Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;
The main Russian ground activity is focused on areas near Kreminna-Bilohorivka and Bakhmut; However, Russians only made visible progress in the Bakhmut area;
The situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged. Information about Russian progress near Dvorichne remained unconfirmed.
Russian attacks across the Luhansk Oblast were repelled as well. Russians may have made some tactical gains near Kreminna, but their impact on the overall situation in this area was non-existent. It is possible that the Russian offensive potential petered out;
Likewise, there were no changes in the broader Donetsk Oblast. No Russian attack delivered stated objectives and the frontline remained unchanged;
All Russian attacks northwest of Bakhmut were repelled, and Russians made no gains in this sector; However, Russians captured a couple of villages north of Bakhmut late in the week, which brought them closer to shutting down one of the two remaining withdrawal routes from Bakhmut;
Ukrainians may have counterattacked in this area on Saturday, but information about this development remains scarce;
No frontline changes occurred in the Zaporizhihia and Kherson Oblasts; Russian activities in these regions visibly decreased;
The Belarusian Armed Forces’ posture did not change; The intensity of their training activities remained low.
**IMPORTANT INFORMATION: Please note that there will be no weekly update next week. We are on a field trip, and our access to the internet and time available for updates will be limited. Nevertheless, we will try to provide some daily updates until 7MAR.**
General outlook
Writing anything larger about the current frontline situation in Ukraine is becoming increasingly difficult. We continue to see more or less the same every week. Russians attack almost across the entire contact line but fail to make any gains. They made limited tactical gains north of Bakhmut, where they captured a couple of villages, but apart from this development, last week was uneventful.
However, the ongoing Russian struggle in Ukraine highlights that it is only with the support of Wagner and its unorthodox tactics that the attackers can move forward. Russians currently do not possess the capability and capacity to wage larger operations and achieve an operational breakthrough. This is perfectly visible near Kreminna, where the deployment of theoretically well-equipped, better-trained and more determined forces essentially delivered nothing. Sure, in December, Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, claimed that Kreminna would be captured within a few weeks; this threat for the Russians is now gone. The attackers managed to successfully push Ukrainians back several kilometres away from Kreminna. But the objective of dislodging Ukrainians from Zarichne and over the Zherebets River remains unfulfilled. Let alone the long-standing objective of reaching Lyman.
As attacks in other parts of the front also fail, the Russian offensive potential appears to be non-existent. Wagner alone is unable to keep the current attack tempo indefinitely. At some point, its combat effectiveness will be degraded so that Wagner will no longer be the primary attacking force. The alleged feud between Wagner and the MoD will likely accelerate its demise.
It also appears that the Ukrainian objective is to allow Russians to blow off some steam before conducting a larger counterattack. Reportedly, on Saturday, a limited Ukrainian attack occurred north of Bakhmut. Although details about its success (or failure) are very limited, it may have exposed the Russian inability to defend their flanks when they overreach their forward movement.
As you know, our assessment is that most Russian reservists have not yet been deployed into combat. This view is based on two assumptions. Firstly, we have seen no footage showing their deployment en masse, and secondly, the impact on the battlefield was imperceptible. Some units are still missing from the battlefield. This week we will try to find out whether these assumptions are correct, and we will report back on how accurate (or inaccurate) we are.
Weather forecast
(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days, unless otherwise stated)
No major changes are expected in terms of weather. We will continue to see freezing temperatures at nights, rising to a few degrees above zero degrees Celcius during days. The weather will thus not support armoured warfare.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast, the temperature will drop to -7°C (20°F) on Wednesday. However, apart from that, the amplitude will be relatively small, with temperatures ranging between -2°C (28°F) and 3°C (38°F). Limited rain and snow showers are also expected in the latter half of the week.
The Bakhmut area is to experience slightly warmer temperatures. A drop on Wednesday is also expected, but to -5°C (23°F). Since then, an increase in temperatures will deliver -3°C /-1°C (28°F/30°F) at nights and 5°C (42°F) during the day on Sunday. Rain showers are also expected on Saturday and Sunday.
The Zaporizhzhia region is steadily moving away from cold weather. The Wednesday’s drop will stop at -4°C (24°F), but the latter half of the week will see temperatures hover around 0°C (19°F) at nights and reach 6°C (42°F) on Friday and Sunday. Rain is also expected on Saturday.
