Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 20 January – 26 January 2024
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week's developments:
Although last week did not bring operational and strategic changes in Ukraine, Russians managed to capture some 41 sq kilometres of land; Ukrainian posture remained defensive, while their positions in general deteriorated; Further Russian gains next week are highly likely;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and continued to conduct cross-border infiltration operations;
Russians captured Krokhmalne last week in the Luhansk Oblast, but this did not greatly impact the operational outlook; Russians sustained attacks in the northern and southern parts of the region;
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Vesele, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka, and Vuhledar and progressed almost everywhere;
Russians made marginal gains southeast of Robotyne, while Ukrainians focused on attacks near Verbove in the Southern Direction.
Ukrainians maintained positions near Krynky on Dnipro’s left bank; Russian attacks proved futile;
Last week saw one mass Russian missile attack and three Shahed kamikaze drone strikes; the Ukrainian interception rate against missiles was again limited;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 39 Russian attacks (16 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 45 Russian attacks (96 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 176 Russian ground attacks (249 two weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian units repelled 14 Russian attacks (16 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 29 Russian concentration areas, one air defence missile system, one ammunition depot, and one communication centre. Ukrainian missile and artillery forces hit five concentration areas, three command posts, four artillery systems, one air defence system, one electronic warfare, and one radar.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated approximately 5.46 square kilometres, while Russians captured around 41 square kilometres. The Ukrainian posture remained defensive, while Russians remained offensively committed across almost the entire front.
Last week did not fundamentally change the situation in Ukraine. Russians continued to attack across the entire front, while Ukrainians, whose posture remained defensive, resorted to tactical counterattacks.
However, what is important to note is that according to the Ukrainian General Staff, compared to the previous week, Russians launched fewer attacks (30% less), yet they captured twice the number of square kilometres. There could be several explanations behind this change. Firstly, Kyiv struggles with access to artillery munitions, which significantly decreased the rate of fire, also forcing Ukrainians to ration what they received. Indeed, during the counteroffensive, Ukrainians reportedly fired 7,000 shells per day, while Russians fired 5,000. Now Ukrainians fire 2,000 and Russians 10,000. In some cases, shells delivered are only smoke shells, not high-explosive, further decreasing artillery effectivness. A Ukrainian military analyst estimated that Russia received some 1.5 million artillery shells from North Korea since the fall, further straining Ukrainian defensive posture.
Russian airstrikes also increased, and they seem to be slowly returning to normal levels, especially in the south, indicating that the Russian Air Force adjusted their operations and tactics to the Ukrainian air defence threat in the region.
Secondly, Russians have been conducting assaults almost across the entire front for weeks. Although their main focus areas have been Avdiivka and Bakhmut, they were also attacking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv, Kreminna, and Kupyansk axes, slightly advancing in all areas. Apart from ammunition shortages, Kyiv may also suffer from manpower issues as it cannot manage the entire frontline effectively. That’s why fixed fortifications are vital, as they require fewer men than defending exposed trenches or tree lines.
Russia will likely either open new axes of advance or intensify ground attacks in areas where they are presently committed. One such area is the Kupyansk axis.
96th Reconnaissance Brigade
As the reader will see below, last week, we confirmed the presence of the 96th Reconnaissance Brigade near Pershotravneve. Its presence could potentially indicate an increase in Russian ground activities towards Kupyansk.
The unit is one of the two separate Russian reconnaissance formations (the other being the 100th Reconnaissance Brigade). It is subordinated to the 1st Tank Army and provides specialised reconnaissance capabilities. Its structure includes at least three battalions – reconnaissance, special purpose (SIGINT) and communications, supported by organic UAV and PSY-OPS companies and other standard supporting subunits.
Doctrinally, the unit is tasked with “deep" (operational-level) reconnaissance activities in support of an offensively oriented operational-level formation - 1st Tank Army.
Open source data indicates that elements of the 96th Reconnaissance Brigade operate within the Western (Zapad) Forces Grouping and are directly deployed in the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 6th Combined Arms Army or the 1st Tank Army.
