Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 13 February - 19 February 2023 (Weekly update)
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;
Russians maintained the number of artillery attacks across the country, which averaged around 100 per day; Yet, this did not translate into any significant land grabs;
The main Russian ground activity is focused on areas near Kupyansk, Kreminna-Bilohorivka, north of Soledar, and north and southwest of Bakhmut, near Avdiivka and Vuhledar. Russians only made visible progress near Bakhmut last week;
Russians probably captured some territory northeast of Kupyansk in the Kharkiv Oblast; However, these gains did not alter the overall operational situation in the region;
Almost all Russian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast were repelled; The only exception are areas near Kreminna, where Russians probably pushed deeper into the Serebryansky Forest;
Although Russians made no progress north of Soledar, they continued to push in areas south of the city, where they captured Paraskoviivka; This development inches them closer to Bakhmut from the north and allowed them to extend attacks along the M03 highway linking the town with Slovyansk;
All Russian attacks northwest of Bakhmut were repelled, and Russians made no gains in this sector;
No changes occurred in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast. The weather is negatively impacting the Russian ability to capture Vuhledar. We assess they do not possess capacities to take the settlement without significant reinforcements and a change in tactics;
No frontline changes occurred in the Zaporizhihia Oblast, although battles continued throughout the week for a small part of a highway southeast of Orikhiv.
There were no operational changes in the Kherson region; Both sides’ activities were limited to artillery strikes, harassing and reconnaissance raids;
The posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces did not undergo any changes; The intensity of their training activities decreased compared to the previous week;
General outlook
Although the tempo of Russian attacks remained heightened, Russians made no significant progress last week in Ukraine. The following axes of advance have been recorded: Kupyansk, Kreminna-Bilohorivka, northwest of Soledar, and north and southwest of Bakhmut, near Avdiivka and Vuhledar. However, whereas some tactical advances were possible, except for Bakhmut, Russians made no confirmed gains in other areas.
Since the start of increased Russian activity at the beginning of February, Russians have made no real breakthroughs. In areas where they managed to progress, Ukrainians either gradually withdrew or were able to respond by deploying locally available reserves. We have seen no indications that the main elements of Ukrainian reserve forces have been utilised to limit Russian movement and the tempo of their operations. Most, if not all, attacks are repelled using units that had already been deployed in these areas.
If what we are seeing now is the apex of Russian military performance post-mobilisation, then we should probably expect nothing more from the Russians apart from capturing Bakhmut.
But is it the apex? Is it the offensive? We don’t think it is. As stated last week, we consider these developments linked to the Russian-spring campaign, but we don’t believe that the bulk of mobilised reservists has been deployed to combat.
Let’s look at the above-listed areas from an order of battle point of view.
Firstly, in the Kupyansk area, Russians deployed elements of the 12th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) and the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 6th Combined Arms Army (6th CAA). 76th Air Assault and 98th Airborne Divisions and the 144th Motor Rifle Division of the 20th CAA, and the 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st GTA lead attacks from Kreminna. Near Bakhmut, Russians employed Wagner, now reportedly being replaced by elements from the 106th and 98th Airborne Divisions. Attacks on Avdiivka are led by the 1st Army Corps (Donetsk People’s Republic). In Vuhledar, on the other hand, the Russian command deployed the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades. Elements of the 58th CAA are also deployed in the Zaporizhihia region and are expected to operate there.
This data shows that relatively few combat formations are presently being utilised for larger attacks. Secondly, except for Vuhledar, they come from the Western Military district or airborne forces. We still have not seen many reconstituted units deployed into combat from Central and Eastern Military Districts. We do not know the current locations of the 90th Tank Division, larger parts of the 1st GTA and the 20th CAA of the Western Military District, or the 29th, 5th, 35th, and 36th CAAs, just to name a few.
That is why we think the intensity of Russian attacks will increase as more combat units enter the fight.
Missile strikes
On the night of 15-16 FEB, Russians also launched 32 missiles at Ukrainian critical infrastructure targets. The attack included 12 Kh-101/Kh-555 air-launched cruise missiles fired from two Tu-95 strategic bomber aircraft operating over the Caspian Sea, eight Kalibr (3M14T?) launched for a Russian frigate operating on the Black Sea, 12 Kh-22 long-range anti-ship missile launched for six Tu-22M3 bombers flying over the Kursk Oblast, and two Kh-59 tv-guided cruise missiles fired from two Su-35 aircraft operating over the Melitopol area. The Ukrainian General Staff claims to have destroyed 14 Kh-101/Kh-505 missiles and two Kh-59. As such, the air defence success rate stood at only 50%. All Kh-22 pierced through Ukrainian defences, and the UGS recognised they did not possess the capability to down this type of missile. Kh-22 was designed as an anti-carrier weapon that sought to engage entire carrier battle groups with conventional and nuclear warheads. The missile’s attack speed is around Mach 4 (4,900 km/h or 3,070 mp/h).
