Ukraine Conflict Monitor- 06 January - 12 January 2024
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week's developments
Last week brought very limited frontline changes in Ukraine; Many claims pertaining to the forward movement were not visually confirmed, while those that were had a marginal impact; The overall operational-strategic situation remained unchanged;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast, including a hotel where many foreign journalists tended to stay;
Russians reportedly made some gains towards Kupyansk in the Luhansk Direction, but, overall, no gains were independently verified; Ukrainians maintained that the Russian objective was to reach the town;
Russians progressed slightly near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka; Despite this, the overall tempo of attacks decreased;
Russians again captured some terrain near Robotyne while the Ukrainian defensive posture remained unchanged;
Ukrainians maintained the bridgehead in Krynky in the Kherson Oblast, but Kyiv lacked resources to expand its presence in the area; Russian counterattacks in this area continued;
Russian ground and MLRS attacks and air strikes decreased over the past week, which could indicate an operational pause;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 23 Russian attacks (44 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 15 Russian attacks (43 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 158 Russian ground attacks (175 two weeks ago, 261 three and 344 four weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian Forces repelled 17 Russian attacks (22 two weeks ago and 51 three weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 39 Russian concentration areas while missile forces hit four concentration areas, three command posts, seven ammunition depots, one electronic warfare station, one air defence radar station, one Tor surface-to-air missile system and five artillery systems.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated approximately 0.13 square kilometres, while Russians captured around 13 square kilometres. In the assessed period, the Ukrainian posture remained defensive, while the Russian focus on offensive operations remained stable. But as always, these numbers do not portray the full picture of the current situation.
So, let’s take a larger perspective on the current situation. In OCT23, Moscow launched its autumn offensive near Avdiivka, also followed by assaults near Bakhmut. After three months, Russians captured approximately 74 square kilometres (31 near Avdiivka, 38 near Bakhmut, and five near Horlivka), while Ukrainians liberated around 12 square kilometres.
Based on this data, the first observation is that although the Russian centre of gravity was near Avdiivka, the attackers progressed more near Bakhmut.
Secondly, to capture Avdiivka, Russians employed two combined arms armies (CAAs). This was a significant achievement. It was the first time since the pullback from northern Ukraine in MAR-APR22 that Russians were capable of employing two CAAs offensively. The attack showed that, at least partly, they regenerated some of their units back in Russia. Although we assess that this force regeneration has likely impacted other armies, such as the 6th and 20th CAAs and the 1st Tank Army, their performance has been very underwhelming so far. Russians failed to attain any operational, let alone strategic objectives, while their forces suffered heavy casualties. In the Avdiivka axis, they lost at least 151 tanks and 249 other armoured fighting vehicles. Ukrainian numbers stand at 17 and 9, respectively, so the total loss ratio is 14:1. At the same time, Ukrainians deployed to this area some badly battered units, which by October, had been heavily involved in the summer counteroffensive. As a result, the 47th Mechanised Brigade, for instance, was significantly depleted and mostly manned with troops that had not been battle-tested when deployed to the Avdiivka axis.
So where are we now? In the previous UCM issue, we noted that the previous week “saw a significant decline in Russian ground attacks. In their centre of gravity near Avdiivka, Russian assaults decreased by 50% over the past two weeks (…) Whether this signals the exhaustion of Russian offensive potential, a short pause, or the beginning of a longer recess is unclear at this stage”. We also stressed that “Russians will continue to attack Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Robotyne, even if the intensity of these attacks declines due to shortages in manpower and equipment.” Since then, Russian attacks have continued to decrease. With hindsight, we assess that the Russian Autumn Offensive (in the Avdiivka axis) culminated without attaining its objectives. Another large-scale attack over the winter (winter offensive) is possible, though. So far, Russians have maintained their pressure along various axes, but evidently, the tempo of operations has decreased even though the Russian artillery advantage is 5:1.
In this context, we were wrong to say in the UCM 341 (16-22DEC) that Russians could sustain the then tempo of attacks for a few weeks. They didn’t.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Monday (08JAN)
The German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz criticised the European Union for providing insufficient military aid to Ukraine. He stated that a “significant German contribution will not be enough to ensure Ukraine’s security in the long run”.
