Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 16 March – 22 March 2024
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
*This issue will not cover developments in Moscow as there is no information upon which reliable analysis can be written*
*A gentle reminder that UCM will be discontinued next week*
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
No major changes occurred in Ukraine over the past seven days; Russian attacks delivered minor territorial gains in the Donetsk Oblast and near Robotyne; The attackers continued to advance despite a reduction in the tempo of attacks across all domains; the Ukrainian posture remained defensive across the entire front;
No changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast; Russians increased the number of missile and air attacks on Kharkiv’s residential and industrial areas;
Russian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast delivered limited gains; We continue to see no major increase in Russian ground activity or new unit deployments that would herald imminent large-scale operation;
Conflicting reports surfaced regarding the situation in the Donetsk Oblast; This, in particular, pertains to areas west of Bakhmut where Russia reportedly advanced; On the other hand, Russian gains west of Avdiivka continued, although the tempo of advance decreased in recent weeks;
Russians made progress around Robotyne as well; The city remained in the grey zone, but further Russian gains in the area are likely;
Kyiv maintained its presence in Krynky as Russian attacks to dislodge small Ukrainian groups were unsuccessful;
Russians launched two mass missile strikes last week, the largest escalation since early JAN2024; The 21/22MAR attack also involved the largest use of Shaheds since early January;
Ukraine-commanded Russian Volunteer Corps maintained a presence in Russian territory in Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts; However, as expected, they made no further gains in land;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 17 Russian attacks (11 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 50 Russian attacks (62 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 279 Russian ground attacks (296 two weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian units repelled 41 Russian attacks (36 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 44 Russian concentration areas. The Ukrainian missile units hit five Russian concentration areas, three ammunition depots, one UAV ground control post, one electronic warfare system, one artillery system, one command post and four air defence systems.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians were not confirmed to have liberated any terrain, while Russians captured around 24 square kilometres. Almost half of this number involved terrain seized in the Donetsk axis (areas west of Avdiivka).
No operational-strategic changes occurred in Ukraine last week. The overall Ukrainian position further deteriorated as Russians continued to make marginal territorial gains. They came despite a reported decrease in Russian attacks across all metrics, especially until late in the week when the intensity of MLRS attacks picked up again. The decreased tempo of Russian attacks points towards regrouping/reestablishing combat potential, some sort of a pause, even though attacks are still ongoing and are on much higher levels than at the start of the autumn-winter offensive.
Equally important is the fact that Russian gains occur despite reported Ukrainian counterattacks. As stated previously, while such an approach could hinder Russian advances in the short term, without sufficient manpower levels, Kyiv will likely consume its available resources at much higher rates, leading to much faster Russian gains in the long term. Ukrainian mobilisation is a beacon of hope, but work on legislation is progressing at a snail’s pace, which further harms Ukrainian ability to defend over the following months. If passed in the current shape, it will guarantee draftees three-month-long training activities before being deployed to the frontline. Even assuming the best-case scenario that President Zalensky signs the law by mid-April, draftees would only start entering the frontline by late summer/early autumn. This presents Moscow with a window of opportunity where manpower and artillery ammunition shortages will prevent Ukrainians from mounting effective defensive operations.
This week, after a 36-day pause, Russians launched a mass missile strike on Ukraine. On Thursday/Friday night, Russians launched another mass strike, marking the first instance since July when Russians conducted mass missile attacks on two consecutive days. The latter attack was also the largest since 2JAN2024 and the third largest since 10FEB2023. The Ukrainian interception rate was also relatively low (42%), as no Iskanders, Kinzhals, Kh-22, or missiles fired from S-300/400 were shot down. While no successes in intercepting the latter two are unsurprising, the Russian success rate concerning Kinzhals and Iskanders warrants concern. According to Ukrainian sources, these missiles were predominantly used to target Zaporizhihia, and while Ukraine possesses the capability to intercept these missiles, these assets are used to protect Kyiv. The rest of the country will be very hard-pressed to defend against high-velocity targets. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether the last attacks mark the beginning of a new Russian missile campaign or whether they are a response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. If the latter, they are likely to be short-lived, but they will also target Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The Friday attack hit Ukrainian energy facilities, damaging power generation, transmission and distribution systems in various regions, including Ukraine’s largest hydroelectric power plant in Zaporizhzhia. It also led to a blackout in the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
To sum up, the initiative is on the Russian side, and we expect further Russian gains on the ground.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Saturday (16MAR)
The Latvian Delfi news outlet reported that Latvian member of the European Parliament Tatjana Zdanoka was accused of spying for the Russian Federation at least since 2015.