The event coincided with the deployment of balloons with attached radar reflectors, presumably to confuse Ukrainian air defences and force them to fire missiles onto these ballons, thus decreasing the number of missiles available during an actual attack and revealing the positions of Ukrainian air defence units. It is unclear how widespread the use of such a technique is. However, for it to be effective, Russians would need to use them en masse, which, so far, we have not seen them do. Nevertheless, we expect Russians to continue utilising such balloons over the coming weeks.
The previous strike was carried out on 10FEB. Before that, missile attacks occurred more or less every fortnight. Does the decreased time interval between recent strikes herald change and increased missile attack tempo? Probably not. The Russian air campaign against Ukraine’s power grid has been a failure, and with temperatures on the rise, the Russian ability to cause hardships to Ukrainian citizens will decrease.
Situation in Belarus
Below is the summary of last week’s events in Belarus, placed into a broader context of the war in Ukraine. A full description and analysis of the military activity in Belarus are further down.
We want to make only one observation this week in this section. As you will see further below, the number and intensity of Belarusian Ground Forces’ exercises decreased considerably last week. There are two possible explanations as to why this happened. The first is quite obvious. Following weeks of intense drills, Belarusian units are now decompressing and recuperating. This process can last a few weeks, and the intensity will probably increase again.
As we stated in one of the previous updates, the fact that Belarusians were training was not in itself worrisome. We would be more alarmed when they stopped. The cessation or near standdown of military activity after such an intensive training period could suggest that Belarusian units are now in the process of rebuilding (raising) readiness. Equipment is being repaired, and stocks of fuel, lubricants and ammunition are being replenished. This stage would also suggest that an announcement of Belarusian participation in the war would occur soon, followed by mobilisation.
We do not know which scenario the Belarusian Armed Forces are currently pursuing. But the reader should be aware that decreased activity does not necessarily mean no preparations for war are ongoing — quite the contrary.
Over the last few months, not only did Minsk deploy all of its units to training ranges where they practised with Russian soldiers, but it also updated contact details for most (officially 95%) of its Belarusian men liable for the draft. If (we emphasise IF) Belarus is to enter the war, it will likely happen over the next few weeks.
Weather forecast
(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days, unless otherwise stated)
This week will deliver a high amplitude of temperatures in the Kharkiv Oblast. Until Tuesday, the temperature will move within the -6°C (23°F) and 3°C (38°F) range. However, a sudden and deep drop is expected on Wednesday and Thursday when the temperatures will drop to -13°C (9°F) during the night and -7°C (20°F) during the day. Then, the weather will similarly suddenly increase to 0°C (32°F) on Friday and 4°C (40°F) on Sunday. Nights will continue to deliver freezing temperatures at night in the latter half of the week, but the drop is not expected to decrease below -2°C. (28°F)
When it comes to fall, this week will produce light snow, snow, rain, and sunny weather too.
The same weather pattern will occur in the Bakhmut area. Mild weather until Tuesday will be pushed out by a freezing spell, with temperatures dropping to -6°C (21°F) during the day and -14°C (7°F) at night on Thursday. But, the subsequent increase in temperature will be more sudden compared to the Kharkiv Oblast. On Sunday, 7°C (44°F) are forecasted for Bakhmut.
Occasional rain showers are forecasted throughout the region.
As always, southern Ukraine is to experience warmer temperatures compared to other parts of the country. The freezing spell in Zaporizhzhia will also be short-lived, but the drop should not exceed -8°C (19°F) at night on Thursday. On the other hand, during the day, the temperature should drop slightly below 0°C (32°F). On Sunday, the weather forecast shows 10°C (50°F) in the region. A general outlook does not foresee freezing temperatures in this area until 5MAR during the day.
Light rain and occasional showers are predicted in Zaporizhihia throughout the week.
Predicting long-term weather forecasts is, of course, always marred with errors, but with March almost upon us, the likelihood of long-term freezing spells remains minimal. Taking the Kharkiv Oblast as an example, +14°C (57°F) is predicted for 6MAR. Although occasional drops in temperatures below zero are possible, it is highly likely that over the next 30 days, we will see temperatures gradually climbing and maintaining the weekly average above 0°C (32°F).
Precipitation is to remain high. Consequently, if the weather is any factor in considering large-scale combat operations, the current forecast does not support sizable employment of armoured formations.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 385 aircraft (+1), 210 helicopters (+3), 3,178 UAVs (+73), 405 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 7,840 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+95), 1,029 MLRS launchers (+14), 4,144 field artillery guns and mortars (+71), as well as 8,458 units of special military vehicles (+108).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 142,860 personnel (+5,080), 3,310 tanks (+30), 6,545 armoured combat vehicles (+57), 2,327 artillery systems (+40) and 469 MLRS (+4), 243 anti-aircraft systems (+9), 298 aircraft (+2) and 287 helicopters (+1), and 2,016 UAVs (+58), 5,196 vehicles and fuel tanks (+105), 873 cruise missiles (+16), 18 warships and boats (0) and 215 pieces of special equipment (+9).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 137,780 personnel (+6,490), 3,280 tanks (+60), 6,488 armoured combat vehicles (+53), 2,287 artillery systems (+61) and 465 MLRS (+5), 234 anti-aircraft systems (+7), 296 aircraft (+2) and 286 helicopters (+2), and 1,958 UAVs (+49), 5,091 vehicles and fuel tanks (+57), 857 cruise missiles (+61), 18 warships and boats (0) and 215 pieces of special equipment (+12).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
Based on the data provided by the Ukrainian General Staff, last week saw mixed results regarding equipment destroyed in Ukraine. On the one hand, Ukrainians claim to have destroyed 30 tanks vs 60 destroyed two weeks ago. A decline was also reported in artillery systems ( 40 vs 61), MLR systems (4 vs 5), and pieces of special equipment (9 vs 12). The number of eliminated personnel decreased from 6,490 two weeks ago to 5,080 last week.
On the other hand, an increase was reported in destroyed armoured vehicles (57 vs 53), air defence systems (9 vs 7), UAVs (58 vs 49), and vehicles and fuel tanks (105 vs 57).
Artillery strikes
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russians more or less maintained the intensity of their artillery strikes, although some notable changes occurred.
Firstly, there was a substantial decrease in artillery strikes in the Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts. Kharkiv is particularly interesting, given the increased tempo of Russian ground attacks in the region. However, a rise was noted in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Sumy Oblasts.
Russians achieved the highest number of locations shelled on Tuesday and Wednesday, 14-15FEB, when 108 villages and cities were struck. The lowest number occurred a day prior when 80 areas were hit.
The seven-day average stands at 100 strikes, compared to 101 strikes a week ago and 89 two weeks ago.
Russians, thus, continue to maintain a heightened rate of artillery strikes.
Military situation in Belarus
Over the past seven days, the highest Belarusian military-political representatives participated in several noteworthy events. Some were full of lofty statements but were not followed by the increased activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces. At the same time, the training tempo of Belausian forces decreased, which also pertained to the Russian presence in the country.
Last week was dominated by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s activities. Firstly, he met with the CSTO Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov. Monday’s meeting was connected to the Belarusian presidency in the organisation but also used to discuss the current issues within the CSTO. Lukashenko stressed that organisation members can’t consider the Russo-Ukrainian war as an “outside conflict” and will probably have to make “certain” decisions in the future, hinting he expected other countries to support the offer tangibly.
Three days later, Lukashenko participated in a press conference with foreign journalists. He mostly spoke about the necessity of ending the conflict, which was deliberately started by the so-called collective west and is currently “fuelled” by the United States and Poland. According to Belarusian President, if US President Joe Biden arrived in Minsk and took part in tripartite talks with Russian and Belarusian Presidents, the war would end shortly. On the other hand, Lukashenko spoke about potential Belarusian participation in the ongoing conflict. He stated that unspecified neighbour state(s) are trying to draw Belarus into the war. Belarus was ready to fight alongside Russians but only in case of an attack on its territory. He also ruled out the possibility of mobilisation, noticing that Belarusian preparations had, so far, had a defensive character. During the event, Lukashenko also referred to the recent Polish and Lithuanian actions related to the closure of border checkpoints with Belarus (as a retaliation for the political imprisonment of Polish journalist Andrzej Poczobut). He stressed that they were economic provocations and would be answered by the Belarusian side. Initially, softly but harsher actions were expected over time.
A day later, Belarusian President departed for Moscow, where he met with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. According to the Russian side, the gathering was held to develop further the Russo-Belarusian partnership and deeper integration within the Union State. In the beginning, Lukashenko noted unprecedented trade turnover between states, which reached almost USD50bn (in goods and services) in 2022. This data shows that Belarus continues cooperating with Russia, despite some “international doubts of certain countries.” After that, he moved to the security and defence issues, noticing that the Belarusian side had fulfilled all the joint aims in the area last year. He precisely spoke about the development of Belarusian microchip capabilities and the cooperation of Belarusian and Russian military and aviation companies. Lukashenko even declared that Belarus was ready to produce Su-25 (mistakenly called MiG-25) close air support subsonic jets with insignificant Russian assistance and informed that about 80% of all integration programs were currently successfully finished.
