Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 17 June – 23 June 2023 (Weekly update)

Situational report 17 June – 23 June 2023

BLUF: Ukrainian units continued offensive operations in southern parts of the country, but the effects on the frontline were minimal. Only one village was captured, although subsequent reports indicated that Russians mounted successful counterattacks. Russian resistance was stiff. Ukrainians continued targeting Russian artillery systems and rear areas to degrade fire and logistics support. As per Ukrainian officials’ statements, Moscow launched attacks in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts, but they appeared small in size and delivered no frontline shifts.

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• Last week delivered minimal confirmed Ukrainian gains in southern parts of the country; Two weeks into the counteroffensive, Kyiv’s forward momentum has almost come to a halt; The Velkyia Novosylivka axis, where the bulk of the forces is now committed, saw no progress;

• There were reports last week about an operational pause in the southern direction, but Ukrainians are unlikely to have decreased the tempo of their attacks; Rotations occur on a standard basis;

• Ukrainians struck a bridge linking Crimea with Kherson Oblast, which will temporarily hinder Russian logistics; Unless the bridge and follow-on pontoon crossings are destroyed, the latest event will not have long-term consequences for Russian units deployed to southern parts of Ukraine;

• Despite reported changes in Russian posture in the Kharkiv Oblast, over the past several days, Russians made no territorial gains in the region, including in the Kupyansk area;

• The frontline in the Luhansk Oblast did not change either; There, too, Russians did not advance, especially along the Kreminna-Lyman direction, where according to Ukrainian sources, Russians launched offensive operations;

• Ukrainians reportedly made some progress northwest of Bakhmut in the Donetsk Oblast; However, neither side made any confirmed gains in other parts of the region, including the Vuhledar axis;

• Russian artillery strikes near Kherson returned to pre-6JUN levels, while ground units returned to their previously occupied positions; Russian sources reported increased Ukrainian troop deployments to the region;

• Russian missile and drone attacks were again limited last week; The seven-day average for the employment of Shaheds reached the lowest level since late April;

Executive summary

Let us start with a short apology. In this update, we will not discuss what is happening between Wagner’s head, Yevghenii Prigozhin, and the Russian MoD. Whatever it is, we are at the very early stages of probably more kinetic (arrests, skirmishes) actions to be undertaken by both sides. As such, any forward-looking comments would be too speculative at this stage. Nevertheless, let’s look at what we already know or what is more likely to be true.

Firstly, both Prigozhin and the Russian MoD have a long history of making false statements. Observing what is currently online (we are looking at you, Twitter), almost everyone accepts Prigozhin ‘s claims at face value, forgetting that he is as corrupt and dishonest as the Russian MoD. We know it is challenging, but caution is advised when dealing with everything that Prigozhin says or does. He is an actor too. The video Wagner released, which is reportedly showing the aftermath of a Russian regular army units artillery strike on a Wagner base, looks incredibly staged. We have seen a lot of videos throughout this war showing what artillery strikes do to forested areas, and it certainly does not correspond with what Wagner showed. Is this a trigger to justify the “march for justice”, as Prigozhin called it? That’s likely.

Secondly, let’s remember that at the current stage, Wagner relies heavily on the Russian MoD provision of supplies. Had it not been for their support (albeit not unproblematic as we know), Wagner’s offensive potential would have been exhausted long ago. It is hard to imagine that Wagner would attempt a coup without securing supplies from another source. The same goes for political support. If the organisation is to stage a coup against the MoD, it better has strong backing from key political figures who can propel Wagner’s actions. Otherwise, Prigozhin overreached and overplayed his hand.

The big question is how the current situation will impact the frontline. As Samuel Bendett noted, on Friday evening, many Russian Telegram channels reposted the following message: “Brothers! Everyone who holds a weapon at the line of contact – remember: your enemy is across from you, keep him at gunpoint, Moscow will sort this all out without us. There is nothing more important than Russia.” Based on what happened on Friday evening, we do not assess that the impact on the regular Russian army posture will be noticeable. But we cannot exclude that a situation will somehow escalate, leading to unpredictable events.

To sum up, we advise caution in believing either the Russian MoD or Prigozhin. The image of what is currently happening is so incredibly obfuscated, and the situation is so rapidly changing that making even short-term predictions is futile. Let’s sit back, observe and adjust.

Now, let’s take a look at the frontline.

Firstly, last week, Ukrainian officials made numerous claims about new Russian offensive operations. In particular, Moscow was to launch coordinated attacks in the Kupyansk direction in the Kharkiv Oblast and along the Kreminna-Lyman line in the Donetsk Oblast. However, we saw no confirmation that this occurred. As we noted many times in the UCM, Russians maintained a very high intensity of artillery strikes in the Kreminna area for many weeks. There were some rumours about Russian forces’ build-up in this sector too. Yet, despite this, not only did Russians make no confirmed gains in both areas, but Ukrainian MoD officials claimed successful ground attacks near Bilohorivka, south of Kreminna. Clearly, Ukrainian public messaging delivers conflicting reports. It does not mean Russians will not try to upset the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south by launching attacks in other parts of the country. But, in general, we remain sceptical about Moscow’s ability to launch any large-scale attacks that could deliver operational-level territorial gains.

When it comes to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south, the past seven days delivered only minimal changes. Ukrainians captured P’yatykhatky on Sunday. But the village remained contested throughout the week as Russian counterattacks were reportedly successful. This battle highlights that Russian forces were far from collapsing in this part of the front and had sufficient resources to mount effective operations to retake previously lost lands. We also assess that Russians are not fighting with their reserves. There have been many rumours recently about the deployment of Russian strategic reserves to the frontline to stall Ukrainian attacks. If so, it would probably be the first time in military history that strategic reserves were deployed to forward positions to reinforce the first echelon forces, even though more sophisticated in-depth defensive lines had been stood up. So no, whereas the frontline may have been strengthened with new units, most of the reserve force is intact.

Secondly, we think it is fair to say that the counteroffensive is behind schedule at the current stage. The progress, especially over the last seven days, has been underwhelming. Most of the territorial gains Ukrainians made occurred during the initial days of the counteroffensive. As such, Kyiv has already lost the forward momentum and is now involved in grinding/attritional battles to move forward. It still has a lot of uncommitted potential, but we assess that these forces will not be deployed into combat in significant numbers unless there is a breakthrough. As such, most newly established brigades likely form the second echelon force to exploit gaps in Russian lines.

Ukrainians tried to compensate for this lack of progress. Reported Russian artillery losses reached an all-time high on Thursday. Deep strikes sought to hinder the movement of supplies from Crimea to the Zaporizhihia, partly isolate the battlefield, and limit ammunition supplies. Their impact, however, will not be immediately felt on the frontline.

To sum up, current battles are chewing up both forces. Western equipment has dramatically increased the survivability of Ukrainian crews and military personnel, and those who can preserve their strength will likely ultimately come on top. But the current stage confirms that while the counteroffensive can have ‘fast’ moments, there will also be times when there is no progress. We are in the latter stage right now.

Ukraine battle map

Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv direction

The overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast did not change, although Ukrainian officials said that the Russian forces started offensive operations in the Kupyansk Oblast. Russians continued limited ground attacks and reconnaissance operations near Masiutivka, Hryanykivka and Krohmalne, but they did not lead to any frontline shifts.

Likewise, no Russian ground attacks from Russia were recorded on the border between the two states.

As expected, Russians continued artillery strikes on targets across the region. Last week they hit Vovchansk, Hryhorivka, Vilkhuvatka, Velykyi Burluk, Lyptsi, Pershotravneve and Morozova Dolyna.

Hanna Malyar, the deputy Ukrainian Minister of Defence, said on 19JUN that Russian forces had gone on the offensive in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions using previously concentrated forces, particularly air assault units. Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, confirmed the increased activities of the Russian units by saying that Russians concentrated forces in the Kupyansk direction and increased the intensity of artillery strikes and sabotage and reconnaissance missions.

So far, this increase in ground activity did not translate into territorial gains. However, the latest information from Russian sources indicates that Russians were trying to advance towards Holubivka and Synkivka.

Given the Russian efforts to upset the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south, Russians may continue to harass Ukrainian positions in other parts of the country, particularly in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblasts. Still, neither source confirmed a significant build-up of Russian units or Moscow’s ability to conduct a large-scale attack. Consequently, despite a rise in the number and intensity of ground attacks, we do not expect sizable Russian operations in the area.

Last week, Russians employed several of their air assets to strike Ukrainian troop positions. According to the Russian MoD, Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters and Su-25s close air support aircraft struck concentration areas of the 14th Mechanised and the 103rd Territorial Defence Brigades.

Luhansk direction

The situation in other parts of the Luhansk Oblast remained largely unchanged. The frontline in the Svatove area remained stable, and no Russian attacks were recorded near Stelmakhivka on Wednesday.

No changes occurred near Novoselivkse and Kuzemivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes in this area.

No frontline shifts occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Some limited Russian ground attacks occurred near Terny, Torske, Yampolivka and Nevske but were too weak to deliver any frontline changes. Describing the situation in the region, Malyar stated that most heavy fighting continued in the Lyman sector near Yampolivka and Serebryansky forest. However, she also added that the situation on the eastern borders is tense but under control.

Malyar said on 19JUN that Russians started conducting offensive operations in the Kreminna-Lyman area. Despite this announcement, no evidence has confirmed any major changes in the area. Our sources on the Ukrainian side stated that Russians had been building up their forces for weeks in this area, which are primarily centred around airborne units. We also suppose that the high intensity of Russian artillery attacks we discussed in previous UCM issues may have been used to prepare the battlefield for the attack. That said, we again stress that we have seen no significant changes on the battlefield despite Ukrainian pronouncements about Russian attacks. We have also made no changes to the frontlines in this area on our Scribble Map.

With the increased pace of ground attacks, Russians tried to improve their positions in the Serebryansky forest, but these attempts failed. Russian sources claimed that the Ukrainian 42nd Mechanised Brigade is deployed in the Lyman direction and serves as a reserve component that can reinforce the already deployed 95th Air Assault and 25th Airborne Brigades.

Malyar stated on Wednesday and Thursday that the UAF conducted offensive operations and partially succeeded in the Bilohorivka – Shypylivka direction. So far, this information is unconfirmed. But it is interesting nevertheless that such news appeared in the Ukrainian official channels, despite previous reports on Russians conducting offensive operations in the Lyman direction.

Whereas Russians conduct active defence operations in the south, their intentions seem more offensively oriented in the north. We also need to remember that from Moscow’s perspective, the goal of the second phase of this war is to seize the remaining parts of the Donetsk Oblast. Successful operations in the Lyman-Slovyansk axis would revive Russian hopes to achieve this objective. Yet, we are still far from seeing Russians entering this path of consecutive successful tactical victories, let alone operational ones, that would bring them closer to capturing the Donetsk Oblast.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts with Russian fortifications (17-23JUN)

(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Brady Africk).

Donetsk Oblast Direction

Last week, Russian forces launched several attempts at breaking the deadlock near Spirne, and although Ukrainian sources reported increased artillery activity in this sector, Russians made no territorial gains.

Apart from that, no frontline changes were reported near Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. Likewise, the frontline became stable near Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, and Vesele.

Early in the week, Ukrainians launched several offensive attempts near Yahidne, Berkhivka and Krasnopolivka. A Russian source stated that Ukrainians managed to advance near Kranopolivka, while Ukrainian sources added that the 225th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade also advanced north of Orikhovo-Vasylivka and took control over height 224.0 near the settlement.

Later in the week, Russian infantry with artillery support conducted counterattacks to retake lost positions near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka. Still, we understand that these Russian attacks were limited in size and did not deliver any frontline changes in these sectors.

The overall situation in Bakhmut remained unchanged. Skirmishes were reported in the southwestern parts of the town, especially near Dachi, where Ukrainians control a small part of the city. Undoubtedly, the intensity of fire exchanges between both sides decreased over the past couple of weeks. We do not expect the situation to change in the short term of 4-6 weeks.

Battles also continued west and northwest of Klishchiivka and the Siversky Donetsk-Donbas canal. But there, too, no frontline changes were reported. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Ivanivske and Bila Hora.

It, therefore, seems that the entire frontline from Yahidne to Klishchiivka is deadlocked. Initial Ukrainian gains were quickly stopped, and despite numerous claims coming from the Ukrainian side, the frontline did not move around Bakhmut for weeks. Unless either side deploys a lot of manpower to the area to tilt the balance, we do not expect a major change, especially given the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive and focus on southern parts of the country.

Russian forces launched limited attempts between Kamyanka and Kruta Balka, but there, too, no frontline changes occurred.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Krasnohorivka, Novokalynove, Keramik, Berdychi, Vesele and Stepove.

Moving further south, in Avdiivka, Russian troops tried to attack southwestern approaches of the city, but all attacks were repelled.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources did not report changes near Pervomaiske, Severne, Tonenke, Vodyane and Nevelske.

Despite this apparent lack of larger activity in the Donetsk Oblast, Russians reinvigorated their efforts to capture the remaining parts of Mariinka over the past several days. They launched several ground attacks within the city and conducted ground assaults on Ukrainian positions north and south of the settlement. Specifically, they attacked Novomykhailivka to the north and Pobieda to the south of Mariinka. Yet, despite these apparent concentrated efforts, no frontline shifts were reported in this area.

Due to an apparent lack of Ukrainian offensive operations in the Vuhledar area, we have decided to remove this area from the Souther Ukraine Direction. When the main phase of the counteroffensive started a couple of weeks ago, we assessed that the Vuledar axis played an important part in the overall operation. It sought to protect the left flank of Ukrainian forces fighting near Velyka Novosilka. While this role could still be preserved, no reports about Ukrainian attacks in this area suggest that we may have overestimated the role of Ukrainian units fighting near Vuhledar in the overall operational assessment of the counteroffensive.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian fortifications, 17MAY-23JUN 2023

Southern Ukraine direction

Last week delivered only one frontline change across the entire area where the counteroffensive is undergoing. Ukrainians find it increasingly difficult to push Russians back. Two weeks into the counteroffensive, overall Ukrainian frontline progress remains limited.

Velyka Novosilka axis

In the Velyka Novosilka axis, Ukrainians continued to attack Russian positions near Pryyutne, Rivnopil and Staromaiors’ke, but these attempts were unsuccessful. Battles also continued near Levadne – Novodarivka.

The composition of Ukrainian units deployed on a 30 km wide front from Velyka Novosilvka to Vuhledar include:

• 35^th, 36^th, and 37^th Marine Brigades;

• 23^rd, 31^st, 68^th, and 93^rd Mechanised Brigades;

• 4^th Tank Brigade;

• A detached TD battalion from the 129^th TDB;

• 110^th TDB;

• 15^th, 47^th, and 55^th Artillery Brigades;

We continue to see limited employment of newly established brigades. So far, this axis has seen a deployment of only three new manoeuvres (23rd and 31st Mechanised Brigade and 37th Marine Brigade). We do not know precisely how Ukrainians plan to use new formations going forward, especially those equipped with Western equipment. But it is likely that Kyiv will not risk employing Western kit at the current stage and will wait until a breakthrough is achieved or the situation is very close to this point.

Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Brigadier General, Commander of the Tavria Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, claimed numerous times that Ukrainian units continued to advance over the past several days. Still, he did not provide any evidence to support these assertions.

Frontlines in southern Ukraine with units involved in combat

But he provided some data on the number of fire missions. He stated that Ukrainian missile and artillery forces performed 1,119 firing missions on 20JUN and 1,212 a day later. As noted below in the section on the Kherson Oblast, 72 fire missions produced 345 artillery shells. Although this equation is not ideal for extrapolating, considering this data, 1,119 fire missions would translate to more than 5,300 shells fired on 20JUN.

As of early March, Ukrainians fired more than 3,600 155mm rounds daily.

Russian official sources provided daily reminders that the counteroffensive had failed. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian attacks on all axes were repelled, while artillery and aviation hit Ukrainian units near Storozheve, Novodonetske and Makarivka.

Orikhiv axis

There have been conflicting reports about Ukrainian gains on this axis. Firstly, on 18JUN, Ukrainians captured Pyatykhatky. However, multiple Russian reports suggested that a successful counterattack managed to retake the settlement, which was reportedly empty when Russians entered it. On the other hand, a Ukrainian source claimed that Pyatikhatky was under Ukrainian control, adding that all Russian claims were invalid. Moreover, Ukrainian sources said Russians launched daily attacks on the village but were continually repelled. The Ukrainian General Staff said that Russians conducted unsuccessful offensives near Pyatikhatky.

So far, Russians failed to provide evidence confirming successful Russian operations to retake Pyatykhatky.

A Ukrainian source claimed that the UAF advanced several kilometres towards Rabotyne and pushed Ukrainians out of several strongholds north of the settlement. Another Russian source said that the UAF indeed managed to break through to Russian trenches near Rabotyne.

On the other hand, we have no visual evidence confirming that Ukrainians progressed near the village. As such, we have made no updates in this area in our Ukraine battle map.

Over the past few days, Russians conducted at least three vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks on Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine. This may indicate a shift in Russian tactics that will deliver more such attacks in the near future. However, we do not expect Russians to benefit significantly from employing VBIEDs, and we do not expect the situation in the region to change as a result of their deployment.

Frontlines in southern Ukraine with Russian fortifications, 17MAY-23JUN 2023

Kherson direction and Crimea

The situation in the region did not change over the past week.

According to Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, the Russians were gradually returning to their positions in the Kherson region after they abandoned them following the Nova Kakhovka dam disaster. This forced them to relocate some 15 km inland, which decreased their ability to conduct artillery fire missions. But the return to their previous positions means that, as Humeniuk explained, the return to the pre-6JUN intensity of artillery strikes. On 20JUN, Russians were recorded firing 72 times, which delivered 345 artillery shells.

As a result, Ukrainians increased the activity of counter-battery fires. Interestingly, Russian sources stated that Ukrainian units too increased their artillery activity, especially near the Antonivskyy Bridge. They deployed additional artillery assets, while their strikes increased from 1-2 daily attacks to ten in some areas. The source also stated a significant increase in the movement of support transport in the rear areas. Reportedly, at least six convoys of trucks and other equipment passed to Snehyrivka and Davydiv Brid between Monday and Thursday. No such activity was previously observed in this area.

On 18JUN, Ukrainians conducted a high-precision missile strike on a cluster of Russian warehouses in Rykove, near the train station. The village is more than 100 km from the frontline, meaning the Storm Shadow cruise missile likely delivered the blow. It seems that many in the Russian forces failed to learn lessons from the Ukrainian application of HIMARS to degrade Russian rear support and logistics. Placing many munitions over a large area so close to the rail station was hugely irresponsible and indicated that not all lessons were learnt across the chain of command.

Apart from Rykove, Ukrainians also struck Russian ammunition storage facilities in Skadovsk, Henichesk, and Lazurne.

Storm Shadow was also used to strike a brigade in Chonhar on Thursday. Russian occupational authorities stated that four missiles were fired, but three were intercepted. Russians also claimed that repairing the bridge would take several days. A pontoon bridge was quickly set up to limit the consequences of the strike. Russian military logistics will likely suffer temporary delays.

It seems that many in the Russian forces failed to learn lessons from the Ukrainian application of HIMARS to degrade Russian rear support and logistics. Placing many munitions over a large area so close to the rail station was hugely irresponsible and indicated that not all lessons were learnt across the chain of command.

Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 17MAY-23JUN 2023

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 444 aircraft (+2), 240 helicopters (+2), 4,751 UAVs (+99), 426 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 10,297 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+279), 1,129 MLRS launchers (+7), 5,204 field artillery guns and mortars (+76), as well as 11,126 units of special military vehicles (+143).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 223,330 personnel (+7,690), 4,017 tanks (+91), 7,798 armoured combat vehicles (+167), 3,985 artillery systems (+249) and 617 MLR systems (+16), 379 anti-aircraft systems (+17), 314 aircraft (0) and 307 helicopters (+8), and 3,447 UAVs (+147), 6,708 vehicles and fuel tanks (+189), 1,214 cruise missiles (+31), 18 warships and boats (0) and 545 special vehicles (+36).

As per Ukrainian General Staff reports, Russians continued to experience a high attrition rate of artillery systems. The loss rate has been relatively high since late May, when Russians were losing 20 pieces daily on average. This trend further increased to 29 by 9JUN. On 22JUN, Russians reportedly lost 44 pieces, the largest one-day loss since the start of the war.

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)

Russian artillery losses (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine

The intensity of Russian missile and drone attacks remained reduced last week.

On Friday, four Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber aircraft operating over the Caspinan Sea launched 13 Kh-101/Kh-505 cruise missiles at a military airfield in the Khmelnytskyi region. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed all missiles were destroyed. On Monday, four Kalibr cruise missiles were launched from the Black Sea towards the Odesa region. All were destroyed. The Ukrainian Air Force achieved a 100% interception rate if this data is correct.

On Tuesday, Russians conducted the largest Shahed 131/136 attack since late May. Altogether, 35 drones were launched, and Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 32. Apart from that, the intensity of kamikaze drone attacks remains significantly reduced.

Lastly, when looking at the USG’s data on the number of Russian attacks (ground, missile, air, MLRS), the number of MLRS attacks on 18JUN (100) was the highest since 1JUN. However, this increase was short-lived and quickly returned to previous average levels. An uptick in Russian air strikes was also short. It, therefore, seems that Moscow cannot maintain a high intensity of all strikes even over a seven-day period, let alone weeks or months.

Number of Russian attacks in June (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine (Shaheds excluded)  (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Russian Shahed 131/136 interceptions (Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command)   

Outlook for the week of 24JUN-30JUN

To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.

Previous forecast

“We continue to anticipate no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces do not possess the manpower and equipment to break the deadlock and push west, and thus, they are unlikely to make any frontline changes (capture one village or more) in the region next week.” Russians reportedly launched offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction, but no progress was recorded. No frontline changes were recorded in other parts of the region.

Score: 1/1

“The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. It is unlikely that Russians will advance in the region and near these settlements.” The reported Russian offensive activity in the Kyman direction also did not result in any Russian territorial gains. The frontline in other parts of the Luhansk Oblast did not change.

Score: 1/1

“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we reduce the probability of Russian gains in the region. We now assess that it is highly unlikely that Moscow will make any gains (capture one village or more). The same pertains to the Bakhmut sector. However, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely continue to conduct offensive operations there, but there is a roughly even chance they will progress on the city’s flanks.” Last week Russians concentrated their efforts on capturing Mariinka, but to no avail. Ground attacks in other parts of the region also failed to deliver any confirmed progress. Regarding Ukrainians, they indeed maintained an offensive posture around Bakhmut, which reportedly allowed them to recapture some territories.

Score: 1/1

“Moving onto the southern direction, it is impossible to predict Ukrainian gains or the course of the counteroffensive in general. But given that the bulk of the forces has been committed to the Velyka Novosilka axis, it is likely that Ukrainians will achieve the biggest progress there.” Ukrainians made no confirmed gains in the Velyka Novosilka axis despite the employment of several brigades.

Score: 0/1

“We continue to expect a short-term lull in operations in the Kherson Oblast, especially amid reports about the redeployment of Russian formations from Kherson to Zaporizhihia. Ukrainian operations on the Dnipro will highly likely be reduced, while Russian artillery strikes on civilian areas will continue.” The past seven days indeed delivered no ground operations while Russian artillery strikes carried on.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 4/5 (80%)

The forecast for the week of 24-30JUN

Despite the reported increase in Russian offensive activities, we expect no major changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. It is unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more over the next seven days in the region.

The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. Russians will continue to attack Ukrainian positions, especially west of Dibrova and near Bilohorivka, where the centres of Russian focus are. But, whereas they can capture some territory, we consider it unlikely that they will capture one village or more over the next seven days.

Regarding the Donetsk Oblast, let’s first focus on Russian operations. 1) Moscow will continue conducting ground attacks across the region, focusing on Avdiivka, Mariinka and areas surrounding Bakhmut. Yet, we assess it unlikely that they will manage to capture one village or more, although some gains in inhabited areas are possible. Regarding Ukrainians, 2) Kyiv’s operations will focus on attacks on the northern Bakhmut flank. But, unless the Ukrainian presence is reinforced, Ukrainians are unlikely to make confirmed gains.

Moving onto the southern direction, it is impossible to predict Ukrainian gains or the course of the counteroffensive in general. But given that Ukrainian progress appears to have stalled, we assess that it is unlikely that they will capture more than one village next week.

We might be seeing the first signs of a shifting situation in the Kherson Oblast. Russian artillery units returned to their original positions after the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam, and the intensity of artillery fire also returned to pre-6JUN levels. But more importantly, the reported movement of Ukrainian units towards the region could indicate that Kyiv may also increase the scope of their attacks. In general, it is unlikely that the situation in the region will change over the next seven days. Still, we will keep a close eye on the deployment of Ukrainian forces to the Kherson Oblast and look for any signs indicating shifts in posture.