Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 07 October – 13 October 2023
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Key takeaways from last week's developments:
· From the frontline point of view, the past week again saw minimal changes as the battles indicated stalemate across the entire theater; However, in mid-week, Russians launched the largest armoured attack since JAN2023 and, despite heavy losses, continued attacking, attempting to encircle Avdiivka;
· The Ukrainian counteroffensive continued to deliver no meaningful territorial results;
· No frontline changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast; Artillery attacks on residential and civilian areas continued;
· Russians continued attacking Ukrainian positions in the northern part of the Luhansk Oblast (Synkivka - Ivanivka – Kyslivka) but made no gains; Sources continued to reiterate Russian preponderance of power in the region;
· No major changes occurred across the Donetsk Oblast; the Ukrainian centre of gravity (CoG) continued to be placed south of Bakhut, while the Russian CoG is now near Avdiivka;
· In the Southern Direction, Russians lost some ground in the Velyka Novosilka axis, while Ukrainian gains in the Orikhiv axis were marginal;
· Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast, while Russian sources continued to stress increased Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes, reportedly to prepare the battlefield for a cross-river operation;
· After weeks of intense bombardments, the past week delivered a breathing space for Ukrainians; Only two major kamikaze drone attacks occurred, but Kyiv boasted an interception rate of 80%.
Executive summary
From the frontline perspective, the past seven days delivered no changes. In fact, comparing the last week with previous periods, the frontline changes declined but continued to show Russian initiative. Ukrainian attacks also delivered marginal gains in the Southern Direction, where Kyiv’s strategic centre of gravity was. Russians counterattacked there, too, but made no confirmed gains.
Despite this clear lack of how frontlines were shaped, the last week saw some notable developments.
The most important event was the commencement of a large-scale (Ukraining General Staff reported three battalions) Russian attack on Ukrainian positions near Avdiivka. This scale means that Russians launched a regiment-level attack, which was the first time Russians attempted such a large-scale attack since the disastrous attempts to approach Vuhledar in JAN-FEB2023. Since then, Russians have utilised small-unit tactics as their main method of ground warfare. Although in the southern parts of the country, they defended as battalions/regiments/divisions, their offensive capabilities were lacking and thus relied on platoon- less often company-sized operations. In this context, the deployment of full battalions is a notable development. Another noteworthy development is how little Russians seem to have adjusted to the battlefield conditions following Vuhledar. The attack on the city is the epitome of the Russian Ground Forces as an organisation, which is inherently unable to adjust, learn from past mistakes, disorganised and where the mission command is heavy-handed, leaving little initiative to junior commanders. The initial attack on Avdiivka this week resulted in more than 40 pieces of Russian equipment lost (damaged/abandoned/destroyed) in return for marginal gains.
As stated in previous UCM issues, both sides could be on the opposite side of their respective offensive spectrum. Following four months of heavy battles with limited gains, Ukrainians are taking a pause. Russians, conversely, largely withstood Ukrainian attacks in the south and are now taking steps to retake the initiative. This means that Russians will probably start deploying their reserves from now on, which many believed Moscow did not have. If the reader looks at our Scribble Map and clicks on the Russian order of battle, they will see many units, which we don’t know where they are currently deployed. They include tens of manoeuvre regiments and brigades. It is highly unlikely that they were dissolved. So far, we have seen that mobilised formations are somewhat embedded into existing command structures of regular Russian army manoeuvre formations. For instance, the badly battered 291st Motor Rifle Regiment (42nd Motor Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) was not dissolved following the heavy losses it sustained between FEB-SEP2022. Instead, following the mobilisation, the 1430th Motor Rifle Regiment was established, and it was drawn into the 291st MRR’s command structure (the 291st HQ commands the newly established 1430th MRR). We believe that this process was repeated across the Russian Ground Forces. In this context, many units have been rebuilt and, more importantly, have not been committed yet. This leaves Moscow significant reserves and, thus, room to manoeuvre (in terms of losses) over the following weeks and months. Nevertheless, the current tempo of armoured vehicles’ losses is not sustainable.
We assess that the Russian objective is to advance along the flanks and slowly encircle Avdiivka.