A 30-day weather forecast shows temperatures permanently leaving the 0°C (19°F) mark around 25MAR. Until then, no big changes in the weather are expected. The end of March is expected to deliver temperatures reaching 13°C (55°F)
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 390 aircraft (+5), 211 helicopters (+1), 3,243 UAVs (+65), 405 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 7,945 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+97), 1,045 MLRS launchers (+16), 4,222 field artillery guns and mortars (+78), as well as 8,556 units of special military vehicles (+98).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 148,130 personnel (+5,270), 3,316 tanks (+65), 6,615 armoured combat vehicles (+70), 2,380 artillery systems (+53) and 475 MLRS (+6), 247 anti-aircraft systems (+3), 299 aircraft (+1) and 288 helicopters (+1), and 2,037 UAVs (+21), 5,242 vehicles and fuel tanks (+46), 873 cruise missiles (0), 18 warships and boats (0) and 230 pieces of special equipment (+15).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
Military situation in Belarus
The military situation in Belarus did not undergo any significant shifts last week. Most military activities were centred around celebrations related to Fatherland Defender Day and the 105th anniversary of the establishment of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Activities of the Russian forces in Belarus were similarly limited, although some Russian military equipment likely departed to Russia.
From the political point of view, interesting events started on Monday when Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko led the meeting of the State Security Council. The event discussed the developments of two legal acts directly impacting the Belarusian Army: the National Security Concept and the draft regulating the creation of the People’s Militia.
At the begging of the gathering, Lukashenko referred to the updated project of the National Security Concept. He stated that the document had already been completed. However, the additional analysis might be beneficial. Council members should now consider changes around Belarus, especially regarding new potential threats and interests of the state. They should also assess the compatibility of the act with the new Belarusian constitution. As claimed by the Belarusian President, the new concept will be public, which is necessary to maintain transparency and to confirm that Belarus is a reliable international partner.
Similar statements were made by the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, who noted the need to adjust the document to the current international environment.
Later on, the Belarusian Commander-in-Chief referred to the Belarusian defence system.
Lukahsneko stated that it should be based on the Belarusian Armed Forces and other power agencies’ ability to execute their tasks in peace and wartime successfully. However, Lukashenko also stressed that every Belarusian citizen must be able to handle weapons to protect his own family and home.
The Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, spoke about progress in establishing the People’s Militia. To recap, in MAY22, Khrenin announced the creation of the force to strengthen the country’s defence and, more specifically, to provide a degree of self-defence capacity at a local level. Back then, Khrenin announced that the militia should consist of groups of about 50 people for each village council. Each member should have basic knowledge of weapons.
On 20FEB, he stated that the total strength of the militia would be around 100,000-150,000. The greatest demand for the force will be in rural areas, where Belarusian internal troops or military formations. But, militia groups could also be created in major cities if local authorities deem it necessary. Moreover, the force will allow citizens who are not mobilised to join the joint effort and participate in the defence of their country. Women will also be able to join the formation. Whether Belarusians can recruit and subsequently train so many militia personnel remains to be seen. But it will provide some answers as to the susceptibility of the Belarusian population to state propaganda. If tens of thousands decide to join the force, then it will be apparent that they consider threats emanating from Ukraine and NATO to be real.
Three days later, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 46 and promoted the current Commander of the 61st Fighter Aviation Base, Col. Leonid Davidovich, to the position of Chief of Aviation (Deputy Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces). Subsequently, he promoted the Head of the Minsk Suvorov School, Col. Andrey Gorbatenko and First Deputy Commander of the North-Western Operational Command, Col. Vadim Shadura, to the rank of Major General.
On Friday, the Belarusian President spoke with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The details of the conversation still need to be clarified. A day later, he noted that the call was long but confirmed good relations between both presidents.
On Saturday, Lukashenko commented on the recent political-military developments in the region. Firstly, the Belarusian leader spoke about the potential military escalation in Transnistria. According to him, the creation of the “second front” by Ukrainians would not benefit Kyiv. He added that a Ukrainian attack on Moldova would help the collective west resolve the issue of Russian presence in Moldova. Still, Lukashenko noted that he does not believe Ukrainian leadership will be fooled into doing so.
After that, the Belarusian President referred to the western sanctions noticing their global and unjust character, which is especially visible in the sports competitions. He also noted that provocations against Russian and Belarusian representatives aimed at chasing away both state officials are ineffective. “The dog barks; the caravan is moving,” he said, underlining the necessity of continuing international work.
Lukashenko also referred to the latest media publications on the Russian plans for the Belarusian incorporation. He stressed that Russia has a right to own such plans and strategies because it is a nuclear power. Lukashenko, however, added that the document was created three years ago, while currently, the Russian strategy aims at coexisting with Belarus as a partner and developing bilateral cooperation as a part of the Union State.
