Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
There were no operational or strategic changes in the situation in Ukraine over the past week;
Russian centre of gravity is placed around Bakhmut, where they slowly progressed towards the city centre;
No major events took place in the Kharkiv Oblast; Russians may have captured one village, but they continued conducting artillery strikes, especially on the northern parts of the region;
The tempo and scale of Russian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast reduced; It is unclear whether this was caused by forces rotation or degradation of Russian offensive capabilities; Russians made no progress there last week;
Russians advanced in Bakhmut and along the M03 road linking the city with Slovyansk; Politically, Kyiv is determined to defend Bakhmut as long as necessary, even though military considerations suggest other options;
Russians probably seek to conduct larger envelopment operations of Ukrainian forces around Avdiivka; There were no other changes in the broader Donetsk Oblast;
Ukrainians conducted limited attacks in the Zaporizhihia Oblast, but they delivered no results;
No Russian offensive actions took place there last week;
There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast; Both sides limited their operations to artillery strikes and ground reconnaissance missions on islands in the Dnipro delta;
The Belarusian Armed Forces’ posture did not change; However, there was a significant uptick in training activities, especially related to artillery forces; Russians reportedly removed some of their units from Belarus;
General outlook
Last week did not deliver significant changes on the battlefronts in Ukraine. Russians remained offensively committed in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, while both sides’ operations in the Kherson Oblast were limited to artillery strikes and reconnaissance missions on islands in the Dnipro River delta. The Zaporizhihia Oblast continued to see positional battles, but last week, Ukrainians conducted some limited ground attacks there. Although they delivered no frontline changes, they could herald changes in Ukrainian posture from now on.
If we remove Bakhmut from the equation, Russians made no progress last week. The tempo of their ground attacks in the Luhansk Oblast, the second most important operational direction, reportedly decreased. We still have not seen many Russian units committed to combat. It is unclear whether they are to be employed during spring or whether they are held in reserve to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks. However, with unconfirmed information about another wave of mobilisation circulating in the media, it appears clear that the first wave stabilised the frontline situation but was insufficient to propel Russians into making new gains. Indeed, the current Russian operations have been underwhelming, especially if we consider that Moscow has already deployed, without effect, most of the 300,000 mobilised men.
The winter is over, and spring is upon Ukraine. This change is clearly reflected in the weather, which will become increasingly warm. It is worth reflecting on each side’s achievements over the past three months. There are still many unknowns, especially regarding manpower numbers on both sides and the impact possible reserves will have on the battlefield.
Regarding the Russian side, over the past three months, they captured around 420 sq km (162 sq miles) (slightly less than the territory of the US city of San Jose) across Ukraine, primarily in the Donetsk Oblast. They also made some gains near Avdiivka, both north and south of the city, but they had no big impact on the overall operational situation in this part of the oblast. The capture of Soledar and ongoing battles for Bakhmut have cost Russians dearly. Different estimates have been published in the open sources, but the consensus is that Wagner PMC lost around 20,000-40,000 men over the winter, primarily former inmates. Its ability to generate new formations is now unclear.
On the one hand, the ongoing turf war between Wagner and the Russian MoD / General Staff will probably limit Wagner’s access to weaponry. Secondly, the number of inmates willing to serve under PMC’s command is finite too. In fact, reportedly, this process stopped in January. On the other hand, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s head, remains optimistic about its ability to recruit new personnel. On Saturday, he claimed he planned to deliver about 30,000 new fighters by mid-May. The company is running recruitment efforts in 42 cities in Russia. If Prigozhin’s assertions come true, the PMC will be far from losing its ability to fight as an organisation, which we initially expected would happen after the fall of Soledar. We now assess that whereas the feud with Shiogu and Gerasimov could impact Wagner’s operations, it is unlikely to lead to its demise. Wagner is convenient to use, is cost-effective and provides an expendable force that attrits Ukrainian operational formations. Indeed, were it not for Wagner, Russia’s winter campaign would probably bring no major territorial gains.
Russians suffer from shell hunger. Their operations and organisation push towards fires as a vehicle for degrading opposing forces’ (OPFOR’s) capabilities did not work. Russians daily usage of artillery shells decreased from 30,000 per day during summer to 10,000 now, according to WSJ. While Russians may have been putting aside shells to increase their use during warmer months, it looks unlikely that they will reach the summer figures this year. For the Russian Ground Forces (RGF), which prioritises fires (in the RGF, artillery fire is a manoeuver, while in NATO, fires enable it), the remaining parts of the year could be challenging. Without a huge preponderance of power in terms of artillery volumes and untrained reservists, Moscow will need to rely on pure mass (the number of) its soldiers to break the deadlock. Following General Surovikin’s dismissal, Russian operations in Ukraine became more offensive-oriented. Whether the Russian high command will maintain this approach throughout 2023 or wait for a Ukrainian attack and try to counter it with reserve forces remains to be seen.
The winter has also shown one thing. Russians are content with their territorial possessions in the Kherson and Zaporizhihia Oblasts. The focus is on the Donetsk Oblast and southern parts of the Luhansk region, where through attacks from Kreminna towards Lyman, Russians hoped to reach pressure Slovyansk from the north. Although this did not happen, it suggested that the main Russian objective was indeed to capture the remaining parts of the Donetsk Oblast and thus fulfil the war’s objectives.