Sunday (17MAR)
Czech President Petr Pavel claimed that Russia “has no right” to set conditions in terms of peace with Ukraine.
Monday (18MAR)
The Ukrainian Government announced that it had allocated about USD128 million to purchase additional UAVs for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The Russian TASS informed that almost 4,700 cases of desertion had been reported in the Ukrainian Armed Forces since the beginning of 2024.
The Romanian Digi24 news outlet informed that the country’s President, Klaus Iohannis, approved training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighters in a training centre in Romania.
Governor of Belgorod Oblast Vyacheslav Gladkov announced the evacuation of 9,000 children “further away” from the Ukrainian border.
Tuesday (19MAR)
United States Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, during another meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, stressed that Ukrainian survival was “in danger”.
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrel proposed to utilise 90 per cent of the Russian assets “frozen” in the West to purchase weapons for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is worth about USD590 million and includes 10,000 artillery rounds, 100 armoured vehicles and 100 logistics vehicles.
The Recruitment Advisor of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, Oleksii Bezhevets, said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would open 27 new recruitment centres in the first half of 2024.
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian FSB to track down Russian citizens fighting for Ukraine.
The (former) Commander of the Northern Fleet, Adm. Alexander Moiseev, was officially appointed the Commander of the Russian Navy.
Wednesday (20MAR)
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Canada had allocated USD1.5 billion to finance the Ukrainian budget deficit.
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said there would not be a third world war if Russia were defeated in Ukraine.
Dutch Minister of Defence Kajsa Ollongren announced that the Netherlands would procure munitions for the Ukrainian F-16 fighters for USD164 million.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte informed that her state supported the Czech initiative of providing artillery munitions to the Ukrainian Armed Forces with around USD38 million.
Spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova claimed that Russia could target satellites of private companies like SpaceX if they were used for military purposes.
Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoigu informed about the creation of two new combined arms armies and 30 formations (14 divisions and 16 brigades) in the Russian Armed Forces.
Thursday (21MAR)
Chief of French General Staff, Gen. Thierry Burkhard, claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin “needs to understand that Western support for Ukraine could extend to the deployment of troops into the state”.
Estonian Minister of Defence Hanno Pevkur informed that his state would provide another military aid package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It will be worth USD22 million and include anti-tank guns, artillery munition, explosives and other equipment.
Czech Defence Minister Jana Cernohova confirmed that the Czech Armed Forces donated all their Mi-24/35 helicopters to Ukraine.
Vice Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov was appointed Acting Commander of the Northern Fleet.
Friday (22MAR)
Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte claimed that Ukraine would receive a large amount of ammunition shortly.
Several camouflaged men reportedly opened fire in the Crocus City Music Hall in Moscow, killing at least a dozen citizens.
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence announced that the first 10 Ukrainian pilots finished their training on F-16 multirole combat aircraft.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
Last week, we noted no significant Ukrainian redeployments.
Over the past seven days, no major movements of Ukrainian military units were observed.
Nonetheless, based on available information, we confirmed the current location of the 9th Separate Rifle Battalion, whose whereabouts were previously unknown – the unit is deployed in the Kupyansk axis of the Luhansk direction.