The increase in Russian ground activity is well depicted in a chart showing the number of Russian ground attacks. The number was on a steady decline since early August. Back then, Russians averaged some 60 attacks per day, but by the end of September, this figure decreased to around 25. Two weeks ago, the moving average (7-day) showing Russian ground attacks started climbing for the first time in two months. The past seven days sustained this surge as Russians peaked with 108 attacks on Tuesday (10OCT). This was a five-time increase compared to attacks reported on 23SEP. We still don’t know whether this is the beginning of a new trend and, if so, how long it will last. But, by looking at Russian attacks near Avidiivka, Moscow appears to be very determined to make at least some territorial gains as soon as possible. This does not exclude the possibility of a major Russian offensive over the next few months. Nevertheless, the last week may have delivered the beginning of a Russian autumn offensive.
We also want the reader to pay attention to Russian reports about Ukrainian activities and troop deployments in the Kherson Oblast. We understand that all Ukrainian marine brigades have been withdrawn from the western Donetsk Oblast (Velyka Novosilka axis) and moved to Kherson. Russian sources noted significant increases in Ukrainian cross-river artillery and drone attacks. We do not know whether Ukrainians are preparing for an amphibious operation to expand their bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro River. Such an operation would be very high-risk due to the highly contested environment, a lack of air superiority and the inability to suppress Russian artillery and its ISR capabilities. On the other hand, a successful operation would bring Kyiv closer to Crimea, and if Ukrainians move deep enough, it would threaten Crimea’s role as the main logistics hub for Russian forces operating in the Kherson and western parts of the Zaporizhihia Oblast.
Next week, we will publish an assessment of possible Ukrainian options in the Kherson Oblast if Kyiv decides to take this step. We are also working on a similar analysis but looking at Russian options in the Luhansk Oblast.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No major changes were recorded in the Kharkiv Oblast last week. According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Vovchansk, Zemlyanky, Kamyanka, Dvorichna, Kyslivka, Kozacha Lopan, Kindrashivka, Peresichne Petropavlivka, Pletenivka and Okhrimivka, Pishchane, Pischane, Vovchanski Khutory.
No cross-border land attacks occurred.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Although no frontline changes occurred in the Luhansk Direction last week, Russians continued ground attacks, especially in the northern parts of the region. Positional battles continued between Synkivka and Bilohorivka. No frontline changes occurred.
According to Roman Vlasenko, the Head of the Severodonetsk District Administration, Russians promised to restore mobile communication and internet access after local elections in early September. However, little has been done since, and the focus has been placed on installing "stationary devices". Mobile communications did not resume as Russians saw it as a threat. Vlasenko probably meant that locals would pass data on Russian forces in the region to Ukrainian intelligence services via mobile services.
On Monday (09OCT), the Russian source claimed that Ukrainians were redeploying additional forces to the Kupyansk frontline due to a possible defence breakthrough.
Artem Lysohor, the Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head, said on Wednesday (11OCT) that the Russians had accumulated significant forces in the region and that their attacks did not cease and involved many armoured vehicles, including tanks.
Ilya Yevlash, the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group spokesman, claimed on Saturday (07OCT) that Ukrainian units from the 66th Separate Mechanised Brigade had destroyed 33 Russian tanks in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction over the previous several days.
On Sunday (08OCT), Yevlash added that another ten Russian tanks were destroyed in this frontline sector, mostly T-72s and a few T-80s. On Wednesday (11OCT), Yevlash claimed that Russians resumed offensive operations in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction. On the other hand, Russians increased the intensity of artillery and air strikes, focusing on Ivanivka and Sinkivka in the Kharkiv region and near Makiivka in the Luhansk Oblast. The Russian main goal remains to capture Kupyansk, he added.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, on Sunday (08OCT), Russians conducted three ground attacks near Synkivka and Ivanivka, all of which were repelled. However, Russian sources presented a less rosy picture. On the same day, a Russian journalist claimed that Russian forces captured several positions near Ivanivka. On Monday (09OCT), the same source stated that Russian forces had launched a large-scale offensive near Synkivka and Ivanivka, although no further information was forthcoming. In response, Synehubov said that Ukrainian units repelled five Russian attacks near these settlements and continued to hold their positions. So far, we have only seen written reports (posts) from both sides and have seen no visual evidence confirming the increased scale of Russian attacks and their territorial gains.
On Wednesday (11OCT), the Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army and the 1st Tank Army launched an offensive near the Synkivka - Ivanivka – Kyslivka line. Near Synkovka, Russian troops attacked along the railway from Lyman Pershyi and captured three Ukrainian strongholds. The source added that the assault was complex due to the densely mined terrain. The Ukrainian defence backbone comprised the 14th Separate Mechanised Brigade, reinforced by territorial defence units, but due to significant losses, reinforcements continued to be sent to Kupyansk.
When it comes to the frontline, no changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
According to Ilya Yevlash, on Wednesday (11OCT), Russians conducted a ground attack near Novojehorivka but were unsuccessful. Russian sources did not report changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes during the week. The same pertains to Novoselivske.
On Sunday (08OCT), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians conducted ground attacks towards Makiivka and captured several positions along the road to the east of the settlement. The Russian source confirmed this statement and added that Russians also sized Ukrainian positions near Nevske. However, Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks near this village.
On Tuesday (10OCT), the Russian source said that Russian units managed to advance on a broad front from Novovodyane and Ploshchanka, almost reaching the eastern outskirts of Makiivka. Also, Russian fighters approached Nevske, where reinforcements of the 88th Battalion of the Ukrainian 106th Separate Territorial Brigade had been transferred to strengthen defensive lines. However, the source also said the Russian attack was difficult because of minefields along the Makiivka-Nevske line. The source also claimed that during the previous day, 200 soldiers from the Ukrainian 44th Mechanised Brigade arrived in Pisky-Rad'kivs'ki. They underwent training in Nizhyn in Chernihiv Oblast. Units of the 44th Brigade were also seen in Borova. The source pointed out that the Ukrainians still had available reserves.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks near Ploshchanka, Chervonopopivka, Terny, Yampolivka and Torske.
In the Kreminna area, positional battles continued near Dibrova and Serebryansky forest. According to the Ukrainian source, the Russians were amassing new forces near Kreminna, which could lead to a new attempt to capture Ukrainian positions (25th CAA). Russian sources did not report any changes.
No changes occurred near Bilohorivka.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russians repelled 14 counterattacks by the Ukrainian 4th Armoured Brigade, 115th Territorial Defence Brigade and the 66th Mechanized Brigade near Synkivka, Orlyanske, Lyman Pershyi and Makiivka. The 14th, 30th, and 32nd Mechanised Brigades and the 115th Territorial Defence Brigade were hit near Kupyansk, Synkivka, Lyman Peshyi and Ivanivka. The Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters and attack aircraft carried out twelve missile and bombing strikes against Ukrainian concentration areas of the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 14th, and 32nd Mechanised Brigades near Synkivka, Ivanivka, Stelmakhivka and Berestove. Heavy flamethrower systems (TOS-1s) carried out two strikes on the Ukrainian concentration areas of the 106th Territorial Defence Brigade, 32nd Mechanised Brigade and platoon strongholds of the 4th Tank Brigade near Ivanivka and Makiivka. In the defence line of the 6th CAA, Ukrainians attempted to rotate units of the 115th Mechanised Brigade to forward positions near Synkivka but failed due to Russian artillery fire. Russian Su-34 bomber aircraft carried out four air strikes against the temporary deployment points of units of the 41st Mechanised Brigade and a stronghold of the 113th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade of the UAF in Petropavlivka.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russians repelled 23 attacks by assault groups of the 63rd and 67th Mechanised Brigades, the 12th "Azov" Special Forces Brigade and the 5th National Guard Brigade near Torske and the Serebryansky forest area. Russian aircraft destroyed two Ukrainian command and observation posts near Dibrova and a command and observation post of the 15th National Guard Regiment near Serebryanka.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Although no frontline changes were recorded in the Donetsk Oblast over the past week, Russians launched a large attack on Ukrainian positions near Avdiivka on Tuesday (10OCT), marking probably the largest mechanised attack since their failed attempts to approach Vuhledar in JAN-FEB2023.
But let's start with the northern parts of the region. No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same pertains to Rozdolivka, Fedorivka, Vasyukivka and Vesele.
According to the Russian source, on Monday (09OCT), Russians launched an attack from Dubovo-Vasylivka towards Bohdanivka, although no further information on this development appeared in open sources. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks. Positional battles continued near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Berhkivka.
The situation in Bakhmut remained unchanged as well.
Moving further south, battles near Klishchiivka and Andriivka continued, although their intensity appears to have decreased over the past week. The Russian source said on Monday that battles for control of the railway line near Andriivka continued, although neither side provided any information about what this entailed.
No changes occurred near Ivanivske, Bila Hora, and Niu-York. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
On Sunday (08OCT), Russians commenced attacks near Avdiivka, probably to encircle the settlement. There was also an attempt to reach the city's southern outskirts, repeated on Monday (09OCT). However, the following day (10OCT), Russians deployed significant forces supported by artillery. The Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) claimed that the force involved up to three battalions, which means a regiment-level operation. The UGS noted increased offensive activities near Avdiivka, Tonenke, Keramik and Pervomaiske. Bohdan Krotevich, the acting commander of the Ukrainian National Guard's Azov Brigade, said Russians conducted an offensive from Krasnohorivka to Vodyane in an attempt to encircle Avdiivka. The attack was by all means substantial. It involved tens of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and infantry vehicles supported by artillery and fixed- and rotary-wing assets.
On Tuesday (10OCT), the Russian source claimed that Russian assault groups managed to break through Ukrainian defences southwest of Krasnohorivka. Near Berdychi, Russian units gained a foothold on the northeastern outskirts of the village. In the southern section, the Russian forces conducted assault operations towards Sjeverne and Tonenke from Vodyane. The source claimed that Russians failed to reach the outskirts of the settlements, but several Ukrainian strongholds came under the control of the Russian units. Also, heavy battles occurred southeast of Avdiivka, a very fortified area. Indeed, due to dense minefields and heavy Ukrainian resistance, Russian units failed to reach the outskirts of the settlement. Nevertheless, Ukrainian bloggers asserted that the Russians managed to capture several positions during the offensive, but the strategic goals were not achieved considering the number of personnel and equipment involved. The source also said that all Russian claims that they had entered Berdychi were false.
By Thursday (11OCT), Russians lost (destroyed/abandoned/damaged) at least 40 combat vehicles, including tanks, APCS, and IFVs; almost half of these losses were BMP-1/2/3s. So far, the attack has failed to deliver any substantial and, above all, quick frontline change. We expect Russians to continue attacking Ukrainian units in the area for at least a week.
To hinder Russian force movements, Ukrainians destroyed an overpass between Yasynuvata and Horlivka.
In addition to attacks near Avdiivka, over the past couple of weeks, Russians appear to have increased their attack's tempo in Mariinka. On Sunday (08OCT), Russian sources reported increased attacks on the settlement. Despite this, we have seen no indications of any frontline changes within Mariinka. That said, the same source also reported on Sunday that Russian units managed to advance near Krasnohorivka, which was confirmed by the Ukrainian source.
No changes occurred near Pobieda. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
According to the Russian source, on Sunday (08OCT), Russians conducted a ground attack near Novomykhailivka. The source claimed that members of the 39th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade, together with Storm-Z assault units, attacked Ukrainian strongholds south of the village. As a result, heights 167(?) and 168(?) were taken. Ukrainian defensive operations focused on positions on the road near Solodke. We have not been able to confirm this development due to a lack of visual evidence. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
In the Vuhledar area, Ukrainian units tried to attack towards Mykylske early in the week. Russian source claimed that Russian soldiers of the 43rd Separate Special-Purpose Company of the 29th Combined Arms Army repelled a Ukrainian attack near the settlement and hit a Ukrainian concentration at the Yuzhno-Donbasska mine. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
According to Petro Andriushchenko, an advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol, on Monday (09OCT), additional Russian reserves were transferred to Mariupol and into the district. Andriushchenko claimed 5,000 personnel were deployed from newly established units, marking the first such instance since APR2023. Also, additional communication systems were being recorded along the coast from the village of Melekino towards Berdyansk.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russians repelled nine Ukrainian attacks near Kurdyumivka, Vesele, Vodyane and Sjeverne. Russian air defence systems in the Oleksandro-Kalynove direction shot down a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter jet as well, while Russian frontline and army aviation struck Ukrainian concentration areas near Andriivka, Klishchiivka, Bohdanivka, Vesele, Spirne, Bilohorivka and Mariinka. Also, Russian aircraft hit Ukrainian command and observation posts of the 79th and 95th Separate Airborne Assault Brigades near Antonivka and Pobieda. Russian artillery hit four Ukrainian control points for unmanned aerial vehicles near Avdiivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Novomykhailivka and hit an electronic warfare station in Siversk.
Southern Ukraine direction
No frontline changes were reported in the Southern Direction over the past seven days. The lull in combat operations on the Ukrainian side is evident.
Velyka Novosilka axis
No frontline changes were reported in the Southern Direction over the past seven days. The lull in combat operations on the Ukrainian side is evident.
The past week delivered no changes in the Velyka Novosilka axis. According to the Russian source, on Sunday (08OCT), Russian units continued the ground attack near Novodonetske but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Novomaiors'ke.
But, on the same day, Ukrainian forces attempted to move forward near Staromaiorske but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Urozhaine.
On Sunday (08OCT), the Russian journalist claimed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces, supported by artillery, were trying to seize the initiative near Pryyutne but were unsuccessful there too.
On Tuesday (10OCT), a Russian journalist claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Levadne, but no further information about this development was provided.
The Orikhiv axis
Likewise, the frontline remained static in the Orikhiv axis.
On Sunday (08OCT), the Ukrainian bloggers said that Russians attacked Ukrainian positions north of Marfopil and achieved partial success but suffered heavy losses. Increased Russian movements in this area were confirmed by Russian sources, which added that the initiative in the area was on the Russian side.
On Saturday (07OCT), Ukrainian artillery pieces belonging to the 82nd Separate Air Assault Brigade, 117th, 118th Mechanised Brigade, and 148th Separate Artillery Brigade launched multiple strikes (Russians called it indiscriminate fires) on Russian positions near the frontline. The following day, elements of the Ukrainian 82nd Separate Air Assault Brigade and 65th Separate Mechanised Brigade supported by the 12th Tank Battalion attempted to break through to Novoprokopivka. Still, they reportedly made no progress due to Russian artillery fire.
The source explained that Ukrainian artillery units operating AS-90 self-propelled howitzers had more and more problems operating the guns due to frequent fire control system failures, which limits their use.
According to the Russian source, Ukrainian forces continued to conduct offensive actions near Verbove but made no progress. On the other hand, a Ukrainian blogger asserted on Sunday (08OCT) that Ukrainian airborne assault troops achieved partial success west of Verbove. Due to a lack of verifiable data, we have made no frontline changes in the Orikhiv axis for over two weeks. It also reflects that the Ukrainian ability to achieve even tactical successes is limited, confirming our previous assessments.
Russian source claimed on Sunday (08OCT) that after abandoning a large-scale assault on the Russian positions due to heavy losses, the UAF command concentrated on conducting pinning strikes along the front. We assess that such intensive strikes are unlikely to be sustained over the following weeks. Instead, they are likely short-lived and only used to prepare the frontline for Ukrainian assaults.
Indeed, such strikes occurred around Sunday near Kopani, which was followed by a ground attack. Russian sources claimed that Russian artillery repelled Ukrainians, but the Ukrainian source asserted the Russians were pushed back north of the village.
No changes occurred near Pyatykhatky. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to the Ukrainian journalist Еvgeny Balitsky, those who had not received a Russian passport would be refused medical care from the new year. He also said several "other measures" were being introduced to force Ukrainians in occupied territories to obtain Russian passports, but he did not provide further details.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South Donetsk direction, Russian units repelled eight by the 127th and 128th Territorial Defence Brigades near Pryyutne. Also, six Ukrainian attacks by unspecified bridges were pushed back near Mykylske, Novodonetske and Staromaiorkse. Russian aircraft conducted air strikes on personnel and equipment of the 58th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 72nd Mechanised Brigade, 128th Territorial Defence Brigade and the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade near Konstantynivka, Staromaiorske, Urozhaine and Novomykhailivka.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
The overall situation in the Kherson Oblast remained unchanged. However, Russian sources reported increased Ukrainian artillery, FPV drones and rocket strikes on Russian positions in the region, which could herald a Ukrainian amphibious assault.
