Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 13 January – 19 January 2024
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week again brought very limited frontline changes in Ukraine; Russians maintained offensive actions in the Kupyansk, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka axes, while Ukrainian operations were predominantly defensive; After a pause two weeks ago, Russians increased the number of ground attacks last week substantially;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and continued to conduct cross-border infiltration operations;
Russians again reportedly made some gains towards Kupyansk in the Luhansk Direction, but they were not visually confirmed; Circumstantial evidence suggested a big increase in Russian ground attacks; After a few week-long pause, Russians restarted attacks on Bilohorivka;
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka; They only progressed near the latter;
The frontline in the Southern Direction remained unchanged despite continuous Russian attacks;
Ukrainians maintained the bridgehead near Krynky in the Kherson Oblast, but the freezing conditions hindered the Ukrainian ability to supply their forces on Dnipro’s left bank; Russians, however, did not use this opportunity to increase attacks on the bridgehead;
Last week saw no missile and limited drone attacks;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 16 Russian attacks (23 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 96 Russian attacks (15 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 249 Russian ground attacks (158 two weeks ago, 175 three weeks ago, 261 four and 344 five weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian Forces repelled 16 Russian attacks (17 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 46 Russian concentration areas, one command post and six air defence missile systems. Ukrainian missile and artillery forces hit 11 concentration areas, four command posts, 19 artillery systems, seven air defence systems, one electronic warfare station, five radar stations and seven ammunition depots. Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated approximately 0.58 square kilometres, while Russians captured around 18 square kilometres. Since the start of the year, Russians increased their territorial control over the Donetsk Oblast by 0,09%. The Ukrainian posture remained defensive, while Russians remained offensively committed across almost the entire front.
Russians’ largest gain occurred east of Vuhledar and progressed in the Mariinka axis. The attackers also reportedly captured Vesele, although we are still waiting for the visual confirmation. This confirms that the primary Russian focus has been on the Donetsk Oblast.
On Friday, Ukrainians also reported 127 Russian ground attacks, the largest number since early March 2023. After a short pause in late December and early January, the increase in ground attacks has been very sharp and steeper compared to early October when Russians launched the Autumn Offensive to capture Avdiivka. Yet, this time, we now see a clear focus on any particular part of the front. Russians seemed to increase the pressure in many areas, from the Kupyansk axis to Krynky. In many places, they did not succeed. Nevertheless, they did progress slightly in the Donetsk Oblast.
When Russians launched the attack near Avdiivka, they deployed two combined arms armies to attain this objective. While we are aware of the limitations of open sources, we have seen no significant Russian troop redeployments that would allow us to conclude that Russians are focusing their offensive on one particular area. We assess that it is likely that this deconcentration of efforts will be maintained over the next few weeks. Unless, of course, we obtain data/information suggesting a commitment of new formations to battle.
Air domain events
On Friday (12JAN), Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Ukrainian Land Forces Commander, said that Ukraine needed more military aircraft for combat operations, such as US-made Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft. Syrsky said that the A-10 would provide very significant support to ground forces as they tried to seize the initiative against a well-equipped enemy. When we were near Bakhmut (12 km from the city) in November, we saw two Ukrainian Su-25s (Soviet A-10 equivalent) flying over our heads and firing unguided missiles towards Russian positions near Bakhmut. They were beyond the MANPAD engagement envelope and were flying so low that, at this range, they were also unlikely to have been picked up by other ground-based air defence assets. Even assuming that Ukraine received A-10s (which is a remote possibility), their distinct advantage would lie in their ability to carry Maverick AGM-65 air-to-surface missiles, but whether Ukrainians would be able to use them effectively would depend on their ability to provide A-10s with target data. Apart from that, flying A-10s towards the frontline to conduct CAS would be suicidal as Ukraine does not possess air superiority and is unable to achieve SEAD/DEAD. As such, given these constraints, A-10s are highly unlikely to be handed over to Ukraine.
Secondly, on Sunday (14JAN), Ukrainian sources claimed that Kyiv’s air defences shot down a Russian A-50U airborne early warning (AEW) and Il-22 airborne command post aircraft. The aircraft was scanning the airspace in southern Ukraine, flying over the Azov Sea (reportedly near Strilkove when engaged). Although initial claims were that both aircraft were shot down, Yurii Ihnat, Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Air Force Command, said on Monday (15JAN) that IL-22 managed to land in Anapa.
