Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 12 August – 18 August 2023 (Weekly update)
Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 12 August – 18 August 2023 (Weekly update)
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week delivered no operational and strategic developments in Ukraine; Both sides made marginal territorial gains, barely impacting the overall tactical outlook.
Russians reportedly made some gains east of Kupyansk in the Kharkiv Oblast and are preparing an echeloned defence of the city;
In the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russians failed to progress after capturing Novoselivske; However, they improved their positions near Karmazynivka;
Russians reportedly counterattacked near Klishchiivka and pushed Ukrainian forces out of the village; No additional changes occurred in the Donetsk Oblast;
In the Southern Direction, Ukrainians liberated Urozhayne and entered Robotyne; Their progress remained very slow;
Ukrainians may have been pushed out of the Kozachi Laheri area, but they maintained their presence near Dachi;
Russian use of missiles and suicide drones was again relatively limited; Ukrainians boasted an interception rate of 100% for Shaheds; Port infrastructure in Odesa was struck again;
Summary of key development in Ukraine - 12AUG-18AUG2023
Executive summary
As expected, last week did not bring any fundamental changes in the battlefields in Ukraine. Russian offensive operations were limited mostly to the Kharkiv/Luhansk Oblasts, where Moscow continued to press Ukrainian lines. Russians also launched limited ground attacks in the Donetsk Oblast, although they delivered no confirmed gains.
On the other hand, Ukrainians remained offensively focused in the Zaporizhihia Oblast and in vicinity of (IVO) Bakhmut. They were also probably completely pushed back from the Dnipro’s left bank IVO Kozachi Laheri in the Kherson Oblast, and continued to execute defensive operations in the Kharkiv/Luhansk Oblast.
Despite this mix of activities, neither side made a breakthrough and frontline changes were minimal, counted in square kilometres maximum. Both sides are evidently focused on conducting ground operations in other parts of the front. The Ukrainian centre of gravity is in the south, while the Russian is in the north. But both sides are also on the opposite spectrum of their ground campaigns. While the tempo of Ukrainian ground attacks will likely slowly decrease going into September, Russians will likely increase the pace of ground operations in the Kharkiv Oblast.
Indeed, this is confirmed by the fact that both sides deployed units that were previously in reserve. To maintain the initiative in the south, the Ukrainian General Staff deployed the 82nd Air Assault Brigade to the Orikhiv axis (Orikhiv-Tokmak). The unit is equipped with German-made Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and US-made Stryker armoured combat vehicles. On top of that, it also fields UK-delivered Challenger 2 main battle tanks. Both Marders and Strykers were committed to battle, and it is a matter of time before Challengers are too. To the east, the 1st Tank Brigade was deployed to support ground attacks in the Velyka Novosilka axis. As the first two corps that were built up specifically to spearhead the Ukrainian counteroffensive have exhausted their combat potential, the Ukrainian General Staff is committing operational reserves to keep the momentum going. However, while Ukrainians can boost their firepower with these formations in the very short term (2-3 weeks at max, given the current tempo of losses), what can be committed to battle after that is unclear.
In the Orikhiv axis, the main axis of advance, Ukrainian brigades equipped with Western-made kit face Russian mobilised formations. Initially, Ukrainians fought against the 291st Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR) (42nd Motor Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army), which, due to heavy losses sustained throughout the war, was reinforced by elements derived from the 1430th (Mobilised) MRR. Both these units were probably withdrawn from the frontline in late July, and their combat status was reinstated. The 1430th MRR was deployed to battle again recently. This development shows two things. Firstly, Russians are able to restore the combat status (probably just manpower numbers) of an MRR relatively quickly. Secondly, the best-equipped Ukrainian units’ attacks are repelled by Russian mobilised formations, whose overall combat effectiveness is likely subpar. Of course, this is not the case across the entire front in the south. But especially in the Orikhiv axis, there has been a significant discrepancy between the capabilities Ukrainians committed, the equipment they had thrown into battle and the gains they made against Russian formations deployed in this sector. But even if Ukrainians achieve a good momentum or a breakthrough, there may not be a force available to exploit tactical, let alone operational, successes.