From an operational perspective, we assess that Russians will almost certainly continue offensive actions in the Kupyansk axis to push Ukrainian forces over the Oskil River. The appearance of the 96th Reconnaissance Brigade may thus be directly linked to the initiation of Russian reconnaissance activities aimed at determining the optimal approach towards the river and Kupyansk.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Saturday (20JAN)
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence informed the first joint Ukrainian-American inspection to verify weapons and property provided by the US began its work. Activities included verifying weapons' condition, storage, and serial numbers.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico claimed he would block Ukrainian entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He also suggested that Ukraine should "cede" its territory.
Sunday (21JAN)
Head of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR), Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, claimed North Korea was currently the largest Russian arms supplier.
Monday (22JAN)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zenelsky informed about Poland's new military aid package after meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Although it is unclear what this involved, Tusk mentioned that the package would be financed via a loan given to Ukraine.
Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky claimed that the Czech Republic would not extradite Ukrainian citizens currently residing in his country for conscription (mobilisation) purposes.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó claimed that Budapest would not participate in financing arms supplies to Ukraine from the European Peace Fund.
Tuesday (23JAN)
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal had a video call with the United States US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. During its course, Yellen reiterated the American commitment to securing USD11.8 billion of direct budget support to Ukraine.
Wednesday (24JAN)
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz claimed that Ukraine and Germany might soon agree on bilateral security guarantees.
Danish Minister of Defence, Troels Lund Poulsen, said that Denmark had allocated about USD13.26 million to support the cybersecurity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The Russian State Duma adopted the bill introducing the confiscation of property and deprivation of honorary titles for specified crimes, including the spreading "fakes" about the Russian Armed Forces.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation commenced the large-scale exercise 'Steadfast Defender 24', which will last until 31MAY and engage more than 90,000 soldiers, approximately 1,100 combat vehicles, 80 fixed and rotary wing airframes and 50 ships.
The group of Ukrainian hackers ("BO Team") conducted a cyberattack against the Russian State Research Center on Space Hydrometeorology. Hackers reportedly destroyed 280 servers and obtained data related to the Russian satellites, weather data and unspecified "unique research".
Thursday (25JAN)
France delivered two M270 MLR systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Bloomberg informed that Hungary would likely withdraw their objections to creating a USD5.4 billion military aid fund for Ukraine.
Reuters reported that elements of the Russian African Corps arrived in Burkina Faso, where they would be responsible for "ensuring the state's safety".
Ukrainian Minister of Energy German Galushchenko said that Ukraine would start the construction of four nuclear reactors to compensate for the loss of energy capacity caused by the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The Moscow City Court convicted former FSB officer Col. Igor Girkin (Strelkov) for four years of imprisonment for extremism.
Friday (26JAN)
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said that all 27 European Union member states agreed to support a EUR 50 billion-worth four-year support program.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
No noteworthy redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ formations occurred over the past seven days.
Last week, we witnessed the continuation of the Russian Armed Forces’ efforts to strengthen areas where they are conducting offensive operations.
In the Luhansk direction, the 96th Reconnaissance Brigade (1st Tank Army) appeared operating near Pershotravneve (Kupyansk axis), while the 164th Motor Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army, MOB) was active west of Kreminna.
In the Donetsk direction, we added the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, CMD) to the Avdiivka axis. This deployment confirms the entire 90th Tank Division has been/is being moved to the area, especially since the 239th Tank Regiment was already reported to be operating there.
Based on available data, we revised the position of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, EMD), which was transferred from the Donetsk direction to the Velyka Novoselivka axis of the Southern direction.
We also need to note that we incorporated BARS subunits into our database, which involved 33 such units altogether. They were placed under the NG/TDF/BARS category. Most of the BARS subunits appeared in the Luhansk direction (12), several in the Southern (7) and Donetsk (6) directions, while two more were included in the Kherson direction. We currently cannot specify the deployment points of the remaining six BARS battalions.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast. The Russians continued to shell the city of Kharkiv.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Balakliya, Okhrimivka, Zemlyanky, Khatnje, Udy, Okhrimivka, Zemlianky, Khatnje, Dvorichna, Masyutivka, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Berestove, Kupyansk and Kozacha Lopan, Ohirtseve, Vovchansk, Budarky and Kolodyazne.
On Monday night (22JAN), the Russians struck several times at Kyivskyi and Saltivskyi districts of the city of Kharkiv. Preliminarily, they used Kh-22 long-range anti-ship missiles. The strikes destroyed apartment buildings, an educational institution and other civilian infrastructure.
On Tuesday (23JAN), the Russians struck the city of Kharkiv again. The Russians shelled the Kyivsky and Kholodnohirsky districts of Kharkiv, damaging civilian infrastructure.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Last week, Russians made marginal gains in the region by capturing Krokhmalne. However, this development did not change the overall operational outlook or lead to additional Russian gains.
On Saturday (20JAN), Ukrainian sources stated that Russian troops captured Krokhmalne. Some initial concerns were that the UAF withdrawal could endanger neighbouring units and lead to a larger pullback, but this did not materialise.
Volodymyr Fityo, spokesperson for Ukrainian Ground Forces Command, said on Monday (22JAN) that the Krokhmalne settlement was utterly destroyed, and there were no civilians there. The decision to withdraw was primarily aimed at saving the lives of Ukrainian soldiers. Fitio added that the pullback to new positions allowed the Ukrainian military to "attack at the best opportunity" and that Russian forces in Krokhmalne are "not in the best position". That said, a Russian journalist expressed satisfaction with capturing the village, adding that a vital logistics route passed through it, which presumably means that it would ease Russian logistics. The source probably talked about the P07 road that passes through Krokhmalne. Russians already control most of the road south of the village. Still, its full utility will only emerge when it is not under Ukrainian fire control, especially around recently captured areas.
The source claimed that the Russians had been bringing reinforcements into the Kupyansk area and redeploying additional forces from other operational commands. However, it is unclear what these units were.
A Ukrainian soldier said on Saturday (20JAN) that southeast of Kupyansk, Russians hit Ukrainian positions with artillery and drove them back up to 150 metres. Kupyansk itself had been suffering from chaotic shelling.
On Monday (22JAN), the Russian source claimed that in the Svatove direction, Russian forces continued to expand on their previous success. After consolidating their positions along the P07 road, Russian assault units extended the zone of control to the north, approaching Kotlyarivka and Kyslivka from the south. The Russian advance westwards did not reportedly stop either. The source said that battles continued near Berestove and Krohmalne, with Ukrainian formations trying to dislodge Russian troops. A Ukrainian soldier assessed on Monday (22JAN) that in the Svatove direction, Russians had become more active. They would send groups of 5-20 people to different areas to probe weaknesses in UAF positions. The Ukrainian side was also trying to conduct assaults. The soldier added that based on Russian communication intercepts, the attackers pulled up many vehicles and infantry into the Kupyansk axis. The Ukrainian blogger also said that on Monday (22JAN), the Russian troops continued to consolidate their positions near Krokhmalne. On Tuesday (23JAN), the Russian journalist asserted that after the Russian units captured the Krokhmalne village, they complicated the logistics of the UAF near Berestove and the entire bridgehead to the south. The Russian forces also attacked the Ukrainian units near Synkivka on Monday, but the AFU held their positions. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks. Attacks from Khokhmalne continued for the remainder of the week but brought no further frontline changes.
No changes occurred near Lyman Pershyi and Ivanivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
On Saturday (20JAN), the Ukrainian source claimed that the Russians were becoming more active near Novovodyane. On Monday (22JAN), the Ukrainian source said that the Russian troops' attack near Novovodyane was unsuccessful. Russian sources did not report changes.