He also noted that the A-50 aircraft remained a priority target for Ukraine. Natalia Humeniuk noted on Monday (15JAN) that the destruction of the Russian A-50 could delay future Russian missile attacks. According to her, it was with the help of the A-50 that the Russians identified and planned future targets. What does the loss of A-50U mean for Russia?
Firstly, this is a big PR defeat for Russia. AEW aircraft are very valuable due to the costs associated with their production and operations and the information they provide, especially if the number of available aircraft is low. This is the most significant aircraft loss for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) since the start of the war.
The number of available Russian AEW aircraft is low. Russians had around 10 A-50Us available at the start of the war, but a high operational tempo has likely reduced their availability;
The attack did not come out of the blue. In November, the UK MoD said that VKS was increasingly risking their A-50Us by bringing them closer to Ukraine’s SAM engagement envelopes.
As a result of the strike, Russians will now have to pull A-50 operations back, which will limit how deep into Ukraine it can “see”. Thus, It will limit its support for VKS fighter aircraft and ground targeting, especially for long-range weapon systems, such as ballistic or cruise missiles.
Russians do not have a sole AWACS platform. That’s why A-50U flies with either an Il-20M EW aircraft or an Il-22 airborne command post to supplement its roles and provide information to command centres on the ground. A-100 is to bridge this gap, but it only made its first flight with activated radar and mission equipment in FEB2022.
Knowing how VKS operates, it is not impossible to envisage a scenario where, after the initial shock, A-50U operations will gradually move closer to the front at risk of being shot down again.
Ukraine’s approach is to push the Russian early warning assets (or any combat aircraft) as far away from the frontline as possible so that they no longer pose a significant threat to the units on the ground. In the meantime, Kyiv will continue striking targets in southern Russia and Crimea as part of its strategy for 2024.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Saturday (13JAN)
Recently appointed French Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne arrived in Kyiv. During his visit, he claimed that France and the European Union would work out certain legal issues to allow French military companies to set up production facilities in Ukraine.
Sunday (14JAN)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky suggested that Ukraine might receive additional air defence assets in the future. According to him, Kyiv is preparing to announce “good news” in this area.
Monday (15JAN)
The United Nations asked donors to allocate USD 4.2 billion to support Ukrainian communities and refugees affected by the war.
Volodymyr Zelensky met with his Swiss counterpart Viola Amherd. During the meeting, both leaders agreed to start preparations for the Global Peace Summit, which will be held in
Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu spoke with the Iranian Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Ashtiani. According to the official statement, talks pertained to bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and “became another step” in strengthening strategic relations between countries.
The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR) representative, Maj. Gen. Vadim Skibitski informed that 1,000-1,100 Russian citizens sign contracts with Russian MoD daily. According to him, the mentioned number translates to about 30,000 per month, which allows the replenishment of the losses of mobilised regiments without announcing mobilisation.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Gen. Valery Zaluzhny discussed the frontline situation with the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. Charles Brown, during a phone call.
Tuesday (16JAN)
French President Emanuel Macron announced the delivery of 40 long-range SCALP-EG cruise missiles and “hundreds” of AASM Hammer guided bombs to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Advisor of the Central African Republic President, Fidel Ngouandika, declared readiness to create a Russian military base in Berengo. He claimed that existing infrastructure allows for the deployment of 10,000 troops.
President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, claimed that a EUR50 billion aid package for Ukraine would be approved without Hungary’s approval.
Wednesday (17JAN)
The German Bundestag rejected the proposal to supply Taurus cruise missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The German government announced a new military aid package including 25 RQ-35 UAVs, eight unspecified APCs, 50 SatCom terminals, and the ammunition for Leopard 1 tanks and other vehicles and personal equipment.
Ukrainian Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov cancelled his visit to France planned on 18JAN due to “security reasons”.
French Minister of Defence Sebastien Lecornu said France would produce 78 CAESAR SPHs for the UAF.
Thursday (18JAN)
Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, claimed that Ukraine could not force conscripts currently abroad to return to Ukraine to be conscripted.
Friday (19JAN)
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said that Kyiv would allocate USD466 million to construct
The Bloomberg news agency informed that the European Union started discussing the 13th sanction package against Russia, which could be introduced on the second anniversary of the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war (24FEB).
