that the EEU possesses greater capabilities than the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or BRICS, attributing this to the "tighter" relationships among its members.
One journalist's inquiry related to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. Lukashenko explicitly affirmed that warheads had already arrived in his state ("in early OCT"). He highlighted the daily training of the Belarusian Armed Forces, incorporating insights from "former Wagner PMC mercenaries."
Subsequently, he received a question regarding the potential resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2024. Lukashenko observed that the Ukrainian leadership should soon recognise the imperative need to conclude the war to avert "total collapse".
In response to a query about why the Eurasian Economic Union was losing Armenia, Lukashenko stated that he did not perceive Armenians as unintelligent. He suggested that such decisions, leading Armenia to "economic demise", would be simply inappropriate.
During the actual gathering (conducted in the "wider circle"), the Belarusian President primarily focused on developing the EEU. After recounting the organisation's history, he underscored the need to address specific issues among its members. He subsequently highlighted a substantial increase in turnover among EEU states and the significant level of self-sufficiency among its members. Lukashenko particularly mentioned self-sufficiency in the food sector, jesting with his Russian counterpart about Belarus's capacity to supply eggs to every state (given Russia's current significant egg shortages).
Additionally, Lukashenko pointed out that the organisation was not isolating itself from the "outside world". He disclosed the creation of a document regulating the integration process of union members until 2045. He stated that EEU members would soon agree on a joint roadmap governing the practical implementation of the document above. According to Lukashenko, the organisation's members should persist in their integration efforts to enhance the EEU's standing. He stressed that this would enable them to augment their future economic, political, and military-political capabilities.
On Tuesday (26DEC), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued his working visit and participated in a bilateral meeting with his Azerbaijan counterpart Ilham Aliyev. The meeting lasted a little longer than an hour. However, its main part was held without a media presence. According to the official statement, Lukashenko and Aliyev discussed the future Belarusian-Azerbaijan cooperation in industry, agriculture, construction, and the military-industrial complex. Officials also spoke about Lukashenko’s upcoming visit to Azerbaijan and discussed the current situation in the Caucasus.
Later on, Lukashenko met with the Belarusian Ambassador to Russia, Dmitry Krutoy. The Belarusian President listened to Krutoy's reports on future Belarusian activities in the international structures. He paid particular attention to the issue of economic cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union.
Lastly, the Belarusian leader participated in the informal meeting of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) presidents in the Blue Hall of the Konstantin Palace. Aside from the participants of the earlier Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the event involved the President of Azerbaijan (Ilham Aliyev), Presidents of Tajikistan (Emomali Rahmon), Uzbekistan (Shavkat Mirziyoyev) and their Turkmenistan counterpart (Serdar Berdimuhamedov).
Military developments
25-27DEC2023 – The domestic activity of Belarusian military representatives
As noted in the beginning, the general activity of the Belarusian military officials had rather ceremonial character last week. Nevertheless, a single event summarising the 2023 took place. Moreover, two officials conducted extensive interviews related to their area of interest.
Starting with examples of (less important) ceremonial activity of high-rank representatives, the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, participated in the opening of the monument dedicated to the soldiers of the 350th Airborne Regiment (former 103rd Airborne Division) and Il-76 crew of the 128th Transport Aviation Regiment (former 18th Aviation Division) who died in Kabul. The event occurred on Monday (25DEC) in Novopolotsk, where a local secondary school also received the honorary name of Army Gen. Vasily Margelov.
Two days later (27DEC), the Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, visited the Social-Pedagogical Center of the Orsha region, where he met with its pupils. During an informal visit, he was accompanied by his Deputy for the Ideological Work, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky and the Military Commissar of the Vitebsk Oblast, Col. Ruslan Shkodin.
Subsequently (27DEC), the First Deputy Head of the Belarusian Military Academy (BMA), Col. Igor Kozlov, led a summarising gathering related to the BMA’s activity in 2023.
Lastly, we can bring examples of two interviews that appeared last week. The first was published on Tuesday (26DEC) with the Chief of Belarusian Radiotechnical Troops, Col. Alexander Vorobyov. A day later (27DEC), the “National Defence” news outlet provided a talk with the Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) Dmitry Pantus. Both officials focused on their activity areas.
Col. Alexander Vorobyov interview
After addressing the establishment and historical role of the radiotechnical troops, Vorobyov discussed their current responsibilities. He highlighted that radiotechnical subunits were consistently engaged in air defence duties, safeguarding Belarusian airspace. He also acknowledged the challenges associated with these tasks, attributing them to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the heightened reconnaissance activity of NATO aircraft. According to Vorobyov, Belarus typically detects three to four reconnaissance flights daily against its forces and infrastructure.
Despite these challenges, the representative of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces asserted that Belarusian servicemen possessed adequate assets, enabling them to observe and identify foreign air assets even from hundreds of kilometres away. Some of these assets are locally manufactured in Belarus.