Secondly, if we look at the map, the main Ukrainian push is very narrow, and it is one-pronged, probably seeking to reach Novoprokopivka from the east, just in front of the second main line of Russian defences. But, this thrust is not supported by attacks from the west as Kyiv likely lacks resources to envelop Robotyne. This questions the durability of Ukrainian gains IVO Robotyne, as Kyiv may be prone to counterattacks from the flanks if the frontline is not levelled.
Let’s focus on the north now. As we stated in previous UCM issues, Ukrainians warned that Russians stationed 100,000 men in the Kharkiv/Luhansk Oblast. A part of this force included the 1st Guards Tank Army. Once expected to break the spines of NATO armoured forces in Eastern and Central Europe, its performance in this war has been poor, to put it mildly. However, the unit was also placed into an operational reserve and has been training for the past several months. Its elements were deployed IVO Svatove (1st and 13th Tank Regiment IVO Svatove, the 15th, 26th, and 429th MRRs IVO Bilolutsk and Pidkuichansk, while the 27th Motor Rifle Brigade was IVO Nyuzhnia Duvanka.
Open-source reports now indicate that Russians have started to commit this formation to combat as well. It comprised 30,000 men, 520 tanks, and 885 armoured fighting vehicles pre-war. Combined with the 6th CAA, Russians may have the force able to penetrate Ukrainian defences towards Kupyansk, especially given that the current frontline is some 30 km away from Kupyansk. But, at the current stage, Russians have more forces to commit in their reserves than Ukrainians. In this context, autumn can prove challenging for Ukraine due to a bulk of its forces needing to be reinstated and a decrease in available artillery ammunition and barrel stocks.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
(We will make minor structural changes to the report. From the next update, the Kharkiv Oblast Direction will only discuss information about the situation in the northern part of the region. Everything else (developments near Dvorchina, Kupyansk and farther south will be moved to the chapter on the Luhansk Oblast Direction).
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
The situation in the northern parts of the oblast is unclear, but Russians have probably made some progress. Early in the week, Russian units continued attempts towards Synkivka, Vilshana and Petropavlivka. On Saturday (12AUG), a Ukrainian source reported that Russians came close to Synkivka, but a counter-attack by the Ukrainian troops managed to push them back.
However, on Monday (15AUG), Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies think-tank claimed that Russian forces had advanced IVO Orlyans’ke and Mykolaivka and reached the Synkivka-Petropavlivka line. They also improved their tactical position IVO Vilshana. Some Russian sources confirmed Russian progress IVO Vilshana. The 1st Guard Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army are supposed to be spearheading the attacks.
The Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, reportedly spent the past few days with units in the Kupyansk direction preparing city defences.
Serhiy Cherevaty, the spokesman for the Eastern Group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, confirmed the deterioration of the overall situation in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction by saying that Ukraine had moved reserves into the area. He also reportedly said that the Ukrainian General Staff had ordered to create echeloned defence around Kupyansk.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, the Russians continued to strike civilian infrastructure in Kharkivsky, Kupyansky, Bohoduhivsky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians hit Okip, Ohirtseve, Budarky, Vovchansk, Kamyanka, Petropavlivka, Pishchane, Berestove, Kyslivka and Kupyansk, Masuytivka, Udy, Strilecha, Hlyboke.
According to the Russian MoD, elements of the 6th CAA captured nine strongholds and 11 observation posts over the past week IVO Vilshana. Ukrainians carried out 17 counterattacks, led mainly by the 14th and 41st Separate Mechanised Brigades, 95th Separate Airborne Brigade, and the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade IVO Synkivka, Usy forest(?) and the Mankovka(?) tract. All counterattacks were repelled.
Russian Ka-52 and Mi-35 attack helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft carried out 20 air strikes on 14th and 32nd Mechanised Brigades’ positions and territorial defence units IVO Synkivka, Stelmakhivka, and Kyslivka. Elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army repelled nine attacks by assault groups of the 44th and 32nd Separate Mechanised Brigades troops IVO Novoselivske.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Russians made some reported gains over the past week in the Luhansk Oblast. However, the overall tendency is that akin to the Kharkiv Oblast – there is an increase in Russian ground forces activities as Ukrainian forces are increasingly pressed.