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
Last week, we continued to observe Ukrainian efforts to strengthen positions in the Horlivka, Klishchiivka and Avdiivka axes.
Near Horlivka, Ukrainians likely deployed the 93rd Mechanised Brigade elements from the Bakhmut axis.
To support the defence of Aviidvka, Ukrainians deployed the 71st Air Assault (Jager) Brigade to Novokalynove from the Orikhiv axis. This area allows them to attack Russian positions north of Krasnohorivka and thus degrade their attempts to push towards Stepove.
We added five new Ukrainian mechanised brigades (150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd and 154th) to our database. However, we still lack data about their whereabouts.
Last week, we observed no significant redeployments of the Russian military formations and units.
Recent offensive actions of the 51st Airborne Regiment (106th Airborne Division, VDV) allowed us to adjust the unit’s position slightly – we moved it from Horlivka to the Bakhmut axis (both located in the Donetsk Direction).
Moreover, based on the latest information, we added the mobilised 49th Air Assault Brigade (most likely remaining under the subordination of the 58th Combined Arms Army) to the map (Orikhiv axis).
We have implemented a major database update of the mobilised Russian formations, units and subunits. We added 67 new (motor rifle, infantry or artillery) units and subunits – four brigades, 31 regiments, and 32 battalions to the chart. However, their locations still need to be confirmed.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Hatyshche, Pletenivka, Vovchansk, Potykhonove, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Berestove, Vesele, Pishchane and Ivanivka, Bochkove, Dvorichna and Budarky.
On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russians launched two attacks on Kharkiv with S-300 missiles from the Belgorod direction. In the Kholodnohirsk district, the facades of about 20 apartment buildings and the premises of a private medical institution were damaged, and 14 cars were destroyed. On Thursday (18JAN), Russians struck Kupyansk, hitting a civilian building.
On Wednesday (17JAN), the commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev, stressed the need to evacuate residents of the border areas in Sumy and Chernihiv regions due to regular artillery attacks by the Russian Federation and operations of sabotage, reconnaissance and subversive groups. He noted that Ukraine’s border with Russia in the north is actually the current frontline, which is regularly infiltrated.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred in the Luhansk Oblast. Russians continued to attack in the Lyman and Kupyansk axes, achieving partial success in some places but without a significant impact on the frontline.
The Ukrainian source claimed on Saturday (13JAN) that the situation in the Kupyasnk direction was quite tense as the attackers were five kilometres from residential areas and that Ukrainians were preparing defences. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that the situation in the Kupyansk direction was difficult. The Russians were using bombs every day, bringing in fresh infantry reserves, and massively deploying subversive reconnaissance groups that moved around with Ukrainian armbands. Evacuation of the wounded was also difficult. Russian drones were constantly bombarding the Ukrainian positions, and it was almost impossible to dig in under such conditions. Despite their vast losses of equipment and infantry, the Russians could advance near Synkivka. On Monday (15JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that after an artillery strike, the Russian forces tried to attack Ukrainian lines near Petropavlivka and Synkivka but made no progress. The same outcome occurred on Tuesday (16JAN). Another Russian source said that on Tuesday, assaults on Synkivka were virtually suspended as main battles occurred to the east of Petropavlivka.
On Wednesday (17JAN), the Russian journalist noted that Russian troops continued to attack Petropavlivka and Synkivka, but no changes were recorded. Oleh Synehubov claimed on Wednesday that Russian attacks decreased. On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier stated on Thursday (18JAN) that in recent days, the Russians had (again) restarted attacks on Synkivka. Another Ukrainian soldier also said on Thursday (18JAN) that the situation near Syinkivka was challenging. However, no detailed information was provided.
On Thursday (18JAN), Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Ukrainian Land Forces Commander, claimed that the situation in the Kupyansk sector remained tense. The Russians continued to conduct active assault operations and were supported by an intense artillery fire.
A Polish volunteer who is in the Kupyansk area noted on Thursday (18JAN) that the situation near Kupyansk had not been that bad for a year. She characterised the situation as critical as Russians were attacking Ukrainian positions for nine hours. Ukrainians lost some terrain initially but counterattacked and took it back. On Friday (19DEC), their positions were hit with two KAB bombs.
On Friday (19JAN), Serhiy Nayev claimed that Russia keeps about 21,800 troops near the northern border with Ukraine. The situation was under control. Nevertheless, the Russians were constantly conducting reconnaissance activities and shelling border areas.
No changes occurred near Lyman Pershyi, Ivanivka and Krokhmal’ne. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
The Ukrainian blogger claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that Russian troops had become more active near Novovodyane. Before that, they had been conducting assault operations west of the village. The source, however, did not provide more information about these actions. The Russian sources did not report changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
The Ukrainian blogger claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that Russian troops advanced near Makiivka. However, the source noted that the event occurred in the first days of the year, and it was only then (14JAN) that it was possible to confirm the contact line. The blogger also added that Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Terny, but no frontline changes were recorded, which was confirmed by the Russian source. On Monday (15JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions near Ploshchanka and managed to advance. However, he, too, did not substantiate these claims.
On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces put serious pressure on Ukrainian units near Ploshchanka. But it is unclear what this involved. On Wednesday (17JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian troops were conducting assaults near Terny and Makiivka, but no changes were recorded. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Thursday (18JAN) that the situation northwest of Kreminna was complicated, as the intensity of Russian attacks was very high. On Wednesday (17JAN), they reportedly destroyed two Ukrainian positions and slightly advanced.
No changes occurred near Chervonopopivka. Also, no changes occurred near Torske, Nevske and Yampolivka.
In the Kreminna area, the Russian source claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that positional battles continued in the Serebryasnky forest. The source said that Russians had captured another Ukrainian stronghold. The Ukrainian sources did not report any changes. On Tuesday (16JAN), the meeting engagements continued in the area and south of Dibrova, but no changes were recorded.
It appears that battles in the Bilohorivka area were reactivated. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that the Russians had conducted an assault using heavy equipment. The UAF lost two positions (which had been changing hands many times), and several Ukrainian fighters were captured. The Russians lost a (unspecified) tank. The soldier added that Ukrainian units were bringing ammunition and building fortifications. The Russians want to capture heights near the village to achieve fire control over the Serebryany forest, Lyman and Terny. On Monday (15JAN), the Russian source stated that Russian troops, supported by long-range weapons, resumed their offensive on Bilohorivka. However, the source failed to provide detailed information. On Wednesday (17JAN), the Ukrainian blogger added that the Russians had partial success near Bilohorivka, but it is unclear what this meant.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk direction, Russian units repelled 11 (aggregate figures for the past seven days) Ukrainian attacks near Lyman Lake and Synkivka.
Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, said that in the Lyman direction, Russian units of the Centre Group of Forces, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled five (aggregate figures for the past seven days) Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The Russians continued attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novobakhmutivka axes during the past week. Although they increased assault efforts overall, no frontline changes were recorded.
On Sunday (14JAN), the Ukrainian source claimed that Russians had resumed attacks between Vesele and Spirne. On the other hand, the Russian source also asserted on Sunday that Russian troops had pulled back near Spirne but continued to attack near Vesele. On Thursday (18JAN), the Russian source said that Russian troops captured Vesele. Another Russian source said that the capture of Vesele was achieved through a flanking manoeuvre, which forced Ukrainians to abandon part of their positions and withdraw from the village. The Ukrainian journalist stressed on Thursday (18JAN) that this information was not confirmed, although some Ukrainian sources admitted to the loss of the settlement.
No changes occurred near Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Rozdolivka and Fedorivka.
On Sunday (14JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian forces had advanced near Khromove. The source added that Russians managed to advance towards Ivanivske, too. On the other hand, the Ukrainian blogger claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that Russian troops attacked the area of the cemetery near Khromove, but no changes were recorded. On Monday (15JAN), the Russian source stated that the Russian assault towards Chasiv Yar from several directions continued without any notable breakthroughs. The source said that Russian troops were exhausting the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske. On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russian source added that Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Khromove and Bohdanivka, but no changes were recorded on the frontline.
On Wednesday (17JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops continued to try to break through Ukrainian lines near Khromove and Bohdanivka, but Ukrainian units held their positions. A Ukrainian soldier added that for two days, Russians were attacking with infantry and armour. The pressure was “enormous”, but they did not achieve their objectives. The source also said everything depended on coordinating UAF artillery, infantry, and UAV strikes to stop Russian attacks. The Russian source claimed on Thursday (18JAN) that the UAF fired cumulative munitions frequently, which was unusual. They were not very effective against Russian manpower and fortifications. The source believes that the UAF had problems with fragmentation ammunition shells on the Bakhmut section of the front, so they were using what they could.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Bohdainivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka.
