Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 03 February – 09 February 2024
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Russian advances continued as they captured territory almost across the entire frontline; The forward movement continued to be slow, as, in some areas, Ukrainians mounted successful but localised counterattacks; The overall outlook for Ukraine deteriorated, which is mostly linked to shortages of ammunition and manpower;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and continued to conduct cross-border infiltration operations;
Russians made small advances in the northern parts of the Luhansk Direction and approached Synkivka; Following the loss of Berestove two weeks ago, Ukrainians counterattacked, reclaiming some open terrain; In the southern parts of the direction, Russians advanced towards Terny and near Bilohorivka;
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka; The Bakhmut area saw no frontline changes, but Russians entered Avdiivka from the north and sustained attacks from the south; They also entered Novomykhailivka near Vuhledar from the east;
No major changes occurred in the Southern Direction, as both sides made marginal gains;
Ukrainians maintained positions near Krynky on Dnipro’s left bank; Russian attacks were unsuccessful;
Last week saw one Russian mass missile attack, while Shahed kamikaze drone attacks decreased;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 16 Russian attacks (29 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 61 Russian attacks (37 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 317 Russian ground attacks (236 two weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian units repelled 13 Russian attacks (14 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, over the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 36 Russian concentration areas and two on anti-aircraft missile systems. Ukrainian missile forces hit seven concentration areas, four artillery systems, four command posts, and seven ammunition depots.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated approximately around 14 square kilometres, while Russians captured around 27 square kilometres. The Ukrainian posture remained defensive despite some territorial gains. The largest occurred near Berestove in the Luhansk Oblast, where Russians captured 20 square kilometres two weeks ago. Last week, Ukrainians counterattacked in the area, retaking some land. It is unlikely that all lost territory will be captured back soon.
Russian attacks persisted across the entire front, and nothing indicates that they are to decrease in intensity and number. Indeed, these attacks allowed Russians to capture territory in the Vuhledar axis as Russians entered Novomykhailivka. Russians also entered Avdiivka from the north and captured some 6 square kilometres in this part of the town.
Both sides made marginal gains in the Southern Direction, but we still describe captured single positions or specific tree lines. We major developments are expected.
The overall outlook for Ukraine deteriorated. Ukrainians continued to suffer from depleted ammunition stocks. Financial Times reported on Friday that Ukrainians were firing only about a third of the shells they needed to maintain their positions. We assess that the number stands at around 1,000-2,000 shells daily. Russians, on the contrary, fire around 10,000. Ukraine’s Defence Minister, Rustem Umerov, said that the artillery advantage was more than 1:3 and was increasing daily (2,000 vs 6,000). But he stressed that Ukraine’s critical minimum was 6,000 (just 2,000 fewer than what they fired during the 2023 summer counteroffensive). Ukraine will not reach 6,000 anytime soon, so shortages will likely continue to grow, at least in the short term, until deliveries increase.
The EU promised to deliver 1 million artillery shells by MAR2024, but these targets were expanded. The EU now plans to produce 1.4 million shells by the end of 2024, but It is unlikely that the whole number will be delivered to Ukraine. In the meantime, the US is on track to produce 36,000 shells by the end of Q1 2024. The 100,000 monthly production rate is now expected to be reached in late 2025/early 2026, compared to late 2028 as per US Army December 2022 and March 2023 targets.
A lack of US funding will further degrade Ukrainian capabilities, especially in air defence and precision-guided munitions. This will further decrease the chances of mounting effective defence against Russian ground and air attacks.
Another, but this time self-inflicted problem, is the lack of infantry. Washington Post (WaPo) reported on Thursday that some mechanised battalions were down to as few as 40 infantry troops, compared to 200 at full strength. To compare, in November, WSJ reported that a mechanised company from the 47th Mechanised Brigade fighting near Avdiivka had 20 combat troops, down from 120 when the counteroffensive started. The same WaPo story claimed that one unit received ten shells for their two howitzers. It is unclear how widespread such problems are, especially since Ukrainians also prioritise certain areas, such as Avdiivka or Bakhmut. But as early as November, artillery units operating in Bachmut complained about shell hunger and the need to ration artillery ammunition.
The new Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief will be tasked with addressing some of these problems.
The (end of) Zaluzhny saga
On Thursday (08FEB), the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, announced that General Valerii Zaluzhnyi was dismissed from his post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to be replaced by his protégé, the Land Forces Commander, Colonel Oleksandr Syrskyi.