No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
On Saturday (20JAN), the Ukrainian sources stated that the battles continued near Terny. The source said the last three days (17-19JAN) were "harsh". On Monday (22JAN), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that Russian troops tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Terny but were unsuccessful. However, two days later (24JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops had advanced to Terny, a critical logistical point through which the Ukrainian grouping on the left bank of the Zherebets River was supplied. However, Ukrainian sources did not report changes on Wednesday.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Also, no changes occurred near Torske, Nevske and Yampolivka.
In the Kreminna area, no significant changes occurred. Positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forestry and near Dibrova. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Saturday (20JAN) that to the west of Kreminna, the Russians managed to advance 200 metres. A soldier said that the situation was not critical but dynamic. The Russian sources did not report changes.
In the Bilohorivka area, a Ukrainian soldier said on Saturday (20JAN) that the Russians were pressing very hard from the northeast and southeast and were using guided bombs on UAF positions near the settlement. A soldier said that on Friday (19JAN), the Russians used about 15 bombs during the evening and night, while Ukrainian units did not conduct a single attack because they could not even leave their dugouts. The soldier also added that Russians were using night FPV drones. So far, in small numbers, but they were already causing problems. On Sunday (21JAN), the same soldier claimed that the Russian assaults were ongoing every day near the village with only intensity changes. On Monday (22JAN), a Ukrainian soldier clarified that during the Russian attack on Sunday (21JAN), 14 Russian soldiers were killed and eight wounded. Russians tried to enter the village and gain a foothold, but they had no success. On the other hand, the Russian source claimed that on Monday (22JAN), the Russian forces were entrenching themselves in the southeastern parts of the settlement.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk direction, Russian units repelled 48 Ukrainian attacks near Lyman Lake, Makiivka, Novojehorivka, Tabaivka, Krokhmalne, Synkivka and Terny.
According to Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, Russian units of the Centre Group of Forces, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled 15 Ukrainian attacks near Yampolivka, Serebryansky foresty, Dibrova and Hryhorivka.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The Russians continued attacks near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novobakhmutivka axes over the past week. However, no significant changes were recorded.
On Friday (19JAN), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that the Russians practically captured Vesele. However, Russian sources did not report changes near the settlement on Saturday and Sunday (20-21JAN). The Ukrainian blogger claimed that on Monday (22JAN), Russian troops launched attacks on areas between Spirne and Vesele, but the results were unknown. On Tuesday (23JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces were conducting offensive operations from Vesele towards Vyimka and near Spirne. The source, however, failed to provide detailed information about these developments. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes. As of Friday, no visual evidence confirmed that Vesele had been taken.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Rozdolivka and Fedorivka.
On Saturday (20JAN), Russians tried to improve their tactical situation near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske but failed to progress. Russian journalists claimed that Russian troops continued to attack Khromove. The heavy battles also occurred near Bohdanivka. However, another Russian source claimed that on Sunday (21JAN), the Russian forces had managed to occupy the central part of Bohdanivka, pushing the Ukrainians to the western outskirts of the village. The primary Russian efforts focused on reaching UAF's tactical space to break into Ukraine's strongholds near Chasiv Yar. The source added that some statements about the complete liberation of the Bohdanivka settlement began to appear. However, the source noted that one-third of the southwestern part of the village was still under Ukrainian control. To the west of Khromove, the battles continued toward the cemetery and Popovsky Forest. Also, Russian artillery units were conducting constant artillery strikes on Ivanivske, and Russian forces were also clearing fields southeast of the village, slowly expanding their zone of control. Attacks on Bohdanivka continued on Tuesday (23JAN), as Ukrainian forces reportedly managed to stabilise the situation there. The source also said that Russian troops managed to advance towards Ivanivske, but this also remained unconfirmed. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Tuesday that the Krynky, Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia directions are the areas where the Russians do not have the overwhelming initiative.
