Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 16 December – 22 December 2023 (Free acces)
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
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Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Although the last week did not deliver any operational, let alone strategic, changes in Ukraine, Russians continued to make tactical gains in the Donetsk Oblast, where their centre of gravity is; Ukrainian posture remained defensive across the entire front;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast; Cross-border infiltration operations also continued;
Russian attempts to reach Kupynansk continued last week but delivered no confirmed territorial gains;
Russians continued attacking Ukrainian positions near Spirne, confirming the opening of another axis of advance; Their attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Mariinka also delivered territorial gains;
Russians captured some terrain south of Robotyne; Apart from that, no further changes occurred in the Southern direction; Ukrainian posture is mostly defensive as their ability to conduct ground attacks is limited;
Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank, but it is likely very limited; There, too, Ukrainians are unable to progress due to persistent Russian ISR capability, artillery and air strikes; The reported shooting down of three Russian Su-34 in the Kherson Oblast may force Russians to limited the scope of their air campaign;
Last week, Russians used kamikaze drones daily, but Ukrainians claimed to have shot down more than 90% of incoming vehicles; Russian missile strikes remained limited;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces repelled 47 Russian attacks (46 two weeks ago) near Syn’kivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 43 Russian attacks (18 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky Forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mar’inka and Shakhtars’ke axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 261 Russian ground attacks (344 two weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian Forces repelled 51 Russian attacks (23 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched 44 air strikes on the Russian equipment and personnel concentration areas and three on anti-aircraft missile systems. Ukrainian missile troops hit 19 equipment and personnel concentration areas, two command posts, two air defence systems, 24 artillery systems, two remote mining areas, one fuel and lubricants depot and seven ammunition depots.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated some two and a half square kilometres (compared to five two weeks ago) of land, while Russians captured around 27 square kilometres (compared to 30 during the previous period). We, therefore, see a continuous decline in Ukrainian ability to liberate territory while Russian attacks deliver steady gains. Although we assess that Russians can sustain the current tempo of attacks for the next few weeks, we are yet to see this preponderance of power translated into a tactical, let alone operational, breakthrough. Likewise, we have seen no reports suggesting that Russians are concentrating significant forces on one part of the front to facilitate the breakthrough. With Ukrainians developing fortifications across the entire front and their persistent ISR capability, it seems that Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to achieve a swift movement as time passes. We, therefore, expect Russians to continue moving slowly forward with high costs.
Last week also confirmed our previous assessment that the Ukrainian posture has been defensive across the entire front. We expect no changes in this regard, either.
Ukrainian progress next year will depend on several factors, but two are absolutely key: manpower and equipment. Let’s leave the latter for future discussions and focus on manpower.
On Sunday (17DEC), the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, General Kryrylo Budanov, said that with over a million soldiers currently in service, Ukraine had no alternative to (mass) mobilisation. Regardless of effectiveness, voluntary recruitment will not deliver the numbers needed to satisfy the armed forces’ needs. Likewise, “hidden mobilisation” is also unlikely to deliver numbers and combat effectiveness as people don’t want to fight. Budanov rightly pointed out that Ukrainians who wanted or were ready to fight joined the armed forces or other organisations (such as the National Guard) within the first six months of the Russian full-scale invasion. The Ukrainian General Staff, therefore, struggles to deliver new forces to the frontline. Budanov also added that in Ukraine, there were not so many people willing to do anything, let alone go to war. Budanov thus highlighted two important things. Firstly, if Kyiv wants to deploy new forces to the battlefield, it needs mass mobilisation. Other “recruitment drives” will be insufficient. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Budanov recognised that the armed forces reached a dead end regarding voluntary recruitment. Ukrainians do not want to go to war. This isn’t anything new. A high-rank Ukrainian military intelligence officer we spoke to in July in Ukraine told us exactly that. Ordinary Ukrainians were tired of the war, which would impact the armed forces’ force generation capabilities going forward.
Many soldiers in the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been fighting in the war for more than a year. They are exhausted and receive very little time off from the frontlines. Changes are being made to allow 30-day holidays that could be used within a year. Still, Kyiv should perhaps start considering demobilising some of its forces, especially since the domestic discontent among families of those who have been serving is growing.