The issue surrounding Zaluzhny’s dismissal was discussed in the previous UCM issue. However, we would like to reiterate that it is good that the saga ended and Ukraine can focus on defence planning.
Speaking of which, Zelensky put forward the following objectives for the near future:
The presentation of a realistic, detailed action plan for the Ukrainian Armed Forces for 2024. It must consider the real situation on the battlefield and the prospects.
Each combat brigade on the first line must receive effective Western weapons, and there must be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favour of the first line.
Logistics problems must be resolved. Avdiivka must not wait for the generals to discover which warehouses the drones are stuck in.
Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he does not serve Ukraine.
The excessive and unjustified number of personnel in the headquarters must be adjusted.
An effective rotation system must be established in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, where such a system is in place, can be used as a basis. Rotations are a must.
Improvement in the quality of training for frontline troops – only trained soldiers can be on the front line.
A new type of force is being created in the structure of the Armed Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. The first commander is to be appointed.
The biggest issue with this list is that Zaluzhny has either done most of these things, or they were denied to him by the political leadership. The plan for 2024 was established, while his ability to enforce the delivery of Western-made platforms to frontline units was limited due to the limited number of such platforms within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Syrsky is known for his micro-management tendencies, so he really may focus on trying to ensure that all available equipment is delivered to the front (A Polish volunteer in Ukraine recently reported that drones were found in one of the warehouses of the 23rd Mechanised Brigade, which were presumably sold on the black market).
Two areas will likely remain unaddressed: rotation and training. Zaluzhny pushed for mobilisation to allow rotation and training. Without a mass influx of personnel, Ukraine is unlikely to rotate its forces properly. Currently, rotations depend on a unit. Frontline troops can get two days off after 5-10 on the front. Plans were made to allow troops to take 30 days off (in two 15-day intervals) within a year, but it is unclear whether they were implemented.
A lack of mobilisation will also impact training. Currently, mobilised troops receive very little training because they are desperately needed on the front to hold the line. A lack of proper training impacts survivability rates. It is a vicious circle: Fragmentary mobilisation delivers insufficient troop numbers, which, in turn, impacts the level of training. Poor training results in more deaths, which results in more fragmentary mobilisation.
Ukraine’s fundamental problems will not be resolved with the appointment of General Syrsky to the Command-in-Chief post. But there are concerns that we will see Ukrainians undertake Bakhmut-like defensive operations from now on. Avdiivka will be Syrsky’s first test.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Saturday (03FEB)
Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov claimed that ports in Odesa (and nearby) exported almost the same amount of goods in JAN compared to their pre-war levels.
Estonia announced the delivery of the military aid package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is worth USD86 million and includes Javelin ATGMs, ammunition and other unspecified military aid.
Sunday (04FEB)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed to have visited the Ukrainian frontline in Robotyne.
Monday (05FEB)
Head of the German Federal Defense Ministry’s Special Staff for Ukraine, Maj. Gen. Christian Freuding stressed that Ukraine needed to mobilise more soldiers.
Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov claimed that Russia would allocate RUB100 billion over three years to develop and produce UAVs. This refers to hundreds of thousands of FPV drones and tens of thousands of heavy drones.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted draft laws extending martial law and general mobilisation for another 90 days.
Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, called Canada to transfer CRV7 missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Canada is about to dispose of thousands of such missiles that could be used in attack helicopters and ground launchers.
Tuesday (06FEB)
The Ukrainian Militarnyi news outlet informed that Ecuador planned to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with six OSA-AKM anti-air systems (through the United States).
Wednesday (07FEB)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the European High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Josep Borrell and discussed cooperation between the European Union and Ukraine, also regarding ammunition delivery. Unofficially, Borrell confirmed his earlier claims about delivering over one million artillery rounds by the end of 2024.
Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, visited the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to assess its safety personally.
Russia announced that the Head of the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate, Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Vice Adm. Oleksii Neizhpapa and Ukrainian Air Force Lt. Gen. Mykola Oleshchuk were “terrorists and extremists”. It included them in the list of people supporting terrorist or extremist activities.
Thursday (08FEB)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, with the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi. Zelensky also awarded Gen. Valery Zaluzhny and Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov the highest national Ukrainian decoration – the Hero of Ukraine medal.
Ukrainian journalist Andriy Tsaplienko informed that the Russian Armed Forces began to utilise Starlink systems, which are activated via Dubai.
British Junior Trade Minister Greg Hands said Britain would extend tariff-free trade with Ukraine on “almost all goods” until 2029.
Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. According to Reuters, Xi Jinping told Putin their states should “pursue close strategic coordination and defend the sovereignty, security and development interests”.