In contrast, in all other directions, assault operations were at full scale. The soldier also said that the UAF had stabilised the situation despite constant pressure from the Russians near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka. On Wednesday (24JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces continued their attacks from Khromove towards Ivanivske. Skirmishes continued near Bohdanivka. However, the source said no changes occurred on the contact line.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka.
In the Bakhmut alone, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Sunday (21JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops continued their assault on the heights northwest of Klishchiivka. On Wednesday (24JAN), the Russian source asserted that the Russian forces continued their attacks on the heights northwest of Klishchiivka, but no changes were recorded. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
On Monday (22JAN), a Russian source claimed that Russian forces had to pull back to the railway line near Kurduymivka.
The Russian source claimed on Sunday (20JAN) that on the northern flank of the Avdiivka axis, the Russian troops continued to attack near Stepove and Novokalynove, but no changes were recorded. On Monday (22JAN), the Russian troops continued attacks near Stepove and tried to extend attacks towards Novobakhmutivka. On Wednesday (24JAN), the Russian source said that Russian forces had managed to advance near the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant. Battles also continued near Stepove.
No changes occurred in the Avdiivka. The Russians continued to shell the city heavily. On Thursday (25JAN), Major Maxim Morozov from the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that the Russians were preparing for a new offensive on Avdiivka. They had already deployed 40,000 reservists to the area, including Storm-Z (prisoners) and Storm-V (former Wagner) units. He also said that Ukrainian intelligence had information about preparations for tank assaults on Avdiivka. In fact, he stated that the new battle had already begun as Russians significantly increased the number of KAB strikes. At the same time, he did not confirm that the Russians had taken control of the area near Tsarska Ohota and had moved forward. He said this situation was "hyped" and the attempt to enter the city was "unsuccessful". Fighters and commanders on the ground, with whom he spoke, did not confirm the critical situation in the city and did not see the need to retreat.
His assessment, however, contradicts what another Ukrainian source reported on Saturday. Deep State said that the attackers had seized Tsarska Ohota Hotel and were trying to gain a foothold on Chernyshevs'koho, Sportivnaya and Soborna Streets. The source said that stabilisation measures were underway. However, if they were unsuccessful, they would endanger the entire eastern part of the city and its surroundings. The Russian source claimed that on Sunday (21JAN), Russian forces were entrenching themselves in Tsarska Ohota. The UAF were trying to counterattack, but it was unclear what exactly this effort involved. On Sunday (21JAN), a Ukrainian soldier asserted that the situation near Avdiivka had stabilised slightly. Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups were trying to enter the city without success. On Tuesday (23JAN), the Russian journalist said that the breakthrough into Avdiivka from the southeast had not yet brought operational success to the Russian forces. On Wednesday (24JAN), the Russian source claimed that Ukrainian units counterattacked in the most problematic area - the southeastern outskirts of the city. They managed to capture several positions. The source said that Russians might struggle to move forward as the corridor Russians had broken into was too narrow and yet too long, which made them too exposed from the flanks.
On Sunday (21JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops continued to attack near Pervomaiske. On Monday (22JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian troops, after artillery strikes, tried to break through the UAF defences near Nevelske, Pervomaiske and Sjeverne, but without success.
On Monday (22JAN), the Russian source stated that the battles resumed near Opytne.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke and Vodyane.
