Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 20 March – 26 March 2023 (Weekly update)
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
There were no operational or strategic changes in the situation in Ukraine over the past week;
Russians remained heavily focused in the Donetsk Oblast, particularly near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, where they made some progress; Russian attacks in other parts of Ukraine delivered no results;
No major events took place in the Kharkiv Oblast; The region was heavily shelled with artillery, but Russians made no gains in the oblast;
For another week, the tempo of Russian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast was visibly reduced; battles mostly had a positional character, and while Russians might have captured some territory, their gains were minimal;
All Russian attacks around Bakhmut were repelled, but they probably made some progress in the city; It is too early to conclude that Russian assaults on the city culminated;
Russians slightly progressed near Avdiivka, but most of their attacks were pushed back; Ukrainians reportedly deployed reserves to stall Russian assaults;
The attackers made no progress in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast;
No major events occurred in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast;
The situation remained stable in the Kherson Oblast; Last week, Ukrainians attempted at least three attacks on Russian bases in Crimea; Probably in response, Russians struck an airbase near Odesa;
There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast; Both sides limited their operations to artillery strikes and ground reconnaissance missions on islands in the Dnipro delta;
The exercise tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces was very high; We noted no changes in their posture, which remains defensive; President Putin announced plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus by 1JUL; A new air defence regiment was stood up in Luninets, southern Belarus;
Satellite imagery shows a 90% decrease in the number of Russian vehicles deployed at the 230th Combined-arms Training Range in Baranovichi, Belarus; However, future Russian deployments to the range are likely;
General outlook
Last week delivered no major changes in Ukraine. Russians remained effectively focused on two areas: Bakhmut and Avdiivka in the Donetsk Oblast. Activity in the Kherson and Zaporizhihia Oblasts remained subdued, while Russian operations in the Luhansk Oblast continued to be reduced. Bakhmut and Avdiivka are the only places Russians can conduct offensive operations. With the Luhansk Oblast put on a back burner, Russian plans to capture the remaining parts of the Donetsk Oblast are almost impossible to implement. We do not know whether this decrease in activity is by necessity or design. In reality, regular army formations only attack near Avdiivka, while Wagner leads the offensive around Bakhmut, albeit with a small airborne forces’ support. If Moscow has really run out of manpower and capability to sustain even limited ground offensives, then their chances of effectively countering the upcoming Ukrainian offensive are small. Indeed, according to Bloomberg, Russia deployed most of the 300,000 mobilised men into the battlefield, and as Moscow achieved no successes, it will not focus on “deterrence”, which we understand means defensive operations. As we have already stated numerous times here, we assess that Russians have not committed all of their available forces, as they would have no capacity to respond to any contingency scenarios. Undoubtedly, one such scenario is the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Moscow needs to have men and equipment ready to deploy into areas where Ukrainians will attack.
We are thus in a transition phase of the war. Both sides are preparing for what the next few weeks will bring.
Thus, we will likely see Russians focus on Bakhmut and Avdiivka without opening new axes of advance. Ukrainians, as we all know, are preparing for the counteroffensive expected to occur within the next 2-3 months.
More Western support for Ukraine
Monday, 20MAR, 17 EU countries and Norway signed an agreement to supply Ukraine with at least one million artillery shells over the next 12 months. Kyiv requested 350,000 shells a month. The agreement is composed of two parts. The first commits EUR1 billion of shared funding for EU states to draw upon their existing stockpiles (or redirect current orders), which should be delivered to Ukraine by the end of May. The second part of the agreement will see these countries spend another EUR1 billion to jointly procure 155mm round for Ukraine. However, the first contracts to purchase additional rounds are expected to be signed in September. According to Josep Borrell, EU foreign policy chief, Russians were firing about 50,000 rounds of artillery daily, and Ukraine needed to reach the same level. The most recent WSJ estimate was that Russians fired some 10,000 shells a day, having around a 3:1 advantage in fires. Moscow may have indeed reached the 50,000 figure, but last summer. Since then, the intensity and number of Russian artillery strikes have decreased. Another important part of this story is the Ukrainian ability to effectively utilise these stockpiles. We are unsure whether Ukrainians will have enough Western-made artillery systems to fire as many as 50,000 155mm shells daily.
Nevertheless, the EU is committed to increasing its domestic defence production capacity to support Ukraine and build its own artillery ammunition stockpiles for future use.
In the meantime, during the weekend, the second group of Ukrainian soldiers finished training on British As-90 self-propelled howitzers.
Although not related to artillery, but last week, Boris Pistorius, Germany’s Minister of Defence, said that the country’s Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), the transfer of which Berlin announced in January, were already on their way to Ukraine. About 40 vehicles should arrive in Ukraine by the end of March. We can confirm the delivery is on the way as we have seen an image of Marders transported on a train in southwestern Poland. Photos were taken mid-week, so it is highly likely that Marders already arrived in Ukraine.
Weather forecast
(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days unless otherwise stated)
This week will deliver a significant, albeit short-lived, drop in temperatures in Ukraine.
In the Kreminna, the first half of the week will be very warm, with temperatures reaching 17°C (62°F) on Tuesday. However, between Wednesday and Friday, the temperature will not rise above 6°C (42°F). Forecasts show warmer weather from Friday onward. 11°C (52°F) are expected on Sunday. Precipitation will be high as it will rain every day.
The Bakhmut area will experience colder weather. The start of the week will also be warm, with 17°C (62°F) expected on Tuesday. Since Wednesday and Friday, the temperatures will drop to -1°C (30°F) at night mid-week. During the day, the temperatures are also not to exceed 6°C (42°F). The end of the week will see an increase to 12°C (53°F). The rainfall is expected throughout the entire week.
The Zaporizhzhia region will also experience a cold spell mid-week. A drop to -1°C (30°F) is also expected mid-week, but the temperatures should not drop below 6°C (42°F) during the day. Sunday will also deliver relatively warm weather of 12°C (53°F). Rain is expected for Tuesday and Friday-Sunday.
Rainfall and decreased temperatures will hinder the movement of heavy armoured vehicles this week.
A medium-term (30-day) forecast shows transitional weather until 20APR, when the temperatures are to permanently rise above 10°C (50°F) during the day and 5°C (41°F) at night. Until then, Ukraine will experience transitional weather.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 404 aircraft (+2), 225 helicopters (+3), 3,587 UAVs (+123), 414 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 8,415 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+77), 1,073 MLRS launchers (+4), 4,440 field artillery guns and mortars (+52), as well as 9,126 units of special military vehicles (+115).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 170,550 personnel (+5,640), 3,595 tanks (+63), 6,947 armoured combat vehicles (+94), 2,631 artillery systems (+63) and 522 MLR systems (+15), 277 anti-aircraft systems (+9), 305 aircraft (0) and 291 helicopters (+1), and 2,216 UAVs (+57), 5,486 vehicles and fuel tanks (+78), 911 cruise missiles (+4), 18 warships and boats (0) and 282 pieces of special equipment (+20).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
Military situation in Belarus
Last week we did not notice any changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces, and we saw no indications suggesting any change will occur soon. The training tempo of Belarusian military formations was high.
However, undoubtedly, the key event that took place was related to President Putin’s comments about the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus. On Saturday, he claimed that construction of a special storage facility would conclude by 1JUL. We have seen no such construction currently ongoing in Belarus (which does not mean it has not been ongoing). If the work on the site has not started yet, then it is highly unlikely that the site will be built within three months.
Putin also added that Russia had assisted Belarus with converting ten aircraft to carry nuclear weapons. It is unknown what aircraft will be tasked with this mission. Belarus operates MiG-29s, Su-25s, and Su-30SMs, while its fleet of Su-24s was withdrawn from service in 2012. Despite various comments in open sources about Su-24s being tasked with nuclear missions, we have seen no evidence suggesting they were put back in service.
Putin stressed that Russia would not transfer tactical warheads to Belarus. He stated that such transfer would be possible only when the United States provided such weapons to their allies. Belarus also recently started operating the Iskander SSM system, and it is possible that the storage site could keep nuclear warheads for this particular system. However, this is a speculative statement. The idea of Belarus housing such warheads has not been floated.
There are several reasons why both countries decided to pursue the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus. Firstly, while the Kaliningrad Oblast also features a nuclear storage facility, the region can be isolated from outside support, and the deployment of additional warheads or any other capabilities would be severely curtailed in case of an armed conflict with NATO. Belarus poses no such problems as Russian access to Belarus by air, road or rail would be uninterrupted. Secondly, this decision is another step in integrating both countries’ armed forces. Although Russians will undoubtedly be responsible for safekeeping any nuclear weapons that land in Belarus, their deployment highlights plans for their use in case of an armed attack. It also solidifies the Russian presence in Belarus. Lastly, taking a broader view, Moscow may be seeking to force Washington into the negotiating table to discuss the future of Ukraine and Europe. It seems that, so far, this has not worked.
Indeed, deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus seems to be mainly driven by political considerations and not by operational necessities. There are a few nuclear storage facilities already near Belarus (Shatalovo Air Base, Bryansk, Shaykovka, Belgorod). To maintain its posture and deterrence, moving a part of the nuclear capacity to Belarus is unnecessary.
Moving to Lukashenko’s activities, on Tuesday, he met with representatives of the power structures to discuss internal and external threats to the state. The meeting was held with a broad group of Belarusian officers, operatives and politicians and discussed internal and external threats to Belarus. Due to the nature of the discussions, only the short part of the meeting was published. Lukashenko stressed that the highest levels of external threats to Belarus require maximal attention to the state’s internal situation. He referred to the latest incident in Grodno (the KDB Alpha personnel shot a foreign citizen who was reportedly preparing another terrorist attack). He praised the special subunit for its professionalism. The suspect, who was detained, was heavily armed, including automatic weapons and grenades.
However, according to the Belarusian Union of Officers (the organisation unites former law enforcement officers who support opposition politicians, considered a terrorist organisation in Belarus), the event in Grodno was staged.
A day later, he was involved in commemorating the Khatyn massacre’s anniversary. The tragedy occurred in 1943 when German SS forces killed the entire population of Khatyn village (149 residents, including 75 children) in retaliation for an attack on German troops.
There he said that the plague of Nazism gained new followers among traitors and criminals and was moving closer to the Belarusian borders.
After the official part of the event, Lukashenko answered questions from Belarusian and Russian journalists. Firstly, he spoke about sabotage acts in Belarus and stressed the importance of deep and continuous cooperation between Belarusian and Russian special services. The Belarusian President also praised Belarusian citizens, who assisted power agencies during the investigation.
Later, Lukashenko moved to the issue of providing depleted uranium tank munitions to Ukraine. He claimed that only madmen would proceed with such support. The President added that we were at a watershed moment which might start a nuclear conflict. He also blamed Americans and Poles for wanting to escalate the conflict. On the other hand, the Belarusian leader also thanked the so-called collective west for uniting China, Russia (and Belarus), which will make this “alliance” much more robust.
On Thursday, the MoD announced the creation of a new air defence regiment (presumably the 56th Air Defence Regiment). The unit is based in the Luniniets Air Base and fields S-300PS air defence systems. However, it may also be the first formation to eventually receive Russian-delivered S-400 complexes. The ceremony in Luniniets was attended by the Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, who shared some views on the reasons behind the unit’s creation. Khrenin stated that the military situation around Belarus was tense, and western states continued active militarisation of their inventories while Ukraine was “being pumped” with new weapons. Khrenin noticed that the creation of the unit is an adequate act to address the current challenges and threats to Belarusian security.
The Head of the Belarusian MoD stressed that the best specialists would serve in the formation. Because of that, the ministry decided to secure their social needs by creating a new educational and material base in Luninets. It includes houses and kindergartens, as well as the provision of workplaces for the soldiers’ relatives. Later, Khrenin participated in a house opening ceremony during which 72 Belarusian families received keys to their new flats.
News about the deployment of a new air defence unit appeared in open sources in mid-February when the Belarusian Hajun provided information about a possible redeployment of the 115th Air Defence Regiment (S-300PS, HQ Brest). According to the recent orders for catering services (outsourced by the Belarusian Armed Forces), about 200 servicemen of the formation were to be deployed to Luniniets.
It is thus possible that the base in Luninets fields elements withdrawn from the 115th Air Defence Regiment, meaning that neither the 115th nor the 56th Air Defence Regiments are now fully deployed.
Last week, the Head of the Belarusian MoD promoted at least 12 Belarusian officers to the colonel rank and handed state awards to medics of the Special-Purpose Detachment of the 432nd Main Military Clinical Medical Center, who returned from Syria after their 30-day-long medical assistance missions.
On Friday, the Deputy Minister of Defence for Ideological Work, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky conducted an informational briefing for military personnel of the 49th Radiotechnical Brigade, 50th Mixed Aviation Base, and 223rd Aviation Medicine Center. According to an official statement, the lecture was linked to the issue of national security in the face of global challenges.
Over the past seven days, Belarusians conducted a few noteworthy training events.
Firstly, the North-Western Operational Command (N-W OC) started joint staff training on planning and using subordinated forces during a defensive operation. The training began on Tuesday under the Commander of the N-W OC, Maj. Gen. Alexander Naumenko command.
Secondly, the 103rd Airborne Brigade started the brigade-level tactical exercise, combined with the induction of more than 500 reservists. The exercise commenced on Monday and was probably still ongoing as of Sunday.
Thirdly, the unspecified logistic subunit of the 120th Mechanised Brigade started a combat readiness check. On Friday, the subunit raised its readiness and most likely started removing equipment from long-term storage. The unit will then deliver supplies to an unspecified area. Such drills have already occurred in all remaining mechanised brigades this year.
Increased training load was still observable among artillery formations. Live ammo drills engaged elements of the 111th Artillery Brigade (Monday and Friday) and the 841st Artillery Group of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (Wednesday and Thursday). Moreover, a probable Iskander subunit of the 465th Missile Brigade conducted a field exit on Friday. Elements of the 51st Artillery Brigade subunit practised employing camouflage and concealment techniques.
Throughout the week, the unspecified Belarusian communications formation(s) participated in the control classes held directly under the Chief of Communications, Col. Vadim Romanov’s command. However, no details linked to the drills were published.
Several company-level tactical exercises also took place. They involved:
Elements of the 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade (Tuesday, Wednesday);
Elements of the 202nd Mechanised Battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (Thursday);
Elements of the 382nd Air Assault Battalion of the 38th Air Assault Brigade (?-Thursday);
Elements of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (Thursday);
Besides, Belarusian air components activity was heightened on Wednesday and Thursday.
Over the past seven days, the number of military equipment spotted on Belarusian roads was average. However, unofficial sources reported the movements of three military trains that carried more than 30 BTRs, dozens of trucks and several MT-LBs. They were spotted on Tuesday and Wednesday, and their movement was likely linked with the ongoing military drills.
The activity of the Russian Armed Forces was also particularly visible in the air. Last week, four Russian airframes (An-12, An-26, Tu-134UBL and An-124) arrived in Belarus, while MiG-31K operating from Belarusian Machulischy Air Base, conducted at least three flights. The training activity was also visible among unidentified fighter aircraft and helicopters, mainly around training grounds where Russian soldiers are currently deployed. The ground activity of the Russian forces was minimal. However, a single echelon with at least five BTRs and a tank was spotted on Saturday in Osipovichi.
Please click here to access the list of Belarusian training activities since the start of the year
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
We continued to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Positional battles continued but without an impact on the frontline. Russians continue to attack Ukrainian positions near Hryanykivka and Masiutivka. It is indeed possible that Ukrainians withdrew from the former, but artillery strikes prevented Russians from making a permanent foothold in the village. We have marked Hryanykivka as a “grey zone” area.
Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies assesses the 25th and 138th Motor Rifle brigades (6th Combined Arms Army) and the 347th Motor Rifle Regiment (unclear affiliation, the unit was created post-mobilisation in Kostroma) lead attacks in the area.
Russians also continued artillery and missile strikes across the entire region, especially near border areas. No reports were made about any military targets hit as a result of these strikes.
Russians did not conduct any ground attacks from the country proper into Ukraine.
Luhansk direction
Russians made no confirmed gains last week, although some reports surfaced suggesting minimal tactical shifts. However, the tempo of Russian attacks remained generally reduced throughout the oblast.
According to CDS, the Ukrainian 25th Separate Airborne Brigade was pushed back from Chernopopivka. The situation in this area remains particularly vague. A few weeks ago, Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian units crossed the R66 road near (or in) the settlement. However, no visual evidence was ever presented confirming this development. We marked the closest Ukrainian positions, some 6 km west of Chernopopivka. The abovementioned report thus suggested that Ukrainian operated closer to the village we assessed. But again, we will not change the front line until we obtain visual evidence confirming the Ukrainian presence in the area.
According to Ukrainian reports, positional battles occurred mostly between Positional battles along the entire frontline between Svatove and Bilohorivka. However, the northern part of the oblast remains relatively peaceful. Most fighting took place between Ploshchanka and Dibrova.
Russians attacked Stelmakhivka, Kuzemivka and neighbouring Novoselivske, Yampolivka and Terny. Footage posted online showed a Russian tank operating in Makiivka. However, it does not seem that the village was under anyone’s control at the current stage.
Regarding the Kreminna area, battles continued in the Serebryansky forest and near Dibrova. Russians maintained heavy pressure on areas west of Dibrova, but according to CDS, Russians regained full control over the village on Friday. Russians also reportedly (CDS) advanced near Terny, but it is unclear what this involved.
On Thursday, a Russian blogger stated that Russian troops attacking from Shypylivka were able to advance towards the Siversky Donets river. However, it is unclear how significant this push was and whether Russians committed enough forces to make this gain more permanent. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes in this area throughout the week.
All Russian attacks on Bilohorivka were repelled.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The Donetsk Oblast was again the only region in Ukraine where Russians made any progress. Although attacks occurred along almost the entire frontline, most of the activity happened near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
But let’s start from the northern parts of the oblast. Russians launched ground attacks on Spirne and Verkhokamyanske but achieved no progress there. They also did not advance near Vesele, Rozdolivka and Vasiukivka.
Two weeks ago, Russians seized Dubovo-Vasylivka and Zaliznianske. We expected that Russians would maintain the momentum they achieved over the past several weeks in this area. However, the attackers made no progress in uphill battles for Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Min’kivka. It also seems that the tempo and intensity of Russian attacks were reduced. We do not know what may have caused this change, but there are a couple of possible explanations. The first is that Wagner and supporting forces were regrouping and reinforcing before restarting their attacks. Secondly, Russians may have reached the peak of their combat performance and no longer possess an offensive capacity to sustain the previous tempo of attacks. Two observations support this hypothesis. Last week, Bloomberg published a piece quoting Prigozhin, claiming that Wagner may decrease its operations in Ukraine and refocus on other areas, such as the Middle East or Africa. Second, the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, stated that the situation around Bakhmut was stabilising. A Ukrainian soldier in Bakhmut shared this view. Still, the spokesman for the Ukrainian military’s eastern command, Serhii Cherevaty, added that it was too early to conclude that the Russian offensive ran out of steam.
The situation looks less rosy if we look at daily reports from the Bakhmut area. On Monday, Wagner fighters attacked from Opytne and Ivanhrad (southern flank) and probably made some progress there. Ukrainian bloggers noted this change but credit Russians with no more than 100 to 150 metres of additional territory.
Heavy battles continued in the city’s industrial zone (northern flank), where, according to the source, Ukrainian troops put up fierce resistance. A Ukrainian soldier deployed in the town claimed Russians were amassing forces for a decisive assault. Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance observes a gradual accumulation of soldiers in the landings around the city, especially in the north and south. The soldier added that the key for the attackers would be the assault on Ivanivske, and everything would be decided in the next two weeks. For now, Ukrainian forces held the “main” logistics road. The city was not surrounded, either.
According to Yevgeny Prigozhin, PMC Wagner head, Wagner troops control about 70% of the city, and at the end of March – beginning of April, the UAF plans to launch a large offensive in Bakhmut.
When it comes to Ivanivske, Russians may have managed to advance 1.5 km towards the village, but the road to Konstantynivka was not cut.
A Polish volunteer serving in Chasiv Yar posted a tweet on Sunday claiming that an order was made to evacuate all children from the city. Journalists have also been barred from entering Bakhmut. These two events may herald preparations for a withdrawal from Bakhmut.
A Russian blogger stated that Ukrainian units regrouped on Wednesday morning and began to retreat to adjacent positions near storage facilities at the Bakhmut railway station and in the area of an abandoned hospital (we are unsure about this location; another possibility could be this facility). Ukrainian bloggers noted that the overall trajectory of Russian attacks did not change. They continue to seek weaknesses in Ukrainian defensive lines to exploit any gaps. So far, this approach has delivered a slow and grinding movement. At the same time, as the frontline shrinks, Ukrainian force density will increase, making it more difficult for Russians to progress. A Russian source added that most of the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut had been captured.
Footage posted online reportedly showed Ukrainian units attacking Russian positions just 500 m (0.3 m) from the T0506 road linking Bakhmut with Chasiv Yar.
According to a Ukrainian soldier deployed in the town, Bakhmut is under heavy artillery fire. The source added that Russians were accumulating forces for a massive attack to take the city. But a significant turning point would be reached if Ukrainians held their ground until April (presumably, a counteroffensive will start then?). Indeed, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Ukrainian Land Forces Commander, said that since Wagner was exhausting itself in Bakhmut, Ukraine would soon take advantage of this opportunity, as it did near Kyiv, Kharkiv, Balakliya and Kupyansk. The Russian source said the 93rd and 57th Mechanised, 5th Tank and 10th Assault Brigades would confront Russian soldiers operating near Bakhmut, mainly Wagner. We understand these units include all brigades currently deployed in or near Bakhmut.
As you can see, a lot happened in Bakhmut last week. That is why we would like to wait at least one more week before assessing whether Russian operations in Bakhmut have culminated. But, undoubtedly, there is a lot of optimism on the Ukrainian side already about the failure of the Russians to take Bakhmut.
Another area Russians remained very focused on was the Avdiivka sector. They continued to pursue their plan to envelop Ukrainian forces in and around the city. However, they did not inch closer towards fulfilling this objective last week. Reports that surfaced suggested that Russians attacked Stepove and Berdychi. In some cases, we saw some sources claim that Stepove was captured. However, in this case, sources referred to a map produced by ISW, so we advise caution in dealing with this information. Russians, however, may have captured a rail station near Stepove.
Early in the week, a pro-Russian source also said that the attackers entered Kamyanka, but it is unclear whether they actually managed to capture the village. We were unable to confirm the veracity of this development either.
The situation near Avdiivka deteriorated. The Russian source said that Russian units attempted to enter the city from the southwest. Heavy battles occurred near Tekhnika and Sport Complex and in quarter 9, but we understand that all attempts were pushed back. Ukrainians may have deployed reserves towards the city.
Some Russian sources hinted that the situation in the city could resemble what was ongoing in Bakhmut as Russian units flank the town along the heights. A reporter from Kyiv Independent, who visited the city early in the week, claimed that Russians had made significant progress in the area while Ukrainians suffered “huge casualties”. Avdiivka was also close to being cut off. He added that the city could fall sooner than Bakhmut.
Russians attacked Ukrainian positions near Vodyane towards Tonenke and Sieverne, but they made no gains in the area last week/ results.
The overall situation in other areas of the Donetsk Oblast remained unchanged.
Ukrainian territorial control in Mariinka did not change. Russians continued to shell Ukrainian positions in the city’s western parts while their attempts to envelop opposing forces failed as well. All Russian attacks on Pobieda were repelled.
Russians continued some limited ground activities near Vuhledar but did not possess enough offensive capability to alter the frontline. We assess that forces either previously fighting in this area or were earmarked for entering the fight have been largely deployed to Avdiivka. One such unit is the 138th Motor Rifle Brigade (58th CAA), which pre-war fielded almost 4,000 men, one tank and three motor rifle battalions, which altogether deployed around 40 T-72B3s and 120 BMP-3s. This was a very heavy formation, earmarked for high-tempo operations. It is unclear what is left of this structure and its capabilities, but given how previous units were rebuilt, it is likely that at least the structure was maintained.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Last week did not deliver any confirmed changes in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. The overall situation remained stable as both sides focused their actions on artillery strikes and positional battles. Two weeks ago, Ukrainians undertook some unsuccessful limited ground attacks. We speculated that these actions could have heralded a change in the Ukrainian posture that could become more offensive. Indeed, whereas no videos were published last week showing large-scale Ukrainian attacks, (pro) Russian sources published several reports about Ukrainian attacks on the oblast.
Let’s look at the context first. A member of the Zaporizhia Occupation Administration Council, Vladimir Rogov, stated late in the week that Ukrainians were concentrating their forces and preparing for an attack near Orikhiv. It is the second warning coming from Rogov in the past three weeks about a possible Ukrainian build-up in the oblast. Previously, on 6MAR, he said that Kyiv had assembled a 12,000-men-strong component for an upcoming offensive, reportedly to occur in late March/early April. The objective of this push is Melitopol/Mauriupol. A few days later, on 9MAR, Yevgeny Balitsky, the acting Governor of the Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, claimed that the UAF concentrated around 40,000 troops in northern parts of the oblast. We have not seen any evidence that such a build-up has occurred, which does not mean that it has not. However, we expect Russian and pro-Russian voices to increasingly warn about the prospects of a Ukrainian counteroffensive across Ukraine, particularly in the Zaporizihihia Oblast.
Probably in response to these circulating rumours about upcoming Ukrainian actions, a pro-Russian blogger claimed on Friday that elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army preempted the Ukrainian attack in the Orikhiv area. They struck “uncovered positions and depots, ” resulting in 500 Ukrainian dead and wounded.
The same blogger claimed on Thursday that Ukrainians entered Novodanylivka, previously in the “grey zone”. These attacks were later reportedly extended to Robotyne, but we understand that the village was not liberated.
Ukrainians also reportedly attacked Russian positions in Charivne and Mala Tokmachka.
Kherson direction and Crimea
The overall situation in the oblast did not undergo any changes.
The most important event last week pertained to the Ukrainian General Staff’s Thursday comment about the situation in Nova Khakovka. The UGS noted that having looted Ukrainian houses, Russians left the settlement. On Friday, the UGS retracted this assessment and asserted that opposing forces were still present in Nova Khakovka and that the initial statement was published due to incorrect use of available data.
Ukrainians conducted some limited reconnaissance-by-force operations and raids on islands on the Dnipro River delta. Skirmishes occurred southeast of Velykyi Potemkin Island and on the left river bank.
As we stated above, we see an increasing number of reports about Ukrainian preparations for a counteroffensive, even in the Kherson Oblast. Last week, Serhiy Khlan, the Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head, stated that Russians tripled the number of personnel in areas under their control in anticipation of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. On the one hand, a successful river-crossing operation would place Ukrainian units close to Crimea relatively quickly. On the other hand, given the complexities of conducting such an attack in such a contested environment, such a decision would be exceptionally risky. Nevertheless, through artillery strikes, Ukrainians want to force Russians to abandon their position near the river and redeploy deeper inland. On Tuesday, Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk claimed that their forces want to clear a 20 to 30-km strip of land on the left bank of the Dnipro River to protect the Ukrainian population from Russian artillery strikes.
Last week, Ukrainians attacked Russian forces in Crimea at least twice. Firstly, on 22MAR, footage emerged showing Russian forces shooting presumably on a maritime drone in Sevastopol Bay. Air defence over Sevastopol was also activated, reportedly in response to a drone attack. The Russian MoD later confirmed that three Ukrainian drones were destroyed. As a result of these strikes, all maritime traffic near Sevastopol was halted.
Prior to that, on 20MAR, explosions were reported in Dzhankoi in Crimea. Videos published on social media showed several explosions, reportedly caused by drone strikes. But, it is unclear where exactly they took place or what the subject of the attack was. Ukrainian military intelligence stated that explosions destroyed “Russian Kalibr NK” (NK: surface ship) missiles during their transportation by rail.
The city houses the 39th Helicopter Regiment of the 4th Air and Air Defence Army.
It is possible that in response to these actions, Russians reportedly conducted a missile strike on the Shkilnyy Airfield in Odesa City, destroying two hangars filled with weapons and equipment.
Outlook for the week of 27MAR-2APR
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
“We will not make any changes to our assessments on the Kharkiv Oblast. Although Russian artillery and missile attacks on the region will continue, the attackers will unlikely extend their territorial control.” This assessment was correct, as Russians made no progress in the region last week.
Score: 1/1
“The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast. Russians will unlikely capture new territory (one settlement and more) this week. Tactical fluctuations are, however, likely.” This prognosis was also accurate. Russians attacked at a reduced tempo and captured no new territories.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Kreminna area, chances are remote that Russians will achieve a breakthrough this week. Positional battles delivering some minor changes on the battlefield are likely.” This assessment was also correct. The battlefield likely fluctuated based on open-source reports, but, in general, the situation in this sector remained unchanged.
Score: 1/1
“We maintain that the Russians will continue to sustain an increased tempo of their attacks this week in the Donetsk Oblast. Their focus will again be placed on the Avdiivka, Mariinka, and Novobakhmutivka, and they will likely make some gains (capture one village or more) there.” Russians indeed continued ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast, but they made no confirmed gains.
Score: 0.5/1
“We assess that chances are even that Russians will capture more territory along the M03 road linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk. This probability score is because Russians are about to fight up towards hills north of Chasiv Yar, and we are currently unsure whether they can achieve this objective. It is unlikely that Russians will capture Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka next week, as the emphasis is clearly on taking over Bakhmut and areas along the M03 highway.” This prognosis was correct. Russians made no gains along the highway, and no progress was recorded north of the road.
Score: 1/1
“Regarding the Bakhmut area, it is likely that Russians will continue to progress within the city’s limits. We are particularly looking at the northern parts of Bakhmut. Given the attackers’ attempts to cross the river into the central parts of Bakhmut, we assess that there is roughly even chance that they will succeed in doing so this week. It is also likely that Russians will physically sever the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka. There is roughly even chance that they will capture Khromove.” This paragraph included several forecasts, but the general assessment was that Russians would progress in the discussed area. However, whereas they made incremental gains in the northern parts of Bakhmut, they made no progress in other parts of the sector.
Score: 0/1
“We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. Ukrainians will likely start conducting more ground attacks this week. It is also possible that their posture in the region has changed from defensive to the one displaying more offensive characteristics.” This prognosis was half correct. Although no major events occurred and the situation remained stable, the Ukrainian posture remained defensive.
Score: 0.5/1
“We forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.” This forecast was correct. Last week delivered no changes to the frontline and operations conducted.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” Last week delivered no changes in Belarus.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 7/9 (78%)
Next week’s forecast
We maintain our views on the situation in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian artillery and missile attacks will continue, but ground attacks will unlikely deliver territorial gains.
The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast. