BLUF: Last week delivered no breakthroughs in Ukraine. Ukrainian units were committed offensively in southern parts of the country and near Bakhmut. They progressed only near the latter, as their attacks in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblast were repelled. While some tactical gains could have occurred, Ukrainians did not capture a single settlement over the past seven days. Russian air and missile strikes were again limited, but the uptick in the activity of the Russian air force was visible.
Key takeaways from last week's developments:
· Last week, with varying degrees of success, Ukrainians continued offensive operations in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, western Donetsk Oblasts and near Bakhmut; There was no confirmed progress in key areas in southern Ukraine;
· The only confirmed progress was achieved south of Bakhmut, where Ukrainians slowly cleared southwestern approaches to the city; It appears that it is only there where Ukrainians maintain some forward momentum, but again, their ability to make rapid gains is limited by the lack of (trained) personnel and equipment;
· No changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast, where Russians again launched several assaults; air and missile strikes continued;
· No frontline changes were reported in the Luhansk Oblast, although it is possible that some under-the-radar tactical shifts occurred; Russian artillery strikes returned to very high levels;
· Russians made no gains in the Donetsk Oblast, but they were very active north of Bakhmut, where they tried to forestall Ukrainian counterattacks; Despite this, Russian offensive potential in the region is non-existent, especially since Wagner pulled back from the frontline;
· Ukrainians maintained their positions over the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal in Kurdyumivka but, more importantly, approached Klishchiivka where battles for nearby hights were ongoing;
· Ukrainians tried to extend their attacks towards Pryyutne, south of Velyka Novosilka, and extended attacks towards Pryyutne; No gains were made as Russian defensive operations were successful;
· Likewise, no frontline changes were reported in the Orikhiv axis; Russians assess the situation there as stable;
· Ukrainians made no progress towards Oleshky last week and were briefly dislodged from their positions near Dachi, near the Antonovskyi Bridge, south of Kherson; Russian tactical aviation employed laser-guided munitions to achieve this objective, which was only short-lived;
· Over the past seven days, Russians launched no mass air and missile strikes; The largest missile attack involved ten cruise missiles, of which three hit residential targets in western Ukraine, including Lviv; The overall tempo of air and missile attacks remained reduced;
**Before we start, there are some housekeeping points. Firstly, apologies for posting this update with a delay. Secondly, this UCM issue lacks maps. I currently have very limited access to the Internet, and I cannot load Scribble Maps. I will add them on Sunday. Next, there will be no UCM update next week. I am on a field trip and, as stated above, with limited internet access. Lastly, as usual, Belarus Security Update will be published on Monday, 10JUL and 17JUL.**
Executive summary
Over the past seven days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) maintained offensive operations in key areas around Bakhmut, western parts of the Donetsk Oblast, in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and south of Kherson. The main thrusts of the counteroffensive continued in southern parts of the country, but it was south of Bakhmut where Ukrainians managed to progress.
Based on Ukrainian social media reports, the overall tempo of Ukrainian attacks in the south remained more or less constant. Although according to Ukrainian MoD officials, Ukrainians progressed to liberate unspecified territories, no visual evidence appeared confirming their advances. A Russian blogger/journalist claimed that the intensity of Ukrainian artillery strikes in the Zaporizhzhia region returned to pre-counteroffensive levels. We have not been able to validate this claim (yet). But, if it is true, it would mean a significant decrease in Ukrainian artillery strikes, perhaps to the point where artillery would no longer be able to support ground attacks. It could also herald a decrease in Ukrainian ground attacks.
It was south of Bakhmut where Ukrainians achieved a tactical breakthrough. They managed to push Russian units east towards Klishchiivka and entered nearby heights. This alleviated the pressure on Ukrainian positions west of Bakhmut. Combined with attacks towards Yahidne and Berkhivka in the north, this development allows Ukrainians to provide almost uninterrupted support for their units near Ivanivkse, Khromove and thus Bakhmut. Does that mean that the second battle for Bakhmut is about to start? We continue to assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely to commence urban offensive operations due to the risks associated with high manpower losses. As such, they are more likely to create conditions to force a Russian withdrawal from Bakhmut, or any other urban settlement, by cutting or threatening to cut off ground lines of communications to a city. As such, we are more likely to see an encirclement operation around Bakhmut than a door-to-door battle across the city. But progress in this area is visible and tactically important. Notably, Russian positions in the south began to crumble after Wagner left the battlefield, which confirmed manpower shortages.