Mass mobilisation would address this issue. But more importantly, it would allow Kyiv to pull some of their most experienced units from the frontline, regenerate them, and prepare for the offensive in 2024/25. A continuous deployment near the frontline coupled with a lack of time for training was one of the most often raised criticisms we heard in Ukraine in November. The creation of fortified lines should also decrease the burden on the force density needed to protect key areas, which means that even more personnel could train in the rear to elevate their overall combat effectiveness.
Regarding Budanov’s comments, President Zelensky said on Tuesday (19DEC) that the General Staff wanted to mobilise 450,000-500,000 men. Zelensky called the mobilisation issue “sensitive” and costly. He explained that mobilisation in the format suggested by the General Staff would cost UAH500 billion (USD13 billion) (Ukraine’s budget deficit for next year is USD43 billion). But Zelensky also wants more specifics: “what will happen to the million-strong army of Ukraine? What will happen to those guys who have been defending our state for two years? We have issues of rotation and holidays. It should be a comprehensive plan.”
Zelensky faces a very difficult choice. On the one hand, many young Ukrainians could still be drafted, but Zelensky hopes that this generation will rebuild the country after the war. On the other hand, if Ukraine loses the war, there will be nothing to rebuild, and young Ukrainians could leave the country en masse. From the armed forces’ point of view, mobilisation is crucial if Ukraine wants to attempt to retake lost territory. The time is also not in their favour. The later they mobilise, the less time troops will have for training, and the less effective troops will be. The Russian Armed Forces, on the other hand, are expected to grow, especially its assault elements, as the concern Putin may have regarding mobilisation pertains to shortages in the labour market.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Monday (18DEC)
The Swedish and Danish Ministers of Defence agreed to provide additional CV90 IFVs to Ukraine. It might pertain to 25 vehicles, the purchase of which will be financed by the Danes.
The United States National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said the “Biden administration” plans to announce one more military aid package to Ukraine in DEC23.
The Telegraph said Great Britain and Ukraine would shortly sign a 10-year agreement to support Ukraine’s naval capabilities. According to available data, it will also include a post-war security guarantee and possibly an increased supply of weapons.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Republic, Lt. Gen. Karel Řehka, took patronage of the Czech initiative meant to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with 10,000 FPV UAVs.
The Ukrainian National Guard received 27 M113 APCs.
Tuesday (19DEC)
The German Bundeswehr ordered “tens of thousands” of artillery munitions from Rheinmetall for Ukrainian Armed Forces needs. Their delivery is planned for 2025, while the cost is “a three-digit” sum in EUR millions.
The French Ministry of Defence announced that France would begin training Ukrainian pilots on Western fighter jets in early 2024.
The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky informed about the plans of the Ukrainian General Staff to mobilise an additional 450,000-500,000 citizens. He noted that he needed additional arguments to accept such a decision, especially since it would cost about UAH500 billion (USD12 billion to mobilise and sustain such a force).
The Washington Post informed that Japan was going to change its defence export rules to be able to provide several dozen Patriot missiles (PAC-2/3s) to the United States. This would allow the US to send additional numbers of missiles to Ukraine – those acquired in Japan would remain in the US stockpile.
Wednesday (20DEC)
The Slovakian Prime Minister Rober Fico claimed he would not agree with Ukraine’s membership in NATO because it would start WWIII.
Switzerland’s Federal Government announced winter aid to Ukrainians worth CHF11.8 million (humanitarian aid).
Ukraine received a EUR150 million non-refundable grant from the European Union dedicated to rebuilding crucial state facilities.
Thursday (21DEC)
The Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, informed that Poland provided 5,000 Starlink terminals to Ukraine.
Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov announced that his state was considering mobilising 25-60-year-old citizens who resided abroad.
Friday (22DEC)
The Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said that the Netherlands would provide 18 F-16 multirole aircraft to Ukraine.
Ukrainians claimed to have shot down three Su-34 fighter-bomber/strike aircraft.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
Although the data is limited, we think Ukrainians continued to strengthen their positions in the Donetsk direction. To this end, we assess that they deployed elements of the 1st Special Purpose Brigade (earlier present at the Svatove axis of the Luhansk direction) to the Bakhmut axis. Similarly, they also brought forces of the KHARTIA Brigade earlier deployed in Kharkiv direction. The exact location of the later formation still needs to be clarified. However, based on the recent Russian open-source reports, it is possible that its elements arrived near Bakhmut as well.