Last week, no noteworthy Russian units’ redeployments were reported/confirmed.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians struck Kozacha Lopan, Hatyshche, Berestove, Synkivka, Vovchansk, Hoptivka, Basove, Ivanivka, Lukyantsi, Starytsya, Pershotravneve, Tabaivka, Kupyansk and Lyptsi.
On Sunday (17MAR), the UGS stated that on Saturday (16MAR), unspecified Ukrainian units stopped two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group’s attempts to attack Ukrainian positions near Stara Huta and Brusky in the Sumy region. So far, apart from this report, we have seen no other information confirming increased Russian infiltration attempts on the border between the two states. Given Ukrainian actions in the Belgorod oblast, such a lack of activity is surprising.
On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier claimed that on Monday (18MAR), the Russians had shelled the Sumy region about 500 times on the day prior. He added that about 200 aerial bombs were dropped on villages near the border over the past week. Twenty-two settlements were fully or partially evacuated. On Tuesday (19MAR), a Ukrainian journalist claimed that the evacuation of civilians from the border settlements of the Velykopysarivska hromada in the Sumy region was extremely difficult due to the destruction of a bridge (perhaps this one) by Russian forces.
Describing the situation in the region, a Ukrainian volunteer, Kateryna Andreeva, said that the evacuation of civilians was conducted under fire and that Russians were attempting to destroy border communities. She further claimed that the entire border in the Sumy region was on fire.
On Wednesday (20MAR), Russian missiles again struck the Kharkiv, hitting storage facilities and civilian buildings.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
In the Luhansk Oblast, no significant changes occurred.
On Saturday, Sunday and Monday (16-17-18MAR), the positional battles continued near Synkivka. However, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes. On Saturday (16MAR), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that all Russian attacks near Synkivka were repelled, and the UAF continued to hold their positions. On Monday (18MAR), a Ukrainian soldier said that in the Kupyansk axis, the situation was under UAF control. The Russians were trying to attack Ukrainian positions in groups of 5-6 people with the support of drones, but they were unsuccessful. On Tuesday (19MAR), the positional battles continued near Synkivka, with no recorded changes.
On Tuesday (19MAR), Kostyantyn Mashovets, a Ukrainian military observer, claimed that between Kupyansk and Lyman, Russians deployed a maximum of 80,000 troops, not more than 1,000 tanks, some 1,110 armoured combat vehicles, and 1,840 artillery systems, of which 300 were MLR systems, including an unspecified number of heavy flamethrowers, TOS-1As. He also asserted that Russians deployed some 16 Iskander launchers, but we understand that most of them are deployed on the Russian side of the border.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Petropavlibka, Tabaivka, Krohmalne and Ivanivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Novovodyane. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
Between Saturday and Monday (16-18MAR), positional battles continued near Terny and Yampolivka, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes. On Monday (18MAR), the Ukrainian soldier claimed that the UAF repelled a Russian attack near Terny and Yampolivka, but it is unclear what this involved. The Ukrainian soldier further said that on Wednesday (20MAR), Russians launched two massive assaults towards Terny and Yampolivka but were unsuccessful. He stated that the Lyman axis is the only area where Russians actively used armoured vehicles during assaults. In other areas, Ukrainian drones effectively prevent Russians from using armour. Another Ukrainian soldier asserted that during Russian assaults, the UAF destroyed nine Russian vehicles and several infantry units. Also, geolocation footage of the Russian assault showed that Ukrainian strikes damaged or destroyed several Russian armoured vehicles in the area. Further to that, Ukrainians claimed to have killed almost a regiment worth of Russian soldiers in the Terny area over the past seven days.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks. Also, no changes occurred near Torske and Nevske.
In the Kreminna area, no significant changes occurred. Positional battles continued in the Serebryasnky foresty and near Dibrova. The same pertains to Bilohorivka.