Ukrainians remained focused on striking Russian artillery assets to degrade their ability to hinder Ukrainian attacks. Indeed, a video was posted on Saturday showing two successful GMLRS strikes against Russian 220 mm BM-27 Uragan MLR systems, which should be a noticeable capability loss. But more importantly, it again shows that Ukrainians are able to operate their drones deep behind the frontline to acquire targets and conduct battle damage assessments. It also highlights Russian weaknesses in countering this Ukrainian capability. A similar situation occurred on 10JUN when Ukrainian artillery successfully interdicted the movement of a Russian artillery unit from Kherson to Zaporizhzhia.
The current phase of the conflict in the south again increasingly moves towards the artillery war, where the country with better access to ammunition and artillery systems will inflict more extensive damage on the OPFOR. So far, the results of this artillery war are unimpressive.
But a US decision to provide Ukraine with DPICMs (dual-purpose improved conventional munitions), also known as cluster munitions, could change the dynamics and trajectory of ground battles in the south. Firstly, it ensures that Ukraine will have steady access to artillery shells allowing them to maintain, or even increase, rates of fire. Secondly, although it remains to be seen how to what effect they will be used on the battlefield, in theory, DPICMs should significantly increase Russian manpower and soft-skin equipment losses and open up the front for Kyiv to exploit. DPICMs could be instrumental against the extensive system of trenches that Russians have constructed over the past nine months.
The decision to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions confirms what we wrote last week. The West needs a coherent strategy for dealing with Russian forces in Ukraine and forcing Moscow to abandon its positions. Clearly, the damage Western-supplied equipment has inflicted on Russian capabilities is significant but still insufficient to lead to the defeat of Russian forces in Ukraine. We maintain that a part of the problem is the incremental deployment of critical capabilities, which should have been delivered months ago to deliver a cumulative effect on the battlefield, including psychological on Russian soldiers and political-military leadership. Instead, we see incremental deliveries allowing Russians to adjust their presence and operations to mitigate their weaknesses and qualitative increases in Ukrainian capabilities.
In summary, deploying cluster munitions should place the Ukrainian counteroffensive on a new trajectory and bring new life into the operation, which is otherwise underwhelming.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
As expected, we continued to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. The intensity of ground fires and battles remained approximately the same, as neither side was able/willing to deploy more forces to tilt the balance in their favour.
We maintain that both sides deprioritise this direction and that we are unlikely to see more than local skirmishes, constant artillery exchanges, and operations run by reconnaissance and sabotage groups.
On Wednesday, Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, said that Russians had concentrated some 10,000 men in the Kharkiv direction. We assess that most of these forces include Western Military District units belonging to the 6th Combined Arms Army. Units from the 1st Guards Tank Army, 18th Mechanised Division of the 11th Army Corps (Baltic Sea Fleet) are also deployed in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Direction. The intensity of combat operations in areas of responsibility of these units has been subdued over the past few months. This, in turn, has allowed Russians to slowly rebuild the combat effectiveness of these formations, which suffered heavy losses during the initial months of the war. Nevertheless, as stated above, we remain sceptical about current Moscow’s willingness to significantly increase the intensity of attacks in a new direction. Perhaps Kyiv realises this too. On Tuesday, a Russian source claimed that a Ukrainian military column had left Kharkiv towards Zaporizhzhia.
When it comes to the frontline, again, the bulk of the fighting occurred near Hraynykivka, Masyutivka, Synkivka and Krohmalne but resulted in no territorial gains by either side. What also remained constant was Russian artillery and missile strikes. Last week, Russians hit Veterynarne, Kozacha Lopan, Budarky, Petro – Ivanivka, Novomlynsk, Cherneshchyna, Petropavlivka and Kolisnykivka, but also Pletenivka, Kozacha Lopan, Vovchansk, Masyutivka, Kyslivka, Berestove, Kurylivka, Shyikivka and Kruhlyakivka.
On Monday, Russians struck Pervomais'kyi using an Iskander missile, damaging nine residential buildings.