The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR) claimed it had obtained 100 GB of classified data from the Russian Special Technology Center company, which provides the Russian Armed Forces with military equipment, including Orlan UAVs.
Tuesday (09JAN)
Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo stressed that the European Union “will further scale up its support to Ukraine” and will “continue to bring its economies and people closer while Ukraine will progress on its accession path”.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Gen Valerii Zaluzhny, jointly with Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, and Minister of Defence Rustam Umerov, visited Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.
The Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico criticised the Western approach to the Russo-Ukraine war and claimed Russia also needed “security guarantees” from the West to stabilise its relations with the European Union.
The Governor of Belgorod Oblast, Vyacheslav Gladkov, announced the upcoming evacuation of children from the oblast. He said they would be relocated to Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Kaluga and Tambov Oblasts.
Wednesday (10JAN)
The Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, announced that his state had approved long-term support for Ukraine. It will include USD219 million worth of military purchases.
The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada returned the draft law on changes in mobilisation to the government for revision.
The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR) representative, Maj. Gen. Vadim Skibitsky claimed that the Russian State Military-Industrial complex could produce two million 122 and 152-mm artillery shells annually, but last year’s deficit was 500,000 shells.
Thursday (11JAN)
Another International Atomic Energy Agency personnel rotation occurred in the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
The Pentagon released a report evaluating the monitoring of American military assets provided to Ukraine. According to the document, the United States “did not fully comply” with their tracking duties concerning USD one billion worth of military equipment.
The Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin claimed that Ukraine received preliminary data confirming the use of North Korean-made missiles by the Russian Armed Forces on 02JAN.
Friday (12JAN)
The British Prime Minister Rishi Sunaki signed a security agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zenelsky. Sunaki also announced a USD3.2 billion military aid package for Ukraine, which will include air defence and anti-tank equipment, long-range missiles, and training for Ukrainian service members.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
Last week, we noted no major changes in the frontline posture of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Available data related to the activity of the 21st Mechanised Brigade in the Luhansk direction allowed us to reposition the formation – from the Svatove to the Kreminna axis.
The same pertains to Russian redeployments.
Russians could have deployed elements of the mobilised 1009th Motor Rifle Regiment in the Kharkiv direction. This information still requires additional confirmation. Nevertheless, because the unit's position was unclear earlier, we decided to move it to the mentioned area.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No frontline changes were observed in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past week, but Russians continued artillery and missile strikes on Kharkiv.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Hatyshche, Bochkove, Dvorichanske, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Berestove, Kupyansk, Lyptsi and Kozacha Lopan, Vovchansk and Budarky.
On Sunday (07JAN), Synehubov claimed that the Russians attacked Kharkiv (an industrial enterprise and an educational institution) with S-300 missiles, but there were no casualties. Another attack took place on Tuesday (09JAN) when two missiles hit a children's health centre, also in Kharkiv. On Wednesday (10JAN), a Russian S-300 attack damaged a hotel complex where more than 30 civilians were staying at the time of the attack.
According to Serhiy Serhiyenko, head of the Novhorod-Siverskyi district military administration, on Thursday (11JAN), a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group entered the Chernihiv region and shot a civilian between Hremyachka and Leonivka, which is about half a kilometre from the border with Russia.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
The frontline in the Luhansk Direction also remained unchanged.
On Saturday (06JAN), Synehubov said that a decrease in Russian attacks had been recorded as the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were inflicting heavy damage on the attackers. Russians were forced to withdraw to recover. He further added that no Ukrainian positions had been lost, but it is unclear what timeframe he had in mind. Importantly, Synehubov stated that Ukrainians were working continuously to build fortifications. Ukrainians were focused on the Kupynask and Lyman areas but were also setting up defensive lines in the northern parts of the Kharkiv Oblast and the Sumy region.
That said, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Ukrainian Land Forces Commander, described the situation in the Kupyansk sector as challenging. The Russians continued to conduct active offensive operations in the Serebryansky forest, trying to break through Ukrainian defences. The intensity of ground attacks significantly increased in October 2023, and he added that the “fierce struggle” had not stopped since then.