On Wednesday (20MAR), geolocated footage was published showing Russian forces advancing north of Zolotarivka. However, the Ukrainian source said that the Russian forward movement was stopped.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk axis, Russian units repelled 14 Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Lyman Lake, Terny and Yampolivka.
According to Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in Lyman’s direction, Russian units of the Centre Group of Forces, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled six Ukrainian attacks near Terny, Yampolivka and Bilohorivka.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Over the past week, the Russians continued attacks in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Novopavlivka axes. They achieved partial success in some areas but made no significant advances. Ukrainians continued to defend with counterattacks.
On Sunday (17MAR), the UGS claimed that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions near Rozdolivka but were unsuccessful.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Ivano-Darivka, Vyimka and Verkhnokamyanske. The same goes for Vesele and Vasiukivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Between Saturday and Monday (16-18MAR), positional battles continued near Ivanivske and Bohdanivka. On Sunday (17MAR), the Ukrainian soldier asserted that Russians had slightly advanced in Ivanivske. However, the source added that the Ukrainian forces continued to hold their positions in the western part of the settlement. The Russian source stated on Sunday (17MAR) that on the Bakhmut axis, Russian troops concentrated all efforts on capturing Ivanivske. On Tuesday (19MAR), the Russian source claimed that the Ukrainians continued to hold the western outskirts of Ivanivske, relying on large fortifications. However, the source noted that Russian aviation was hitting Ukrainian artillery and manpower, which forced the Ukrainian command to withdraw some of its heavy weapon systems from this direction. They were also dropping bombs on Ukrainian defensive lines. However, the Ukrainian source said new defence lines had been built near Chasiv Yar. He also believed that the battle for this city would last all summer. On Wednesday (20MAR), the positional battles continued in Ivanivske and Bohdanivka. A Ukrainian soldier asserted that the situation in Ivanivske was unchanged for a week now, with many Russian losses every day. Most of the Russian equipment is destroyed at the Bakhmut exit and north of Klishchiivka. The soldier added that the Russians continued to attack (hit with artillery and bombs) Chasiv Yar actively, mostly hitting apartment buildings with basements. The UAF also had problems with CASEVAC. The soldier noted that first aid was previously provided in the city, but now the wounded must be taken to neighbouring towns.
On Wednesday (20MAR), the Russian source claimed that for the first time, Russian forces tried to attack Oleksandropil near the H20 road. The source said the Russian advance along the road with gradual coverage of the Toretsk – Niu York area from the west gives the Russians further access to Konstantynivka from the southwest.
Between Saturday and Tuesday (16-19MAR), positional battles continued near Klishchiivka, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any frontline changes.
No changes occurred near Andriivka and Kurdyumivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
The Ukrainian bloggers claimed that on Sunday (17MAR), the Russian troops advanced near Orlivka. Geolocated footage published on Saturday (16MAR) confirmed that Russian forces progressed to the central part of the settlement. The Russian source assessed on Sunday (17MAR) that the situation in Berdychi and Orlivka was difficult; battles were ongoing, but neither side took complete control of the villages. Most of Orlivka was occupied by the Russian forces, while Berdych was under UAF control. In Tonenke, the Russian source stated that Russian units advanced along Tsentralnaya, Tsvetochnaya and Umanskaya Streets in an area up to 730 metres wide and up to 400 metres deep in the direction of Shkolnaya Street.
The source added that the UAF kept constantly throwing reserves and trying to counterattack. On Monday (18MAR), the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russians advanced in Orlivka, which was confirmed by the Ukrainian soldier, who said that Ukrainian troops withdrew a little to the west of Orlivka because it was impossible to hold the defence there. But, he added that most of the village had become a good place for destroying Russian equipment. The Russian source said that on Monday (18MAR), the heavy battles continued on the Tonenke – Orlivka – Berdychi line. The Russian forces continued to press the UAF, but their advance “could not be described as rapid”. The source said that firstly, this was due to the fierce Ukrainian resistance in this area, and secondly, due to the actions of the Russian command, which sought to preserve personnel, avoiding frontal attacks if possible. Another Russian source stated that on Monday (18MAR), north of Avdiivka, the Ukrainians conducted several reconnaissance operations near Petrovske(?) and northwest of Krasnohorivka from Ocheretyne and Novokalynove.