The Russian MoD claimed to have disrupted multiple Ukrainian operations in the region. The focus was again on concentration areas of the 14th Mechanised and the 103rd Territorial Defence Brigades, especially near Manchkivka(?) and Petropavlivka. Russians also claimed to have hit a Ukrainian convoy near Balakliya using the BM-27 Uragan MLR system, reportedly destroying five Ukrainian combat vehicles.
Several attempts to rotate forces near the frontline were also reportedly interrupted.
Luhansk direction
Russian forces continued to focus their ground operations in the southern parts of the frontline, near Dibrova and Serebryansky forest. Yet, as expected, these attacks delivered no confirmed frontline changes, neither in these sectors nor other parts of the oblast.
However, Cherevaty said on Wednesday that Russians concentrated around 125,000 personnel along the 110 km wide frontline between Lyman – Kupyansk. This thus suggests that the 10,000 figure he mentioned above should pertain to forces deployed from Kupyansk to Dvorichna. The entire Eastern Group of Forces, as he called them, had some 180,000 soldiers. A part of this grouping includes Storm-Z units (formations created with former inmates). However, we are unsure how big this force is. However, Cherevaty believes they are actively involved in ground operations between Kupyansk-Lyman.
Last week, we highlighted a perceived drop in the reported intensity of Russian artillery fires in the region. Although we noted that this reduction could suggest issues relating to ammunition access, we also warned that these problems could be short-lived. Indeed, data provided by Cherevaty last week confirmed that Russian problems (if they occurred) passed. On 2JUL Russians fired 595 times, and a day later, 661 in the Lyman – Kupyansk direction. On 5 and 6JUL, these numbers stood at 445 and 578, respectively. Russians also conducted at least 24 ground attacks and 49 airstrikes over the past week. As such, the intensity of Russian fires returned to the levels seen two weeks ago and earlier. We do not know whether this region remained the most heavily shelled in Ukraine. Probably it is surpassed by frontline areas in Zaporizhzhia and western Donetsk Oblast.
Regarding the frontline, as stated, the situation remained stable. No changes were recorded in the Svatove axis. No Russian attacks were recorded near Stelmakhivka between Monday and Wednesday.
On Wednesday, Russian troops supported by artillery attacked Ukrainian positions near Novoselivske, but we understand that this attempt delivered no results. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes in the area.
On Monday, Russians launched an assault from Chervonopopivka towards Nevske, but it was repelled. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Torske, Terny and Yampolivka.
No changes occurred near Makiivka and Ploshchanka. According to the Russian journalist, Russian troops tried to push towards Novovodyane. In general, the first two days of the week (Monday and Tuesday) were uneventful, but only on Wednesday did the tempo of attacks appear to have picked up.
In the Kreminna area, according to Ukrainian bloggers, positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest. Russians claimed that Russian troops tried to attack from Dibrova towards Yampil, but no further information about this development was provided.
Last week, we noted the reduction in Russian ground attacks near Bilohorivka. Indeed, the past seven days further confirmed this drop. Although Russian units launched a few attacks on Ukrainian positions near the village, they were all repelled. But again, we will reiterate what we said last week: due to a lack of progress in the area, Russians either decided to pause their attacks or their offensive potential is exhausted.
In the previous UCM issue, we wrote that a pro-Russian source claimed that Ukrainians launched a counteroffensive in the Kreminna area involving six brigades. Still, we also warned that it was too early to confirm such development. With hindsight, we can confirm that no such event occurred.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
As part of the ongoing counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued attacking Russian positions around Bakhmut, where they made visible progress. No frontline changes were reported in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
When speaking about the overall situation in the region, Hanna Malyar, the Deputy Minister of Defence, said that Russians continued to attack in the Lyman, Avdiivka and Mariinka sectors, and the intensity of Russian artillery attacks increased from 6,457 to 11,753 between 26JUN-2JUL. The uptick in Russian artillery activity was likely linked to Ukrainian progress in liberating territory.
When it comes to the frontline, let’s start from the northern parts of the oblast. The situation was relatively stable near Spirne, Verkhnokamyasnke, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka, where neither side reported any significant changes to the frontline.
The situation also remained unchanged near Vasiukivka and Fedorivka.