Based on reports, we also moved the 2nd Separate Rifle Battalion into the Orikhiv axis in the Southern direction.
Last week, available data related to the Russian troop movements confirmed that Russians were focusing their activities on the Kreminna axis of the Luhansk direction and the Bakhmut axis of the Donetsk direction.
First, we noted the arrival of the 348th Motor Rifle Regiment (mobilised: MOB) and the elements of the 201st Military Base (Central Military District), whose earlier positions were unknown.
Russians also deployed elements of the 344th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB) to the Kupyansk axis in the Luhansk direction. The previous position of the unit was unknown.
Based on Russian and Ukrainian reports, we also moved the 1307th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB), elements of the 1st Army Corps – 105th Motor Rifle Regiment and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion to the Bakhmut axis.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past seven days.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Chervona Zorya, Kozacha Lopan, Lukiantsi, Zelene, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Kupyansk, Ivanivka, Berestove and Udy, Starytsia, Vovchansk and Topoli.
Synehubov said on Wednesday that S-300 missiles had hit a residential building and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv. It is unclear whether there were any casualties.
On Sunday (17DEC), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group continued to be active in the Sumy and Chernihiv Oblast. No further details were provided. However, this aligns with our assessment of continuous Russian infiltration missions of the Ukraine-Russia border in Ukraine’s northern regions. At the same time, we reiterate that we do not expect these activities to be a prelude to a larger Russian push.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
No changes in the Luhansk Oblast direction occurred over the past week.
On Tuesday (18DEC), Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, said that in the Lyman sector, Russian forces had started constant attacks on Ukrainian troops’ positions near Makiivka and Terny. Battles also occurred in the Siverskyi sector (northwest of Siversk). Syrskyi added that Russian troops continued daily assault operations near Synkivka to capture it and create favourable conditions for further attacks towards Kupyansk. He characterised the current situation in the area as “complicated”. In this context, his assessment did not change. Neither did his view that Ukrainians must fight in conditions of Russian superiority in weapons and personnel.
Moving to the frontline, on Saturday (16DEC), a Russian journalist said Russians had been trying to break through UAF defensive lines west of Yahidne and near Synkivka. The source said, however, that the line of contact had not changed significantly. The Ukrainian sources claimed that on Sunday (17DEC), the Russians moved two engineering units to the Lyman Druhyi area, which may indicate preparations for crossing the Oskil River. The Russians also continued to attack the forest area near Lyman Pershyi, having had success in recent days, the source said. However, it is unclear what this involved. Russians also continued to gain a foothold in Synkivka using vehicles, but all attempts had been repelled. Based on frontline reports, Russians sustained attacks on the village throughout the whole week. Yet, they made no confirmed progress.
The Russian source claimed on Wednesday (20DEC) that Russian units had captured two more strongholds on the eastern bank of the Oskil River and that attacks near Synkivka and east of Petropavlivka continued. On the other hand, the Ukrainian bloggers asserted on Wednesday (20DEC) that the Russians were attacking near Synkivka but were unsuccessful. The source added that Russians were massing forces because the current intensity of attacks did not deliver. Ukrainians claimed that Russians still had significant manpower reserves.
On Tuesday (19DEC), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that documents found on a dead Russian soldier near Lyman Pershyi showed that he had served for two months from the moment the contract was signed and his death.
Further south, no changes occurred between Ivanivka and Raihorodka.
Russian reports appear to confirm Syrski’s comments regarding Terny. On Sunday (17DEC), Russians reportedly launched an attack on the settlement. Another attack reportedly occurred on Wednesday. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any further attacks in this area. Likewise, no frontline changes were reported.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka, Chervonopopivka, Torske, Nevske and Yampolivka.
When it comes to the Kreminna area, the frontline there also saw no confirmed changes. The Ukrainian bloggers claimed that on Sunday (17DEC), the Russian troops had continued their attempts to advance in the Serebryansky foresty.
Last week, Russians conducted two reported attacks near Kreminna. The first one occurred on Monday (18DEC) and involved a large number of vehicles and personnel assaulting Ukrainian positions southwest of the city. The second took place a day later (19DEC) when Russians attempted to breach the defensive lines of the 21st Mechanised Brigade. A Ukrainian soldier claimed that one Leopard tank was mostly responsible for stopping the assault. Russians suffered 40 casualties in the latter attack. The Leopard statement appears to be exaggerated, but it shows that Russians in the area assault using companies, which indicates ongoing force generation problems.