On Tuesday (19MAR), the Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian forces were pushed back from Orlivka. But, the source suggests that the AFU might try to counterattack. The Russian MoD also said that (unknown) Russian Central Grouping of Forces elements captured Orlivka. On the other hand, Ukrainian sources did not confirm the settlement was lost. Some Russian sources stated that the clearing of the settlement was completed at least as early as Sunday morning (17MAR). Still, the delay in reporting was due to constant Ukrainian counterattacks and the need to consolidate positions. Another Russian source claimed that the UAF had only a few observation posts left near Tonenke. They were preparing to withdraw from the settlement. The situation near Berdychi was similar. The source believed that the UAF would also withdraw from the village. The source noted that after the beginning of spring, the weather conditions at the front were difficult for the offensive due to the swampy terrain. On Wednesday (20MAR), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops continued to put pressure on the Ukrainian forces on the Tonenke – Orlivka -Berdychi line. The source said there were Russian advances in Tonenke, where the UAF had left some positions. On the same line, Russian troops made further advances in Orlivka. In Berdychi, Ukrainian forces were still putting up serious resistance, but Russian forces continued to attack from the east. Another Russian source asserted that the Russian forces had completely cleared Orlivka, and the battles continued in Berdychi and Tonenke. The Ukrainian blogger claimed that on Wednesday (20MAR), Russians advanced in Orlivka. However, there was also no information about the complete loss of the settlement. On Thursday (21MAR), the Russian source claimed that if the Russian forces paused along Tonenke – Orlivka – Berdychi, the fighting on this line might continue for quite a long time. Therefore, the Russian forces actively sought to push the UAF back to the second line of defence near Ocheretine – Novoselivka Persha – Karlivka.
Positional battles continued near Pervomaiske, Sjeverne and Nevelske. The Russian source claimed that on Sunday (17MAR), the Russian Forces continued to advance slowly in Pervomaiske. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes in the area. On Tuesday (19MAR), the Russian source claimed that the heavy battles continued in Pervomaiske, where the Russian troops continued to advance. The source, however, failed to provide more detailed information. On the other hand, geolocated footage was published on Tuesday (19MAR), indicating that Russian forces advanced on the northwestern edge of the Pervomaiske Dam. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
On Saturday and Sunday (16-17MAR), the positional battles continued near Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka and Pobjeda. The Russian source claimed that the active battles with Russian advances continued in Novomikhailivka, but the Ukrainians still controlled most of the settlement. The Ukrainian forces did not withdraw from the Pobjeda outskirts, either. Heavy battles also continued on the border of Marinka and Heorhiivka, where the UAF continued to hold their positions. On Monday (18MAR), the Russian source claimed that the heavy battles occurred in Krasnohorivka, where the Russian forces had recently advanced. However, the source added that despite an initial advance in the south of the village, no further gains were achieved. After the transfer of reserves, the Ukrainians stopped the main assault groups and then partially pushed the Russian forces out of the residential sector south of the city. On Tuesday (19MAR), the Russian source claimed that the meeting engagements continued in Krasnohorivka, but no changes were reported. Another Russian source stated that Novomykhailivka was gradually coming under Russian control. As of Tuesday (19MAR), the Russian troops were already in the centre. On Wednesday (20MAR), the Russian source asserted that the Ukrainian forces had almost completely pushed Russian troops from Krasnohorivka. However, Russian forces still had a small presence on the city’s southern outskirts. On the other hand, on Wednesday (20MAR), geolocated footage showed that Russian forces advanced north of the dam in Heorhiivka, and additional geolocated footage showed that Russian forces advanced north of Novomykhailivka. The Russian source also claimed on Thursday (21MAR) that the Russians consolidated their positions in Novomykhailivka.