When it comes to Ukrainians, we must admit that our initial forecast from late autumn was incorrect. We expected Ukrainians to conduct one big push throughout winter to exploit Russian shortages in winterwear, training and equipment. Instead, Ukrainians largely waited, allowing Russians to attack and lose some steam. The loss of territory around Bakhmut and Soledar had no operational impact. At least from a territorial perspective, and given overall defensive posture, it is indeed a success that between July (the fall of Lysychansk) and March, Kyiv only lost Soledar and a half Bakhmut.
Secondly, Ukrainians sustained and ultimately came up victorious in the Russian campaign to destroy the country’s power grid. Ukrainians showed resilience and high spirits, and even during the most difficult days in December, when the grid was close to collapsing, Ukrainians endured. On the other hand, Russians showed a lack of capacity to sustain a long air and missile campaign. Had the strikes occurred more often, Kyiv’s ability to generate and transfer electricity nationwide would have been severely degraded, heavily impacting the economy.
Many countries across the world pledged further arms deliveries. While we might have peaked in terms of what has been promised, Ukrainians will receive modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles this year. Ukrainian logisticians’ headaches will also probably get more acute. Still, Kyiv should generally be on a path of a long-term rearmament programme, which will allow it to abandon its Soviet-era equipment. Unfortunately, the war also highlighted the scale of unpreparedness of European countries to sustain a partner nation’s support in a high-intensity war, let alone its own participation, if it were to happen. The war in Ukraine caused global disruptions to artillery ammunition supply chains. As this issue can only be solved over the following months and years, Ukrainians must be ready to sustain their operations and advance with limited access to artillery munitions.
However, access to high-precision munitions prevents Russians from concentrating their forces. Russians need to learn to prepare to fight in dispersal and conduct attacks with limited means, as any larger force concentrations immediately facilitate PGM attacks. Such an approach contrasts with the Russian doctrine, which necessitates a preponderance of fire- and manpower to achieve a breakthrough. Equipment losses have been so severe that, in many cases, Russians are an infantry-based army with limited artillery support. We do not know how Moscow plans to turn the current situation around, except for relying on attritional warfare as the ultimate vehicle towards victory.
Ukrainians also continue to innovate. Especially at the lower levels, Ukrainian soldiers show great initiative and ability to develop new solutions, often based on commercially available products. However, as we noted last week, there are definitely problems with mission command within the Ukrainian Armed Forces and legacy tendencies in the command and control. Franz Stefan-Gady wrote a very good article about the culture war within the Ukrainian military. We currently see no easy fixes to these problems. On the contrary, mission command may become more rigid, especially if Ukrainians continue will suffer profusely high losses on the battlefield.
Ukrainians also spent winter months preparing for a counteroffensive. Altogether, three army corps are being established (each corps will have 3-4 manoeuvre brigades), totalling some 20-25,000 men per corps. A few months is insufficient to create a fully functional organisation of this size capable of conducting combined arms operations effectively. Ukrainians, however, are confident that in 2023 they will liberate most of the territories they lost since 24FEB22.
Conscription age
On Monday, 13MAR, Andrei Kartapolov, former command of the Western Military District (2015-16), now turned politician (United Russia), introduced a bill to change the conscription age to compulsory military service from the current 18-27 years to 21-30 years.
Under the bill, the lower limit for conscription will be raised after a one-to-three-year transition period, but the upper limit could be increased as early as 2023’s spring draft. As a result, the General Staff will immediately have access to an increased number of those eligible for the draft. It especially pertains to students, who would usually defer military service due to undertaking higher studies. Those who finish universities on time, or even with slight extensions, will now probably be drafted. There are some 4 million students in Russia (interestingly down from 7 million in 2010).
We also understand that Russians will partly try to plug holes in their officers’ corps with these students. Especially given the number of armed forces personnel is to increase from 1.15 to 1.5 million over the following years. It should also be noted that a vast majority of the Russian ground forces are deployed to support operations in Ukraine. Moscow has no manpower numbers to respond to any contingency scenarios. Moscow needs to add soldiers as quickly as possible just to cover the losses sustained in Ukraine and man existing units that protect the state border.
Let alone in late DEC22, Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, announced the re-establishment of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and formations of 17 new manoeuvre divisions. A new army corps is to be established in Karelia, and two new airborne assault divisions will also be stood up. Three motor rifle divisions will be in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. At the same time, seven existing brigades of the Northern Fleet and Western, Central, and Eastern Military districts will be expanded into seven new motor rifle divisions. The same pertains to the five existing naval infantry brigades, which will be converted into divisions. Shoigu also proposed that Russia form five artillery divisions to support military districts.
Thus, if anyone thought that Russian defence reforms would stop and the leadership would ponder where the armed forces would go, then Shiogu’s comments made it clear this did not happen. We see an acceleration of reforms proposed by Shiogu in 2012 rather than a reversal.
In the short term, we will probably see a lot of focus on airborne units as they are better trained and have better chances of achieving tactical success. For instance, we have witnessed airborne units operate T-90s, confirming their priority in reequipment.
The problem is that such a programme would take over a decade to fully implement in peacetime. Given that we are in wartime and the ongoing need to feed the war in Ukraine, the establishment of all of these units is hardly realistic.