Ukraine and Russia conducted another POWs exchange, which involved 100 servicemen from each side.
The Ukrainian National Resistance Center informed that Russians were building military camps for Ukrainian teenagers in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast to prepare them to serve in the Russian Armed Forces.
Unspecified “US officials” quoted by the New Year Times claimed that the Patriot air defence system was responsible for shooting down the Russian Il-76 over Belgorod Oblast on 24JAN.
The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate informed about a successful cyberattack against the Russian MoD server responsible for Russia’s drone control system, thus likely rendering remote access to drones impossible.
The Italian Parliament approved a year-long extension of military aid to Ukraine.
The United States Senate advanced the bill, including a USD95.34 billion-worth aid package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan despite an earlier block by Republicans on 07FEB.
The Russian MoD proposed a draft bill to the Duma to establish a single maximum age for contract service personnel during partial mobilization, martial law, or wartime. The proposal is 70 years for senior officers and 65 for all other personnel. The MoD likely took this step to increase the pool of available personnel from which it could draw to supply forces to Ukraine.
Friday (09FEB)
Norway Defence Minister Bjoern Arild Gram said his state planned to provide additional NASAMS air defence systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The Finnish Ministry of Defence informed about approving the 22nd military aid package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is worth USD205 million. However, its composition remains unclear.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence informed that representatives of the Ukrainian Union of Armenians provided 10 tonnes of medical equipment for the needs of the Ukrainian military hospitals.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
Based on open sources, we conclude that Ukrainians conducted minimal changes in their force distributions.
Ukrainians likely strengthened their defences around Kurdiumivka (Horlivka axis of the Donetsk direction) by deploying the recently formed POMSTA Brigade of the Ukrainian Offensive Guard.
We also confirmed the presence of the 61st Mechanised Brigade in the vicinity of Sluchovsk and Sopychi villages.
Last week, no significant relocations of the Russian units were observed.
Russians apparently deployed the mobilised 1442nd Motor Rifle Regiment from the Donetsk direction (Bakhmut axis) to support offensive actions south of Novomykhailivka (Vuhledar axis of the Southern direction).
It is also possible that they withdrew elements of the 346th and 380th Motor Rifle Regiments to the Kursk Oblast. Hence, we decided to move these units from the Svatove axis of Luhansk direction to mainland Russia.
Besides, we obtained data that allowed us to adjust the positions of over a dozen Russian formations (sub/units). This resulted in the repositioning of the BARS-5 and BARS-14 subunits (the first changed its axis within the Luhansk direction, while the latter was moved from the Orikhiv axis), as well as the 7th Military Base, which appeared at the Horlivka axis of the Donetsk direction (instead of Kherson direction).
On top of that, the following units’ deployment areas were confirmed and adjusted (their locations were previously unknown):
Kursk direction (not included in the main list):
345th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
Kharkiv direction:
2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (WMD/GRU);
Luhansk direction:
11th Tank Brigade (MOB);
36th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
137th Assault Brigade (MOB);
1102nd Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
1220th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
Donetsk direction:
1008th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
1219th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
1465th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
Southern direction:
1198th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
1455th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
1466th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB);
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Udy, Kozacha Lopan, Ohirtseve, Vovchansk, Budarky, Kolodyazne, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka and Berestove, Veterynarne, Lukiantsi, Okip, Starytsa and Kupyansk.
On Tuesday (30JAN), a Russian source stated that Russian forces hit an oil depot in Zmiiv in the Kharkiv region. An intense fire started at the facility. On the same day, Oleh Synehubov reported that Russians used six UAV Shahed-136 drones and hit civilian infrastructure and private residential buildings in Zmiiv. Another Ukrainian source confirmed that Russians indeed hit an oil depot during the Tuesday attack.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Russians made marginal gains in the region last week, but the overall operational situation remained unchanged.
Speaking about the situation in the region, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine, claimed on Saturday (03FEB) that the operational situation remained tense, especially in the Kupyansk sector, but heavy battles were occurring in all parts of the frontline. He added that Russians continued to high-intensity assault operations and were constantly deploying new reserves. He further stated, “to address the issues that were critical to the sustainability of defence, the necessary instructions had been given, and the redeployment of forces and assets was carried out”. So far, we have noted no changes in the composition of Ukrainian forces deployed in the region.