Referring to the internal issues, the government introduced a decree regulating housing provisions for Belarusian service members on Monday. The document signed by Lukashenko governs the procedure and conditions for the transfer of accommodation rented by the personnel of the Belarusian Armed Forces, State Security and Border Committees, as well as the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Emergencies to their ownership. It also impacts service members of the other power agencies and allows them to receive properties free of charge after 25 years of service. Moreover, family members of servicemen killed on duty will receive property free (regardless of the length of the service). On the other hand, relatives of personnel that died for other reasons will be able to rent housing on the same terms (until their living conditions improve). The decree comes into force three months after its publication. The decree could indicate that Belarus is preparing to join the war and will try to suppress dissent by offering free accommodation.
Last week, the majority of the Belarusian high-rank officers’ actions had rather an informational or cultural character. However, also a few interesting events nevertheless occurred. The meeting of the Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, with Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Imangali Tasmagambetov, was one of them. It took place shortly after the meeting of the Belarusian President and was used to debate the military-political situation in Eastern Europe. Officially, Khrenin briefed an official on the Belarusian priority areas of the organisation’s activities, such as increasing force readiness, strengthening military-technical cooperation, and building up institutional capabilities in the analytical sphere. Both officials informed about four joint drills to be held on Belarusian soil this year. It pertains to Interaction-2023, Echelon-2023, Search-2023 and Barrier-2023 exercises.
Notably, two days later, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin promoted 13 Belarusian officers to the Colonel rank. A day later, a conference dedicated to the issue of military flight safety was held. It was attended by unspecified Russian representatives and the Commander of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces, Col. Andrey Lukyanovich, who summed up the results of Belarusian aviation exercises and led the discussion linked to the factors affecting flight safety.
On Wednesday, the Belarusian Armed Forces commemorated the anniversary of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Several events were held across the country involving dozens of Belarusian high-rank officers.
The Head of the Main Ideological Work Department, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky led the informational briefing for Belarusian ceramic producer – Keramin OJSC enterprise workers. There, he spoke about the role of military security in state development but also covered the issue of the political-military situation around Belarus.
Official celebrations were also held on Friday when the Belarusian Armed Forces commemorated the 105th anniversary of their formation.
Last week, the Belarusian officers paid particular attention to the informational activities.
On Tuesday, the Spokesman of the Belarusian MoD, Lt. Col. Inna Gorbacheva, jointly with the Belarusian military television VoenTV representatives, took part In the press conference with the Chief of the CSTO Joint Staff, Col. Gen. Anatoly Sidorov. Moreover, foreign journalists had an opportunity to visit the 38th Air Assault Brigade (Monday) and the Belarusian Military Academy (Friday). Throughout the week, the Commander of the North-Western Operational Command (OC), Maj. Gen. Alexander Naumenko headed the Belarusian delegation in the Aero India-2023 international exhibition. There he took part in a Defence Ministers 2023 convention.
Besides, the Belarusian Armed Forces deployed the Special Purpose Medical Center of the 432nd Main Military Medical Center to Syria as a part of humanitarian support after recent earthquakes.
Also, the Commander of the 120th Mechanised Brigade was relieved from the post and is waiting for his appointment to a higher position.
Over the past seven days, we observed a visible decrease in Belarusian training activities. There were almost no major mechanised formations training events. The engineering-sapper battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade continued practical classes on using explosives (Monday). Elements of the 111th Artillery Brigade conducted control classes combined with live ammo firing at the Brestsky Training Ground (Thursday). They involved unspecified 2A65 and 2S5 subunits. The same training ground also hosted the 111th Artillery Brigade tactical medicine classes and the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion. Moreover, the communications company of the 36th Road and Bridge Brigade underwent special tactical exercises on Wednesday and Thursday. Besides, standard firing classes were held among cadets of the 72nd Joint Training Center, servicemen of the Minsk Military Commandant’s Office and the 8th Radiotechnical Brigade.
On the other hand, Belarusian air components were very active last week. Dozens of training flights involving fighter aircraft, helicopters and transport aircraft were conducted on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Saturday.
Last week, a visible increase in the number of movements of military equipment was reported. However, it likely correlated with the celebrations of the abovementioned anniversaries. Despite single tanks, BTRs, BM-21 and BM-30 launchers, some more sophisticated weaponry was also observed on the move. It pertains to APP-90PM-2 airfield searchlights, ZIL-131-based command-staff vehicles and 19ZH6 radar stations. Interestingly, the arrival of two S-300 launchers was reported at Luniniets Airport. This development is likely connected to the recent unofficial information about the redeployment of the 115th Air Defence Regiment (fielding those systems) to the city. Two military echelons with Belarusian military equipment were also observed. They consisted of almost 30 BTRs and several trucks (in total) and were seen on Tuesday.
When it comes to the Russian Armed Forces, their activity was average. Over the past seven days, two Tu-134AK and a single Tu-154M aircraft arrived in Belarus. The Russian air component carried out several training flights that involved A-50 AEW&C aircraft with MiG-31K supersonic interceptor aircraft escort and unspecified helicopters operating from Belarusian air bases. On the other hand, the ground activity was limited and included only a small number of trucks, light vehicles or civilian cars.