We also assess that to further increase the pool of trained soldiers, Moscow could increase compulsory military service from 12 to 18-24 months. The initial six months are spent on basic training, and the next half a year on specialised drills. After this period, a Russian soldier could present some level of competency on the battlefield.
Under Russian law, conscripts cannot be sent to war abroad during peacetime. One could argue that after the annexation of Ukrainian territories on 30SEP22, territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhihia Oblasts do not constitute aborad. Yet, we have seen no evidence that large numbers of conscripts are fighting in Ukraine. Some isolated cases probably happen, but nothing indicates an en masse deployment of such forces.
Secondly, we must also note that Moscow is running a special military operation and not war, especially from domestic and legal points of view. If the status of the Russian military involvement changes, then conscripts could indeed be deployed to Ukraine to fight there. But the legal paradigm within which Russia operates would need to change drastically for this to happen. We have seen no indications that such options are being considered.
MiG-29s for Ukraine
Last week, Poland and Slovakia announced plans to hand over their MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine. Bratislava will donate all 13 retired airframes. It is unclear how many Warsaw will hand over. Numbers circulating in the press suggest 12-20 aircraft, of which four will be handed over “in the coming days”. This will mark the first instance when foreign partners officially donated combat aircraft to Ukraine. Unofficially, Poland may have already done this but covered the delivery under the” spare parts” disguise.
Nevertheless, the aircraft will sustain the Ukrainian MiG-29 fleet and probably allow it to increase its combat aviation presence across the country. However, these airframes do not add any new capability to the Ukrainian Air Force and will thus not change the course of the war. There were discussions about upgrading MIGs to carry the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, but they probably led nowhere.
We also do not believe that announcements regarding these deliveries will force other countries to donate their combat aircraft.
Germany also criticised the Polish decision. Berlin accused Warsaw of forming a small coalition of countries willing to donate aircraft to Ukraine without informing Germany about its plans (Washington was reportedly warned about this development). Warsaw was again accused of stepping out of the line and not co-ordinating its decisions with foreign partners. Interestingly, it is possible that the aircraft to be donated to Ukraine will be ex-DDR (German Democratic Republic) airframes donated to Poland by Germany in the 1990s. In theory, Germany could object to delivering their airframes to Ukraine, citing the military end-user agreement signed with Poland.
Poland operates around 24 MiG-29s and MiG-29Ms. Fourteen airframes were upgraded to the M-variant a few years ago, and they feature new-generation avionics, modern communication and navigation systems. The MiG-29 donation is also controversial in Poland. On the one hand, Poland has had issues with servicing its MIG-29 fleet. On the other, it still has not received any replacement aircraft, either F-35 or FA-50, so the donation will undoubtedly lead to another erosion of existing capabilities. Poland has donated a lot of equipment from its operational forces. Although the exact numbers are unclear, some voices in Poland call for a pause so that the armed forces can rebuild their capacities. To put this into a broader perspective, it will take Poland around 5-6 years just to cover gaps caused by the donation of around 300 tanks to Ukraine (Warsaw has contracts signed for the delivery of K2 and M1A1/2 tanks).
Weather forecast
(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days, unless otherwise stated)
Spring weather is upon Ukraine, with increased temperatures but also precipitation.
Only Monday will see temperatures below 10°C (50°F) in the Kharkiv Oblast. Since Tuesday, it will gradually increase, reaching 15°C (59°F) on Friday. Monday will also be rather cold at night (2°C (36°F)), but by Thursday, the temperature will not drop below 8°C (46°F). Heavy showers are expected in the second part of the week.
The weather around Bakhmut will follow a similar pattern. However, in this area, Monday will be already relatively warm at 11°C (51°F), with temperatures increasing to 16°C (60°F) by Friday. Nights will be warm, with temperatures in the 4-9°C (39-48°F) range. Rain is only forecasted for Saturday and Sunday.
The Zaporizhzhia region will also be warm. Friday is to see 16°C (60°F), while the entire week will deliver temperatures above 10°C (50°F). Nights there, too, will be warm. Apart from Monday (1°C (34°F)), the temperatures should not drop below 5°C (41°F). Rainis only expected during the weekend.
Short and medium-term (30-day) forecasts do not show temperatures dropping below 0°C (32°F), even at night. This increasingly warm weather should translate into more offensive actions undertaken by both sides. But, we are still in transitional weather mode, where the mud will temporarily hinder the movement of armoured vehicles.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 402 aircraft (+2), 222 helicopters (+2), 3,464 UAVs (+79), 414 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+3), 8,338 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+63), 1,069 MLRS launchers (+13), 4,388 field artillery guns and mortars (+58), as well as 9,011 units of special military vehicles (+132).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 164,910 personnel (+5,820), 3,532 tanks (+66), 6,853 armoured combat vehicles (+84), 2,568 artillery systems (+81) and 507 MLR systems (+13), 268 anti-aircraft systems (+9), 305 aircraft (+1) and 290 helicopters (+1), and 2,159 UAVs (+51), 5,408 vehicles and fuel tanks (+60), 907 cruise missiles (+34), 18 warships and boats (0) and 262 pieces of special equipment (+20).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
Military situation in Belarus
Last week did not bring significant developments regarding the general situation in Belarus. Activities of the military-political leadership were somewhat limited. However, the armed forces’ training activities increased substantially. Russians also probably conduct troop rotation.