Ivan Shevtsov, assistant chief of the 15th Mobile Border Guard Detachment Stalevyi Kordon, claimed on Sunday (04FEB) that the Russians doubled the number of artillery attacks in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction compared to the number of attacks before the New Year, from 400-500 to 700-800 artillery attacks now. One reason behind this intensification was the weather, which had recently improved and allowed for more intense use of artillery and drones.
On Friday (02FEB), Ilya Yevlash, head of press service for the Ukrainian army’s “Khortytsia” troops, stated that the Russians had concentrated a grouping in the Kupyansk sector, which involved about 40,000 troops, more than 500 tanks, 650 armoured vehicles, 430 artillery systems, and more than 150 MLR systems.
In the Lyman direction, these numbers stood at almost 57,000 personnel, 500 tanks, more than 1,100 armoured vehicles, 534 artillery systems and almost 200 MLR systems.
This gives a total of 97,000 troops, more than 1,000 tanks, over 1,750 armoured vehicles, and over 1,180 artillery systems, MLRS excluding. As such, over the past few months, Russians have continued to deploy personnel and equipment to frontline areas in the Luhansk Direction. For context, in mid-July 2023, Serhiy Cherevaty, the then head of the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces press service, said that Russians had gathered some 100,000 troops, 900 tanks and 555 artillery systems between Lyman and Kupyansk. On 30AUG, Ilya Yevlash, the spokesperson of the Eastern Group, said that in the same area, Russians had now accumulated 110,000 troops (including rear and support units), almost 1,000 tanks, 1,500 armoured combat vehicles, 650 artillery systems and almost 400 multiple launch rocket systems.
On Sunday (04FEB), the Russian journalist claimed that the Russian forces had captured heights near Krokhmal’ne and captured lowlands near Tabaivka. Also, Russian troops were trying to bypass Synkivka from the northwest. On Sunday (04FEB), geolocated footage showed that Russian units had marginally advanced in northern Synkivka. On Monday (05FEB), the Russian source said that Russian forces were attempting to bypass fortified Ukrainian positions to advance from the northwestern side of the forest area near Synkivka. They reportedly captured some positions in the process. A Ukrainian soldier also confirmed these gains, adding that the Russians were putting heavy pressure on the village with artillery and manpower. The Russians failed to go straight to the settlement and decided to go around the forest. Under heavy pressure, the UAF had to leave some positions, he explained. On Tuesday (06FEB), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops tried to attack near Tabaivka but were unsuccessful.
On Wednesday (07FEB), the Ukrainian bloggers assessed that the Russians were pulling up reserves for a potential strike near Tabaivka. The source also said that one of the strikes would likely be in the rear of the Ukrainian grouping in Kotlyarivka and Kyslivka. A Ukrainian soldier also said that on Wednesday, the most challenging situation was near Synkivka, but the UAF continued to hold their positions. On the other hand, a Russian journalist claimed that on Wednesday (07FEB), the Russian Armed Forces managed to advance northwest of Synkivka. However, no detailed information was provided.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Petropavlivka and Ivanivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Novovodyane. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
On Sunday (04FEB), the Russian source claimed that Russian forces made a “serious breakthrough toward a key logistics route” in the direction of Terny, but it is unclear what this involved. The source added that the Luhansk direction was the most promising across the entire front regarding probable Russian forces’ advances. Although, on the same day, the Ukrainian soldier confirmed that the Russians were putting heavy pressure on Terny, he did not confirm Russian gains in the area. Although he stated that the Russian objective was to capture Terny and reach the Zherebets River, pushing Ukrainian forces over the river.
On Monday (05FEB), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians progressed towards Terny. The Russian source also confirmed this and said on Monday that the Russian forces continued to advance toward the Yampolivka-Terny line. On Tuesday (06FEB), the Russian journalist further stated that after artillery strikes, Russians expanded their zone of control near Terny as they managed to enter the heights to the east of the village.
On Wednesday (07FEB), the Russian journalist acknowledged that the Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yampolivka and Terny and managed to regain several positions in the area. The Ukrainian blogger also confirmed this development.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks. Also, no changes occurred near Yampolivka, Torske, or Nevske.
In the Kreminna area, no significant changes occurred. Positional battles continued in the Serebryasnky foresty and near Dibrova. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
In Bilohorivka, on Monday (05FEB), the Ukrainian blogger asserted that the situation near the settlement had become worse. On Monday, the Russians moved in columns of at least 20 vehicles. The source said some of them were destroyed, but Russian infantry continued to assault the village. However, on Tuesday (06FEB), a Ukrainian soldier summarised last night’s Russian attack and said that the Russians actively stormed Ukrainian positions using about 20 pieces of equipment, including an old T-55 main battle tank. The battle lasted from 3 AM (05FEB Monday) until 1–2 AM (06FEB Tuesday). In the morning, the Russians seized the initiative and pushed back the UAF from several important positions near the settlement. But, in the second half of the day, Ukrainian units retook the initiative in the area, and 90% of the lost positions were regained. Russians were left with only one captured position.