Below is the summary of last week’s Belarusian training activities. Click here to access data for the entire month.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
Russians continued attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast last week. Although they reportedly captured a couple of settlements, we can hardly talk about an ongoing offensive in the oblast. Certainly, the number and intensity of Russian ground attacks increased, and in some areas, they overwhelmed defending Ukrainians, forcing them to retreat. But, the number of units deployed near the frontline is unlikely to deliver significant changes and turn tactical victories into an operational success. In this view, attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast could be battle-shaping activities seeking to divert Ukrainian attention and capabilities from other parts of the country or to wear Ukrainians down before follow-on forces are committed. We will only find the answer to this question in a few weeks and with hindsight.
Last week did not deliver any Russian ground attacks from Russia proper into Ukraine. No attacks occurred from the Belgorod-Valyuki area into Ukraine. On the other hand, Moscow continued daily missile and artillery attacks on targets across the region. On Thursday alone, five missiles fired from an S-300 air defence system hit Kharkiv, causing damage to civilian infrastructure. Ukrainians do not report any successful Russian strikes targeting Ukrainian military facilities, but some attacks likely aim at the Ukrainian military presence near the frontline.
Last week, the Russian MoD claimed to have destroyed two US-supplied HIMARS systems in the Kharkiv Oblast. However, there are reasons to be sceptical about such claims. Firstly, the MoD did not produce any proof confirming their destruction. Secondly, Russians have reported many times about the destruction of HIMARS systems. In fact, the number of alleged platforms destroyed by the Russians probably already exceeds the number of systems delivered from the United States. Yet, despite this, Ukrainian high-precision strikes continue.
Moving onto the battlefield changes, Russians reportedly captured Hryanykivka, although this claim continues to be disputed, even among Russian sources. Lyman Pershyi was also seized, and the Russians extended their attacks towards Synkivka. For clarity, we have had Lyman Pershyi marked under Russian control for months, which means we were probably wrong in this assessment. However, even assuming that we were wrong in this instance, since the start of the month, Russians captured 50 sq kilometres. One can hardly call this progress.
According to Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) think-tank, the Russian 138th Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB) of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) is leading the attack along the Oskil River. Before the war, the CAA was the weakest of all CAAs across the entire Russian ground forces. It deployed 40 T-72B3s and some 160 MT-LBs, which formed the core of its mechanised force. The army suffered heavy casualties in the early days of the war, with its commander reportedly dismissed as early as late MAR22. It is highly unlikely that the capabilities and combat effectiveness of the entire army and the 138th MRB, in particular, were reconstituted to the point that these units are now fully functional, capable tactical and operational formations.
The main objective of Russian attacks appears to be Kupyansk. However, given the size of currently deployed Russian forces, chances are remote that the goal will be attained over the short term (one month)
We continue to maintain that Russians are unlikely to be preparing for any larger offensive in this direction (Kharkiv Oblast), at least until the end of this month. We see no evidence to suggest that Russians are concentrating their forces on this axis (Dvorchina-Kupyansk).
A Russian source claimed last week that the UAF lost a tank company a month in the Kupyansk area due to fuel shortages. The source added that the Ukrainians could not deliver fuel to the battlefield by military fuel trucks and were forced to use civilian vehicles. In general, the problem appears to be more systemic, the source added, and can cause significant degradation of the Ukrainian ability not only to attack but also to withdraw from battle. There were examples of immobilised vehicles being picked up by Orlan-30 UAVs and subsequently struck with Russian artillery.
Luhansk direction
According to Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, the most difficult situation is near Kreminna and Bilohorivka. Russians increased the intensity and number of artillery and air strikes in these areas. Haidai characterised the current situation as “massive Russian attacks” and “powerful escalation”. He added that although Russians were transferring additional reserves and equipment to the Luhansk oblast, Ukrainians understood “exactly what to expect from the enemy.” He also claimed that Russian airborne forces were employed in both Svatove and Kreminna directions.
Although these words sound dramatic, the reality is that Russian progress near Kreminna was minimal. It is possible that they inched forward in the Serebryansky Forest, but the most important thing is that attacks from Dibrova towards Zarichne/Torske and on Yampolivka were pushed back.
Bilohorivka is also under Ukrainian control
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka, Novoselivske, and Kuzemivka.
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian defensive lines west of the Makiivka area to push Ukrainians over the Zherebets River that goes through the village. However, they had no success in this area either.
Chervonopopivka saw no changes. Russians continued to push towards Nevske, but no advances were recorded in this area.
It seems that the Russian offensive capability in this area was exhausted as of Sunday, 19FEB. It will be very difficult for Russians to push forward without significant reinforcements.
Last week, only one HIMARS strike was reported in the Luhansk Oblast: a Russian troop concentration area was hit in Kadiivka on 13FEB.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
As in the Luhansk Oblast, despite significantly increased offensive activities across the entire Donetsk Oblast, Russian progress was only limited to the Bakhmut-Soldar area. Looking at Russian operations since the start of the year, Russians only really progressed in Soledar and southwest of Bakhmut, which extended their territorial control by 60 sq km. However, had it not been for Wagner PCM and its willingness to take immensely high manpower losses in Soledar, none of these gains would have probably materialised.
Russian sources reported last week that Russian operational formations were gradually replacing Wagner. Still, it is unclear whether this means a rotation or the end of the Wagner as an independent fighting force. Undoubtedly, the rivalry between the Russian MoD and Wagner leadership hinders operations near Bakhmut and forces Russian military leaders to command two different operations.
Regarding frontline operations, last week, Russians made no progress near Spirne and Verkhokamyanske. Attacks on Spirne from this direction were pushed back. It is highly doubtful that Russians will make any advances in this area, at least until Bakhmut is captured. The main focus is Bakhmut, which draws Russian forces from other axes and thus decreases their chances of tactical success elsewhere. Indeed, a Russian failure to move forward from Rozdolivka and Vesele probably has the same cause. Consequently, last week, Russians made no progress towards reaching Siversk.
Further south, the attackers made some progress. Although Ukrainians claim that their forces were still present in Krasna Hora, the reality was that this presence, if indeed existed, was on the outskirts of the village and was unlikely to serve as a staging ground for a counterattack. Indeed, an image posted on social media showed Russian personnel in Paraskoviivka (the exact spot where the photo was taken), which confirms that Wagner moved past Krasna Hora.
In doing so, Russians also cut off the Slovyansk-Bakhmut M03 road. Ukrainians also recognised no route leading to Bakhmut presently fulfils logistical functions as all are under artillery or mortar fire. According to a Ukrainian source, Russians strengthened their positions near the highway where they had reportedly brought new reserves. The next objective is to attack Dubove-Vasylivka.
According to a Russian source, heavy fighting occurred near the road across Berkhivka, which the UAF had started to use as a secondary road for supplies to Bakhmut. Last week, many Ukrainian sources stated that Russians were regrouping north of Bakhmut, which probably suggests preparations for offensive actions from this direction towards the city centre. Alternatively, Russians can push towards Yahidne and then Khromove to cut off another road to Bakhmut. A Ukrainian soldier stated on Wednesday that the road through Khromove had already been under mortar control, and Russians periodically fired at it.
When it comes to Bakhmut, the situation in the city hardly changed. Russian sources claimed last week that number of Ukrainian forces defending Bakhmut decreased to 2,500 men from 10,000 in January. This comes after reports from two weeks ago claimed that the number of Ukrainians defending the city was reduced by 50 per cent. However, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner PMC head, claimed two weeks ago that Ukrainians were strengthening their forces in Bakhmut, not withdrawing.
Nevertheless, heavy fighting took place in the city’s eastern part, but the Russians made no progress there. According to a Ukrainian soldier, the most difficult situation was in the northern direction, but Ukrainian units were conducting some actions to stabilise the situation. The soldier did not specify what action was undertaken to achieve this objective. The soldier claimed that Russians had increased their MLRS, mortar, artillery and aviation attacks. He added that the UAF’s counterattack in the city’s south pushed Russians back from their positions on Tuesday.
Russian reports about entering the city’s southwestern areas (near the Mauriupol Cemetery) were not confirmed, although fighting in this area was ongoing.
From the Ukrainian perspective, the key aspect is that the attackers made no progress towards severing the Kostyantynivka-Bakhmut highway. In fact, after a reported counterattack near Ivanivske, the situation in this sector appears to have stabilised. Without deploying reserves, it does not seem that Russians will be able to break Ukrainian positions in the area.
According to Prigozhin, Wagner would capture Bakhmut in March – April, when all Ukrainian supply routes were cut. He also complained about the Russian MoD’s opposition to supplying the group with ammunition, adding that the MoD seeks to bleed Wagner out. Indeed, a video appeared on social media on Thursday showing three Wagner artillerymen complaining about a lack of artillery shells. They appealed to the MoD to fix the problem and provide the group with ammunition.
According to Ukrainian bloggers, battles occurred on the western outskirts of Novobakhmutivka. CDS claimed that Russians “broke through to Novobakhmutivka and captured it”. Units of the 11th Separate Motorised Rifle Regiment of the 1st Army Corps captured the heights near Novoselivka Druga.
Despite ongoing ground and artillery attacks, the situation near Avdiivka did not change. Following the capture of Vodiane and Opytne two weeks ago, Russians made no progress in this area, either south or north of the city (from the Krasnohorivka area). Regarding the latter, Russians reportedly concentrated a large number of troops to assault the village, where they allegedly found a gap in the Ukrainian defence and regularly saturated this area with manpower. However, so far, no even circumstantial evidence exists to confirm Russian progress near Krasnohorivka.