The visit of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to Iran was the only notable political event. During the visit, Lukashenko met with his Iranian counterpart, Ebrahim Raisi, and Iranian Vice-President Mohamad Mokhber. The talks were mainly concentrated on the issue of bilateral economic cooperation. Leaders signed a cooperation roadmap for 2026 and discussed “opportunities” that stem from western sanctions. Lukashenko asked Iranian officials to continue the development of new technologies in Belarus.
Over the past seven days, the military leadership was not particularly active either.
The most important event occurred on Tuesday, when the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, summed up the latest tabletop exercise (TTX) held at the Belarusian Military Academy between 7FEB and 9FEB. Officially, the Belarusian President initiated the exercise to ensure coherence, interoperability and effectiveness of the Belarusian government’s and military structures’ actions during an emergency or counter-terrorism operations. Despite earlier statements about the success of the training, a recapitulation came more than a month after the drill. Volfovich reiterated that the TTX was successfully completed. However, some mechanisms need to be corrected. State bodies received a detailed description of gaps ad are obliged to fix them by the end of 2023. It is unclear what these deficiencies involved. Volfovich also spoke about “hybrid aggression” against the state and the ongoing militarisation of the neighboured states (Poland, Latvia, Estonia). Below are two slides from his presentation, which repeat Belarusian state propaganda regarding the build-up of NATO forces in neighbouring states and hybrid methods used to cripple Belarus.
The Head of the Main Ideological Work Department, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky was heavily engaged in public meetings throughout the week. On Wednesday, jointly with the representatives of the Presidential Administration, he appeared at a meeting dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Belarusian Union of the Afghanistan War Veterans. A day later, Kasinsky led an informational briefing dedicated to Belarusian youth. There, he spoke about national security in the face of global challenges but also touched on the use of fake information and modern technologies utilised to manipulate youth perceptions. On Friday, Kasinsky officially welcomed Belarusian medics of the Special-Purpose Medical Detachment (432nd Main Military Clinical Medical Center), who returned from Syria (the subunit was deployed in Aleppo for a month to support local citizens after recent earthquakes; officially, it assisted more than 3,000 patients).
At the same time, a noteworthy event occurred at the Osipovichi Training Ground, where more than 500 schoolchildren and pupils of military-patriotic clubs could participate in a “military-patriotic education and agitation event”. It was combined with an exhibition of artillery equipment, and even a demonstration of live ammo fire missions carried out by 2A65 and 2S3 howitzers, 2S5 guns, and 2B11 mortars. The event aimed to instil patriotism and encourage the highest number of children to serve in the army when they grow up.
On Tuesday, the Belarusian MoD announced combat readiness measures. Various military formations will call up an unspecified number of reservists in March to increase their training level and familiarise them with new military equipment and weapon systems. Unofficially, such measures have already been implemented nationwide and involved more than 100 reservists.
Last week, the training activity of the Belarusian military formations was very high.
Practical actions were carried out mainly among artillery formations, including live ammo firing at several Belarusian training grounds. They included:
Elements of the 51st Artillery Brigade (BM-27 battery) were involved in the live ammo firing exercises on Wednesday and Thursday (unspecified location);
Elements of the 231st Artillery Brigade were involved in the live ammo firing on Thursday (Osipovichi Training Ground);
Elements of the 191st Artillery Group (19th Mechanised Brigade) were deployed currently at Osipovichi Training Ground;
Elements of the 310th Artillery Group (120th Mechanised Brigade) were involved in direct firing classes on Friday (Osipovichi Training Ground);
Elements of the 350th Artillery Group (6th Mechanised Brigade) were involved in a control lesson and a complex control exercise on Thursday and Friday (Osipovichi Training Ground);
Elements of the 841st Artillery Group (11th Mechanised Brigade) were involved in weapons zeroing classes, direct and semi-direct firing classes and a special training session between Tuesday and Friday (Gozhsky Training Ground);
The mixed Artillery Battalion of the 103rd Airborne Brigade were involved in the tactical exercise on Thursday (likely Losvido Training Ground);
Cadets of the Missile Forces and Artillery Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy were involved in mortar firing classes on Wednesday (Osipovichi Training Ground);
Notably, the training activity was also visible among mechanised and specialised formations. Among the first group, field exit of the 6th Mechanised Brigade’s battalion occurred on Monday. At the same time, elements of the 120th Mechanised Brigade (339th Mechanised and 355th Tank Batalions) underwent firing and driving classes, respectively (Wednesday-Friday, Wednesday). Interestingly, drills of the 339th Mechanised Battalion involved recently conscripted reservists. Moreover, the 4th Tank Battalion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade carried out tank ATGM firing (Thursday).
It must be noted that the logistic battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade continued practical actions carried out as a part of the combat readiness inspection. On Friday, after withdrawing about 140 vehicles from storage base(s), the subunit marched to the Gozhsky Training Ground and delivered supplies for Belarusian service members deployed at the range.
On Monday, the Western Operational Command started its competition for the best motor rifle and tank crew, which was likely carried out until Tuesday/Wednesday at the abovementioned training ground.
A day later, the leadership of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces started a command-staff exercise held directly under the command of the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich. Officially, it sought to improve the knowledge and skills of the command members regarding planning and executing intended tasks. Subsequently, the 103rd Airborne Brigade servicemen carried out parachute jumps from MI-8-MTV-5 helicopters. Three days later, another military competition in the Belarusian Armed Forces started. It pertained to the best SOF (conscript) shooter contests held at the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade’s base.