Syrskyi also spoke about the situation in the Luhansk Direction on Thursday (11JAN). He said the Russians were trying to increase their offensive efforts primarily at the expense of human resources. In the Lyman sector, the Russians were focused on pushing Ukrainian troops over the Zherebets River. He noted severe artillery strikes and added that additional assault companies were being moved from Russia to frontline areas. New assault units were also trained in base camps (presumably in Ukraine in the Luhansk Oblast). Syrskyi added that Russians were preparing to resume the offensive in the Siverskyi direction and were amassing “Storm” and assault units.
Russian sources claimed throughout the week that Russian units attacked Ukrainian positions near the village almost constantly. Attacks occurred on Saturday (06JAN), Sunday (07JAN), Monday (08JAN), and Wednesday (10JAN). Out of these attacks, the Sunday one reportedly resulted in Ukrainians losing some ground, but the exact scope of this development is uncertain. We have seen no visual evidence confirming frontline changes in the area. Likewise,
The Russian source claimed on Sunday (07JAN) that the UAF had changed tactics in the Svatove and Kupyansk areas and on the northern flank of Bakhmut due to a shortage of personnel. While strongholds on the zero and first defensive lines were manned, more often, lines farther back were not. As soon as a Russian assault began, reinforcements moved to secure these unmanned positions, whose task was to hold the line and prevent a breakthrough.
On Monday (08JAN), the Ukrainian soldier claimed that the Russians had made six rotations near Lyman Pershyi in three months. The soldier added that Russian sanitary losses ( personnel who have lost their combat capacity for at least a day) in some units reached 70-80 per cent. However, the Russians had a significant manpower advantage and could replace these losses. He added that Russians would continue to attack until the UAF changed their posture from defence to offence.
No changes occurred near Lyman Pershyi, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka and Krokhmal'ne. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
On Saturday and Sunday (06-07JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Terny, but no Russian progress was recorded. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Also, no changes occurred near Torske, Nevske and Yampolivka.
No significant changes occurred in the Kreminna area. The Russian source claimed that the meeting engagements continued on Saturday (06JAN) in Serebryansky foresty and south of Dibrova, but no changes were observed. Ukrainian sources did not report changes. On Wednesday (10JAN), the Ukrainian soldier said that Russians had multiplied their artillery fire and were preparing for assault operations. However, he added that Ukrainians received a decent amount of ammunition for artillery (the exact number was not specified) to provide the counterbalance.
In Bilohorivka, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk direction, Russian units repelled 20 Ukrainian attacks.
Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, said that in the Lyman axis, near Torske and Serebryansky forestry, Russian units repelled two Ukrainian attacks. At the same time, the group's artillery hit over 100 UAF targets.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Although Russians continued attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka throughout the whole week and claimed to have progressed, no visual evidence emerged confirming any frontline changes.
On Tuesday (09JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops attempted to capture Ukrainian positions near Vesele but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Rozdolivka, Sakko i Vantsetti and Fedorivka.
Syrskyi claimed on Thursday (11JAN) that the Russian objective near Bakhmut was to reach the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. From the north of Bakhmut, the Russians were conducting assault operations in the direction of Bohdanivka, with units of the 'volunteer corps' involved. The objective was to create favourable conditions for an offensive on Chasiv Yar.
Conflicting information appeared regarding frontline changes near Bakhmut. On Saturday (06JAN), Ukrainian sources claimed that the Russian forces captured unspecified positions near Khromove. On the other hand, the Russian journalist asserted on the same day that Russian troops continued to attack fortifications near Khromove and Bohdanivka, but no frontline changes were recorded on the line of contact. Another Russian source said on Sunday (07JAN) that heavy battles continued near these two settlements. It was early in the week when Ukrainians reportedly withdrew to the outskirts of Bohdanivka.
The Ukrainian soldier asserted that heavy battles continued near Khromove as well. He predicted that attacks would be sustained until spring. The Russian objective is to reach the rear of Chasiv Yar to cut off Ukrainian forces there. Nevertheless, the UAF was ready to defend the settlement.
On Wednesday (10JAN), the Russian source claimed that battles continued near Khromove and Bohdanivka. The Ukrainian soldier claimed on Thursday (11JAN) that the Russian attacks on Khromove and Klishchiivka continued and intensified.
No changes occurred near Dubovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes. The same goes for Bakhmut.
Moving further south, Russians sustained their attacks near Klishchiivka and Andriivka. Although both Ukrainian and Russian sources specifically mentioned Saturday, Sunday, and Monday (06-08JAN) as the day when Russian assaults occurred, we assess that Russian attempts to capture Ukrainian positions are almost constant (occur every day). Indeed, on Monday (08JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces had managed to advance on the northwestern approaches to Klishchiivka, but he provided no further details. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks. On Tuesday (09JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops continued to attack near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, but the UAF held their positions. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
A Ukrainian soldier asserted on Saturday (06JAN) that Russians were digging an „underground frontline tunnel” under the railway in Andriivka.
On Saturday (06JAN), Ukrainian bloggers wrote that Russians conducted relatively weak attacks near Stepove compared to the previous days. The primary attacks shifted slightly to the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant and Avdiivka Dachi. The source failed to provide detailed information about Russian attacks. However, the Russian source claimed on Sunday (07JAN) that Russian troops tried to attack from the northeast to the Coke Plant and the Stepove area. There was also an attack on Novobakhmutivka. The source added that the contact line did not change significantly in these directions. On Monday (08JAN), the Russian source added that Russian units continued to attack near Stepove and Ocheretyne, but no changes were recorded on the line of contact. On Tuesday (09JAN), another source claimed that the northern flank of the Avdiivka axis was characterised by heavy fighting near Stepove and the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant.
On Thursday (10JAN), the Ukrainian source stated that Russians, with the support of the two tanks, MT-LBs and infantry, tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Stepove but were unsuccessful. Another Ukrainian source claimed on Thursday (11JAN) that the situation near Stepove was tough, but no further information was provided as to what this involved.
We observed no changes in Avdiivka. Russians continued to shell the city heavily.
On the southern flank of the Avdiivka axis, during the weekend, Russians were very active near Pervomaiske. Russian operations were characterised by regular assaults in many places throughout the weekend. They also tried to break through near Nevelske but were also unsuccessful.
On Tuesday (09JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russians continued to attack near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Sjeverne and from the industrial zone. The source said that no significant changes were recorded on the frontline. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke, Opytne and Vodyane.
On Saturday (06JAN), the Ukrainian bloggers stated that Russians continued to be active near Mariinka and were attacking Heorhiivka. However, the UAF repelled all attacks. The Russian source claimed on Saturday (06JAN) that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions near Pobjeda and on both banks of the Osykova River from the direction of Mariinka. The primary task was to advance towards Heorhievka, while the operational objective was to advance towards the UAF hub in Kurakhove. The source also added that Russian units stormed Novomykhailivka from the southeast and northeast. Yet, despite this and overall, the battle intensity had decreased. On Sunday (07JAN), the same source claimed that Russian troops had managed to capture some positions near Heorhievka. On Monday (08JAN), the Russian journalist said that Ukrainian forces had counterattacked south of Novomykhailivka and forced Russian units to withdraw from this part of the settlement. The source added that the UAF had achieved some tactical successes, and the frontline remained dynamic. The Ukrainian blogger also confirmed the Ukrainian gains near Novomykhailivka.
The Ukrainian blogger claimed on Tuesday (09JAN) that Russians had captured one Ukrainian position near Novomykhailivka and continued to attack in the Heorhievka direction (no detailed information was provided).
No changes occurred near Vuhledar. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Ukrainian sources, the UAF destroyed a half-built railway bridge, fuel tanks and engineering vehicles in Hranitne near Mariupol. In order not to be so dependent on the Crimean corridor, Russia started building a railway line through Mariupol. The source said this was a strategic project, which, when completed, could provide Russia with a railway passage through the occupied territories, omitting Crimea and significantly improving their logistics.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, four Ukrainian counterattacks were repelled near Heorhievka. Also, Russian forces hit Ukrainian troop and equipment concentration areas near Toretsk, Andriivka, Klishchiivka and Ivanivske.
Southern Ukraine direction
Last week brought no frontline changes in this direction.
No changes occurred in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
On Sunday (06JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops supported by artillery attacked from Pryyutne towards Novodarivka. The sources failed to provide detailed information about this development. The Ukrainian sources did not report change attacks.
On Monday (08JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops tried to advance near Staromaiorske. On Wednesday (10JAN), the Russian source claimed that positional battles continued near Staromaiorske. Combat operations are focused on the use of surveillance and strike UAVs. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Urozhaine.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Russian source asserted that on Sunday (07JAN), Russian troops, supported by artillery, attacked UAF positions near Robotyne and captured several UAF strongholds. The source also said that near Verbove, Russian troops destroyed a Ukrainian IFV and repelled a Ukrainian infantry counterattack. On Monday (08JAN), the Russian source claimed that the UAF counterattacked on the northern approaches to Novoprokopivka and managed to regain previously lost positions. The line of contact again came close to the village. Battles also occurred near Verbove. Another Russian source asserted that in the Orikhiv axis, both sides’ actions were complicated by worsening weather conditions: cold and wet snow. On Tuesday (09JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russians were attacking the western outskirts of Robotyne. Battles also occurred on the approaches to Novoprokopivka and Verbove. Another Russian source claimed that on Tuesday, the UAF again tried to attack towards Verbove with small infantry groups, but they were destroyed. The Russian Armed Forces were using the tactic of raids by assault groups of paratroopers on IFVs on Ukrainian strongholds. This makes it possible to "keep the UAF in suspense" and prevent them from advancing, but Russian groups of 30-50 men at most cannot achieve significant frontal breakthroughs. The source added that the Russian troops were working to deplete the Ukrainian forces. On Wednesday (10JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that the overall situation did not change significantly. The Russian forces attacked the west of Robotyne after artillery strikes. In turn, the UAF conducted similar actions near Verbove. On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier claimed on Wednesday that for two days, Russian small-group assaults continued uninterrupted. In addition, the attackers were recorded refusing to take some positions.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novofedorivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near P'yatykhatky.
On Monday (08JAN), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that Somalian, Nepalese and Iranian units arrived in the Zaporizhzhia direction. However, another Ukrainian source recently claimed (08JAN) that on the outskirts of Mariinka, soldiers from the Ukrainian 46th Airmobile Brigade captured four Russian fighters, one of whom was a Somali citizen.
According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South-Donetsk direction, Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Pryyutne with air and artillery support. Also, Russian units defeated Ukrainian formations near Novomykhailivka. Aviation and artillery hit temporary deployment points, strongholds, and manpower concentration areas near Novomykhailivka, Konstantynivka, Volodymyrivka, and Staromaiorske. Eight attempts by the Ukrainian forces to carry out rotations in these areas were also disrupted.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
In the Kherson Oblast, no significant changes occurred. Despite Russian counterattacks, Ukrainian forces continue to hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River near Krynky.
On Saturday (06JAN), the Ukrainian sources claimed that no changes occurred on the left bank of the Dnipro River during the last few days. The Russians continued concentrating their fire on the crossings with all possible weapons and means.
On Sunday (07JAN), the Russian source stated that battles continued near Krynky, where both sides were using drones of all types to target each other artillery pieces. The source added that roads were being mined with the help of UAVs. On Saturday (06JAN), six small boats of the Ukrainian armed forces and up to 40 personnel were destroyed.
On Monday (08JAN), a Ukrainian soldier said that the UAF was using cluster munitions on the left bank of the Dnipro River. Another Ukrainian soldier claimed that Ukrainian Marines repelled a massive Russian assault on Monday near Krynky. A soldier said that the Russians increased the use of armoured vehicles in this area, but these reserves were destroyed during the Monday attack. Another Ukrainian source said that the UAF destroyed five tanks and three armoured personnel carriers near Krynky.
On Wednesday (10JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian troops, despite losses, did not abandon their intentions to expand their presence on the left bank of the Dnipro River. In the rear areas, the UAF were moving personnel and equipment, which indicated constant efforts to maintain the presence near Krynky.
When it comes to attacks in Crimea, on Saturday (06JAN), the Ukrainian Air Force reportedly hit the Saki air base. The commander of the UAF Air Force, Mykola Oleshchuk, explained that Ukrainian forces managed to destroy a command centre. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence further claimed on Saturday (06JAN) that on 4JAN, a special operation had been conducted in Crimea, which resulted in Russians losing several ammunition depots and radars.
On Monday (08JAN), Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, asserted that Russians in Crimea had changed priorities for the deployment of air defence systems after successful Ukrainian strikes. In particular, the Crimean Bridge is the air defence priority. She also noted that Russians continued to defend Sevastopol Bay to protect Kalibr-carrier vessels.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 567 aircraft (+3), 265 helicopters (+2), 10,620 UAVs (+414), 447 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+2), 14,578 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+195), 1,202 MLRS launchers (+12), 7,694 field artillery guns and mortars (+247), as well as 16,833 units of special military vehicles (+512).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 368,460 personnel (+10,940), 6,060 tanks (+107), 11,254 armoured combat vehicles (+221), 8,710 artillery systems (+293) and 957 MLR systems (+19), 642 anti-aircraft systems (+22), 329 aircraft (0) and 324 helicopters (0), and 6,836 UAVs (+297), 1,806 cruise missiles (+186), 23 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 11,612 vehicles and fuel tanks (+397), and 1,339 special vehicles (+85).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a fortnightly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
The past two weeks saw significant decreases (across almost all categories) in the number and intensity of Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine.
Starting with missile strikes, Russians fired 185 missiles, of which Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 107 (58% interception rate). These attacks occurred across four days (01, 02, 08, 12-13JAN), but notably, the 1JAN attack involved only one missile, while the remaining three 96, 51, and 37 missiles, respectively. We have seen no indications that Russians focused these strikes on the energy infrastructure. Instead, it is likely that the strikes again sought to degrade Ukraine’s defence production, especially its capacity to produce drones and long-range missiles. Given that we are already in mid-Jan and the astronomical spring will start in two months, it seems unlikely that Russians will target the power grid again. Although civilian targets do get hit, the primary focus is on Ukraine’s defence production. Undeniably, the intensity and pace of these strikes are limited, especially compared to the SEP22-MAR23 period.
We also need to point out that the 13JAN strikes, which involved a mix of three 131/136 Shahed kamikaze drones, seven S-300 air defence, six Kinzhal aerodynamic, 22 cruise, and two anti-radiation missiles, had a very high success rate. Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted only eight cruise missiles (20% interception rate). This is the lowest number since we started tracking this data in SEP22. It is unclear why this attack was so successful, but we will monitor Russian missile strikes to see whether this was a one-off event or the beginning of a new trend.
Shahed strikes decreased. Over the past seven days, Russians conducted only two strikes involving 36 vehicles, of which 29 were reportedly destroyed (80% interception rate). Extending the timeframe to the past fortnight, Russians launched 262 Shahed 131s/136s, of which 209 were shot down (79% interception rate). The largest attack in this war using this capability occurred on 01JAN when Russians launched 100 vehicles, and Kyiv claimed to have shot down 96. However, if we remove this particular strike from the equation (as it may have been psychologically oriented in striking Ukraine on New Year’s Eve), Russian Shahed strikes decreased. Over the past two weeks, Russians fired 156 drones, compared to 164 between 23-29DEC. Back then, Russian strikes occurred daily. There were eight over the past two weeks (excluding the 1JAN one).
Ukrainians also reported significant drops in Russian ground attacks. They peaked on 13DEC with 120 assaults and were on a downward trajectory until 7JAN, when they bottomed at 35. There has been an uptick since then, and numbers increased to around 70, but still, they are significantly below October or December attacks. On 13JAN (data for Friday 12JAN), Ukrainians reported 83 attacks, a significant increase compared to previous days. It remains to be seen whether this heralds the return to more ground activity or whether this was an occasional event.
The same pertains to MLRS strikes. There, too, Russians fired 181 times on 31DEC, the highest number in 2023. However, the number of MLRS attacks started decreasing, reaching 16 on 11JAN.
Outlook for the week of 13JAN – 19JAN2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
This forecast is two weeks old. Despite this, we got most of the things right again. It only highlights how difficult it is to break the current frontline deadlock.
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This assessment was correct.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in both the Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes, but we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.” Russians made marginal gains. The operational outlook remained unchanged.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (increase in probability) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” This assessment was correct because Russians advanced slightly while the Ukrainian defensive posture remained unchanged.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. They also may deploy additional forces. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more.” Russians retook some land on Dnipro’s left bank, while Ukrainian operations focused on maintaining the bridgehead near Krynky.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 5/5 (100%)
The forecast for the week of 13JAN – 19JAN2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka (new addition), Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. Still, we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely to eliminate it.