On Wednesday, the Upper House of the Belarusian Parliament approved the draft law related to the amendment of criminal liability codes. The document introduces the death penalty for treason and criminal liability for disseminating deliberately false information discrediting the Belarusian Armed Forces.
The Head of the Belarusian Military Industrial Committee, Dmitry Pantus, met with the Minister of State for Defence of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed al-Bovardi and Minister of State, Ahmed Al-Sayegh, on Thursday. He discussed bilateral military cooperation and economic partnership between both states during both meetings.
Over the past seven days, the activity of the Belarusian high-rank officers had either an informational character or was directly correlated with the celebration of the main Belarusian military holiday.
The informational briefing for foreign military attaches in Belarus led by the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Valery Revenko, fits in the first group. During his presentation (Tuesday), Revenko spoke mainly about the current aggravation of the political-military situation in Eastern Europe but also referred to the development of the Belarusian Army. According to him, the geopolitical confrontation reached an unprecedented level in 2022, caused by the rejection of the negotiation processes, large-scale militarisation and constant provocations. Revenko stressed that due to the continuous Ukrainian border violations, the Belarusian Armed Forces would continue to cooperate more with Russia and seek to create compact, well-prepared and trained armed forces ready to execute its tasks in any scenario. The Head of the International Military Cooperation Department informed about 150 joint training events which will be carried out in 2023 with Russia. He also mentioned the Plan of the Belarusian Armed Forces Creation for 2021-2025, which aims to increase the country’s military capabilities, mainly in C2, reconnaissance, and EW capabilities).
On Saturday, the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, gave an interview on various topics. Speaking about the Belarusian National Security Concept, he noted that the document draws from similar legal acts from multiple states, including western ones – USA, Great Britain and France, but directly corresponds with the current Belarusian Constitution. It will regulate issues of societal development and (unspecified) security areas. Voflovich gave an example of biological security, which came to the fore during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian data related to the American bio-laboratories preparing chemical weapons in Ukraine (This is Russian propaganda. Such information was never confirmed). He also spoke about the militarisation of Poland and increasing NATO activities directed against Russia and Belarus. As stated, the abovementioned factors created the necessity of updating the current document and creating a legal basis for potential counter-action against hostile activities. Referring to the People’s Militia, Volfovich noted that its members (under the supervision of the Internal Troops) would be used to secure order and security in their home areas. At the same time, the Territorial Defence Troops would be directly supervised by the Belarusian MoD and would be responsible for protecting critical infrastructure objects.
Last week, Belarusian military officials were also involved in international events. On Monday, the Belarusian delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Andrey Zhuk departed to Abu Dhabi, where they participated in the 16th International Defence Exhibition “IDEX-2023”. On Friday, Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, met with the Turkish Ambassador in Belarus, Mustafa Ozja. Officially, the Turkish side initiated the meeting to express gratitude for Belarusian solidarity and support shown after the recent earthquakes. Nonetheless, Khrenin and Ozjan discussed issues linked to the international agenda and bilateral military cooperation between their states.
As stated in the beginning, the training tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces likely decreased due to the official celebrations held on Wednesday and Thursday (the actual holiday). Nonetheless, some interesting exercises also occurred on Tuesday and Friday.
Among mechanised formations, the elements of the 358th Mechanised Battalion (120th Mechanised Brigade) reinforced with an unspecified air defence unit carried out a field exit to the Lithuanian border on Tuesday (Uruchcha>Ashmyany). Subsequently, elements of the 11th Mechanised Brigade practised ATGM firing involving standalone ATGM squads, BMP-2s and T-72 crews. Moreover, the service members of the engineering-sapper battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade took part in the engineering reconnaissance (Tuesday) and tactical medicine classes (Friday).
Furthermore, elements of the 111th Artillery Brigade (unspecified 2A65 subunit) underwent a combat readiness check on Tuesday. A similar event involving the first Belarusian Iskander subunit (465th Missile Brigade) occurred three days later. According to the Belarusian MoD, the field exit included smaller drills related to preparing the launcher’s starting positions and preparing equipment for combat use. It must be noted that footage from practical actions presented Iskander missile launchers with several red stars painted on them (blurred in certain materials). These missile marks probably indicated combat launches against Ukrainian targets. It also implies that the system received from Russia was not brand new.