Elements of the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion (1st and 2nd Radiointerference Companies) were involved in special-tactical exercises (Wednesday and Thursday, respectively), while a Tor-M2K battery of the 15th Air Defence Brigade undertook a tactical exercise on Thursday. Besides, unspecified reconnaissance subunits of the North-Western Operational Command and unspecified communications subunit(s)/formation(s) were engaged in field exit and tactical-special exercise. However, the dates and locations of the drills remain currently unclear.
Over the past seven days, the number of military transfers of Belarusian equipment was higher, which seems evident given the abovementioned training load. Although mostly trucks and BTRs were observed on the roads, some more sophisticated pieces of equipment also appeared: six 9K33 Osa air defence complexes (Monday), two S-400 launchers (Wednesday) and two echelons with 20-25 trucks (Tuesday and Wednesday). On Friday, two long columns of the 11th and 120th Mechanised Brigades departed from their home garrisons. The equipment of the latter formations was likely loaded onto a train. We have not been able to confirm where the train departed to.
On the other hand, the activity of the Russian Armed Forces was relatively standard. Ground components’ movements were minimal, but aviation was busy. At least three cargo planes arrived in Belarus (Il-76: RF-76640, An-26: RF-90319, An-124: ??-?????). Moreover, MiG-31K supersonic interceptor conducted three flights in Belarusian air space (Wednesday, Thursday, and Saturday). Several flights of Russian Mi-8 helicopters were also seen throughout the week. Usually, at least one helicopter departed toward the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground, where Russian soldiers are deployed.
In this context, the Belarusian military monitoring team Belarusian Hajun noted that the Russian Armed Forces might have removed almost 700 military vehicles and 2,900 personnel from the range. To partly fill in the gaps, Russians brought in only about 80-200 vehicles and ~600 personnel in the last few weeks.
We will publish a satellite imagery analysis of the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground this week.
Please click here to access the summary of Belarusian training activities:
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
Last week did not deliver any significant changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces remain offensively committed, but their ability to dislodge defending Ukrainians without significant reinforcements is slim. We continue to see no conclusive evidence that Hryanykivka has been taken, despite Russian claims that the settlement was taken over five weeks ago. However, we must add that a team of Finnish OSINT researchers marked Hryanykivka as taken this week.
Last week, Russians continued artillery attacks on Ukrainian targets near the border and civilian facilities in the broader region. It does not appear that these strikes hit any significant target. However, Ukrainians continually highlight strikes against civilian facilities and infrastructure.
Russians did not conduct any ground attacks from the country proper into Ukraine.
Luhansk direction
According to various Ukrainian sources, both local and nationwide, the tempo of Russian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast remains reduced. Some argued it was linked to a rotation, but some voices claimed the Russian ability to advance was nonexistent. Indeed, a pro-Russian source asserted on Monday that Ukrainians were conducting troop rotations near Dibrova. The 13th Air Assault Battalion of the 95th Air Assault Brigade was withdrawn to Tors’ke, while (unknown) reserves were deployed west of Dibrova to strengthen Ukrainian extended positions there.
Regardless of which factor contributes to overall Russian failure in the region, the reality is that Russians again made no territorial gains last week.
Most combat operations are conducted along the Ploshchanka – Divrova line. However, there reportedly was a Russian attack on Novoselivske, but it did not deliver any results. Ukrainian bloggers asserted that Ukrainians improved their positions in the settlement and now control half of the village. The situation in this sector is very vague. A few weeks ago, Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainians held Kuzemivka, so information about them controlling a part of Novoselivske indicates a successful Russian tactical assault. Nevertheless, the battle for the Novoselivske-Kuzemivka does not impact the overall operational situation north of Svatove.
No changes were recorded near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. According to a Russian source, Russian troops continue to attack along Nevske, Terny and Makiivka lines, but no source observed any changes in these sectors.
Two weeks ago, Ukrainians claimed their forces moved past the R-66 road in Chervonopopivka.
A Russian source claimed that after a dozen unsuccessful attempts to cut off the Kreminna – Svatove road, Ukrainians began to build a defensive line on the western bank of the Zherebets River along the Zarichne – Yampolivka – Ivanivka – Novolubivka – Makiivka line.
According to Serhiy Haidai, now former Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, Russians constantly “stormed” Kreminna and Bilohorivka, where the situation was the most difficult. Russians deployed a significant part of the existing military capabilities into the area, which remains their centre of gravity in the oblast. Haidai stated the weather was working in Ukraine’s favour and that two to three weeks was enough for Ukrainian forces to accumulate reserves and “move from defence to a counterattack”. There are reasons to be sceptical about these assertions. If a Ukrainian offensive plan focused on the Luhansk Oblast existed, Haidai would not announce it so openly on Telegram. It is also unclear to what extent Ukrainians actually possess the capabilities to launch any significant attack in the Luhansk Oblast. Both sides suffer from shell hunger, so insufficient artillery stocks will hinder Kyiv’s offensive operations. That said, Ukraine’s posture throughout the region may gradually morph into an offensive one.
Nevertheless, battles for the Serebryanskyy forest and near Dibrova continued. According to a Russian source, Russian troops kept on attacking towards Yampolivka and made some progress. However, it remained unclear what it involved. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes in this sector.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Donetsk Oblast was the only region in Ukraine where Russians achieved any confirmed territorial gains last week. Their progress was noted along the M03 highway linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk, in Bakhmut and southwestern parts of the town. Russians made no confirmed advances in other parts of the region. Undoubtedly, the focus remains on Bakhmut, but Russians were also very active near Avdiivka.
Let’s start from the northern parts of the oblast. Although Russians conducted ground attacks on Spirne and Verkhokamyanske, they made no advances near these settlements. The same goes for Vesele, Rozdolivka, Vasiukivka. We understand that Russian attacks do not seek to gain more territory as Russians do not have the equipment and manpower numbers to advance in these areas. Instead, Russians keep Ukrainians occupied and prevent the deployment of other forces from these areas into the Bakhmut area.
Last week, the Russians progressed west of Krasna Hora. They captured Dubovo-Vasylivka and the tiny village of Zaliznianske. Battles for Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Min’kivka continued.
The situation in this area is very concerning. If Min’kivka is captured, Russians may enter heights on which the defence of Kramatosk is based, and thus defending Ukrainian forces may lose the elevation advantage.
A Ukrainian source noted on Thursday that Khromove might have been taken. However, this was the only source that mentioned the village in this context since Thursday. We have also been unable to verify this claim independently. Russians did not report any changes in the area.
Last week, Russians also progressed in Bakhmut. Firstly, on Tuesday, several images showing Wagner forces at the AZOM plant in Bakhmut were posted online. They may have been taken in the same spot President Zelensky visited in early December. Russian progress in this part of the town is plodding, but they continue pushing Ukrainians out. Following the withdrawal behind the Bakhmutivka river, Ukrainian defences appear to be solid in the central-eastern parts of the town. However, a video was posted late last week, purportedly showing Russian attempts to cross the river. So far, these attempts failed to deliver any meaningful results, but it is clear that Russians are determined to enter the city centre from three directions.
Russians entered the southwestern parts of Bakhmut and operated around the WOG petrol station. Attacks were pushed back on Ivanivske or generally along the T0504 road linking Bakhmut with Konstatinivka. Some sources suggested that Ukrainians counterattacked southwest of Ivanivske and managed to force Russians to retreat.
The width of the front in Bakhmut is around 3 km (1.8 miles), and the total area Ukrainians still control in Bakhmut is approximately 12 sq km (4.6 sq miles). Although the city is regularly shelled, the battle for it is fought at very close distances, and the artillery fire Russians concentrate on it is profound.
According to a Ukrainian soldier fighting in the city, Bakhmut is not surrounded, and it is doubtful that Russians will be able to achieve such an objective. He added that although Russians have fire control on all roads, Ukrainians physically control it. The soldier added that if Ukrainians managed to hold the city until April, the situation would change, and the UAF would gradually start to push Russian troops back. The soldier did not shed light on the sources of his optimism on both claims.
So let’s reassess why Ukrainians keep their hold on the city. In December, when Zelensky visited the United States, he handed over a battle flag, taken from Bakhmut, to representatives of the US Congress. Undoubtedly what is now happening in the city carries an important political symbolism. Kyiv may be concerned about how the city’s fall can reflect on its standing within Ukrainian society and internationally. Russians would undoubtedly spin the event to fit their propaganda purposes, probably presenting the city’s capture as more significant than taking over Severodonetsk.
Militarily and officially, Ukrainians want to grind Russians down. However, the problem is that while Russians are degrading Ukrainian operational formations, Wagner attrits regular Ukrainian formations. Both sides also continue to spend artillery ammunition in significant volumes while suffering from an overall shell hunger across the entire frontline. Russians maintain an overall artillery advantage with a 10:1 ratio.
Ukrainians probably do not fight with battalions but with entire brigades. Previously we assessed that Ukrainians maintained +10 brigades near Bakhmut. Each brigade would detach a battalion from its structures and send it to defend the city. On the one hand, this would prevent brigades from severely degrading combat effectiveness and capabilities. On the flip side, such an approach necessitated the deployment of many military formations, thus degrading their ability to train and prepare for future operations. During our trip to Ukraine, we learnt that 4-5 brigades deployed into Bakhmut, at least two were deployed in full. Other units likely followed the same concept. It thus seems that Kyiv decided to “sacrifice” formations fighting in the city to degrade Wagner’s potential and make them combat ineffective, at least over the short term.
We do not know the extent to which current volumes of artillery strikes will translate into offensive actions later in the spring. Common sense dictates that Ukrainians spend in Bakhmut volumes they can afford to spend and that the impact on future operations will be manageable. However, we have no data or anecdotal evidence supporting this hypothesis. When it comes to the Russians, they are both military and politically fully committed to taking the city, irrespective of losses or costs. They are highly unlikely to stop their attacks until the town is taken. In fact, they have no choice but to continue their attempts to take over Bakhmut as it is the only area where they display any meaningful progress.
Ukrainians also probably decided it was better to grind Russians in Bakhmut than on hills west of the city, where the opportunity for Russian manoeuvre and dispersal is greater. Defences of these hills would also probably necessitate the deployment of a larger force to prevent Russians from advancing.