However, to alleviate the pressure on the frontline in the Bakhmut area, Russians launched counterattacks from Dubovo-Vasylyivka towards Bohdanivka. There were also attempts to push Ukrainian units back from near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Yahidne, from Berkhivka to Bohdanivka and from Dubovo-Vasylivka to Hryhorivka and near Vesele. Yet, evidence has yet to emerge to suggest that Russians made any progress in these areas.
However, Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians retreated from their positions near Khromove and Berkhivka, adding that it was too early to discuss territorial gains near these villages. That said, footage was published on Thursday showing Russian artillery strikes near Berkhivka, which confirms Ukrainian progress in the area. Ukrainian tactics involve employing small groups of 15-20 men supported by a few armoured vehicles. With this level of forces simultaneously committed to battle, we cannot expect a big Ukrainian breakthrough north of Bakhmut. Although slow Ukrainian advances are likely.
Ukrainians also progressed in the western parts of Bakhmut; according to the Ukrainian source, the UAF advance was recorded towards the western part of the city. Despite this, Cherevaty said there were no intense battles ongoing in Bakhmut, which again suggests that the number of forces deployed on both sides in the city is relatively small. However, Mykola Volokhov, the commander of the “Terra" reconnaissance unit, said that while the previous battles involved mostly infantry, Russians began deploying reserves into the city, which also include tanks, which in his view, highlights increasingly difficult to maintain Russian positions.
Ukrainians made the biggest progress last week south of Bakhmut. They liberated territories between Ivanivske and approached Klishchiivka from the west and northwest.
A video was posted showing a Russian strike on Ukrainian equipment east of height 215.7. The situation in the village is unclear. Some Ukrainian sources said on Wednesday that Russians left Klishchiivka, while some claimed that Ukrainians sabotage and reconnaissance groups operated in it. We, however, have not been able to verify these reports independently.
Currently, control over the village is not very important. Ukrainians should first fully capture hills overlooking Klishchiivka, which will strain Russian units defending the settlement. If this happens, Russians may indeed abandon their positions in Klishchiivka and redeploy toward Opytne and the T-0513 road.
According to Cherevaty, there are about 50,000 Russian troops in the Bakhmut sector.
Moving further south, both sides’ overall tempo of operations was limited over the past seven days. Russians, however, continued assaults in an attempt to improve their positions. These attacks are unlikely to deliver any major tactical victories, let alone a breakthrough. Moscow clearly does not possess enough manpower and equipment to mount even a tactically significant operation. So while their attempt to inch west will undoubtedly continue, they will not translate to any territorial gains.
Indeed, despite attacks on southwestern approaches to Avdiivka, the frontline remained unchanged. Specifically, according to the Ukrainian bloggers, battles continued near Pervomaiske and Nevelske. Russians continued to pressure the Ukrainian 110th Separate Mechanised Brigade south of the city. The source, however, needed to provide detailed information.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke, Severne and Vodyane.
Fully committed to their plans to capture Mariinka, Russians again launched assaults on Ukrainian positions in and near the city but were unsuccessful.
On the other hand, a Ukrainian source claimed that the Ukrainian 59th Infantry Brigade liberated new areas near the village, but no information was provided as to what this involved.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar.
Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry and the 39th Motorised Rifle Brigade conducted attacks near Vuhledar, but we understand they did not affect the frontline.
Regardless, operations around Vuhledar continue to be subdued, both from the Ukrainian and Russian sides.
Southern Ukraine direction
Ukrainians made limited gains in the southern direction over the past seven days, although they have yet to capture a single village. The counteroffensive continues, although the progress was minimal last week.
Velyka Novosilka axis
Ukrainians continued attacks from the Levadne side towards Pryyutne and Staromaiors'ke, and Novodonetske. A Russian source said on Tuesday that Ukrainians reached the former, but this information has yet to be confirmed. Neither did this claim reappear elsewhere in the second half of the week.
Personnel from the 35th Naval Infantry Brigade captured several Russian servicemen near Marakivka, which indicates minimal advances in the area.