In the Bakhmut alone, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
The Russian sources claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that Russian troops, supported by artillery, again stormed the heights northwest of Klishchiivka. Another Russian source stated that Russian units captured a part of “a significant stronghold” near the village. On the other hand, the Ukrainian sources did not report any changes or loss of positions near this settlement. The Ukrainian source also said that Russians tried to attack east of Andriivka, but no changes were recorded. On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the heights northwest of Klishchiivka, but no frontline changes were recorded. A Ukrainian soldier also claimed on Tuesday (16JAN) that almost nothing had changed regarding Kyiv’s territorial control, but Russians were attacking around the clock. On Wednesday (17JAN), the Russian source added that Russian forces continued to try to break through UAF defences on the heights northwest of Klishchiivka, but the UAF held their positions.
Battles for Stepove continued. During the weekend, they launched attacks on Ukrainian positions near the village but gained no ground. The attackers also became more active in the Dachi area, east of the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, which was confirmed by the Russian journalist. Another Russian source said that in the Dachi area, the UAF had withdrawn some 300 metres, but this remained unconfirmed. On Monday (15JAN), the Ukrainian source claimed that Russian troops continued to attack near Stepove but were unsuccessful. The attack involved former Wagner PMC fighters. The source also added that south of Vesele, a Russian convoy of more than ten armoured vehicles tried to pass through the Dachi area and enter the town. However, this attempt was halted, and the attackers were forced to withdraw.
No changes occurred in the Avdiivka. The Russians continued to shell the city heavily. On Thursday (18JAN), Anton Kotsukon, the spokesman for the Ukrainian 110th Separate Mechanised Brigade, claimed that Russians intensified attacks near Avdiivka and tried to cut the roads from the northwest and southwest. There was a short period of calm before and after the New Year, but the Russians had increased the intensity of their attacks. They started using armoured vehicles again, but the defenders held their positions. The Russian source claimed that on Wednesday (17JAN) Russian forces retained the initiative and continued attempts to move forward.
On the southern flank of the Avdiivka axis, the Ukrainian source claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that the Russians continued their daily assaults near Pervomaiske. Since the beginning of the year, the Russians had conducted daily assaults near this village. The Russian source added on Sunday that with artillery support, the Russians also attempted to breach the frontline near Nevelske and Pervomaiske and tried to advance towards Sjeverne. The source stated that no changes were recorded on the contact line. Another Russian source also said that no changes occurred near Sjeverne and in the “Khimik” micro-district in Avdiivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke, Opytne and Vodyane.
On Sunday (14JAN), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that the situation near Novomykhalivka was critical. The Russians were attacking from three sides – north, east and south. The Russian source said that on Sunday (14JAN), the Russian troops, supported by long-range weapons, carried out assault operations southwest of Novomykhailivka and on the outskirts of the Krasnohorivka, but no significant changes were recorded. Another Russian source added that the Russian units managed to advance slightly to the south of the village. However, no changes were recorded on the southeastern outskirts of the settlement. Also, heavy battles continued near Heorhiivka. On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Novomykhailivka. The source also added that battles continued in the direction of Kurakhove near Heorhiivka, but no changes were recorded. The Russian source claimed on Wednesday (17JAN) that positional battles continued near Novomykhailivka, with Russian offensive actions being carried out mainly on the flanks of the settlement. To the south of Novomykhailivka, a significant advance of the Russian forces was recorded (approximately seven square kilometres). The main battles occurred in the forest areas around the settlement. Russian units were attempting to destroy Ukrainians before they approached their positions in the village. The artillery strikes were being carried out on Ukrainian concentration areas and facilities near Yelyzavetivka and Vodyane, as well. Several Ukrainian strongholds were destroyed near Solodke and Mykylske.
No changes occurred near Pobjeda and Vuhledar. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units successfully repelled five Ukrainian attacks (aggregate figures for the week) near Vesele and Bohdanivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
The past week brought no frontline changes in Velyka Novosilka’s and Orikhiv’s axes.