Indeed, according to Artem Lysohor, the Luhansk Oblast Military administration head, Russians had become very active in the Luhansk sector, but Ukrainian troops held the line so far. Russians carried out 20 airstrikes daily between Stelmakhivka to Bilohorivka. Lysohor also added that between 14-15AUG, the tempo of Russian attacks subsided slightly due to heavy losses. We expect Russians to maintain a relatively high tempo of attacks with intermittent pauses to rotate forces and resupply.
According to Serhiy Cherevaty, between 13-17AUG, in the Lyman – Kupyansk axis, Russian artillery fired 2,581 times. Russians also conducted at least 23 ground attacks and 67 air strikes.
When it comes to the frontline, after the Russians captured Novoselivske, they tried to attack towards Myasozharivka and Andriivka, but these attempts delivered no frontline changes. The source said the main goal was to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces behind the Zherebets River, some two kilometres from current Ukrainian positions. To this end, Russians also launched attacks towards Stelmakhivka, but they were unsuccessful.
Farther south, on Saturday (12AUG), the Russian forces retook the initiative IVO Karmazynivka and again pushed towards Nadiya. According to Ukrainian bloggers, on Tuesday (14AUG), Russians captured several positions in the forest area IVO Karmazynivka. However, we were unable to confirm the veracity of this claim.
No changes occurred IVO Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes. Also, no changes were recorded IVO Terny, Torske, Yampolivka and Nevske.
In the Kreminna area, both sides’ sources confirmed battles in the Serebryansky forest, but neither side confirmed any changes.
Lastly, Russians resumed attacks on Bilohorivka. The Ukrainian source reported on 12AUG that Ukrainians had suffered manpower and equipment losses IVO the village, which indicated that the situation there deteriorated. But no further information has been provided about any changes in this sector since then. The potential loss of the village could affect Ukrainian defensive positions south of the Serebryansky forest.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Svatove and Lyman direction, Russian units repelled nine Ukrainian attacks conducted by elements of the 42nd and 67th Mechanised and the 5th National Guard Brigades. Russian aviation hit the 63rd and 67th Mechanised Brigades, while in the Serebryansky forest area, Russian artillery fire and air strikes hit elements of the 21st and 42nd Mechanised Brigades. The 68th Jaeger Brigade was also hit. The Russian aviation forces launched eight missile strikes against Ukrainian concertation areas in the Serebryansky forest, Dibrova and Terny settlements.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Brady Africk).
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The last seven days were relatively uneventful in the Donetsk Oblast direction. Neither made any confirmed gains.
On Sunday (13AUG), Russian sources reported that Russians captured several Ukrainian positions IVO Spirne. However, this was not confirmed independently, while a Ukrainian battle map depicted Ukrainian gains around the same area.
No changes occurred IVO Vesele, where Russians launched ground attacks early in the week. The situation IVO Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka also remained unchanged.
Positional battles continued IVO Berkhivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka but delivered no shifts in the frontline. A Russian source claimed that both sides had paused active operations around Bakhmut, especially compared to battles the area has seen over the past several months. Syrskyi, on the other hand, described the current situation in the Bakhmut axis as “difficult, but under control”. He added that Russians were counterattacking, laying mines, intensively using artillery and combat aircraft. Yet despite this, Ukrainians were advancing, he said. For weeks, we have seen no frontline changes in this axis, so Syrskyi’s claims are unsubstantiated.
The same pertains to Bakhmut, where no changes occurred within the city’s limits. On Wednesday (16AUG), a Russian source claimed that Ukrainians deployed two HIMARS battalions towards the Bakhmut axis. Thus, Ukrainians will likely try to degrade Russian logistics support and artillery capability in this sector to facilitate forward movement.
A Russian source reported on Thursday (17AUG) that Russians counterattacked IVO Klishchiivka and managed to retake previously lost positions in the village. However, we have not been able to confirm this information. But, the key point is that for weeks Ukrainians have been unable to capture the village even though they initially enjoyed a positive forward momentum and their positions were on higher ground. This should have made the attack easier, but clearly, Russians also considered the control over Klishchiivka essential in their defensive operations south of Bakhmut. Indeed, Russians reportedly used T-90 tanks and continued to bring significant reserves (including airborne forces) into the area to hold the ground at all costs.