Last week, it seemed that Ukrainians made some organisational changes coupled with units’ redeployments. Elements of the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade and 31st Mechanised Brigades were deployed towards Levadne - Rivnopil area. Secondly, elements of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, previously deployed near Vuhledar, were seen in the Velyka Novosilka axis. It is unclear whether the entire brigade had been redeployed, but certainly, some of its elements were used as reinforcements.
Orikhiv axis
Ukrainians sustained their operations in the Orikhiv axis. Firstly, they maintained positions in recently captured Pyatykhatky, although their presence is under constant Russian artillery attacks. Secondly, Ukrainians launched attacks towards Zhereb'yanky and Robotyne and reportedly recorded some progress near Verbove.
Likewise, minor progress was also achieved near Konovalova and Dolyna in the Vasylivka direction.
But, in general, Russians assess the frontline in this axis to be stable. Although Ukrainians continue assaults, they are conducted in small groups. No large-scale operations are conducted. At the same time, battles mainly occur over forward positions, which often change hands due to Russian counterattacks. The Russian source said the intensity of Ukrainian artillery attacks is the same as pre-8JUN.
According to Hanna Malyar, the Ukrainian defence forces continued the offensive in the Melitopol and Berdyansk sectors. Heavy battles continue in the entire frontline. She claimed that the ratio of irrecoverable losses in the south is 1 to 5.3, which we believe is exaggerated.
Kherson direction and Crimea
There were no changes in the overall situation in the Kherson Oblast. Over the past seven days, Russians attempted to dislodge Ukrainians from areas near Dachi. To this end, they launched air strikes on the settlement and Ukrainian positions near the Antonovsky Bridge. In mid-week, it appeared that these attempts were successful. However, Ukrainians quickly deployed new units and retook previous positions. Over the long term, Russian attempts to push Russians out will not deliver desired effects without intercepting Ukrainian movements on the Dnipro’s right bank and committing forces in ground attacks towards the bridge to recapture positions currently occupied by Ukrainians. Perhaps to this end, Russian frontline aviation focused last week on launching numerous bombing raids using KAB laser-guided bombs in the Beryslav region.
We understand that Russian units involved in operations near the bridge include the Russian 126th Coastal Defence Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet) and 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), which are too underequipped and undermanned to achieve permanent results. Interestingly, Igor Girkin, a Russian nationalist, said that elements of the 7th Mountain Air Assault Division were redeployed from the Oleshky area to the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, which means that Moscow believes that sufficient forces guard approaches to Oleshky.
On Friday, it was reported that First Deputy of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko visited Russian units in the Kherson Oblast on 6JUL and congratulated the 387th Regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Assault Division for reportedly pushing Ukrainian units from the left bank near the Antonivsky Bridge.
However, on Wednesday, a pro-Russian source claimed that Ukrainians continued to concentrate forces near the Dnipro River on the right bank. A howitzer battery of the Ukrainian armed forces' 406th Separate Artillery Brigade had been moved to the Kherson-Sadove line. The intensity of shelling along the line of contact also increased. In addition, a company of the 70th Separate Pontoon Regiment arrived in Lvove, and the 39th Rifle Battalion was demining the coastal area on the Zmiivka- Chervonyi Maiak line.
As the Dnipro’s flow has stabilised, Russians restarted riverine reconnaissance missions on the Dnipro using minor sabotage and reconnaissance groups. However, it is unlikely that the tempo of these operations will be high. Indeed, a Russian source appealed on 2 JUL to the heads of the Dagestan and Tatarstan republics to send boats confiscated from poachers to the Kherson Oblast to support riverine operations there. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, supported the idea.
A Russian source added that a resurrected “Dnepr” flotilla could significantly ameliorate the position of Russian troops in the Kherson direction and that this grouping could be reinforced with simple, civilian-use boats. Such claims confirm that Russians suffer from equipment shortages.