No changes occurred near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske. Russians continued to attack, but so far, without result.
Russians continue to assert that they made some gains in Mariinka, but this has not been independently confirmed. Last week, a Ukrainian source published a video showing Russian units advancing in the city’s northern parts before being engaged by Ukrainian artillery and probably killed.
Lastly, Vuhledar. Russians resumed their attacks on the settlement but at a significantly decreased capacity. They continue to experience losses, but not at the same rate. The weather is probably a contributing factor in this reduced activity. Russians stated that due to deteriorating weather, Russian UAV operators faced problems, which impacted the overall Russian ability to launch coordinated assaults. Russian attacks are also hindered by minefields Ukrainians established in the city and approaches to it. Indeed, Russians tried to deploy the UR-77 Meteorit mine-clearing vehicle to pave the way, but at least one attempt was unsuccessful.
There were also Russian attacks near Novosilka and Prechystivka but without success. The attack on the latter probably sought to open up a new route of advance towards Vuhledar.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Last week was most likely the quietest in the Zaporizhia Oblast since the war began. There were no significant events. Tactical scale actions were also kept to a minimum.
Early in the week, there was a Russian attack on Zaliznychne, but it is unclear whether it delivered any frontline changes.
The second attack also occurred early in the week, southeast of Orikhiv. In this area, Russians attacked from Robotyne towards Mala Tokmachka, intending to take over the control of the
T0803 highway. Battles for this stipe of land lasted the entire week, but there were no reports about Russian progress in this area.
Kherson direction
The overall situation in the Kherson Oblast did not change. Both sides’ operations are limited to artillery fires and river infiltration operations.
We continue to see no evidence indicating any significant changes in the oblast. Both sides’ presence in this direction is minimal and mostly centred around special operations forces, artillery units, and territorial defence on the Ukrainian side and national guard/Wagner forces on the Russian one.
Ground actions on the islands in the Dnipro delta mostly have a harassing and/or reconnaissance character and do not indicate preparations for more sizable moves.
Last week, through artillery fire, Russians claimed to have destroyed a Ukrainian vessel attempting to deploy a reconnaissance and sabotage group in an unspecified area in the Kherson Oblast.
Footage released last week also showed that both sides conducted drone and ATGM strikes on opposing forces’ positions. On Friday, a video was released showing a Russian ATGM hit a building on the northern side of the river, which Ukrainian snipers reportedly used. Also, on the same day, another video appeared showing a Ukrainian kamikaze drone targeting what seems to be a Russian tank hiding under a bridge in Nova Khakovka.
Last week, Ukrainians also hit the manpower concentration areas in Hola Prystan and Pishchanivka and five ammunition depots and an observation post.
Looking farther south, there was a possible Ukrainian attack on a Russian military facility in Crimea. There was an explosion near Armyansk, but it is unclear what caused it. Ukrainians did report any drone or missile strikes, while Russians claimed that the blast was caused by “combat coordination activities in the area.”.
According to the UGS, Russians have sent about 200 National Guard soldiers to Lazurne to strengthen counter-sabotage measures in the area.
A Russian source claimed instructors from the United States or the United Kingdom arrived in Sadove near Kherson. No further information about the purpose of their visit was provided, but we assess that the likelihood of such an event was low.
Outlook for the week of 20FEB – 26FEB
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
This is what we forecasted last week:
“Russians will likely maintain the scale of their attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast. Currently, the scale of these attacks resembles positional battles/reconnaissance-by-force assaults. We believe that there is roughly even chance that they will bring frontline changes in the oblast next week. We continue to see no preparations or indicators suggesting a sizable attack. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.” We were correct in forecasting no changes in the scale of Russian assaults in this direction. According to Russian sources, the attackers made some incremental gains last week, but their impact on the overall situation in the region was minimal.
Score: 1/1
“For next week’s prediction, we will stick to what we wrote last week. Based on current operations, it is likely that no significant changes will occur in the wider Luhansk Oblast. We continue to maintain that tactical fluctuations are highly likely, but neither side will be able to turn these into operational successes. Despite reports about the upcoming Russian offensive, we see no evidence confirming Moscow is building its forces in the Luhansk Oblast.” This forecast was correct. No major changes occurred in the Luhansk Oblast last week.
Score: 1/1
“Ukrainian posture near Kreminna is now entirely focused on defence. Possibilities are remote that Kyiv’s forces will make any gains in this area next week. On the other hand, Russians will likely capture more territory west and south of Kreminna.” We will give ourselves no points for this because, despite many efforts, Russians did not extend their territorial control last week.
Score: 0/1
“We do not foresee major changes in the Donetsk Oblast. Russian attacks will almost certainly persist, but their ability to capture new territories is limited. They may capture some settlements, but the impact on the operational picture will be limited. We continue to see no evidence to suggest Russians are preparing for a broader offensive in this direction. Based on last week’s Russian failures to capture Vuhledar, we assess that it is highly unlikely that the settlement will be taken next week.” This prognosis was also correct. Russians probably captured two settlements last week, while their attempts to capture Vuhledar, although continued, brought no results.