The same source also said that Ukrainians were actively using the cluster munition IVO Andriivka, but the advance there slowed down, too, due to the deployment of Russian reserves.
According to Serhiy Cherevaty, between 13-17AUG, in the Bakhmut axis, Russian artillery fired 2,278 times (there was no data provided for 15AUG, so artillery strikes were cumulatively likely more intense than in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction). Russians also conducted at least 29 ground attacks but only ten air strikes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes IVO Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Novokalynove, Vesele and Kamyanka.
Russians launched several attacks towards Avdiivka, especially from the Kruta Balka area. Southern approaches were also tested, but all attempts to alter the frontline were unsuccessful.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes IVO Pervomaikse, Tonenke, Severne, Vodyane and Nevelske.
Russian attempts to capture Mariinka and Krasnohorivka continued. Last week, they launched ground attacks supported by artillery and aviation but made no gains in this sector.
No changes occurred IVO Pobieda, Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar.
According to the Russian MoD, aviation continued to work extensively to degrade Ukrainian ability to conduct counterattacks in the Donetsk Oblast direction.
Over the past week, Russian Ka-52 helicopters destroyed a Ukrainian tank IVO Klishchiivka. Army aviation also hit Ukrainian concentration areas assault in the Kurdyumivka area. Russian artillery and aviation units also hit deployment points and an ammunition depot of the 110th Separate Mechanised Brigade IVO Avdiivka and Netailove. Ukrainian ammunition depots in Belohorivka and Dronivka were also engaged.
Army aviation struck Ukrainian units IVO Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Bilohorivka, Krasnohorivka and Spirne.
A Su-34 all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber/strike aircraft attacked two deployment points of the UAF 3rd Airborne Assault Brigade IVO Bila Hora.
Artillery struck a temporary deployment point of the 80th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade in Kramatorsk, while elements of the 93rd Mechanised Brigade were hit in Kostyantynivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
The Velyka Novosilka axis
The major event in this axis over the past week pertained to the liberation of Urozhayne, which was confirmed on Wednesday (15AUG), but it highly likely occurred earlier. The village was captured by elements of the 1st Tank and 31st Mechanised Brigades, while the 128th Territorial Defence Brigade reinforced Staryomayorske.
Ukrainians also extended their attacks towards Zavitne Bazhannia (as early as Tuesday (15AUG)) from Staromayorske, but this attempt was unsuccessful.
Following the loss of Urozhayne, Russians quickly counterattacked, but Ukrainian equally promptly reinforced their positions, and all attacks were repelled.
Using aviation, Russians struck Urozhayne, Velyka Novosilka, Makarivka and Staromayorske. Artillery hit Urozhayne, Neskuchne and Rivnopil.
Russians also continue to threaten Ukrainian positions with counterattacks. The Russian MoD claimed its forces destroyed four Ukrainian strongholds, two tanks, and eight armoured vehicles. Russians stopped two Ukrainian reconnaissance attempts IVO Pryuutne.
Despite the liberation of Urozhayne, it is difficult to talk about any Ukrainian breakthrough in the Velyka Novosilka axis. Ukrainian units lack momentum. Progress is plodding and undoubtedly very costly. Prior to Urozhayne, Ukrainians retook Staromaiorske, an adjacent village, on 27JUL. As such, battles for Urozhayne lasted more than two weeks, during which Ukrainians captured some five sq km and deployed elements of three naval infantry brigades and a tank brigade that was diverted from an operational reserve.
The Orkhiv axis
Over the weekend (11AUG-12AUG), elements of the Ukrainian 46th Airmobile Brigade probably entered Robotyne for the first time. To prevent further Ukrainian advances, Russians deployed the mobilised 1441st Motor Rifle Regiment (likely subordinated to the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade) near the frontline.
Although Ukrainians maintained a presence in the northern parts of the village, they made no progress in it throughout the week.