On Wednesday (07FEB), according to the Russian source, the attackers had seized control of a Ukrainian position within the Bilohorivka industrial zone. Corroborating this, a Ukrainian soldier also confirmed on the same day that Russian forces had indeed taken control of the Bilohorivka industrial zone. Describing the event, the soldier mentioned that the Russians launched their assault with a substantial convoy. Despite the Ukrainian Armed Forces managing to destroy some of the equipment, it had little impact on the overall outcome of the battle.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk axis, Russian units repelled 13 Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka and Lyman Lake.
According to Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in Lyman’s direction, Russian units of the Centre Group of Forces, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled 11 Ukrainian attacks near Torske and Yampolivka.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Over the past week, the Russians continued attacks near the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar axes, which delivered some gains. Ukrainian troops are suffering from a severe shortage of ammunition, making defensive operations difficult.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka and Rozdolivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Saturday (03FEB), the Russian source claimed that Russian units progressed north of Vesele. Also on Saturday, Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defence press service, asserted that Russian forces had captured Vesele. Another Russian source said the Russian forces had begun active operations north of Soledar. The attack near Fedorivka brought them partial success, but the source noted that these were the lowland positions. Further on, the whole width of the front is heights.
On Sunday (04FEB), Khrystyna Voyak, spokesperson for a Ukrainian 4th Brigade of the Operational Assignment operating in the Bakhmut direction, stated that Russian forces had advanced five to seven kilometres closer to Chasiv Yar over an unspecified period and that Russian forces recently began conducting “meat” and mechanised assaults in the area.
On Monday (05FEB), the Russian source added that positional battles continued near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske. The Ukrainian soldier said on Monday that heavy battles occurred near Ivanivske, and Ukrainian troops continued to destroy Russian equipment near the settlement. On Wednesday (07FEB), positional battles continued west of Bakhmut, near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske, but no changes were recorded.
On Thursday (08FEB), Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed that the Russians were trying to break through the Ukrainian defences near Chasiv Yar and were resorting to localised actions by small assault groups under the cover of drones and artillery. They were actively using FPV drones and electronic warfare. The situation also required constant monitoring and prompt decision-making on the ground.
No changes occurred in Bakhmut. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes. On Saturday (03FEB), Ilya Yevlash reported that the Russian military command was transferring reserves to the Bakhmut direction to break through Ukrainian defensive lines west of Bakhmut towards Chasiv Yar.
On Sunday (04FEB), a Ukrainian soldier said that Ukrainian troops managed to push back Russians from some positions near Klishchiivka. The Russian source published geolocated footage on Saturday showing elements of the 85th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) striking Ukrainian forces operating in a forested area east of Klishchiivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces indeed regained ground in the area. On the other hand, another Russian source published footage on Sunday (04FEB) indicating that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Klishchiivka. On Thursday (08FEB), the Ukrainian soldier assessed that in Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka, the Russians reduced their attacks. According to unconfirmed information from Russian radio intercepts, some Russian troops were redeployed to the Avdiivka area, which resulted in decreased intensity of attacks and their numbers.
Geolocated footage posted on Wednesday (07FEB) shows that Russian forces recently made a marginal advance northeast of Niu-York.
No changes occurred near Andriivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Saturday and Sunday (03-04FEB), positional battles continued near Stepove and Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant. The Russian source claimed that on Sunday, Russian troops managed to advance near the Coke Plant. On the other hand, the head of the public relations service of the Ukrainian 47th Mechanised Brigade, Dmitry Lazutkin, reported that Russian forces had not advanced near Stepove or the Coke Plant. According to him, the contact line occasionally moves by 50-100 metres, which was considered insignificant. Lazutkin added that the Russian army’s losses among troops were ten times higher than those of the Ukrainian army, and the figures for equipment were even higher.
The Russian journalist claimed that on Monday (05FEB), the UAF regained several positions near Novobakhmutivka. The same source also said that after a breakthrough on the northeastern outskirts of Avdeevka – Russian forces could attack the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant from two directions. The Russian troops also attacked Ukrainian positions near Stepove but were unsuccessful. An attack in the area also occurred on Wednesday. On the other hand, the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops advanced near Stepove village, but this reported advance was not independently confirmed.