In the Vuhledar area, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Southern Ukraine direction
In the Velyka Novosilka axis, no changes occurred.
No changes occurred near Zolota Nyva. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Staromaiorkse and Urozhaine.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodarivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Pryuutne and Levadne.
On Sunday (17MAR), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops advanced near Malynivka. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Ukrainian blogger claimed that on Sunday (17MAR), the Russians advanced near Verbove. The Russian source claimed that battles continued in Robotyne and north of Verbove. The source said that the line of contact had not changed. On the other hand, the same source stated that Russian progress was made southwest of Hulyaipole. As a result of assault operations, the Russians captured Myrne, which the Russian MoD also confirmed.
On Tuesday (19MAR), the Russian journalist claimed that the heavy battles continued in Robotyne. The source said that the Ukrainian command was again bringing fresh forces into the battle in an attempt to dislodge the Russian troops from the village, but these attempts were unsuccessful.
On Wednesday (20MAR), the Russian source stated that Russians managed to advance deep into Robotyne, and the Ukrainians were pulling up fresh reserves and trying to counterattack, but without success. At night, the Russians again stormed Ukrainian positions and managed to capture one dugout. The intensity of Ukrainian artillery was reduced, but the activity of drones was increasing. The source also stated that the Russian forces continue to suffer from an acute shortage of EW assets across the entire Zaporizhzhia axis. On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier from the 118th Separate Mechanised Brigade claimed that the situation near Robotyne is variable and stable. The Russians attempted to attack in groups, mostly at night, but the Ukrainians worked with drones equipped with night vision capabilities. However, the Russians actively used artillery, mortars, MLRS, KABs, and FPVs, both day and night. Getting to the positions became much more dangerous. Logistics was also more challenging.
On Sunday (17MAR), geolocated footage was posted indicating that Russian forces were marginally east of Luhivske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Kamyanske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Kopani.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novofedorivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pyatykhatky.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
No significant changes occurred in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian forces continue to hold a bridgehead on Dnipro’s left bank despite Russian counterattacks.
On Saturday and Sunday (16-17MAR), the positional battles continued near Krynky on the left bank of the Dnipro River. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Monday (18MAR), the Russian source claimed that in the Kherson direction, the Ukrainians were constructing fortifications in the coastal villages. In Krynky, the UAF was trying to throw small groups of infantry on boats under the fire of the Russian Forces. The sources noted a decrease in the quality of the Ukrainian personnel.
On Tuesday (19MAR), the positional battles continued in Krynky, but no changes were recorded. The Russian source said that the Ukrainians maintained a presence in the Dachi area near the Antonovsky bridge. The UAF also continued to prepare a line of defence on their right bank. Another Russian source claimed on Tuesday (19MAR) that in the Kherson direction, the Ukrainian armed forces had received French-made 155mm Bofors/Nexter Bonus cluster shells, which were very accurate and deadly against Russian positions in the rear.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 577 aircraft (0), 270 helicopters (+1), 16,565 UAVs (+992), 487 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 15,572 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+76), 1,252 MLRS launchers (+14), 8,490 field artillery guns and mortars (+84), as well as 20,057 units of special military vehicles (+293).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 434,710 personnel (+6,290), 6,840 tanks (+82), 13,111 armoured combat vehicles (+162), 10,775 artillery systems (+195) and 1,018 MLR systems (+1), 723 anti-aircraft systems (+6), 347 aircraft (0) and 325 helicopters (0), and 8,388 UAVs (+134), 1,953 cruise missiles (+33), 26 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 14,287 vehicles and fuel tanks (+294), and 1,749 special vehicles (+38).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
Last week, Russians launched two mass missile strikes. These events occurred after a 36-day pause in mass missile attacks but also marked the first instance since mid-SEP2023 when Russians conducted two mass strikes in two consecutive days (17SEP – 10 missiles fired, 18SEP 17).