A day later (13AUG), Ukrainians tried to push deeper south in the area and deployed forces of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade, a part of the so-called “Maroon” Tactical Group (according to Russian sources, it includes the 82nd Air Assault Brigade, 71st Jaeger Brigade and probably other formations).
At least two Ukrainian attacks took place between Tuesday and Wednesday (15AUG-16AUG). However, neither side’s sources’ reported any frontline changes. One of the attacks reportedly resulted in a loss of a Marder IFV, a Leopard tank, and 70 personnel.
Ukrainian attacks on 16AUG probably forced Russians to deploy more forces towards Robotyne, which also led to a loss of a Ka-52 attack helicopter.
Unconfirmed reports also suggest that Moscow deployed additional units of the 7th Air Assault Division (56th Air Assault Regiment) to strengthen the defence of Tokmak. It is possible that these formations could be used for the rotation of presently deployed frontline units. The unit is deployed IVO Chystopilla, which means it could be employed in the western and central parts of the Orikhiv axis.
Throughout the week, Russians targeted the ammo depot of the 108th Territorial Defence Brigade in Huliaipole (11AUG) and three Ukrainian command posts (two IVO Marfopil and a single IVO Chervone). Notably, the latter belonged to the 10th Corps. On Tuesday (15AUG) and Wednesday (16AUG), they also struck the ammo depot of the Ukrainian 43rd Artillery Brigade (Omelnyk) and two ammo depots of the 117th Mechanised Brigade (Tavriiske), respectively.
No changes occurred in the western part of the Orikhiv axis.
Over the weekend (11AUG-12AUG), Ukrainians additional elements of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade towards Pyatchatki.
Russians “countered them” by deploying the 45th Spetsnaz Brigade subunits and the abovementioned 56th Air Assault Regiment.
On Tuesday (15AUG), Ukrainians committed the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade to reach their old positions in Pyatchatki. However, they were hit by Russian mines and artillery and withdrew.
It is important to note that the intensity of the Russian fire varied throughout the week. It peaked during the weekend and Monday when Russian aviation struck Pyatchatki while artillery shelled Scherbaky, Mali Scherbaky, Stepove, Lobkove, and Kamyaske. Russian artillery strikes were limited second half of the week. On Wednesday (16AUG), Russians “only” shelled Mali Shcherbaki and Pyatikhatki.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
According to Russian sources, Ukrainians were dislodged from the Kozachi Laheri area early in the week but maintained their positions IVO Dachi near the Antonivsky Bridge.
Ukrainians maintained their positions IVO Kozachi Laheri at least until 12-15AUG. On Wednesday (16AUG), a series of Russian reports suggested that Russians conducted successful clearing operations and that Ukrainians were fully pushed out from their positions near the village. This development came despite Ukrainians reportedly transferring elements of at least one brigade (126th Territorial Defence Brigade) to ensure the sustainment of their positions on the left bank.
That said, we must stress that no Ukrainian sources confirmed this development and information about the developments IVO Kozachi Laheri comes only from Russian sources. We thus need to confirm the veracity of this information.
There were reports last week that Ukrainians had established two pontoon crossings over the Dnipro at Kozachi Laheri. However, we assess that no such event ever occurred.
Another Russian source additionally claimed that heavy fighting had occurred IVO the Antonivsky Bridge, where Russian Spetsnaz elements were fighting to clear the Dachi area of Ukrainian troops. It is unclear whether they were successful.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 461 aircraft (+3), 246 helicopters (+1), 5,831 UAVs (+177), 431 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+2), 11,366 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+136), 1,144 MLRS launchers (0), 5,928 field artillery guns and mortars (+81), as well as 12,307 units of special military vehicles (+131).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 256,510 personnel (+3,730), 4,332 tanks (+42), 8,410 armoured combat vehicles (+92), 5,193 artillery systems (+150) and 714 MLR systems (+1), 486 anti-aircraft systems (+15), 315 aircraft (0) and 316 helicopters (+3), and 4,276 UAVs (+70), 7,658 vehicles and fuel tanks (+147), 1,406 cruise missiles (+59), 18 warships and boats (0) and 756 special vehicles (+27).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, Russian missile use was again limited.