On Saturday (20JAN), the Ukrainian source said that near Novomykhailivka, Russians concentrated additional forces and tried to pressure small groups along the Vodyane - Kostyantynivka line. The Ukrainian soldier added on Sunday (21JAN) that in the Mariinka direction, the Russians were attacking Ukrainian positions constantly, even without heavy equipment. The Russian source claimed that on Sunday, the Russian troops continued to storm Novomykhailivka from the south. They were also carrying out similar actions near Heorhievka. However, the source said that no changes were recorded. On the other hand, another Russian source also said on Sunday that Russian troops continued to advance in Heorhievka, where, as a result of assault operations, they advanced up to 300 metres towards Kurakhove. The source said that battles occurred on Zhovtneva Street as of Sunday.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian soldier explained on Tuesday (23JAN) that the Russians were trying to advance in the northern part of Heorhiivka village towards Kurakhove. They were attacking in small assault groups from "house to house", trying to push Ukrainian units to the west. Still, the line of contact remained effectively unchanged as the Ukrainian 46th Airmobile Brigade held their positions. Also, the Russians are constantly attacking through the forest area from the southern part of Mariinka towards Pobjeda. They also tried to advance in small assault groups, but were stopped on the approach by Ukrainian artillery and FPV drones. However, the source stated that the UAF was experiencing problems with artillery ammunition and had to ration ammunition. On Wednesday (25JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces continued to attack near Novomykhailivka from the south and east. However, the source said that these attacks were not intense anymore, but near Heorhievka, the Russian attacks continued unabated.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Vuhledar.
On Thursday (25JAN), the Russian source claimed that on Wednesday, a Ukrainian HIMARS strike hit a training area for UAV operators near Pokrovka, killing 24 personnel.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units successfully repelled 12 Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka, Shumy and Bilohorivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
In the Velyka Novosila axis, the Ukrainian blogger claimed on Saturday (20JAN) that Russians were advancing south of Urozhaine. However, they failed to gain any footholds. Indeed, the Russian source also claimed that the UAF counterattacked near Urozhaine. As a result of the counterattack, they managed to occupy several new positions in the Zavitne Bazhannya area. However, this does not herald a larger Ukrainian push in this area.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Staromaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pryyutne and Novodarivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Russian journalist claimed that the Russian forces continued their offensive operations west of Robotyne. The UAF, in turn, counterattacked near Verbove and recaptured one position. Battles in this direction occur regularly, but neither side had the initiative. At the same time, the UAF's FPV drones had also become a significant problem on the Zaporizhzhia front. With the help of retransmitters, they can hit Russian targets at a depth of up to 17 kilometres from the line of contact. The total range from the Ukrainian operator is up to 20-25 kilometres (we can independently confirm these numbers).
On Monday (22JAN), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that skirmishes occurred near Robotyne and Verbove, but no frontline changes were recorded. On Tuesday (23JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian forces had counterattacked west of Robotyne and had held the initiative here. The source added the situation throughout the entire length of the line of contact in this area was quite dynamic. The source also said Russian troops tried to advance from Novoprokopivka's direction.
On Wednesday (24JAN), the Russian source stated that battles occurred west of Robotyne as Ukrainians attempted to advance towards Verbove. The source added that Ukrainian assault units did not conduct large offensive operations. The Ukrainian soldier claimed on Thursday (25JAN) that Russian units attempted to take dominant positions in the Zaporizhzhia direction (unknown area), but the UAF repelled these attacks. However, a soldier said that Ukrainian forces continued to suffer from heavy Russian artillery and MLRS attacks.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novoprokopivka and Novofedorivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near P'yatykhatky.
According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Novomykhailivka and Rivnopil. Also, six attempts by the Ukrainian units to reinforce forward positions near Staromaiorske and Novomykhailivka were foiled.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
Last week delivered no breakthroughs in the Kherson Oblast. In the Kherson Oblast, no significant changes occurred. Ukrainian forces continue to hold a bridgehead on Dnipro's left bank despite Russian counterattacks.
On Saturday (20JAN), the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russians increased pressure on Krynky, which presumably involved more ground attacks. However, the same source also added that some Russian units faked attacks and reported failed assaults to avoid going to battle.
Russian attacks occurred on Sunday and Monday (21 and 22JAN), but they delivered no frontline changes. A Russian source, however, asserted that Russian forces had intercepted a summary of Ukrainian naval infantry losses for the first 20 days of 2024. They claimed that the 35th Separate Marine Brigade alone suffered 350 personnel killed. We cannot substantiate these numbers, but they appear overly excessive.