On Wednesday (07FEB), Ukrainian defence analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces had reached the northern part of a gardening partnership on Zaliznychnyi Lane in Avdiivka. Mashovets also stated that Russian forces were focusing on severing the Hrushevskoho Street, a Ukrainian ground line of communication that runs west of the Coke Plant and into Avdiivka via the northwestern part of the settlement. Russian sources also assessed that Russian forces had advanced westward towards the Coke Plant and controlled between 18 and 20 per cent of Avdiivka.
The overall situation in Avdiivka, as indicated above, is critical.
Ukrainians believed the Russian breakthrough could be eliminated if infantry reserves with experience in fighting in urban areas were available.
Another Ukrainian journalist, Yuriy Butusov, also said that the biggest Ukrainian weakness was the interoperability and employment of all forces and means by the operational-tactical management (command and control structures). He further stated that reports from the frontline hid the truth to not “annoy senior management with “bad news” as the top brass only wanted to listen to positive, not critical, information. Therefore, there was no adequate response to changes in the situation in Avdiivka.
The Ukrainian blogger also confirmed that Russian troops advanced north of Avdiivka. However, on Monday (05FEB), the head of Avdiivka city military administration, Vitaliy Barabash, said that Russians had not entered the city and there were no street battles, an untrue claim. Indeed, a Ukrainian blogger claimed on Monday (05FEB) that despite certain statements by Ukrainian officials, the situation in the city continued to deteriorate. On Monday, the Russians were attacking from all possible directions in the Dachi area. The Russians focused on consolidating and manning in the old Avdiivka, in the Dachi area and near the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant. In addition, the Russians tried to occupy the bridge over the railway. In some places, the Russians had managed to advance; in others, the Ukrainian forces had managed to repel attacks. On Monday (05FEB), the Russian source stated that in the fortified “Tsarska Ohota” area, the Russian forces continued their assault operations on the city’s southeastern outskirts, advancing in residential areas. The source said it was about one kilometre to the “Khimik” district in the city. On Tuesday (06FEB), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that there was a shortage of artillery rounds in Avdiivka. The Russians were attacking every 20-30 minutes, often advancing.
By Wednesday (07FEB), the situation in the city was critical and chaotic. Russians continued to advance in the residential sector along Nezalezhnosti and Sapronova Streets. Near the railway bridge, they had partial success and were storming Ukrainian positions in the Dachi towards the entrance stele and the motor depot. The source added that the Russians had not yet deployed the main forces into the area, but the latest Russian moves were designed to destroy Ukrainian logistics completely. The Russian journalist also claimed on Wednesday (07FEB) that the UAF units in Avdiivka were experiencing severe problems on its northeastern outskirts as Russians had entered the city and were trying to cut the main logistical line at Lastochkyne. Another Russian source stated that on Wednesday, Russian forces had dropped 60 FAB-500 UMPCs against Ukrainian positions in the city. In the Tsarska Ohota area, the situation was unstable. The Russians were complaining about Ukrainian FPVs, although they had no shortage of artillery.
Moving south, on Monday (05FEB), the Russian journalist said that the Russian forces had advanced 400-500 metres into Pervomaiske. The Russians also tried to attack near Sjeverne and Tonenke but were unsuccessful. However, Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the southern direction. Geolocated footage published on Monday (05FEB) indicated that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Nevelske.
On Saturday and Sunday (03-04FEB), the positional battles continued near Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka and southwest near Novomykhailivka. However, Russian sources claimed on Sunday that Russian forces may be conducting a “tactical pause” southeast of Novomykhailivka. Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Mariinka on Sunday (04FEB). Geolocated footage was published indicating that Russians recently marginally advanced northwest of Marinka.
Indeed, the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that on Monday (05FEB), the Russians were more active near Novomykhailivka. The source said that Russian units attacked from several places south of the village with several armoured vehicles. One tank and two unidentified pieces of equipment were destroyed.
On the other hand, the Russian journalist assessed that on Monday (05FEB), the Russian troops tried to attack near Novomykhalivka and Heorhiivka. Although initially unsuccessful, on Tuesday (06FEB), Russians reportedly reached the southern and eastern outskirts of Novomykhailivka. Geolocated footage published on Saturday (03FEB) confirmed that Russian forces advanced east and south of Novomykhailivka during recent renewed mechanised attacks. However, the Russian journalist added there was no question of a breakthrough in the Ukrainian defence in this area yet. The Ukrainian blogger also confirmed Russian advances in the area. The Russian forces also continued to attack near Heorhiivka. Still, the Russian source claimed on Tuesday (06FEB) that prepared Ukrainian defences near Heorhiivka, the lowland comprising Heorhiivka, and nearby Ukrainian artillery firing positions would complicate any Russian advances through the settlement towards Kurakhove located about 15 kilometres in a straight line from Mariinka.