No changes occurred near Bilohorivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk direction, Russian units repelled 32 attacks Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Vilshana, Petropavlivka and Lyman Lake. On top of that, Ukrainians made four attempts to breach Russian lines near Zhytlivka and Terny. Russians claimed that all attacks were repelled.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman axis, Russian aviation and artillery repelled two attacks near Kuzmyne.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The last week saw no significant frontline changes in the Donetsk Oblast Direction. Russians progressed near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka, but these advances had a tactical dimension. The overall operational-strategic outlook did not change.
On Tuesday (18DEC), Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed Russians remained committed to advancing in the Bakhmut area. To this end, they concentrated their main efforts there, using the most capable airborne troops, marines and the Storm-Z (prisoners) and Storm-V (PMC Wagner’s former fighters) units to advance. The Russian goal in this area is an attack on Chasiv Yar, then on Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk, followed by an advance to the borders of Donetsk Oblast, Syrskyi explained.
On Sunday (17DEC), the Russian journalist claimed that the Russian units continued to put pressure on the Ukrainian troops near Spirne, trying to improve their tactical positions. On Wednesday (20DEC), the Ukrainian blogger stated that Russians conducted an assault to the south of the village. A day later, the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces, with the support of armoured vehicles, were advancing near Berestove. The same source said that the Russian units also succeeded in Ivano Darivka’s direction, but no detailed information was provided. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Although these areas saw no confirmed frontline changes, battles near Spirne confirm that Russians had effectively opened up a new axis of advance deeper into the Donetsk Oblast.
No changes occurred near Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Rozdolivka, Sakko i Vantsetti and Fedorivka.
On Sunday (17DEC), the Ukrainian source claimed that the Russians were advancing along the road to Chasiv Yar. The battles also occurred near the eastern and northern outskirts of Bohdanivka. The Russians were also advancing from Bakhmut towards Ivanivske, having successes on the outskirts of Bakhmut and in the Dachi area. These developments were confirmed by the Russian source.
On Monday (18DEC), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops managed to advance near Khromove and Bohdanivka. Another Russian source added that on Monday, Russian troops continued pushing towards Ivanivske, where the UAF was forced to deploy reserves into the battle. The Ukrainian blogger confirmed that on Monday (18DEC), the Russian forces achieved some success near Khromove. The same Ukrainian sources also claimed that the Russians advanced east of Ivanivske, and the UAF lost some positions in Dachi. The source explained that the Russians went on the attack towards Ivanivske “at full stretch” (along a wider front), which made it possible to succeed.
On Wednesday (19DEC), the Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued their offensive to the northwest and west of the city. The Russian troops achieved partial success to the west of Bakhmut (without detailed information). The battles also continued near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka. The source said that both villages were still under the Ukrainian armed forces’ control. The Ukrainian blogger claimed that on Wednesday (20DEC), the Russians continued to advance near Khromove and east of Ivanivske. However, no detailed information was provided. Another Russian source claimed on Wednesday that all Ukrainian attempts to counterattack near Ivanivske were unsuccessful.
On Wednesday (19DEC), the Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued their offensive to the northwest and west of the city. The Russian troops achieved partial success to the west of Bakhmut (without detailed information). The battles also continued near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka. The source said that both villages were still under the Ukrainian armed forces’ control. The Ukrainian blogger claimed that on Wednesday (20DEC), the Russians continued to advance near Khromove and east of Ivanivske, making progress. However, no detailed information was provided. Another Russian source claimed on Wednesday that all Ukrainian attempts to counterattack near Ivanivske were unsuccessful.
Speaking about the size of the Russian grouping in the Bakhmut area, Lieutenant Oleh Kalashnikov, the press officer from the 26th Artillery Brigade, claimed on Sunday (17DEC) that Russia kept about 80,000 troops in the Bakhmut sector, which includes “about 19 division-level groups, 21 regiments, about 15 battalions and about 18 tactical units, and army-level commands”.
On Wednesday (20DEC), a Ukrainian soldier said Russians deployed new motorised formations equipped with BMP-3s and tanks to the “rear of the Bakhmut direction”. This may suggest that Russians deployed new formations into the area and may increase, or at least sustain, the tempo of the attacks in the westward direction.
In Bakhmut alone, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Sunday (17DEC), the Ukrainian bloggers stated that heavy battles continued near Klishchiivka. The situation near height 215.7 was difficult. On the other hand, the Ukrainian soldier claimed on the same day that Russian troops advanced on the northern part of the village. The soldier added that if Russians captured the height, their positions in Klischchiivka would be in jeopardy.
The early days of the week did not bring any confirmed frontline changes in the area. Although all Russian attacks were repelled near Klishchiivka, Russian artillery reportedly “worked many times more intensively”. On the other hand, according to one Russian source, the village is now in the “grey zone”, meaning there are no Ukrainian forces therein.
Russian troops continued to put heavy pressure on Stepove as well. On Sunday (17DEC), Russian units reportedly launched an assault on the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant and Stepove but were unsuccessful. Similar attacks continued in the early part of the week.
The Ukrainian source claimed that on Wednesday (20DEC), the Russians continued to attack Stepove but were pushed back to their original positions. The battles also occurred between the railways north of Stepove. On Thursday (21DEC), a Ukrainian serviceman reported that in the Avdiivka axis, Russians were committed to breaking through near Stepove. They achieved some success in that they advanced 200 metres over the past week.
In Avdiivka alone, no changes occurred. Russians continued to shell the city.
On the southern flank of the Avdiivka axis, Ukrainians claimed on Sunday (17DEC) that after capturing the Avdiivka’s Industrial Zone, Russians took positions in Avdiivka’s residential area. Russians also improved their tactical positions north of Opytne and north and west of Vodyane. The situation was similar in Pervomaiske and Nevelske, with several positions lost.
On Monday (18DEC), the Russian source stated that Russian troops continued to entrench themselves on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka. Russian attacks near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Sjeverne, and on the southwestern approaches to Avdiivka resulted in tactical successes. However, no detailed information about these gains were provided. Ukrainian sources did not note any changes in these areas.
As of Wednesday (20DEC), a Russian source claimed that Russians continued attacks on the outskirts of the city and achieved partial success in the industrial area. The source said there were no changes south of the city near “Khimik” and Sjeverne. The attackers had also consolidated their positions north of Pervomaiske, although the Ukrainian source claimed that on Wednesday (20DEC), attacks near Pervomaiske were repelled.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke and Opytne.
On Sunday (17DEC), the Russian source claimed that the attackers continued to advance near Mariinka and began to advance towards Kurakhove. Attacks on Ukrainian fortifications near Novomykhailivka also occurred. Russians also attacked Ukrainian units in Pobijeda, where the Ukrainian forces had strong defensive positions.
Describing the situation in Marrinka, a Ukrainian blogger claimed that Russians had driven Ukrainian forces out of the southern part of the town and almost the entire northern part. The Russian sources claimed on Monday (18DEC) that the attackers were clearing the suburbs of Mariinka with plans to move westwards. However, the source said that the Ukrainians were counterattacking. As a result of attacks towards Novomykhailivka, Ukrainians were withdrawing forces to the centre of the village, the source asserted. The Ukrainian sources indeed confirmed their progress on Monday (18DEC), but it remained unclear what this involved.
A day later (19DEC), Russian troops reportedly entered the southern part of Novomykhailivka. They also managed to take new positions west of Mariinka. On Wednesday (20DEC), the Russian source assessed that Russians continued to push on Ukrainian positions on the northwestern outskirts of the city. Ukrainians were completely pushed out of the southwestern parts of Mariinka. The same source also said that to the east, UAF positions near Novomykhailivka were attacked, and Russians were making slight progress. The village itself was still under Ukrainian control as the pace of the forward movement was slow.
No changes occurred near Vuhledar. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units repelled 19 Ukrainian attacks near Bilohorivka, Shumy, Kurduymivka, Klishchiivka, Ivanivske, Mariinka and Pobiejda. Artillery also hit Ukrainian equipment and concentration areas in Kurdyumivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Vasyukivka, Rozdolivka, Vesele and Mariinka.
Southern Ukraine Direction
No changes occurred in the Velyka Novosilka axis over the past seven days. In the Orikhiv axis, Russians continued attacks near Robotyne, Verbove and Novoprokopivka, achieving some progress but without significant impact on the frontline.