On Wednesday (24JAN), the Russian source claimed that the situation had not changed near Krynky. The battles continued near the settlement, and the UAF continued to hold their positions in the Krynky ruins under fire from Russian artillery and drones. The UAF also continued to resupply their personnel across the Dnipro River. There were artillery strikes from both sides, and the Ukrainian drone superiority in the air continued.
A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Saturday (20JAN) that the Russians were again actively using KAB bombs on the right bank, which is in line with Rochan's assessment that after a pause following the destruction of three Su-34s on 22DEC, Russian air strikes were likely to return to normal levels of activities. Russian air strikes also hit Kherson.
Indeed, Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, said on Monday (22JAN) that Russians were cautiously using tactical aviation and were trying to amend their air tactics. So far, it remains unclear what this involved. Also, on the left bank of the Kherson region, the Russian command prohibited units from using armoured vehicles, knowing that they would lose them irretrievably with virtually every assault. Humeniuk also said that the intensity of Russian attacks fluctuated wildly. "In an attempt to drive the UAF out of the positions (…), the Russians used an intensity of attacks ranging from 1-2 to 10 attacks per day ". She added that this was due to the rotation of personnel and weather conditions. Natalia Humeniuk also claimed that the situation in southern Ukraine remained very tense. The Russians were trying to increase the pressure using artillery, aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicles of various modifications, from strike aircraft to those carrying fragmentation munitions. She stressed that the Russians had intensified the use of drones not only in the Kherson region but also in the Ochakiv district. At the same time, she noted that the Russians are trying to keep the intensity of artillery strikes at a high level, bringing them to the 100 mark.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 568 aircraft (+1), 265 helicopters (0), 11,255 UAVs (+361), 455 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+5), 14,800 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+114), 1,210 MLRS launchers (+8), 7,871 field artillery guns and mortars (+83), as well as 17,891 units of special military vehicles (+274).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 380,600 personnel (+6,080), 6,265 tanks (+98), 11,637 armoured combat vehicles (+192), 9,082 artillery systems (+228) and 972 MLR systems (+6), 660 anti-aircraft systems (+7), 331 aircraft (+2) and 324 helicopters (0), and 7,033 UAVs (+104), 1,845 cruise missiles (+27), 23 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 12,064 vehicles and fuel tanks (+233), and 1,425 special vehicles (+86).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
The Russian use of drones and missile strikes continued to be limited.
Over the past seven days, Russians conducted one mass missile strike. It occurred on the night of Monday to Tuesday (22-23JAN) and involved four S-300/S-400 missiles, 15 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles, two Kh-59 cruise missiles, eight Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, 12 Iskander-M (9K723) ballistic missiles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 21 missiles, including 15 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55s, five Iskanders and one Kh-59, which gives an interception rate of 51%.
Three Shahed strikes involved 29 vehicles, of which Kyiv claimed to have intercepted 23 (79%).
Ground attacks decreased from a peak of 127 on 18JAN to 56 on 23JAN. Last week, they averaged 69 assaults per day, but the 10-day average is around 80.
(Battlefield) missile strikes remained limited. Ukraianians reported 48 strikes on 23JAN, but we understand that 41 were the ones mentioned above.
Airstrike data showed extreme figures. On the one hand, on 21JAN and 23JAN, Russians reportedly launched 102 and 112 air strikes, respectively, and on 20JAN and 25JAN, they only launched 4 and 19, respectively.
Ukrainians claimed that on 24JAN, Russians launched 121 MLRS strikes, the second-highest number since MAR2022. Russians currently average some 70 strikes per day, an increase from around 41 at the beginning of the year.
Outlook for the week of 27JAN – 2FEB2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This assessment was incorrect, as Russians captured Krokhmalne. Further gains are likely.
Score: 0/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. Still, we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.” Information about Moscow capturing Vesele remained unconfirmed, but they reportedly made gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka. No additional settlements were taken.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.” This assessment was correct.
Final score: 4/5 (80%)
The forecast for the week of 27JAN – 2FEB2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (increase in probability) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. There is a roughly even chance (increase in probability) that they will capture one village or more.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.