According to the Russian source, on Sunday (08OCT), Ukrainian forward detachments of the "Omaha" Tactical Group deployed on Kozatsky Island were rotated. A Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group arrived by boat from Mykolaivka with supplies and ammunition to the island's northern part. The UAF carried out similar actions on Oleshkinsky Island near the railway bridge and Kozachi Laheri. At the Antonovsky Bridge, the UAF sabotage groups continued to hold their positions. From time to time, Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance conducted raids towards Oleshky. However, these raids were exactly that and did not translate into any territorial gains. The source said that looking at the Ukrainian's actions, a specific change in the conduct of the battle along the Dnipro is clear: Ukrainians are preparing for an attack. Primary Ukrainian efforts near the islands are concentrated on reinforcing their positions without attempts to move inland. The source added that the number of artillery and FPV drone strikes on Russian forward areas has increased dramatically. The number of counterbattery assets deployed to the Kherson Oblast also increased. Another sign of an impending Ukrainian assault near Kherson is the intensity of shelling of Russian rear areas with cluster munitions and rockets from aircraft.
Two days later (10OCT), the same source stated that Ukrainian activities in the Dnipro Island zone decreased due to the deterioration of weather conditions. That said, Ukrainians started firing more actively along the left bank while continuing to move units to the line of contact. Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups resumed activities in the Hola Prystan area. At night, Ukrainian units from the 123rd Territorial Defence Brigade headed towards Bilohrudove Island from Yantarne. Their movement to the island indicates it is in a Grey zone.
Russians claimed to have shot down a Ukrainian MiG-29 near Soldatske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 488 aircraft (+2), 250 helicopters (0), 7,790 UAVs (+218), 441 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 12,546 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+185), 1,163 MLRS launchers (+2), 6,753 field artillery guns and mortars (+169), as well as 14,143 units of special military vehicles (+293).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 285,920 personnel (+4,830), 4,931 tanks (+154), 9,313 armoured combat vehicles (+231), 6,807 artillery systems (+141) and 811 MLR systems (+5), 546 anti-aircraft systems (+6), 316 aircraft (+1) and 316 helicopters (0), and 5,264 UAVs (+106), 1,531 cruise missiles (+1), 20 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 9,015 vehicles and fuel tanks (+188), and 967 special vehicles (+16).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Regarding Russian missile and kamikaze drone strikes, the past seven days were benign compared to the previous 30 days.
Ukrainian Air Force Command reported no missile strikes, while the Ukrainian General Staff said 17 missiles were fired on a battlefield. This is a significant drop compared to the previous period when 45 missiles were employed.
The number of Shahed strikes was also limited. They only occurred twice last week (Tuesday and Thursday) and involved 69 vehicles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 55 (80% interception rate).
On a side note, we added a new layer to our Scribble Map, which will show probable routes of Russian Shaheds, cruise and ballistic missiles. Please see the map below to see how to extract this option. Data for this layer comes from a Ukrainian source.
We continued to see an increase in Russian ground attacks. On Wednesday, Ukrainians reported 108 ground attacks, the largest number since MAR2023. The 7-day moving average is climbing as well. Undoubtedly, the increase is attributed to Russian attacks near Avdiivka and Synkivka, and Russians will likely maintain pressure in these areas over the following week.
Outlook for the week of 14OCT-20OCT2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.” This assessment was correct. No frontline changes occurred in the region.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will make territorial gains. We expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This assessment was also correct. Russians made no confirmed gains while their attacks persisted.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. However, there is a roughly even chance that they will reclaim some territory in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are unlikely to progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. It is also highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” This prognosis was generally correct, but a more nuanced look is required to assess it. Firstly, we were correct in anticipating no Ukrainian territorial gains. Russians did not capture a village either. But they reportedly made minor territorial gains (not visually confirmed) near Avdiivka. We did not anticipate their attack in this area, hence half a point reduction.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. Ukrainians are highly unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka. But, we also add that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis. We expect no Ukrainian gains in this area.” No frontline changes in the area occurred.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 14OCT-20OCT2023
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will capture one village or more. We expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, Russians will likely make some territorial gains. We also assess that there is a roughly even chance that they will capture one village or more over the next seven days. This view refers to the Avdiivka area. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are unlikely to progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. It is also highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow, if non-existent. Ukrainians are highly unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka. But, we also add that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis. We expect no Ukrainian gains in this area.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro. We now assess that Ukrainians could conduct a major river-crossing operation in the region, but, at present, we would not like to attach a probability score to this event.
About those reserves. The question was never whether they would exist, but where.
We are seeing Russian offensives in Luhansk and Donetsk in no small part because of their logistical constraints in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Limited logistics = limited local reserves. Thus the logic of Ukraine extending their littoral activity to Crimea, which has been the reserve base for Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.