Although, on Wednesday (07FEB), the Russian journalist assessed that Russian attacks near Heorhiivka were unsuccessful, geolocated footage posted on Wednesday (07FEB) showed that Russian forces had advanced into the eastern outskirts of Heorhiivka. Additional geolocated footage also posted on Wednesday indicated that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) advanced into eastern Novomykhailivka, which was in line with some Russian claims that Russian forces entered eastern Novomykhailivka.
It was in this context that Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian forces were preparing to place the main effort north of Novomykhailivka towards Oleksandrivka-Novomykhailivka and Marinka-Pobieda and would use elements of the 20th Motor Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reinforced with elements of the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry (both of the Pacific Fleet) as the main attacking force. He added that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 33rd Motor Rifle Regiment, and 255th Motor Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorised Rifle Division)were replenished. Concurrently, the 1219th and 1465th Motor Rifle Regiments (mobilised) were rotated in and were operating alongside the elements of the 20th Motor Rifle Division.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pobjeda.
On Wednesday (07FEB), the Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Vuhledar towards the Pivdennodonbaska Coal Mine. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes in this area. However, geolocated footage published on Wednesday showed Russian advances north of Mykilske.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units successfully repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Klichshiivka, Andriivka, Kurduymivka, Shumy and Niu-York.
Southern Ukraine Direction
No significant changes occurred in southern Ukraine last week.
On Sunday (04FEB), the Russian source said that the Russian forces tried to advance towards Zolota Nyva but were unsuccessful. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Urozhaine and Staromaiorske.
On Monday (05FEB), the Russian journalist claimed that Russians attempted to attack Ukrainian positions north of Pryyutne but were unsuccessful. The attack was repeated on Tuesday (06FEB). Supported by artillery, they also tried to advance near Staromaiorske. In all cases, the attacks led nowhere.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodarivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Russian source assessed on Sunday (04FEB) that the Russian forces advanced southeast near Robotyne. However, the source said the area was an open ground, so it was too early to discuss Russians establishing a foothold there. The Ukrainian soldier claimed on Sunday (04FEB) that the intensity of the Russian assaults in the Zaporizhzhia axis was high, but so far, the UAF had managed to fight back. On Monday (05FEB), Russian troops again tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Robotyne but were unsuccessful.
The Russian source said on Wednesday (07FEB) that Ukrainian drones were limiting Russian forces’ (from 136th Brigade) ability to use armoured vehicles during the day and night in the Orikhiv direction and that Russian forces were suffering from an acute shortage of drones. The source also added that Russian units in the Kherson direction were also experiencing UAV shortages. It, therefore, seems that Russians were driving resources away from the Zaporihihzia and Kherson and placing them in the Luhansk, but more importantly, Donetsk Directions. This confirms that their main priority is to advance in the Donetsk Oblast while maintaining some pressure in the south. As such, we do not expect major Russian gains in the area.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novoprokopivka and Novofedorivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Verbove.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near P’yatykhatky.
According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units disrupted nine attempts by the Ukrainian forces to rotate units to forward positions near Novodonetske, Urozhaine, Staromaiorske and Rivnopil.
Map 5. Frontlines in Southern Ukraine with Russian fortifications, 09FEB2024
Kherson Direction and Crimea
No significant changes occurred in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian forces continued to hold a bridgehead on Dnipro’s left bank despite Russian attacks.
On Saturday and Sunday (03-04FEB), Positional battles continued near Krynky. Russian sources said on Sunday (04FEB) that Russian forces continued to conduct strikes on Krynky using glide bombs. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on Sunday (04FEB) that elements of the Russian 337th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division), elements of the 144th Motor Rifle Brigade (40th Army Corps, 18th CAA, SMD), and elements of the 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motor Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions in Krynky over the previous few days. Mashovets further added that Russian forces simultaneously attacked Ukrainian positions, conducted artillery strikes and deployed electronic and aerial surveillance. This indicates an improved command and control and cooperation over the forces operating in the area.
