Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 18 November - 24 November 2023 (Weekly update) (Weekly update)
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
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Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week again did not deliver any major frontline changes across Ukraine; Ukrainians remained defensively oriented almost everywhere apart from the Kherson Oblast and the Orikhiv axis; Russians, on the other hand, maintained an offensive posture near Avdiivka and Bakhmut;
Russian air and missile strikes remained very limited as only two missiles were fired last week; One was shot down, and the other crashed before reaching the target; Shahed strikes decreased, too;
The overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged as Russians continued to strike Ukrainian civilian areas with artillery;
Russians maintained attacks in the northern parts of the Luhansk Oblast Direction (formally Kharkiv Oblast) but made no confirmed gains in the area; The frontline in other parts of the direction also remained unchanged as ground activities were subdued;
Russians were very active near Bakhmut, where they reportedly made some gains; The same pertains to the Avdiivka area; The overall situation in the Donetsk Oblast remained unchanged;
Marginal frontline changes occurred in the Southern Direction, where both sides captured some terrain;
Ukrainian units maintained their bridgeheads on the Dnipro’s left bank; They made no progress in land;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, over the past seven days, Ukrainian units repelled 32 Russian ground attacks near Syn’kivka, east of Petropavlivka and Ivanivka in the Kharkiv Oblast.
In the Luhansk Oblast, the Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian ground attacks (unclear how many attacks were). In the Donetsk Oblast, the UAF repelled 228 ground attacks near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novokalynove, north of Lastochkyne, Novobakhmutivka, Sjeverne, Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Mar’inka, Pobjeda and Staromaiors’ke. In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the Ukrainian units repelled four Russian attacks near Robotyne and Kamyanske (unclear how many attacks were)
According to the UGS, over the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched one air strike on a command post, 29 air strikes on the Russian concentration areas, and two air strikes on the anti-aircraft missile systems. The Ukrainian missile troops hit seven command posts, 21 troop concentration areas, weapons and military equipment, five artillery systems, one air defence system and eight ammunition depots.
Moving beyond official statistics, last week did not deliver any major events or frontline changes in Ukraine. In fact, from the latter point of view, Ukrainians retook some six sq kilometres, while Russians captured 7.1 sq kilometres, most of which (5.2 sq km) in the Avdiivka area. Nevertheless, looking across the entire battle space, these changes were marginal.
But, as always, the changes in the frontline do not show the whole story. Russians remain offensively committed near Avdiivka. On Thursday, the Commander of the Tavriia (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Operational-Strategic Group said that Russians had commenced the third wave of assault actions as part of the Avdiivka offensive. The number of ground attacks increased, which led to Russians reportedly making some gains on the southeastern approaches to the city. The scale of Russian attacks was that when they advanced, Ukrainians did not counterattack. It is unclear whether it was because of a lack of reserve or Ukrainians were caught off guard and were unable to quickly respond. We expect Russians to continue to attack, which will likely deliver some gains, although the fall of the city next week is unlikely. While both the southern and northern flanks are under pressure, Russian progress in the north has been very limited. From Moscow’s point of view, the capture of Stepove and push from the north to sever the ground line of communication to Avdiivka would present an ideal scenario as it would likely force Ukrainians to abandon the city due to a threat of encirclement.
Let’s also look at Ukrainian defensive operations in the area. Last week, the Wall Street Journal published a great article on the situation on this axis. Based on the article, we would like to make some comments that align with what we heard in Ukraine a few weeks ago.
Troops are still motivated but also exhausted – some personnel have been in the area since spring 2022 (18 months). The same situation is the same in other areas (Bakhmut).
Russians have largely abandoned mechanised attacks and focused on ground assaults. In this context, the change in their approach closely resembles Ukraine’s choices at the start of the counteroffensive. Kyiv, too, decided to focus on small unit tactics to preserve personnel and equipment. The main difference, however, is that Russians do not appear to care for personnel losses. One Ukrainian soldier said that Russian troops came “like zombies”. But, there is also an understanding on the Ukrainian side that Moscow can afford to pursue such an approach due to the abundance of manpower.
The Ukrainian 47th Mechanised Brigade (Bradley IFV and Leopard MBT-equipped) is also defending the area. The unit formed the spearhead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive when it started in Zaporizhzhia in June. Back then, it was manned only by highly motivated volunteers but now relies mostly on briefly trained conscripts.
At the start of the summer, one of the companies from the 47th Mechanised Brigade had 120 men; now, it has 20. The rest are dead, wounded or no longer undertake assault roles.
The Ukrainian approach is defending forward. In this regard, Ukrainians also appear to follow Russian operations from Zaporizhzhia. When the terrain is lost, Ukrainians attempt to counterattack, which is “tactics ordered from on high”. These counterattacks often take the form of frontal assaults, which is a questionable tactic. One soldier said that his subunit was ordered to retake a tree line, but he deemed the attack to be too risky (Russians held a perpendicular tree line, too), meaning that Ukrainians would be under very heavy fire from two sides. The commander refused to participate in the attack, which cost him a month’s salary. The attack occurred, nevertheless, which cost Ukrainians the lives of 17 troops (presumably out of 36).
We assess that such an approach will unlikely be sustainable for Ukrainians over the next few months. Kyiv will not be able to match the Russian ability to sustain attrition on this scale or the scale similar to what Russians chose to endure in Zaporizhzhia between June and September. We also need to bear in mind that Russians were forced to redeploy reserves (airborne) forces from the Luhansk Oblast to avoid larger Ukrainian gains. No such reserves likely exist on the Ukrainian side, especially with a comparable level of training.
Russians are, therefore, likely to continue pushing on this axis for the next few weeks, and although the tempo of their attacks will fluctuate, we assess that their determination to capture Avdiivka is unharmed by its vast manpower losses.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides as well.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
Last week did not facilitate any changes in the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Veterynarne, Budarky, Vovchansk, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Berestove, Kurylivka, Kozacha Lopan and Ohirtseve, Hatyshche, Tabaivka and Pletenivka.
On Sunday (19NOV), a Ukrainian soldier again claimed that almost every night, small Russian infiltration groups of about eight personnel crossed the border and committed sabotage acts and killed Ukrainian civilians and uniformed personnel. Most cases were not reported in the media, he said. These groups operated in a very professional and coordinated manner. The source added that in the border area, Russian electronic warfare was so intense that sometimes Ukrainian FPV drones did not even take off.
We confirmed with our sources that such Russian operations are regularly undertaken regularly. Russian objectives include probing Ukrainian defensive lines, mapping minefields, and gathering intelligence on Ukrainian forces in the border areas. Russians do not seek to control the ground, so infiltrations are short-lived.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Russians continued attacks in the northern parts of the Luhansk Direction, but the frontline remained unchanged.
According to Ukrainian bloggers, Russians continued to pressure Ukrainian units, especially near Kupyansk in the Luhansk region. Weather conditions deteriorated as snowfall and mud significantly deteriorated the ability to move, let alone manoeuvre.
Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the Ukrainian ground forces, claimed on Monday (20NOV) that Russians continued to utilise Storm-Z and Storm-V units based on prisoners and military convicts. He stressed that Russians continued attacks towards Kupyansk, although Ukrainian forces repelled these attacks. Syrskyi added that in the Lyman sector, Russians were pulling together reserves and regrouping to prepare for further attacks.
On Sunday (19NOV), the Ukrainian source said that battles continued near Lyman Pershyi and Pershotravneve, where Russians had partial success. The source characterised the situation near the former Lyman Pershyi as challenging, adding that the UAF constantly had to retreat from their positions. The source also highlighted the constant use of FPV drones in support of assault operations. They also highlighted that some Russian subunits get lost in the woods and unexpectedly reach Ukrainian positions, leading to small meeting engagements.
On Sunday (19NOV), Russian units reportedly cut off the Ivanivka-Kyslivka road and entrenched themselves near the railway line. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
However, on Wednesday (22NOV), the Ukrainian source confirmed that Russian troops continued to pressure the forest to the south of Lyman Pershyi, where they progressed. The source also said that battles continued near Pershotravneve.
Russian journalist claimed that on Monday (20NOV), Russian troops became more active near Synkivka. The source also said that an attempt to rotate the Ukrainian units was disrupted by Russian artillery.
When it comes to the frontline, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes near Krohmalne and Orlyans’ke, Dvorichna, Svatove, Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka, Raihorodka, Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. The same goes for Nevske, Terny, Yampolivka and Torske.
No frontline changes were reported in the Kreminna area. Battles continued in the Serebryansky forest. On Tuesday (21NOV), Ukrainian troops reportedly regained positions in the forest, reportedly due to redeployment of Russian units elsewhere. This information remains unconfirmed. No changes were reported in the Bilohorivka area.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, over the past week, Russian units repelled seven Ukrainian attacks conducted by assault units from the 67th Mechanised Brigade near Synkivka. Also, Russian forces conducted fire strikes and hit the Ukrainian 14th, 41st, 43rd, 44th, 52nd Mechanised Brigades, 101st Territorial Defence Brigade and 10th Mountain Assault Brigade near Petropavlivka, Stepova Novoselivka, Ivanivka and Zagoruykivka (?). The Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters launched strikes on equipment and personnel concentration areas of the 14th, 32nd Mechanised Brigades, and 25th Airborne Brigade near Ivanivka, Stelmakhivka, Berestove.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, Russian units repelled seven Ukrainian attacks by assault groups from the 24th, 47th and 63rd Mechanised Brigades near Dibrova. Russian artillery and aviation also hit elements of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, the 12th “Azov” Special Forces Brigade and the 15th National Guard Regiment. The Russian aircraft struck two Ukrainian command and observation posts in the Serebryansky forest area. Russian artillery units hit 12 strongholds, six clusters of hardware and more than 40 artillery positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The last week saw no frontline changes in the Donetsk Oblast. Russians continued ground attacks near Avdiivka, but it appears that their intensity has decreased. The Ukrainian approach now appears to mimic the Russian one in Zaporizhihia Oblast during the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. Ukrainians do not fall back to previously designated defensive lines but defend forward, mounting counterattacks. Such an approach indeed stalls Russians, but on the other hand, it is costly in terms of manpower and equipment. We assess that Ukrainians cannot maintain such an approach for longer (more than two months) with currently deployed formations.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka and Vesele.
The Russian source claimed that on Tuesday (21NOV), the Russian Forces, supported by long-range weapons, continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Khromove and Bohdanivka. Still, these assaults had no impact on the frontline.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Dubovo-Vasylivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Khromove and Bohdanivka.
The situation in Bakhmut also remained unchanged, although a Ukrainian soldier said on Sunday (19NOV) that the International Legion was deployed to the Bakhmut area.
On Saturday (18NOV), the Russian source asserted that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions near Klishchiivka. The source said the settlement was empty, but no detailed information was provided (we were there two weeks ago, and it was far from empty). However, the source added that the UAF had control over nearby heights. Ukrainian bloggers added on Sunday (19NOV) that battles continued near Klishchiivka, where Russians managed to capture some positions and continued to attack to a height of 215.7(?) near the village. The source said that capturing the height would create severe problems in the short term as it is the highest point near the village. The initiative is firmly on the Russian side as attacks continued for most of the week.
Further south, on Tuesday (21NOV), Ukrainian sources claimed that Russian troops regained positions near Andriivka, although it was unclear what this involved. Russians added that Russian units were attacking Ukrainian positions in Klishchiivka from the north with the support of long-range weapons. The battles there were also for dominant heights, which were still controlled by Ukrainian forces as of mid-week.
On Wednesday (22NOV), the Ukrainian bloggers asserted that the Russians continued to attack Klishchiivka and Andriivka and that they progressed near the latter with the objective of crossing the railway near the village. Russians confirmed the forward movement near Andriivka but disclosed no further information.
No changes occurred near Ivanivske, Bila Hora and Niu York. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to the Ukrainian source, on Monday (19NOV), Ukrainian forces made no progress near the slag heap on the western outskirts of Horlivka. The source added that the heap gave control over the city’s western outskirts and opened operational space for the Ukrainian defence forces.
It is unclear what the source meant by this statement. The control over the heap could indeed extend the range of ground-based reconnaissance systems. But neither side can maintain a presence there due to constant surveillance and the presence of strike drones. Even if reconnaissance systems are placed there, they will likely be destroyed relatively quickly.
According to the Ukrainian source, on Sunday (19NOV), Russians made some progress near Novokalynove (Avdiivka axis’s northern flank). They also tried to attack north of Stepove and between Stepove and Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, where the situation was difficult.
The Russian source claimed on Sunday (19NOV) that Russian forces continued to conduct assault operations near Stepove and on eastern and north-eastern approaches to Avdiivka. The source also added that Russians achieved partial success near Ocheretyne and Keramik, but it is unclear what this involved. On Tuesday (21NOV), the same source claimed that the attackers continued to assault the eastern and northeastern outskirts of Avdiivka but were unsuccessful. However, the source claimed that Russian troops managed to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from Stepove, putting the village in the “grey zone”. On Wednesday (22NOV), Ukrainian bloggers said that according to a participant in battles near Avdiivka, there were five Russian fighters for every Ukrainian infantryman.
No changes occurred in Avdiivka, which is regularly shelled by artillery struck by aircraft.
On the southern flank, the Ukrainian blogger said on Sunday (19NOV) that Russians tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Pervomaiske and Tonenke but were unsuccessful. However, the source stated that Russians progressed in the city’s “industrial zone” and near Vesele. On the same day, the Russian source claimed (19NOV) that Russian troops had almost captured the industrial area. However, he also added that Ukrainians were fortifying themselves in the Dachi area to the north, in the forest area north of the industrial zone, and in the remaining two buildings in the zone itself. Ukrainians reportedly counterattacked on Monday (20NOV) but were unsuccessful.
On Wednesday (22NOV), Russian bloggers said that Russian assault units seized five buildings in an “industrial zone”. The source said there was no counterattack in response, as Ukrainian forces did not have time to request reinforcements, allowing Russian assault units to gain a foothold in new positions. However, the source added that a counterattack was expected. Ukrainians were clarifying the scale of Russian advances as of Thursday.
On Tuesday (21NOV), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions near Pervomaiske and Sjeverne but were unsuccessful. Attacks near these areas persisted throughout the whole week.
On Wednesday (22NOV), a Ukrainian soldier from the 1st Tank Brigade claimed that the situation was expected to deteriorate in Avdiivka. He said the Russians began to concentrate infantry in large numbers near Ukrainian positions for further assault operations. Ukrainian artillery was working very actively to hinder troops from concentrating, but two more appeared when one group of Russians was destroyed. Also, Russian aircraft are working around the clock.
In the meantime, on Thursday (23NOV), General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Commander of Tavriia (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Operational-Strategic Group, stated that Russians had begun the third wave of assault actions as part of the Avdiivka offensive.
According to a Russian journalist, on Sunday (19NOV), Russian units, supported by long-range weapons, attacked Mariinka and Novomykhailivka. Although the source did not provide further details, Ukrainians claimed on the same day that Russians had captured another quarter of the ruins in Mariinka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pobieda and Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk direction, Russian units repelled 11 Ukrainian attacks by assault groups of the 24th, 30th Mechanised Brigades, 5th Assault Brigade and 95th Air Assault Brigade near Klishchiivka, Shumy, Kurdyumivka, Andriivka and Rozdolivka. In addition, Russian troops also inflicted fire damage on Ukrainian 112th, 114th, and 241st Territorial Defence Brigades, 28th, and 30th Mechanised Brigades near Andriivka, Vasyukivka, Rozdolivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Krasne, Kurdyumivka, and Klishchiivka. The Russian operational-tactical and army aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery hit an aviation ammunition depot at the Lozovatka airfield in Dnipropetrovsk region, two ammunition arsenals in Karpylivka in the Kyiv region and Oleksandrivka in Zhytomyr region, and a fuel depot near Vyhoda in Odesa region.
Southern Ukraine direction
The situation in the Southern Direction remained unchanged.
No significant changes occurred in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
According to the Ukrainian blogger, on Sunday (19NOV), the Russian attacks near Staromaiorske were stopped. They renewed the attempt on Monday (20NOV), but it is unlikely they progressed.
On Tuesday (21NOV), the Russian source claimed that positional battles continued west of Staromaiorske and at Urozhaine, where the Russian troops tried to improve their tactical position. No detailed information was provided. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Urozhaine and Pryyutne, and Levadne.
Operations in the Orikhiv axis were more intense but delivered no frontline changes.
On Sunday (19NOV), Russian forces reportedly tried to counterattack west of Robotyne and from the Novoprokopivka direction. They also tried to advance near Verbove. The source, however, failed to provide detailed information about these developments.
On the other hand, Ukrainian sources claimed on Sunday (19NOV) that the Ukrainian units had achieved partial success west of Robotyne. This only confirms how contested the area is. By saying “partial success”, we understand that both sides mean capturing a tree line or a trench.
On Tuesday (21NOV), the Russian journalist said that the Ukrainian troops tried to attack near Novoprokopivka and Verbove but were unsuccessful. Another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully tried to break through near Robotyne with two infantry groups on AFVs.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pyatykhatky.
According to the Russian MoD, in the South Donetsk direction, Russian units repelled a 79th Airborne Assault Brigade’s attack (highly likely very small in scale) near Novomykhailivka. The Russian forces also inflicted damage on the Ukrainian 128th Territorial Defence Brigade near Staromaiorske. Nine attempts to rotate UAF units near Rivnopil, Chervone, Urozhaine and Staromaiorske were also disrupted. Russian operational-tactical and army aviation, missile forces and artillery struck Ukrainian concentration areas of the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade and the 128th Territorial Defence Brigade near Novomykhailivka, Vodyane, Novodonetske, Staromaiorske and Urozhaine.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
Open-source reports indicated that Ukrainians have progressed on Dnipro’s left bank over the past seven days. These claims, however, have not been substantiated with visual evidence. We continue to maintain that Ukrainian progress in the area is unlikely to deliver substantial gains.
According to the Russian source, battles continued near Poima, Pishchanivka and Krynky on Sunday (19NOV), but neither Ukrainian nor Russian units succeeded. Another Russian source claimed on the same day that the Russian forces maintained their defensive positions on the Poima – Pidstepne – Pishchanivka – Krynky line. The Ukrainians still held positions in Krynky, but between 13 – 19NOV), they lost 500 men.
On Monday (20NOV), Russians said that the situation in the Kherson direction remained unchanged. Ukrainian marines from the “Katran” group still held the central part of the Krynky settlement. Despite the regular Russian strikes, Ukrainian units also reportedly established a supply line via Frolov Island, having deployed two small crossings across the Konka River. This allows Ukrainians to regularly rotate and replenish their forward-deployed forces, which reportedly occurred on Monday in Krynky. The source also added that the UAF had operations seeking to reach Hola Prystan. These attacks were predominantly driven by Ukrainian SOF, which appeared in settlements far from the line of contact.
Another Russian asserted on Monday (20NOV) that Ukrainian marines continued to attack from Krynky and entered the forest belt near the village. The source said the Ukrainian goal was to reach the M14 (T2206) road. Attempts to move farther south continued on Wednesday (22NOV), but Ukrainian progress was hindered by constant artillery and missile strikes.
On Thursday (23NOV), the Russian journalist claimed that after a slight improvement in the weather, the Ukrainian Marines intensified their attacks in the forest area near Krynky. They expanded the bridgehead and advanced south in the forest area. The source said that so far, the Ukrainians had not achieved a significant result in the area. However, the intensity of attacks and attempts to enter the forest area increased. While earlier, the Marines were only “probing” the defences, now they are trying to penetrate 200-300 meters deep, which, as the ground solidifies, could lead to larger-scale attacks from Krynky.
In the meantime, Russian aviation continued to strike Ukrainian forces on the left bank.
In the meantime, Russian occupation authorities were reportedly moving from Oleshky to Velyki Kopani due to the proximity of battles, constant artillery fires and the pervasive presence of Ukrainian drones. Although another Ukrainian source confirmed this development, we have not been able to verify this information independently.
Russians also suffer from their own, albeit well-known, problems, such as insufficient cooperation with artillery units or other ground forces formations operating in the area.
According to Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defence, Ukrainian losses on the Dnipro’s left bank totalled 13,700 men and 1,800 weapons and pieces of equipment. He also said that all Ukrainian amphibious attempts were countered, which we know is untrue.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 537 aircraft (+1), 255 helicopters (+1), 9,165 UAVs (+205), 442 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 13,586 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+160), 1,185 MLRS launchers (+7), 7,166 field artillery guns and mortars (+45), as well as 15,572 units of special military vehicles (+260).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 322,900 personnel (+6,140), 5,496 tanks (+81), 10,256 armoured combat vehicles (+124), 7,833 artillery systems (+121) and 904 MLR systems (+9), 595 anti-aircraft systems (+10), 323 aircraft (0) and 324 helicopters (0), and 5,800 UAVs (+91), 1,564 cruise missiles (+1), 22 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 10,230 vehicles and fuel tanks (+153), and 1,108 special vehicles (+22).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Russian use of missiles remained minimal. Over the past week, the Ukrainian Air Force Command reported only one such attack, which involved a 9K728 cruise missile. It was reportedly shot down. It is also noteworthy that on Wednesday, Russians employed a Kh-22 long-range anti-ship missile after a few months’ pause. The missile, however, failed to reach its target and crashed in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, damaging residential buildings.
Last week, Russians conducted six Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drone strikes, which involved 84 vehicles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 70 (83% interception rate vs 74% two weeks ago).
The intensity of Russian ground attacks decreased last week compared to the previous period. Three times, Ukrainians reported 70 attacks and more, but for the three other days, these attacks did not exceed 50. This gave an average of 61 attacks per day. The decrease in their number, however, is clear.
Outlook for the week of 25NOV-01DEC2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Although the previous forecast was made two weeks ago, let’s reflect on it to see what changed.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This prognosis was also correct, as the frontline in the area did not change.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, even then, we believe they are highly unlikely to progress (decrease in probability) in this part of the front. 2) We assess that Russians are likely (no changes) to make gains in the Avdiivka axis. There is a roughly even chance (no changes) that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.” We were correct about anticipating no Ukrainian gains in the entire direction. However, we expected Russians to continue pushing west near Avdiivka. It appears they made no gains in the area.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely (no changes) to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. But, we also assess that there is a roughly even chance (no changes) that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis.” This prognosis was correct as neither side made any gains.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no changes) to continue (ground) attacks on Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces to the area. There is a roughly even chance (no changes) that they will capture some land, but we think they are highly unlikely (decrease in probability) to capture a village or more.” This assessment was correct. Although Ukrainians can rotate their forces, they lack the overall capacity to make substantial gains in the area.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 4.5/5 (9%)
The forecast for the week of 25NOV-01DEC2023
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, even then, we believe they are highly unlikely to progress (no change) in this part of the front. 2) We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to make gains in the Avdiivka axis. It is unlikely (decrease in probability) that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely (no changes) to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. We also assess Russians are highly unlikely (decrease in probability) to make similar gains across the entire region.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no changes) to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance (no changes) that they will capture some land, but we think they are highly unlikely (no changes) to capture a village or more.