Last week, Russians made no progress in other parts of the oblast. But let’s examine three main areas: Avdiivka, Mariinka and Vuhledar.
As frontal attacks did not deliver any meaningful results, Moscow probably plans to encircle Avdiivka. Last week, they conducted attacks from Krasnohorivka towards Stepove and from Vodiane towards Sieverne and Tonenke. In the former axis, Vesele was probably taken.
Due to the loss of Krasnohorivka, Ukrainian formations reportedly started transferring ammunition to Avdiivka in case defence lines were breached and a more significant pullback was needed.
Russian artillery continued artillery attacks on Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka. They also conducted ground assaults in all directions, from Opytne to Kruta Balka. According to a Ukrainian soldier, the situation in Avdiivka is challenging, but the Russians lack the forces to conduct (larger?) offensive actions.
According to a Russian source, on Tuesday, the elements of the Ukrainian 53rd Mechanised Brigade and 145th and 147th Independent Battalions conducted a reconnaissance operation from the outskirts of Sieverne. Ukrainian units managed to recapture one Russian position but could not advance further. Several assault detachments from the 53rd Mechanised Brigade were also deployed near Tonenke. These actions appear to indicate that Ukrainians will try to conduct at least limited counterattacks to maintain their control over the area and prevent the envelopment.
In Mariinka, the situation did not change. Russians continued frontal assaults on the city while simultaneously conducting envelopment attacks on Pobieda and northern Mariinka but did not deliver any results. Footage emerged on Saturday showing an armoured vehicle firing a canon on a nearby building.
Russians continued to display some offensive intent near Vuhledar, but their losses sustained over the last few weeks mean that their ability to push forward is absent. Although the Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russians were preparing to resume offensive operations in this area. We, however, remain sceptical about the possibility of such actions, at least until the end of March.
Russian positions are now located around Mykilske.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Last week did not deliver any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. However, as stated at the beginning of this issue, Ukrainians conducted an apparently larger counterattack in the region. Although it failed and caused a loss of life and equipment, it may herald a larger shift in Ukrainian operations in the region, which will see them conduct more offensive actions. The next couple of weeks will show whether this hypothesis is correct.
The attack occurred around 15MAR, probably around Polohy and showed a company-sized unit assaulting Russian positions south of Orikhiv. There Ukrainian attacked elements of the 291st Motor Rifle Regiment (42nd Motor Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army).
A pro-Russian source claimed that Ukrainians do not anticipate a large-scale Russian attack in southern Ukraine. The source stated that Ukrainians planned to shift the 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade to the Donetsk direction. Initial assessments said that Ukrainians lost a couple of tanks. However, Russians claimed the attackers lost up to five tanks and two other armoured vehicles.
Ukrainian bloggers also stated that fighting resumed in the Nesteryanka – Novopokrivka area. On 14MAR, a Ukrainian attack in this area was pushed back, and the attackers retreated with losses.
Satellite imagery also shows increased fortifications established in the region as Russians prepare for a Ukrainian counteroffensive in this direction. Based on our conversations in Kyiv and with other analysts, it appears that everyone is talking about Zaporizhihia as the region where Ukrainians will counterattack. No other scenarios are being considered, and neither is a failure. Just to be a bit contrarian, it is important to observe Ukrainian activity in other parts of the front to look out for any signs of a build-up. Cutting off the land brigade linking Donetsk Oblast with Crimea would have the biggest impact on the war strategically. However, we are now not at all fully convinced that this is the area where Ukrainians will attack.
On the other hand, there was some criticism about fortifications that Russians have stood up. They have been built by civilians, not military engineers, and do not follow military engineering paradigms. They have been constructed without following terrain features and too much focus on the map. There are no minefields and evacuation and supply roads. Russians are ready to conduct static, not manoeuvre, defence. It is important not to overgeneralise. We do not know where these observations were made. Concurrently, as with everything in the Russian Armed Forces, some areas underperform, and some perform above expectations. We can only assess the quality of Russian works and approaches to defending in depth when Ukraine launches their anticipated attack.
As stated in the previous issue, on 9MAR, Yevgeny Balitsky, the acting Governor of the Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, claimed that the UAF concentrated around 40,000 troops in northern parts of the oblast. We continue to see no evidence to support this claim.
Kherson direction
The overall situation in the oblast did not undergo any changes.
Both sides’ operations are limited to artillery exchanges and occasional reconnaissance operations on the islands located on the Dnipro delta. Neither side control them fully, but skirmishes occur there regularly.
According to a Russian source, Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct an assault from Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast across the Kakhovka reservoir towards Russian positions along the left bank of the reservoir in Zaporizhia Oblast but failed.
On 13MAR, Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for the Southern Operational Command, said that two vessels that can together carry up to 16 Kalibr missiles were stationed in the Black Sea. By Saturday, this figure was expanded to five vessels that could carry 32 Kalibr missiles, according to Ukrainian General Staff. The total number of combatants also increased from 13 to 21 vessels within a few days. This influx was highly likely related to the downing of the MQ-9 reaper drone by a Russian Su-27 aircraft on 14MAR and ongoing Russian efforts to salvage the uncrewed vehicle.
She also added that the tempo of Russian artillery fires decreased due to Ukrainian artillery strikes and that the objective was to push Russian units some 20 km away from the Dnipro River bank.