On Monday, the Belarusian military television VoenTV published a short video about the combat readiness check of the 19th Mechanised Brigade: an unspecified formation subunit equipped with the Kraz trucks (removed from long-term storage) conducted a 180-kilometre training march to an unidentified fuel base. Such a drill already occurred in the 11th Mechanised Brigade (JAN-FEB). However, no details linked to the removal of equipment from long-term storage from the 19th Mechanised Brigade’s base have been published yet.
On Tuesday, several Belarusian military commissariats carried out practical classes related to conscription/mobilisation work (notifications, adoption of personnel and vehicles).
The Belarusian air force components were active on Tuesday and Wednesday, which involved training flights of combat aircraft and helicopters.
Over the past seven days, a lot of sophisticated military equipment was observed on Belarusian roads. Nonetheless, most transfers included single or double pieces, which might indicate that they were used during the various army picnics or celebrations organised across the country related to the ongoing festivities. These movements pertained to Polonez and BM-30 MLR systems, R-934 Groza electronic warfare complex samples, ITS-2006 information centre, or several R-142 complexes. In addition, a few air defence assets were spotted on the move (Buk, S-300/S-400, Tor-M2K).
A military train carrying a 2S1 SPH battery was observed on Saturday near Gozhsky Training Ground. The artillery pieces were likely used for combat training.
There were no significant changes in the activities of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus. However, the main difference was the appearance of three military trains. The first carried about eight tanks and ten UAZ vehicles and was observed at Lesnaya Railway Station. The second one carried two R-149 command-staff vehicles (BMR and A1 variants), four trucks and an APE-5 complex and was spotted at Slonim Railway Station. According to the Belarusian Union of Railway Workers, the train departed towards the Rostov Oblast (Matveev-Kurgan Railway Station) a day later. Lastly, the third train was loaded with about 12 BMP-2s, three T-72 tanks, five communications vehicles and a Gazel Next vehicle, up to ten trucks, at Lesnaya Railway Station.
Last week the Russian air activity included at least one takeoff of an A-50 AEW&C aircraft with a MiG-31K supersonic interceptor escort (Wednesday). On the ground, the situation was relatively normal – despite mentioned echelons, equipment transfers were limited to trucks and light vehicles.
Speaking about the A-50, Belarusian opposition sources (BYPOL and Belarusian Hajun) claimed on Sunday (26FEB) that a Russian AEW&C aircraft was hit by two drones when parked on a stand at the Machulishchy Air Base. The radar and the front part of the aircraft were reportedly damaged. However, no visual confirmation confirming the strike and the damage was published.
From the PR point of view, this is undoubtedly a blow to the Belarusians and Russians alike, as they could not protect such a high-value target. Whether the strike will have a military impact remains to be seen. A lot depends on the scope of the damage the aircraft sustained and the Russian ability to deploy a new aircraft to Belarus to cover the gap in airborne early warning and control.
Below is the summary of last week’s Belarusian training activities. Click here to access data for the entire month.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
No frontline changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast last week.
Two weeks ago, the Russian MoD claimed that its forces had captured Hryanykivka. However, since then, no visual evidence has been produced to confirm this development. Attacks on Masiutivka and Synkivka continued, but they delivered no territorial gains. A notable departure from ongoing activities was Russian attacks on the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), on 22FEB, Ukrainians a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group was detected and pushed back from near Bolohivka. Another Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group also attempted to infiltrate areas near Fyholivka, but they were also forced to retreat. This marks the first instance since DEC22 when Russians tried to enter the state border with Ukraine. It is possible that this type of activity may increase over the next few weeks.
At the same time, Russians continued to strike Ukrainian villages and cities across the oblast with artillery and missiles fired from S-300 air defence systems, causing damage to civilian infrastructure.
Last week we wrote that the Russian objective is to reach Kupyansk and that chances were remote that the goal would be attained within one month. We maintain this view as nothing indicates that Russians are preparing for a major push in this direction.
Luhansk direction
Although Russian attacks across the entire line of contact continued in the Luhansk Oblast, they failed to deliver any frontline changes. Indeed, one could argue that Russian offensive potential in the region fizzled out. With currently available forces, Russians are unlikely to achieve a tactical, let alone an operational, breakthrough.
Last week’s main focus was on the Ploshchanka – Kreminna line. According to Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, Kreminna presents the most challenging issue for the UAF. However, despite constant Russian attacks, Ukrainians kept the line and even took back territory in some areas. This probably pertained to some areas near Shypylivka. On the other hand, Russian units captured some forested terrain near Kuzmyne, a development which Ukrainian bloggers confirmed.
According to Leonid Pasechnik, the acting head of the Luhansk People’s Republic, the situation near Kreminna was difficult. He did not explain how this manifested. However, given the lack of progress Russians have experienced over the last couple of weeks, Russian attacks in this area may have culminated.
Attacks near Stelmakhivka, Kuzemivka, Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka were repelled.
The same goes for Nevske, Terny, and Yampolivka.
According to the Kyiv-based think-tank Centre for Defence Strategies, the following units are involved in battles in the Luhansk Oblast:
3rd Motor Rifle Division (MRD) of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) deploys the 252nd and 752nd Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR) (Western Military District);
The 144th MRD of the 20th CAA deploys the 254th and 488th MRRs and the 59th Tank Regiment (TR); (Both divisions are employed along the Svatove-Kreminna line)(Western Military District);
The 4th (unspecified regiments) and 47th (26th TR: the division fielded only one tank regiment pre-war) Tank Divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Western Military District);
The 27th Motor Rifle Brigade(MRB) (1 GTA) (Western Military District);
6th TR of the 90th TD (Central Military District);
4th MRB of the 2nd Army Corps (Luhansk People’s Republic);
Elements of the 76th Air Assault and the 98th Airborne Divisions are deployed in the Bilohorivka area.
The source also added that the 2nd MRD ( 1st and 15th MRR and 1st TR) of the 1st GTA have been moved from Belarus to the Luhansk Oblast, where they are kept in reserve.
Assuming this data is correct, the Western Military Distict-based forces conduct the bulk of activity with limited support from one regiment of the 90th TD. Airborne forces probably run independent missions.
The 1st GTA and 20th CAA were one of the best-trained and capable Russian military formations that fielded 47,000 soldiers pre-war. Out of this number, the 3rd MRD’s above-listed regiments had 4,000 men, the 144th MRD had 6,800 men, both tank divisions from the 1st GTA fielded 10,500 soldiers, while the 27th MRB’s manning level stood at 2,800 personnel. The 6th TR deployed around 2,000 soldiers.
As such, excluding LPR and airborne forces, the Russian regular army formations’ strength should be around 26,000 personnel. But that’s under the condition that all units have been reconstituted to their full pre-war manning levels.
Secondly, it is unlikely that all of the available regiments are deployed at once. We assess that Russians rotate battalions from these regiments as the terrain in these areas does not favour large masses of armour, assuming it is available.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Donetsk Oblast remains the only area in Ukraine where Russians made territorial gains last week. However, these changes continue to be propelled by Wagner forces and their ability and willingness to sustain heavy losses. Had it not been for Wagner, the situation in the Donetsk Oblast would likely be as deadlocked as it is in other parts of the country.
However, reports from Russia suggest that Wagner is being gradually sidelined and its access to ammunition curtailed as a struggle between its head, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the Russian military establishment (Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov). There is a reported rotation of Russian forces around Bakhmut, which sees Wagner fighters being moved out from the battlefield.
Yet, despite this, Wagner remains a viable and essential force in this war, which can make a difference on the battlefield and inch Russians closer to capturing the remaining parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
A lack of progress in the northern parts of the oblast clearly highlights the Russian focus on the Bakhmut area. It also underlines one more critical aspect. Russians lack the capacity to mount successful attacks not only across different oblasts but also within one region.
Apart from Bakhmut, Russians made no gains in the Donetsk Oblast. Siversk remains a long-standing objective. However, attacks from Spirne and Verkhokamyanske were futile. Likewise, attempts to move towards Rozdolivka, Fedorivka, Vesele and Vasyukivka were unsuccessful as Russians have stalled.
However, the closer we get to Bachmut, the more intense the fighting is, and the more Russians progressed. Following the loss of Paraskoviivka, Ukrainians put their defensive lines on the M03 road linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk. For most of the week, these positions were successfully defended. However, Russians broke through Ukrainian lines on Thursday and captured Berkhivka and Yahidne. This places them only three kilometres from Khromove, through which the only supply road leading to Bakhmut passes.
On 24FEB, Ukrainians reportedly blew up a dam in Bakhmut to slow down the Russian offensive in northern parts of the city, where attacks were the most intense.
On Saturday night, the Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted what appeared to be a limited counterattack in areas north of Bakhmut. Specifically, elements of the 17th Tank Brigade and 46th Airmobile Brigade moved towards Paraskoviivka cutting Russian units in Berkhivka and Yahidne. Much information is unconfirmed, and the overall situation is unclear. So far, we are looking at Ukrainian attempts to alleviate pressure on Bakhmut. Whether this gives Ukrainians time and space to withdraw from Bakhmut remains to be seen.