Last Friday (11AUG), Russians launched four 9-S-7760 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles towards the Kolomyia Air Base. Three missiles were intercepted.
There were only two large-scale attacks. On Monday (14AUG), Russians launched eight 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea. This attack was combined with the use of Shahed 131/138 UAVs.
A day later (15AUG), Russians fired four Kh-22 long-range anti-ship missiles from Tu-22M3s operating from the Shaykovka Air Base and 20 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles using Tu-95s from the Engels-2 Air Base. In this case, Ukrainians shot down 16 Kh-101/Kh-555s.
The Russian use of Shahed 131/136s was also reduced. They were employed on 12, 14, and 16AUG. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed to have shot down 31 vehicles, although how many were fired is unclear. The largest attack occurred on 14AUG when 15 UAVs were fired and intercepted. Two days later, 13 were launched and shot down. Assuming that the 12AUG attack involved three munitions, the Ukrainian interception rate reached 100%.
The 16AUG Shahed attack focused on port infrastructure in Odesa, which marked a resumption of attacks on export facilities after a short break.
Russians maintained a high tempo of air strikes, reaching 82 hits on Wednesday (16AUG). That’s the highest number since 2AUG (89) and the second-highest since 20JUN (83).
At the same time, the number of destroyed Russian artillery systems is in decline. On 8JUL, Ukrainians claimed to have averaged 29 artillery systems destroyed over a seven-day period. This number now stands at 20 (as of 18AUG), but the trend is downward.
Outlook for the week of 12AUG-18AUG
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Last week’s reports about the deployment of Russian forces towards the frontline in the Kharkiv Oblast increase the likelihood of a larger attack in this direction. As such, we assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will progress in this area over the next seven days.” This assessment was incorrect, as Russians made no gains in the region. Although we assess that over the medium term (three months), Russians will increase the tempo of their attacks in this area.
Score: 0/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast, we assess that there is a roughly even chance that both sides will progress next week. Russians will probably focus on Novoselivs’ke – Berestove and Novoselivs’ke – Stel’makhivka lines, while Ukrainians around Raihorodka.” Russians reportedly captured some territory, but Ukrainians failed to make any gains.
Score: 0.5/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are also unlikely to liberate any villages in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” This assessment was correct. Neither side made any confirmed gains in the region.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the southern direction, we continue to maintain that Ukrainians will need to fight for every meter of land and, therefore, they are unlikely to make quick gains across the entire direction. There is a roughly even chance that Robotyne and Urozhayne will be taken over the next seven days.” Ukrainians captured the remaining parts of Urozhayne while battles for Robotyne continued.
Score: 0.5/1
“We now assess that Ukrainians will likely advance on the Dnipro’s left bank near Kozachi Laheri and maybe Oleshky in the Kherson Oblast. But, we assess that they are unlikely to capture one village or more.” Ukrainians were reportedly pushed back from the Kozachi Laheri area, although they maintained some presence IVO the Antonivskyi Bridge.
Score: 0/1
Final score: 2/5 (40%)
The forecast for the week of 19JUL-25AUG
We continue to expect Russians to maintain at least the current tempo of attacks in the Kupyansk axis in the Kharkiv Oblast. If they commit more resources, they will likely make some territorial gains.
Regarding the Luhansk Oblast, we assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will progress over the next seven days. It is unlikely that Ukrainians will liberate any village.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are also unlikely to liberate any villages in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Moving onto the southern direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely be very slow, and there is a roughly even chance they will capture Robotyne. We expect no major Ukrainian breakthrough or a collapse of Russian defences in the south.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank IVO the Antonivskyi Bridge. They may also attempt to conduct riverine raids in other parts of the region and establish limited bridgeheads. The prospects of Ukrainian progress on Dnipro’s left bank decreased compared to two weeks ago. The pullback from the Kozachi Laheri area confirms that the Ukrainian General Staff does not plan to conduct a major offensive operation in the region.
So, the ISW continues to beat an optimistic tone, and harping how Russia lacks operational reserves in the south. How likely would you say it is that Ukraine could take, say, Tokmak by the end of the year? And, Melitopol?