Vorobyov also discussed the competition between radiotechnical troops and UAV-equipped subunits. He emphasised that Belarus would commence state tests of the Rodnik radar station designed for detecting UAVs, with plans for its future integration into the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Reflecting on lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the Chief of Radiotechnical Troops underscored the importance of preserving the lives of his subordinates. He shared that servicemen in radiotechnical forces continually analysed the ongoing conflict, striving to adopt new tactics to enhance their effectiveness. One notable measure he mentioned was the reduction in radar station deployment time. According to him, the Vostok radar station can now be deployed in minutes, a significant improvement compared to the standard hour required for its Soviet-made counterparts.
Vorobyov briefly touched upon the training of the Belarusian Radiotechnical Troops, noting that their servicemen currently undergo training at the Belarusian Military Academy and the Military Faculty of the Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics. He asserted that both institutions provide a high level of training, enabling their graduates to perform their duties immediately.
Finally, Vorobyov outlined measures implemented in Radiotechnical formations to prevent soldier burnout due to the constant nature of their work. He specifically mentioned providing good living conditions, establishing a vocal group, and collaborating with local schoolchildren as examples.
Dmitry Pantus interview
Pantus began the interview by addressing the matter of Western sanctions. He asserted that Western economic pressure significantly rose following unsuccessful attempts by the West to interfere with Belarusian internal affairs in 2020, reaching its peak in 2022. Despite this, Pantus remarked that the Belarusian MIC continued progressing and fulfilling its defence orders. However, achieving this required Belarusians to tackle challenges related to import substitution and establish new logistical chains.
The Chairman underscored the crucial role of enhanced cooperation with "Russian colleagues", enabling overcoming challenging situations. He noted that this success was possible because of their substantial experience in "working under pressure". Pantus asserted that developing bilateral military-technical cooperation between Belarus and Russia was in Belarus's national interest. During 2023, Belarusian arms exports to Russia increased to 60% (from 30% reported in 2022).
The Head of MIC also addressed the aspect of social protection for industry workers, highlighting that despite Western sanctions, all MIC employees received their salaries on time and in full. This enabled the MIC to continue approximately 170 various military research projects, considered the "driving force" behind weapons production. Pantus noted the active participation of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex representatives in various conferences and exhibitions.
Pantus elaborated that MILEX-2023 attracted 28 foreign delegations from 19 countries, expressing significant interest in Belarusian products such as the T-72MB2 tank, V-2 APC, Kvetka electronic warfare complex, and other equipment, including communication systems, grenade launchers, small arms, etc. Belarus companies signed 14 contracts worth more than USD 266 million (compared to around USD 144 million during MILEX-2021).
The Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex also discussed the interests of the domestic armed forces. He specifically mentioned systems recently adopted or tested by the Belarusian Armed Forces, such as Uragan-M and Skhval MLRS, Vostok radar complex, Quadro-1400 UAV, and others. According to Pantus, the Belarusian Ground Forces received over 430 communication assets since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, along with thousands of various missiles. The army also underwent the modernisation of the OSA system and the creation of a domestic version of the BUK anti-air system (Buk-MB2).
Lastly, Pantus reiterated the significance of deep military-technical cooperation with Russia, especially in import substitution. He also highlighted the ongoing and future digitalisation of work and research conducted by the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex elements.
Military exercises
25-30DEC2023 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated forces
Over the past seven days, the formations of central subordination underwent several varying training events.
On Tuesday (26DEC), drivers of the 336th Reactive Artillery Brigade participated in the 50-kilometre training march, summarising their initial training cycle.
A day later (27DEC), a noteworthy training action occurred at the Uruchcha Training Ground. This refers to theoretically standard firing classes of the Minsk Military Commandant’s Office (MMCO). They engaged personnel of a newly created anti-UAV patrol equipped with MP-155 shotguns. It currently remains unclear if the MMCO created an additional subunit within its structures or simply added “anti-UAV” duties to soldiers of existing ones.
Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that such a measure will be (or already was) implemented in other formations and units. On 24OCT, all commanders of the Belarusian military formations and units participated in the training gathering organised by the Belarusian Minister of Defence, where they watched ways of countering UAV threats – including the use of MP-155 shotguns (the issue covered in BSU 23-29OCT).
On Friday (29DEC), another 50-kilometre training march involved drivers of the 30th Railway Brigade.
A day later (30DEC), the Osipovichi Training Ground hosted firing classes for the 51st Artillery Brigade service members.
25-30DEC2023 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Over the past seven days, the forces subordinated to the Western Operational Command (OC) presented a heightened training tempo. It was especially visible in contrast to the North-Western OC forces, which undertook no noteworthy drills.
On Tuesday (26DEC), the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion personnel were trained to repel UAV attacks on the garrison using the Groza-R2 system.
A day later (27DEC), servicemen of grenade launcher subunits (AGS-17 equipped) of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in control firing classes held at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground. During the course, they trained indirect AGS-17 fire, which was adjusted with UAVs.