According to a Ukrainian journalist, Russians conducted searches and raids in Henichesk around 15MAR. Local residents said the Russians ran an intimidation campaign to force people to obtain Russian passports. Those who refuse may have their cars taken away.
Outlook for the week of 20MAR-26MAR
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
“We continue to anticipate no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Although Russian artillery and missile attacks on the region will continue, the attackers will unlikely extend their territorial control (we decreased the probability score from 45-55 per cent to 20-45 per cent). At the current juncture, Russian operations are contingent on reinforcements, and so far, it does not seem that their positions in the Kharkiv Oblast have been strengthened.” This assessment was correct. Russians made no gains in the region last week.
Score: 1/1
“Despite deploying a rather sizable force into the Luhansk Oblast, Russians have been unable to alter the frontline. They are thus unlikely to capture new territory (one settlement and more) this week, either. Tactical fluctuations are, however, likely.” Although some positional battles occurred in the oblast last week, no major events unfolded. Russians did not extend their territorial control.
Score: 1/1
“The same pertains to the Kreminna area. While positional battles are highly likely, a Russian push forward is not. The chances of Russians achieving a significant breakthrough in this sector are presently remote.” This forecast was correct. Russian positions compared to two weeks ago did not change.
Score: 1/1
“The increased tempo of Russian attacks across the Donetsk Oblast highlighted their focus on fulfilling the goals of the second phase of the war (capturing the remaining parts of the oblast). Based on last week’s activities and operations, it is likely that Moscow’s forces will capture more territory. We are particularly looking at areas near Avdiivka, Mariinka, and Novobakhmutivka.” This forecast was, in part, incorrect. Firstly, there were some positional battles near Avdiivka, but Ukrainians retook some territory there. Secondly, no Russian progress was made in the above-listed directions. However, Russians captured more territory along the M-03 road linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk.
Score: 0.5/1
“Forecasting operations around Bakhmut is either very easy or very hard. Why? We believe that the decision to maintain a Ukrainian presence in the city is purely based on political and not military considerations. It is thus difficult to predict what Zelensky will decide. On the other hand, with a clear political commitment to defend the city, Ukrainians can presumably rely on reinforcements to stall Russian attacks in the city and on its flanks. Nevertheless, Russians will likely progress in the city’s northern parts, while their advances in the eastern parts have probably culminated. We continue to maintain that Russian attacks towards Ivanivske lost steam. They are unlikely to progress in the southwestern sector. Based on last week’s comments by Ukraine’s top military officials, Ukrainians are unlikely to leave Bakhmut this week.” It was a mixed-bag assessment. On the one hand, we were right in anticipating more Russian progress in the city’s northern parts. On the other hand, we made a mistake by assuming that Russian attacks in the eastern parts of the town culminated. Footage that appeared late in the week suggested attempts to cross the Bakhmutivka River, suggesting offensive intent.
Score: 0.5/1
“It is unlikely that Russians will capture Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka next week, as the emphasis is clearly on taking over Bakhmut.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. It is also possible that Russians will make some territorial gains, but a sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine is highly unlikely to happen next week.” This forecast was incorrect. Positional battles occurred, but Russians made no gains. On the other hand, Ukrainians launched at least one failed attack. We did not forecast any changes in Ukrainian behaviour.
Score: 0/1
“The same pertains to the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 7/9 (78%)
Next week’s forecast
We will not make any changes to our assessments of the Kharkiv Oblast. Although Russian artillery and missile attacks on the region will continue, the attackers will unlikely extend their territorial control.
The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast. Russians will unlikely capture new territory (one settlement and more) this week. Tactical fluctuations are, however, likely.
When it comes to the Kreminna area, chances are remote that Russians will achieve a breakthrough this week. Positional battles delivering some minor changes on the battlefield are likely.
We maintain that the Russians will continue to sustain an increased tempo of their attacks this week in the Donetsk Oblast. Their focus will again be placed on the Avdiivka, Mariinka, and Novobakhmutivka, and they will likely make some gains (capture one village or more) there.
We assess that chances are even that Russians will capture more territory along the M03 road linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk. This probability score is because Russians are about to fight up towards hills north of Chasiv Yar, and we are currently unsure whether they can achieve this objective. It is unlikely that Russians will capture Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka next week, as the emphasis is clearly on taking over Bakhmut and areas along the M03 highway.
Regarding the Bakhmut area, it is likely that Russians will continue to progress within the city’s limits. We are particularly looking at the northern parts of Bakhmut. Given the attackers’ attempts to cross the river into the central parts of Bakhmut, we assess that there is roughly even chance that they will succeed in doing so this week. It is also likely that Russians will physically sever the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka. There is roughly even chance that they will capture Khromove.
We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. Ukrainians will likely start conducting more ground attacks this week. It is also possible that their posture in the region has changed from defensive to the one displaying more offensive characteristics.
We forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.
We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.
I'd say there's a reasonable chance that Ukraine's counterattack will come at the western edge of Donetsk, aimed at Mariupol. Being able to reveal RU atrocities before all evidence is wiped clean might be a reasonable strategic objective, given that it is Russian atrocities that have probably sustained aid to Ukraine more than any other factor.
Weight of new MBTs might badly restrict the axis of attack chosen. Huliaipole-Berdiansk is where my old cav scout training says to keep an eye out.