In the Velyka Novosilka axis, the Russian source claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that after artillery strikes, Russian troops attacked west of Staromaiorske and towards Prechystivka. The sources said that it was a new Russian active area. The Ukrainian blogger said no changes were recorded on Sunday (14JAN). On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions north of Kermenchik and Staromlynivka and captured several positions. The battles also occurred in the dominant height east of Urozhaine, but it is unclear whether they led to any territorial changes. The source also said that the UAF tried to counterattack near Zavitne Bazhannya but were unsuccessful. The UAF retreated with losses. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pryyutne and Novodarivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Russian source claimed on Saturday (13JAN) that Russian troops attacked west of Robotyne and regained positions southwest of Verbove. The Ukrainian sources did not report any changes. The same Russian source further stated that on Sunday (14JAN), the attackers continued to attack west of Robotyne, while the UAF did not carry out any active offensive actions in the area. Another Russian source noted on Sunday that the Russian advance continued southeast of Robotyne and west of Verbove. The pace of advance was slow but steady.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that on Sunday (14JAN) that no changes were recorded in the area. On Monday (15JAN), the Russian source said that Russian forces counterattacked from Novoprokopivka and near Verbove. The source said that the line of contact did not change. The Russian units also tried to advance towards Chervone but likely failed.
On Tuesday (16JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces attacked west of Robotyne and from Novoprokopivka, but the UAF held their positions.
On Wednesday (17JAN), the Russian journalist said that battles occurred west of Robotyne as the UAF were trying to stabilise the situation in this area. At the same time, Russian forces continued positional attacks from Novoprokopivka and Verbove. However, the source failed to provide detailed information about these attacks.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novofedorivka.
On Wednesday (17JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy several Ukrainian strongholds near Pyatykhatky. No further information was provided.
On Sunday (16JAN), Dmitry Rogozin, the so-called senator from the Russian-annexed part of the Zaporizhzhia region, claimed that many units of the Ukrainian troops had changed their staffs and virtually every infantry platoon had drone operator squads. He complained that there was a “carousel of enemy drones” all over the Zaporizhzhia front. “I think it’s the same on other fronts. There are countless enemy drones. When you drive into a front-line village, it’s as if you’ve walked into a hornet’s nest — everything is buzzing. At the entrance, enemy FPV drones are on duty in pairs. One immediately attacks, the other registers the strike and attacks those who rush to help the victim.” – Rogozin stated.
According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South-Donetsk direction, Russian units hit Ukrainian two concentration areas (aggregate number for the past seven days) near Novomykhailivka.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
No significant changes occurred in the Kherson Direction. Ukrainian forces continue to hold a bridgehead on Dnipro’s left bank despite Russian counterattacks. Due to worsening weather conditions (the river’s freezing), both sides faced problems with logistics, evacuation, and rotation of troops.
The Russian source claimed that on Saturday (13JAN), the UAF attempted to move forward from an island near Pischanivka but were unsuccessful. Battles also continued near Krynky. Another Russian source claimed on Sunday (14JAN), that Ukrainian activity was temporarily reduced in the area. This was likely the result of Dnipor’s freezing, which hindered the Ukrainians’ ability to resupply their forces.
Indeed, a Ukrainian soldier confirmed on Monday (15JAN) that it was the first time in 2024 that they had difficulties crossing the ice-covered Dnipro River. As a result, as Russians noted, the number of Ukrainian personnel in Krynky decreased due to sustainment problems. However, another Russian source said on Tuesday (15JAN) that due to the freezing Dnipro River, Russian troops also faced problems with ammunition delivery, evacuation, and rotation of troops. The same source claimed on Wednesday (17JAN) that Russian fighters deployed in Krynky reported problems in their units. The general message was that there was a complete lack of cooperation. The source reported that, first of all, the Russian assault teams had no direct link to drones or artillery. Secondly, requests for fire support from the ground first went to the command and then (if lucky) to the artillery units. Thirdly, there was no systematic electronic warfare and signals intelligence effort to degrade Ukrainian operations in the area, either.
The Ukrainian blogger claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that the Russians were pulling up forces to increase pressure on the bridgehead in Krynky.