In the city, Ukrainian bloggers stated that Russians significantly increased the tempo of their attacks in the eastern parts of Bakhmut, where they had “a partial success” on Wednesday. It means that Russians advanced, but the scope of this progress is unclear. Despite this, some stabilisation measures were employed on the flanks. It remains unclear what actions were indeed undertaken. Interestingly, a Russian blogger stated that Ukrainians were forming a strike force to launch a counter-offensive in Bakhmut.
Russian progress remains very incremental. However, coupled with attacks from the north and southwest, Ukrainian positions in Bakhmut are under increased threat. On 25FEB, Ukrainian media reported that Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Commander of the Eastern Group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, arrived in Bakhmut. There, he reportedly “checked the situation in units, listened to unit commanders speak regarding problematic matters, assisted in resolving them and supported the soldiers there”.
Despite the visit, we maintain that unless Ukrainians counterattack, which presently appears unlikely, the chances of saving Bakhmut are slim.
Ukrainian bloggers stated that Russians significantly increased the tempo of their attacks in the eastern parts of Bakhmut, where they had “a partial success” on Wednesday. It means that Russians advanced, but the scope of this progress is unclear. Despite this, some stabilisation measures were employed on the flanks. It remains unclear what actions were indeed undertaken. Interestingly, a Russian blogger stated that Ukrainians were forming a strike force to launch a counter-offensive in Bakhmut.
On 25FEB, Russians reportedly launched another wave of attacks on Ivanivske, but it is unclear whether this assault delivered any changes. Attempts throughout the week to capture the village and neighbouring Stupochky proved futile.
Last week, we quoted Prigozhin, who said that Wagner would capture Bakhmut in March – April. Given the current operational tempo and successful but also slow attempts to move forwards, it is highly likely that the city will be taken by April.
The Bakhmut area is where all Russian progress ends. Last week, no territorial gains were made in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Two weeks ago, Russians captured Novobakhmutivka, but their attacks in the area petered out and delivered no other changes.
Avdiivka is regularly shelled. Last week, Russians also attempted to conduct some ground attacks from Vodiane and Opytne, but they delivered no frontline changes.
No changes occurred near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske. Russians continued to attack these villages, but so far, without result.
Likewise, despite numerous attacks, the frontline in Mariinka did not change. Russians’ approach is based on frontal assaults combined with attempts to attack Ukrainian positions from the north and south. To this end, they were active near Pobjeda, but Ukrainians pushed them back here too.
According to Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the UAF destroyed 14 Russian tanks during failed Russian attacks on Vuhledar and Mariinka.
He added that on 22FEB, 17 armoured personnel carriers and three light armoured vehicles MT-LB were destroyed. Russians lost more than 120 soldiers killed and 137 wounded, but he failed to specify where Russians sustained these losses.
Russian senseless attacks on Vuhledar continued. Russians seem to deploy small forces, even smaller than company tactical groups. They are easy targets for Ukrainians to engage either through artillery, ATGM strikes or the deployment of minefields.
Russians will not be able to take the settlement without deploying a much larger force. And given the losses they have sustained over the last weeks of such attacks, it does not appear such a force (at least a regiment) is available. Thus Vuhledar will remain under Ukrainian control for the foreseeable future.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Both sides’ activities in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast were subdued last week. No major events occurred in the region as Russians and Ukrainians continued to limit their operations to positional battles,reconnaissance-in-force attempts and artillery strikes.
The attackers reportedly tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Shcherbaky, but the entire 120-men-strong company(?) was hit by Ukrainian artillery and was forced to pull back. Limited Russian attacks were also repelled near Novodanylivka and Kamyanske.
Ukrainian sources reported the arrival of the Wagner PMC in the oblast. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov also stated that apart from Wagner, the reinforcements included the Ossetian and Dagestani battalions.
Speaking about reinforcements, according to Petro Andryushchenko, who serves as an advisor to the mayor of Mariupol, Russians are concentrating their forces near Orikhiv. So far, ten battalion tactical groups have been concentrated in the area (villages Robotyne, P’yatykhatky, and Novopokrovka), but five more are expected to arrive by 24FEB. He added that this force might conduct offensive operations soon.
According to Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Operational Command South, Mariupol was no longer unreachable for Ukrainians. Indeed, on Tuesday, ten explosions were reported in the city, and it appears missiles caused them. Explosions also occurred on Wednesday.
So far, Mariupol was beyond the range of available Ukrainian missile systems. The strike on the town thus suggests that Kiyiv has a new capability in stock that can effectively range targets 90 km away from the firing positions. We do not know whether this capability is home-produced or supplied by a partner. If the former, the system will probably be used sparingly as Ukraine currently probably lacks the capacity to produce missiles in large quantities. On the other hand, if strikes repeat in other parts of the country, then it will probably mean that Ukrainians have received the system from the outside.
Kherson direction
Last week did not deliver fundamental changes in the Kherson Oblast. In fact, the overall situation remains stable as both sides limit their operations to artillery and missile strikes and infiltration missions across the Dnipro Delta. Nevertheless, looking at the past few weeks of activity in this region, the last two weeks were particularly quiet. Indeed, the spokesperson for Ukraoine’s Southern Operations Command, Natalia Humenyuk, claimed on 20FEB that although Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue their attempts to establish positions in the Dnipro delta, the overall tempo of such activities was declining.
What is also decreasing are Ukrainian strikes on Russian storage facilities. Last week, only one such strike was reported as Ukrainians reportedly struck an ammunition depot in Nova Kakhovka. There were no reported HIMARS strikes, which confirms that Russians have dispersed their forces, presence and support bases. Humenyuk said Russians also moved most of their bases beyond the HIMARS range to preserve their forces.
The strike on Nova Khakovka could have been facilitated by recent reports that claimed Russians had reinforced their positions near Kakhovka and Nova Kakhovka. However, no further information about the size of this strengthening was
Nevertheless, the Russian posture in the oblast is inherently defensive. We expect to see no changes in this regard.
It was announced last week that Russian authorities had finished repairing the Kerch Strait Bridge road spans. The damaged section of the Kerch Strait rail tracks will be restored by 1DEC23.
This development means that Russia will slowly reset the movement of military material from mainland Russia to Crimea and then to southern parts of the Kherson Oblast. But the slow pace of repairing the rail line will continue to limit Russian ability to move forces and supplies into the region. Indeed, pre-strike (8OCT), the Kerch Bridge has played a crucial role in sustaining the Russian military presence in Crimea and Kherson Oblast by providing a land connection that allows for the rapid transportation of troops, tanks, and other military equipment to the region. The bridge has also provided an economic lifeline to Crimea and has significant strategic importance for Russia.
Outlook for the week of 27FEB – 5MAR
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
“Russian attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast next week will continue to have a limited scope and intensity. We continue to assess that there is a roughly even chance that they will capture new territory, but the focus here is on the lower number. In other words, it is more likely than not that no changes will occur. We continue to see no preparations or indicators suggesting a sizable attack. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.” This forecast was correct. Despite ongoing efforts to push through Ukrainian defensive lines, Russians made no confirmed gains in the Kharkiv Oblast. Hrianykivka was reportedly seized two weeks ago, but Russians failed to produce any evidence substantiating the village’s capture.
Score: 1/1
“We continue to expect no major changes in the Luhansk Oblast. Based on field reports, it seems that in terms of ground activity, the last week was calmer compared to the week prior. As we see no indications of a larger push, we do not expect any changes in the scope of Russian attacks. It is unlikely that the frontline will be altered significantly next week, but positional battles will likely produce tactical shifts.” This forecast was also correct as no changes occurred in the oblast last week. Concurrently, it seems that the intensity of Russian ground attacks was subdued for another week in a row.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to Kreminna, we are degrading the Russian capacity to capture new territory in this area. Last week we stated that Russians likely would seize more territory west and south of Kreminna. This week, we are placing the probability at a roughly even chance (45-55%).” While placing the 45-55% predictability score was a safe choice, the main point was that the chances of Russian forces capturing territory would decline. And this indeed happened. Russians made no confirmed gains in near Kreminna last week, despite deploying a fairly sizable task force.
Score: 1/1
“Moving to the Donetsk Oblast, Russians there, too, are unlikely to make significant gains. We see no evidence suggesting a more extensive operation is being planned or prepared for. Attacks are likely to be limited in intensity and scope. Nevertheless, it is possible that Russians will capture some territories in the oblast., But, again, the impact on the overall situation in this direction will be minimal. It is highly unlikely that Vuhledar will be taken next week.” This prognosis was also correct. Russians made no progress in the Donetsk Oblast last week, despite front-wide attacks on Ukrainian positions. They were also pushed further back from Vuhledar.