The first attack occurred on the night of 20/21MAR (Wednesday/Thursday). Russia launched 31 missiles, a mix of two ballistic missiles (Iskander-M, North Korean Kn-23) and 29 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles. Ukrainians claimed to have achieved an interception rate of 100%. A video posted online showed a crater following a missile strike, which puts into question the claim about the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences. Still, no deaths or major damages were recorded. This attack was the largest since 07FEB when Russians launched 44 missiles. Another relatively heavy attack occurred on 15FEB when 26 missiles were fired.
However, on the night of 21/22MAR (Thursday/Friday), the Russians launched the largest attack since 2JAN when they launched 88 missiles. They included a mix of 12 ballistic missiles (Iskander-M), 40 cruise missiles (Kh-101, Kh-555), five Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, seven Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles, two Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missiles, and 22 missiles fired from S-300/400 air defence systems. Altogether, Russians launched 88 missiles, and Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 37 (42% interception rate). Specifically, Ukrainians reportedly shot down 35 Kh-101/Kh-555s (88%) and two Kh-59s (100%). It is not surprising that no air defence or anit-ship missiles were intercepted. What also stands out is that no Iskanders and Kinzhals were shot down. Previously, Ukrainians claimed to have a good interception rate against these missiles. They were also susceptible to Ukrainian EW operations. A lack of interceptions in these categories could indicate that Ukrainians are prioritising targets and are conserving ammunition.
Moving beyond mass missile strikes, between 15-18MAR, Russians launched sporadic missile strikes, which involved a mix of missiles fired from S-300/S-400 air defence systems and Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missiles. No missiles were intercepted.
Russians launched Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drone attacks four times. They were utilised between 16-18MAR and 21/22MAR and, in total, involved 103 UAVs. Forty drones were used between 16-18MAR, but the 21/22MAR attack involved 63 UAVs, of which 55 were reportedly shot down (87%). This was also the largest Shahed attack since 2JAN.
Ground attacks continued to decrease. From a time perspective, this decline has now been the longest since December. Then, Russian ground activity declined significantly between 17DEC and 13JAN (28 days), from an average of 98 daily attacks to 58. The current decrease in activities started around 11FEB when Russia hit an average of around 90 attacks per day. This number now stands at around 75, but the decline lasted 39 days. Although still significant in absolute numbers, this decline likely heralds Moscow’s preparations for another large-scale attack.
Missile (battlefield) attacks fluctuated, but the overall average intensity remained stable. There was a big uptick recorded on Friday (36 strikes), but it was driven by the mass Russian missile attack on Ukraine.
Air strikes declined from an average of 90 to 78 air strikes per day. Between 20FEB and 20MAR, Russians, on average, maintained a tempo of 80-100 strikes per day. The decline below 80 thus suggests a major decrease in operational tempo.
Lastly, MLRS strikes continued to decline and appeared to have stopped at around 100 attacks per day as of Wednesday (20MAR). However, Ukrainians reported 150 attacks on Thursday (21MAR), the highest number since 5MAR. This also reversed the downward trend in the average strikes (10 previous days).
Outlook for the week of 23MAR024 – 29MAR2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” Russians made no confirmed gains last week.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote (no change). We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. It is highly likely (no change) that Russians will continue attacking west from the Avdiivka, and there is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more.” This assessment was correct. Russians indeed made confirmed gains and reportedly captured a village. The latter claim is pending confirmation.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are likely (no change) to sustain a ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.” This assessment was also correct.
Final Score: 5/5 (100%)
The forecast for the week of 23MAR024 – 29MAR2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
We are not assessing the likelihood of Ukrainian forces’ incursions into Russia as it is beyond OSINT.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote (no change). We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. It is highly likely (no change) that Russians will continue attacking west from the Avdiivka, and there is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are likely (no change) to sustain a ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.