On Saturday (13JAN), Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, said that Russian troops had returned to active assault operations in the south of the country. According to her, nine assaults were recorded per day. “If earlier we used to record 10 to 13 assaults per day. Lately, there have been 1-3 assaults per day. This is a sharp drop. However, today, there were already nine assault actions,” – she said. Humeniuk also added that Russian troops were using not only Storm-Z (prisoners) units but also deployed naval infantry and airborne troops, which indicated a desire to increase the effectiveness of assault operations. She also claimed on Sunday (14JAN) that as Russians were trying to drive Ukrainian units out of Krynky, they had deployed about 10,000 personnel to the area. On Tuesday (16JAN), Humeniuk added that Ukrainians suffered logistical difficulties on the left bank but held their positions. However, she said that the attackers lost up to 50-70% of their personnel and equipment after each assault on Ukrainian positions.
On Monday (15JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that battles occurred near Pischanivka and Krynky. The source, however, failed to provide detailed information about these developments. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
On Tuesday (16JAN), a Ukrainian soldier noted that Ukrainian units had improved their situation slightly in Krynky, but he did not explain what this involved. On the other hand, also on Tuesday, the Russian source reported a reduction in Ukrainian territorial control in the village. The source also mentioned that a lack of vegetation and persistent ISR activities made combat operations difficult to conduct. The same Russian source claimed that on Wednesday (17JAN) the Russian flag was put up in Krynky. The scale of Russian advances was unclear, but nevertheless, the Ukrainians continued to hold a part of the village. Ukrainians denied the former claim. Another Ukrainian source said on Wednesday (17JAN) that the village of Krynky was utterly destroyed by artillery and that it no longer exists.
According to ATESH, a military movement of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, telegram channel, a Tarantul-type patrol ship had sunk in Sevastopol on Thursday (18JAN). The vessel is located on the pier of “Grafskaya” bay. The source believed that the ship was hit in a naval drone attack a few weeks ago.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 567 aircraft (0), 265 helicopters (0), 10,894 UAVs (+274), 450 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+3), 14,686 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+108), 1,202 MLRS launchers (+0), 7,788 field artillery guns and mortars (+94), as well as 17,617 units of special military vehicles (+272).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 374,520 personnel (+6,060), 6,167 tanks (+107), 11,445 armoured combat vehicles (+191), 8,854 artillery systems (+144) and 966 MLR systems (+9), 653 anti-aircraft systems (+12), 329 aircraft (+2) and 324 helicopters (0), and 6,929 UAVs (+93), 1,818 cruise missiles (+12), 23 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 11,831 vehicles and fuel tanks (+219), and 1,339 special vehicles (+45).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
We continued to see a decreased tempo of Russian missile and drone attacks in Ukraine.
There were no missile attacks over the past seven days.
Russians launched two Shahed 131/136 drone attacks. The first one occurred on Wednesday (17JAN) and involved 20 vehicles, of which 19 were shot down. The second attack took place a day later (18JAN) and involved 33 drones. Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 22 (66% interception rate) using air defence equipment (SAM, mobile fire groups) and electronic warfare assets. As such, both attacks involved only 53 Shaheds.
On the other side of the spectrum were ground attacks. Last week, we noted a significant decrease in such assaults, which bottomed at 35 on 7JAN. Since then, they increased sharply, reaching 127 attacks on Thursday (18JAN). This is the highest one-day figure since March 2023. From the numbers perspective, we are now on the same level of attacks as during the initial days of attacks on Avdiivka. Yet, certainly, this rise in ground attacks has not reflected in frontline changes or even a perception that the frontline situation has deteriorated, especially near Avdiivka. It seems that the focus has shifted towards Kupyansk.
(Battlefield) missile strikes decreased and featured only 23 attacks last week.
Ukrainians reported a significant increase in airstrikes. Similar to ground attacks, Russians bottomed on 11JAN with three attacks. Russians launched 65 strikes the following day and 91 a day later. On Wednesday (17JAN), 128 strikes were reported, the highest number since we started tracking these metricks in MAR2022. Such tempo is unlikely to be sustainable over the next few days, let alone weeks. Lastly, MLRS attacks increased following the pause two weeks ago. But, looking at a longer perspective, they are now at previous levels of around 60 (+/- 10 attacks) conducted per day.
Outlook for the week of 20JAN – 26JAN2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” No changes occurred in the Luhansk Oblast last week.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka (new addition), Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. Still, we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.” Russians made some gains but did not capture a single settlement (Vesele has not been confirmed independently).
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” The Southern Direction saw no major changes last week.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely to eliminate it.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 5/5 (100%)
The forecast for the week of 20JAN – 26JAN2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. Still, we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.