At the same time (27DEC), drivers of the 6th and 11th Mechanised Brigades (more than 120 drivers in the latter), 74th Communications Regiment, as well as the 111th Artillery Brigade and 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion underwent 50-kilometre training marches.
A day later (29DEC), the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground hosted demonstration classes related to ATGM use. Most likely attended by servicemen of the same formation.
26-30DEC2023 – The training activity of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces
Last week, elements of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces presented rather limited training activity, which focused on personnel of the 377th Air Defence Regiment.
On Tuesday (26DEC), conscripted soldiers of the unit took part in the firing classes led by senior officer Lt. Col. Anatoly Trofimov. Drivers of the 1st Air Defence Regiment participated in a 50-kilometre training march.
A day later (27DEC), an analogical march engaged personnel of the abovementioned 377th Air Defence Regiment.
Besides, servicemen of the 83rd Airfield-Engineering Regiment took part in firing classes three days later (30DEC). They were held at the Osipovichi Training Ground jointly with the personnel of the 51st Artillery Brigade.
27-29DEC2023 – The training activity of the Special Operation Forces
On Wednesday (27DEC), grenade launcher operators of the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade conducted firing classes as a part of the ongoing military speciality training. Classes also included drills related to first aid.
A day later (28DEC), the 103rd Airborne Brigade organised a training gathering for the Belarusian SOF diver subunits at the Losvido Training Ground. During its course, divers trained in the use of explosive materials underwater. Those who successfully passed the exams received the “demolition diver” qualification.
Besides, drivers of the same formation finished their additional training classes with a 50-kilometre training march a day later (29DEC).
26-29DEC2023 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Last week, three ground movements of Belarusian military equipment were noteworthy. This refers to the following:
Tuesday (26DEC):
· A single Bogatyr vehicle, two MAZ trucks and four UAZ-469 were moving in Mazyr;
Thursday (28DEC):
· A single R-414MBRP Sosna-2 radio relay station was moving in Minsk;
Friday (29DEC):
· Five Tor-M2K systems with MAZ and Zil-131 trucks were moving on the M5 highway in the area of Osipovichi;
Russian military activity in Belarus
Over the past seven days, the activity of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus was minimal.
On Wednesday (27DEC), unspecified Russian aircraft flights occurred from the Baranovichi and Machulischy Air Bases. In the latter case, flights involved at least a single An-26 aircraft.
A day later (28DEC), the Belarusian Hajun team informed about the movement of a single covered Ural-4320 truck in Mazyr.
On Friday (29DEC), Флагшток news outlet published a story that alleged that a Russian soldier lost his credit card in one of the nightclubs in Mazyr, which allowed the OSING team to confirm that he served in the 1530th Air Defence Regiment, which had been in Belarus since the exercise “Allied Resolve 2022”.
Considering the fact that the unit is equipped with S-400 and Pantsir-S1 systems, it is highly likely that those assets are currently deployed in the vicinity of the Velyky Bokov Airfield. This would correspond with data of the Belarusian Hajun team, which reported the presence of eight S-300/S-400 air defence systems with a single Pantsir-S1 in this area in OCT.
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Last week, only a single piece of data related to the Wagner PMC activity appeared.
On Tuesday (26DEC), unofficial sources provided information suggesting that Wagner PMC instructors led special-tactical training classes for cadets of the Internal Troops Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy. During their course, future officers learned how to command their subunits and fight in trenches. Notably, tanks and BMPs were also used during the drills.
Comment
· Lukashenko's engagement in international meetings seemingly yielded no substantive decisions impacting the political-military situation in Belarus. His statements regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus could be seen as a deliberate disinformation tactic. Conversely, these assertions align with information from the Belarusian Union of Railway Workers, stating that nuclear weapons components arrived in Belarus by the end of September. Lukashenko's political declarations regarding amicable relations among Eurasian Economic Union member states appear somewhat inflated.
· The Christmas and New Year’s Eve period was a significant factor influencing the activities of the Belarusian Armed Forces representatives last week. This led to a scenario where officers and soldiers, in a festive spirit, dedicated a substantial portion of their time to participate in diverse ceremonial initiatives rather than combat training.
· While the number of undertaken training events was quite notable, a majority of them were “quite narrow” and dedicated to specific soldier groups such as drivers, grenade launcher operators, and divers. That said, the Belarusian emphasis on using UAVs and training actions to counter them is worth noting. The creation of an “anti-UAV” patrol seems particularly interesting. However, its scale and execution require additional clarification.
· The recent actions of the Russian Armed Forces and Wagner PMC mercenaries can be characterised as relatively standard. Wagner mercenaries likely continued their training alongside Belarusian Internal Troops cadets. During these sessions, future officers did not focus on guarding and preserving internal order but practised fighting in trenches as small subunits in the presence of tanks and BMPs.