On Sunday (17DEC), the Commander of the Tavria (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, claimed that Russians continued land attacks (supported by armoured vehicles) and increased the intensity of artillery strikes.
On Monday (18DEC), Reuters published an article that quoted Tarnavskyi as saying that Ukrainians faced a shortage of artillery munitions and were forced to curtail some military operations due to a lack of foreign aid. He said there was “a problem with ammunition, especially post-Soviet (shells) – that’s 122 mm, 152 mm. And today, these problems exist across the entire front line. The volumes we have today are insufficient for us, given our needs. So, we’re redistributing it. We’re replanning tasks we had set for ourselves and making them smaller because we need to provide for them.” Tarnavskyi specified that the Ukrainian troops on the southeastern front had gone on the defensive in some areas while attempting to advance in others. He also claimed that Russian forces were also facing ammunition shortages, although he did not elaborate on this topic further.
To be clear, Ukraine’s access to 122 mm artillery shells is either extremely limited or non-existent due to a lack of such ammunition worldwide. The 152 mm shells are also problematic. That’s why Kyiv wants to transition its artillery capability to the 155 mm NATO standard, slowly producing 155 mm shells in the country.
In the Velyka Novosilka axis, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes. This pertains to Novodonetske, Novomaiorske, Staromaiorske, Urozhaine, Pryyutne and Levadne.
On Wednesday (20DEC), Russian sources asserted that the Russian units continued attacks near Staromaiors’ke and maintained pressure near Pryyutne. Ukrainians had switched on the defensive and were no longer attempting to break through to Staromlynivka.
Likewise, no significant changes occurred in the Orikhiv axis, although Russians made marginal gains east of Robotyne.
Ukrainian bloggers claimed on Sunday (17DEC) that Russians launched assault operations south of Robotyne and west of Verbove. The source said the situation was dynamic in this area, and positions often changed hands. On the same day, the Russian source said that the Russian units attacked Ukrainian positions west of Robotyne, adding that Ukrainians held their positions. The situation was similar east of Novofedorivka.
On Monday (18DEC), the same source claimed that Russian troops, supported by artillery, were advancing west of Robotyne. They also counterattacked from Verbove and Novofedorivka. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks. Russians again attacked Ukrainian positions in Robotyne from Novopokrovka to Mala Tokmachka on Tuesday.
On Wednesday (20DEC), the Russian source claimed that the Russian Armed Forces captured and consolidated new positions near Verbove, where several strongholds and trenches were taken. The source said that Moscow was taking advantage of the fact that the UAF had transferred five (unspecified) brigades from Robotyne to Avdiivka and Mariinka axes, which allowed Russian units to retake previously lost positions. On Thursday (21DEC), the Ukrainian soldier said the UAF had regained ground in some areas over the past day. „Akhmat” units were defeated on the left flank (?), and there was a relative lull in frontline activity.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pyatykhatky.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South-Donetsk direction, Russian artillery hit three temporary deployment points and a communications centre of the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade in Novomykhailivka. Also, in cooperation with army aviation and artillery, Russian units repelled three ground attacks near Novomykhailivka. The Russian artillery also disrupted the supply of ammunition to Ukrainian troops near Urozhaine.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
The overall situation in the Kherson Direction did not change. Despite Russian ground attacks, Ukrainians maintained their positions on Dnipro’s left bank. However, it should be noted that Russian and Ukrainian sources provide a minimum of information about what transpires in the area.
No significant changes occurred on the left bank of the Dnipro River during the weekend (16-17DEC). Positional battles continued near Krynky. The Ukrainian blogger claimed on Sunday (17DEC) that the Russians had been constantly and unsuccessfully trying to drive the UAF out of Krynky, which was confirmed by a Ukrainian soldier fighting in the area. He stated that Ukrainians destroyed a Russian assault group and its four tanks.
Another Ukrainian soldier added that the Russians were planning an operation to cross the Dnipro River to cut off Ukrainian supply routes to Krynky.
The situation remained unchanged in the latter half of the week as Ukrainians held Krynky.
On Wednesday (20DEC), the Russian journalist claimed that Ukrainian troops continued to hold the bridgehead on the left bank near Krynky, regularly moving more forces. However, UAF losses were increasing and were having a degrading impact on their overall capabilities. The source said the number of Ukrainian personnel in the village was 110 men from the combined formations of the 35th, 36th, 37th and 38th Marine Brigades. The source also noted a decrease in the intensity of forward group movements from the right bank, indicating a lack of soldiers. At the same time, Russian troops managed to dislodge the Ukrainian units from the forest area (Ukrainian sources did not report any changes in the area). Despite this, Ukrainian troops were trying to advance in the grey zone on the western and eastern outskirts of Krynky.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 554 aircraft (+4), 261 helicopters (+3), 9,955 UAVs (+259), 442 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 14,251 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+173), 1,189 MLRS launchers (+1), 7,447 field artillery guns and mortars (+108), as well as 16,572 units of special military vehicles (+236).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 351,350 personnel (+7,460), 5,837 tanks (+131), 10,843 armoured combat vehicles (+189), 8,250 artillery systems (+151) and 932 MLR systems (+12), 611 anti-aircraft systems (+6), 324 aircraft (0) and 324 helicopters (0), and 6,365 UAVs (+139), 1,613 cruise missiles (+5), 22 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 10,944 vehicles and fuel tanks (+245), and 1,217 special vehicles (+58).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
Compared to the previous period, the past week saw a significant decrease in missile strikes. Russians launched two missiles. Both strikes occurred on the night of 16-17DEC and involved a 9K728 and a Kh-59 cruise missiles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down the latter, while the Iskander missile “did not reach its target.”
On the other hand, Russian Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drone strikes occurred daily. Altogether, they involved 140 vehicles, of which Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 133 (95% interception rate). Russians launched 99 drones two weeks ago, but the interception rate stood at 93%.
Russian strike patterns continue to feature significant spikes. Last week, two Shahed attacks involved 34 and 30 drones (21 and 16DEC). Apart from that, three employments involved 18, 20, and 24 UAVs, while another two featured only five and two drones used.
Russian ground attacks maintained a high tempo. They peaked at 105 (17DEC) on Sunday and decreased to below 100 for the remainder of the week. Despite this, the moving average for the ten days has been on a rising trajectory since late November.
(Battlefield) missile attacks decreased significantly last week and involved 11 strikes. Air strikes have also been declining, with a 10-day average of around 35 daily strikes. Although Wednesday (20DEC) saw a significant spike (68 strikes) in strikes, Russians bottomed at six air strikes on Monday (18DEC), the lowest number since 8MAR. There are several possible explanations behind this drop. The intensity of air strikes has greatly strained the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), translating into a decreased sortie ratio. Russians may also have difficulties in equipping their aircraft with payloads. Lastly, the decrease in air presence seeks to prepare the force for a major air campaign. A reported loss of three Su-34 strike/bomber aircraft could further limit Russian bomb strikes in the Kherson Oblast. Much information about what occurred on Friday remains unknown. Still, the latest reports indicate that Ukrainian Patriot missiles conducted a cooperative engagement with NATO AWACS aircraft against Russian Su-34s operating in the southern Kherson Oblast. It remains to be seen whether this development will have any impact on Ukrainian forces operating on Dnipro’s left bank (the primary target of the Russian bombing campaign).
MLRS strikes saw an uptick in the latter half of the week, which saw Russians conduct 87 and 88 attacks on Tuesday and Wednesday (19-20DEC). Otherwise, in hindsight, we have seen no major changes in Russian MLRS strikes over the past few weeks.
Outlook for the week of 23DEC-29DEC2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are no longer assessing the probability of Ukrainian advances, which we consider to be presently non-existent. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in both the Avdiivka and Bachmut axes, but we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.” This prognosis was also correct. Russians progressed in both axes but failed to capture a village or more.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess changes are roughly even (no change) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” This assessment was also correct, as Ukrainians captured no ground last week. Russians advanced slightly near Robotyne.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. It is highly unlikely (decrease in probability) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more.” This assessment was correct, as Ukrainians maintained their positions in Krynky.
Final score: 5/5 (100%)
The forecast for the week of 23DEC – 29DEC2023
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are no longer assessing the probability of Ukrainian advances, which we consider to be presently non-existent. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in both the Avdiivka and Bachmut axes, but we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess chances are roughly even (no change) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. They also may deploy additional forces. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more.
Happy holidays!