On Monday (05FEB), the Russian journalist reported that Russian forces had allegedly attacked Ukrainian positions in Krynky following artillery strikes, but their efforts were reportedly unsuccessful. The source suggested that the triumphant declarations from certain Russian sources did not align with the actual events on the ground. However, the source mentioned that both sides currently face limited prospects in the region. Additionally, another Russian source asserted on the same day that Ukrainian forces were utilising mobile electronic warfare systems in attempts to cross the Dnipro River. Yet, Russian drones remained effective in targeting Ukrainian crossing units.
Nevertheless, the source acknowledged that Russian electronic warfare systems proved ineffective against Ukrainian FPV drones in the area. Conversely, another Russian source, who consistently emphasised the threat posed by Ukrainian FPV drones on the left bank of the Dnipro River, claimed on Monday (05FEB) that Russian forces in the vicinity had bolstered their capacity to counter these drones. Again, however, specific details were lacking.
On Wednesday (07FEB), sources from both sides (Ukrainian and Russian) reported changes near Krynky. Specifically, geolocated footage published on 07FEB indicated that Ukrainian forces had advanced slightly in eastern Krynky. Additional geolocated footage also published on Wednesday indicated that Russian forces advanced in southern Krynky.
Black Sea
On Tuesday (06FEB), the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces announced that their units had effectively detonated explosives on a gas or oil rig in the Black Sea, which had been seized by Russian forces and utilised as a base for launching attacks with Iranian Mohajer-6 reconnaissance drones and coordinating Shahed drone strikes. According to the Ukrainian source, Russian forces had also installed a “Neva-B” object detection radar system on the rig, enhancing their surveillance capabilities over the northwestern region of the Black Sea. Additionally, the Ukrainian SOF reported that Russian forces repurposed the mining platform into a radar station for monitoring surface vessels in the same area of the Black Sea.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 570 aircraft (+2), 265 helicopters (0), 12,137 UAVs (+517), 464 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+7), 14,953 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+73), 1,218 MLRS launchers (+3), 8,000 field artillery guns and mortars (+54), as well as 18,404 units of special military vehicles (+248).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 394,270 personnel (+6,670), 6,394 tanks (+63), 11,942 armoured combat vehicles (+150), 9,459 artillery systems (+185) and 981 MLR systems (+3), 666 anti-aircraft systems (+3), 332 aircraft (0) and 325 helicopters (+1), and 7,235 UAVs (+89), 1,881 cruise missiles (+34), 24 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 12,579 vehicles and fuel tanks (+263), and 1,512 special vehicles (+42).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
The Russian use of drones and missile strikes increased last week.
On Wednesday (07FEB), Russians launched a mass missile strike. It included 29 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles fired from 10 Tu-95MS strategic bomber aircraft, four Kh-22 anti-ship cruise missiles fired from Tu-22M3, three Kalibr cruise missiles, three 9M723 ballistic missiles and five missiles fired from S-300 air defence systems. Out of 44 missiles fired, Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 29 (65%), including 26 Kh-101s/Kh-555s/Kh-55s and three Kalibrs.
This attack was combined with Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drone employment as well. Russians launched 20 vehicles, of which 15 were shot down (75%). Altogether, however, Russians used Shaheds on three more occasions. Strikes occurred on Saturday (03FEB), Thursday (08FEB), and Friday (09FEB) and involved 14, 17, and 16 drones, respectively. The reported interception rate was relatively even, encompassing around 62-64% of incoming vehicles.
Ground attacks increased. Russians averaged 92 attacks, compared to 73 two weeks ago and 69 three weeks ago. Attacks peaked on Monday (05FEB) with 126, the second largest number since MAR2023.
Battlefield missile attacks decreased. Ukrainians reported 51 on Wednesday (07FEB), but the spike was short-lived. Excluding this particular attack, Russians averaged 5.3 attacks per day, compared to 5.85 two weeks ago.
Air strikes decreased, too. Two weeks ago, Russians averaged 70 strikes per day; last week, they averaged only 46. Strikes continue to fluctuate. For instance, they bottomed at 25 on Sunday but peaked at 80 on Wednesday.
MLRS strikes also decreased. Russians averaged 75 compared to 88 two weeks ago.
Outlook for the week of 10FEB2024 – 16FEB2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” Although Russians slightly extended territorial control in the region, they did not capture a single settlement.
Score: 0.5/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more.” Russians entered Avdiivka from the north and Novomykhailivka from the east. No settlements were taken.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.” Ukrainians made marginal gains near Krynky, and so did the Russians.
Score: 0.5/1
Final Score: 3.5/5 (70%)
The forecast for the week of 10FEB2024 – 16FEB2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote (no change). We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.