According to Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, Russian forces returned to positions they occupied prior to the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam. A Ukrainian journalist added that the number of Russian personnel in Nova Kakhovka increased significantly.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 452 aircraft (+8), 240 helicopters (+1), 4,921 UAVs (+88), 426 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 10,566 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+153), 1,135 MLRS launchers (+1), 5,370 field artillery guns and mortars (+89), as well as 11,493 units of special military vehicles (+201).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 232,810 personnel (+4,470), 4,070 tanks (+29), 7,944 armoured combat vehicles (+81), 4,330 artillery systems (+203) and 658 MLR systems (+28), 408 anti-aircraft systems (+19), 315 aircraft (0) and 309 helicopters (+1), and 3,652 UAVs (+133), 6,898 vehicles and fuel tanks (+113), 1,271 cruise missiles (+57), 18 warships and boats (0) and 612 special vehicles (+43).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Over the past seven days, Russians delivered no mass missile and kamikaze strikes on targets across Ukraine. The largest employment occurred on Thursday when Russians launched ten Kalibr cruise missiles from surface and subsurface combatants from the Black Sea. Missiles were traversing along the Dnipro River basin and, at some point, abruptly changed course towards Lviv. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed to have intercepted seven missiles. Remaining three hit residential areas, killing at least ten civilians.
Likewise, the employment of Shahed 131/136 drones was also limited. They were launched on Sunday, Monday and Friday. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 33 incoming UAVs out of at least 39 fired.
Lastly, according to the UGS data on the scale of Russian attacks, the past seven days were relatively stable. The number of ground attacks (UGS calls them combat engagements) stood at around 40 for most of the week. But surprising is the number of air strikes, which Russians managed to sustain a high tempo for almost the entire week.
Outlook for the week of 8JUL-14JUL
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“As expected, we continue to anticipate no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian ground attacks are highly unlikely to deliver any major frontline changes (capture one village or more). Artillery attacks on civilian targets will almost certainly continue.” This assessment is correct. ‘
Score: 1/1
“The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. Despite official Ukrainian pronouncements about Russian attacks in the region, we assess that it is unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more.” Russians indeed made no progress in the region.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on last week’s performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are likely to liberate some territory, especially south of Bakhmut and especially if they maintain the foothold over the Seversky Donets-Donbas Canal. 3) There is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture one village or more”. We were correct when it comes to the progress (or rather a lack thereof) of the Russian Armed Forces. Our prognosis pertaining to the Ukrainian advances was also correct, even though they did not capture any villages, their progress was visible.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the southern axis, we continue having difficulty forecasting Ukrainian operations in the region. The reported deployment of a new artillery brigade to the Orikhiv axis could herald more progress. Ukrainians also continue to push in the Velyka Novosilka. In general, we assess that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture a village over the next seven days.” Ukrainians made no confirmed progress last week, although reportedly, they did advance.
Score: 0.5/1
“We now expect Ukrainians to continue in their attempts to push south of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast. They will likely capture some ground around Oleshky.” It is unclear whether Ukrainians continued organised attacks towards Oleshky last week. However, it is clear that Russians managed to at least temporarily dislodge the Ukrainian beachhead near the Antonovsky brigade.
Score: 0/1
Final score: 3.5/5 (70%)
The forecast for the week of 8-14JUL
We do not expect to see any changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian ground attacks are highly unlikely to deliver any major frontline changes (capture one village or more). Artillery attacks on civilian targets will almost certainly continue.
The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. Ground attacks are unlikely to deliver any confirmed territorial gains. We do not anticipate Russians to be able to capture more than a village or more over the coming seven days.
Again, when it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region. That said, Russian counterattacks are increasingly likely, mainly around Bakhmut, where Russian units are on the defensive. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are likely to liberate some territory, especially south of Bakhmut. 3) There is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture one village or more.
Moving onto the southern axis, we continue having difficulty forecasting Ukrainian operations in the region. It is almost certain that Ukrainian officials will continue claiming that Ukrainian troops progressed in the Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka axes. While it will be likely true, we assess that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture a village over the next seven days. We are waiting to see what effect cluster munitions will have on the frontline, but the impact could be significant.
We expect Ukrainians to maintain their positions on the Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast, but the last week showed that their presence mostly has a harassing role and that no major operations are probably planned in this direction.
Konrad, I'm curious what you think about these prediction market odds. Insight Prediction is currently around 10% for Ukraine to cut the land bridge by September 30th, https://insightprediction.com/m/154445/will-ukraine-sever-the-land-bridge-to-crimea-by-september-30th-2023, and Metaculus is more bullish, at about 25% by year's end. https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13531/ukraine-to-cut-land-bridge-to-crimea-by-2024/#comment-124973