Score: 1/1
“Russians are likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. Firstly, given that the focus is on Krasna Hora, it is highly likely that they will capture some territory in this sector. Unless Ukrainians deploy reserves and counterattack, we assess that it is likely that Russians will continue to move forward. When it comes to attacks on Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka, there is roughly even chance that Russians will make progress on these axes, given that the emphasis is on areas towards Bakhmut.” This forecast is a mixed bag. Russians indeed made some progress south of Krasna Hora and entered Paraskoviivka. They moved forwards in northern Bakhmut. But, assaults towards Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka brought no progress.
Score: 0.5/1
“Regarding Bakhmut, we are amending our last week’s prognosis. Unless Ukrainians start withdrawing, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains within the city. Last week we noted that “it is highly improbable that Ukrainians will pull back from Bakhmut.” This week, however, given that Russians reportedly started approaching (and in some places temporarily cutting off) the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka), we assess that it is possible that Ukrainians will start leaving Bakhmut. The fall of Ivanivske is also possible. The situation is complex, and the withdrawal is contingent on many factors, but the trajectory near Bakhmut is negative for Ukrainians.” The main tone of this prognosis was a Ukrainian pullback from Bakhmut was a real possibility and that it could happen during the week. Indeed, some Russian sources reported that the number of Ukrainian personnel defending the city decreased fivefold. However, despite this, Russians continued to make incremental gains in the city, and a reported Ukrainian counterattack near Ivanivske pushed Russians back. The situation appears to have stabilised, at least temporarily.
Score: 0/1
“Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian positional attacks will continue. It is unlikely, however, that Russians will capture some territory. We expect no sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine. “The prognosis was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We foresee no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but they primarily seek to test and probe defences and reconnoitre OPFOR positions. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River, including with incendiary ammunition.” The prognosis was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue its increased exercise tempo. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” This forecast was largely correct. The only thing that was not was the Belarusian Armed Forces exercise tempo. Much to our surprise, it decreased substantially last week.
Score: 0.5/1
Final score: 6/9 (66%)
Next week’s forecast
Russian attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast next week will continue to have a limited scope and intensity. We continue to assess that there is a roughly even chance that they will capture new territory, but the focus here is on the lower number. In other words, it is more likely than not that no changes will occur. We continue to see no preparations or indicators suggesting a sizable attack. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.
We continue to expect no major changes in the Luhansk Oblast. Based on field reports, it seems that in terms of ground activity, the last week was calmer compared to the week prior. As we see no indications of a larger push, we do not expect any changes in the scope of Russian attacks. It is unlikely that the frontline will be altered significantly next week, but positional battles will likely produce tactical shifts.
When it comes to Kreminna, we are degrading the Russian capacity to capture new territory in this area. Last week we stated that Russians likely would seize more territory west and south of Kreminna. This week, we are placing the probability at a roughly even chance (45-55%).
Moving to the Donetsk Oblast, Russians there, too, are unlikely to make significant gains. We see no evidence suggesting a more extensive operation is being planned or prepared for. Attacks are likely to be limited in intensity and scope. Nevertheless, it is possible that Russians will capture some territories in the oblast., But, again, the impact on the overall situation in this direction will be minimal. It is highly unlikely that Vuhledar will be taken next week.
Russians are likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. After the fall of Paraskoviivka, Russians are likely to extend their attacks to Yahidne. It is possible that the push from the Paraskoviivka area may not be directed at northern Bakhmut but at Khromove, through which the only supply route to Bakhmut passes.
It is unlikely that Russians will capture Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka next week, as the emphasis is clearly on capturing Bakhmut.
Regarding Bakhmut, the withdrawal from territories north of the city further deteriorates Ukrainian positions in the town. Given Ukrainian reports about Russian forces regarding the north of Bakhmut, we assess that it is possible that the attackers can attempt a large push from this axis into Bakhmut next week. The withdrawal from Bakhmut hinges on the pace of Russian attacks from Paraskoviivka and their ability to hold the road from Khromove. We assess that is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will start pulling back next week, but everything currently depends on Ukrainians holding the ground in these two areas.
It seems that Russian attacks towards Ivanivske petered out. Here too, we give it a 45-55% chance that Russians will progress.
We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. It is also possible that Russians will make some territorial gains, but a sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine is highly unlikely to happen next week.
The same pertains to the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.
We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF’s exercise tempo will likely remain subdued. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.
"One can hardly call this progress." Indeed. Albuquerque, New Mexico was 136 sq km 20 years ago, and has grown in the meantime. Russia has expended a thousand lives a day to claim a patch of land a third the size of one median American city.