Score: 1/1
“Russians are likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. After the fall of Paraskoviivka, Russians are likely to extend their attacks to Yahidne. It is possible that the push from the Paraskoviivka area may not be directed at northern Bakhmut but at Khromove, through which the only supply route to Bakhmut passes.” We correctly anticipated further Russian gains north of Bakhmut as Yahidne and Berkhivka fell. On the other hand, it was too early to push towards Khromove.
Score: 1/1
“It is unlikely that Russians will capture Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka next week, as the emphasis is clearly on capturing Bakhmut.” We were also correct in assessing Russian priorities around Soldar and a lower likelihood of capturing areas north of the city.
Score: 1/1
“Regarding Bakhmut, the withdrawal from territories north of the city further deteriorates Ukrainian positions in the town. Given Ukrainian reports about Russian forces regarding the north of Bakhmut, we assess that it is possible that the attackers can attempt a large push from this axis into Bakhmut next week. The withdrawal from Bakhmut hinges on the pace of Russian attacks from Paraskoviivka and their ability to hold the road from Khromove. We assess that is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will start pulling back next week, but everything currently depends on Ukrainians holding the ground in these two areas.” This prognosis delivered mixed results. Although Ukraine’s situation deteriorated and Russians inched closer to the city from the north and east, no larger pushes occurred towards Bakhmut.
Score: 0.5/1
“It seems that Russian attacks towards Ivanivske petered out. Here too, we give it a 45-55% chance that Russians will progress.” This forecast was correct. Russians made no gains in this area.
Score: 1/1
“We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. It is also possible that Russians will make some territorial gains, but a sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine is highly unlikely to happen next week.” Despite positional battles, no frontline changes occurred in this oblast last week.
Score: 1/1
“The same pertains to the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF’s exercise tempo will likely remain subdued. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” The BAF exercise tempo picked up a pace slightly last week, but it stayed somehow muted.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 10.5/11 (95%).
Next week’s forecast
We do not anticipate any changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. The intensity of Russian attacks will not increase, and neither will their geographical scope. We continue to assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will capture new territory, but we are more focused on the 45 per cent number than on the 55. Following last week’s incursions into the Kharkiv Oblast from Russia proper, the attackers can conduct similar attacks this week. However, we would not like to attach a probability score to such a scenario. Russian artillery attacks will certainly continue.
Likewise, we continue to expect no significant changes in the Luhansk Oblast. It does not seem that Russians can conduct larger attacks across the oblast. Hence their advances stalled in the region with little prospect of moving forward this week. Indeed, it is unlikely that they will make territorial gains across the oblast.
The exception could be the Kreminna area, but here we give Russians a 45-55 per cent chance of achieving tactical progress and moving slightly forward. It is highly unlikely that a significant breakthrough will be achieved.
We will stick with the same prognosis for the Donetsk Oblast. Russians are unlikely to make substantial gains, although there is a roughly even chance that they will capture some territory. Specifically, we are looking at areas near Novobakhmutivka and Avdiivka. We assess that chances are remote that Vuhledar will fall next week, although it is likely that some offensive actions will be taken in this direction.
On the other hand, Russians are highly likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. After the fall of Yahidne and Berkhiva, the Ukrainian position in the area deteriorated. Last week’s assumption that attacks from Paraskoviivka may be extended onto Khromove was incorrect. This week will show whether Russians are more interested in pushing towards Bakhmut’s city centre from the north or conducting an envelopment attack on Khromove.
It is unlikely that Russians will capture Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka next week, as the emphasis is clearly on capturing Bakhmut.
Regarding Bakhmut, the withdrawal from territories north of the city further deteriorates Ukrainian positions in the area. Especially the fall of Yahidne and possible extensions of attacks towards Khromove could seriously jeopardise the Ukrainian presence in Bakhmut. Russians are likely to capture some territory within the city, and there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians would pull back from Bakhmut. The probability score will increase substantially if Khromove falls.
We continue to maintain that Russian attacks towards Ivanivske lost steam. We give it a 45-55% chance that Russians will progress in this area.
We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. It is also possible that Russians will make some territorial gains, but a sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine is highly unlikely to happen next week.
The same pertains to the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.
We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF’s exercise tempo may increase this week. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.
Thanks for the Belarus reporting. It's interesting that when Russians have trouble deploying EW, Belarus stands up EW. When Russians have problems with their SAM game, Belarus practices AA mobilization. Russians seem to have run out of ATGMs at Bakhmut and Vuhledar, Belarus practices ATGMs. All consistent with a preparedness strategy that stops short of participation.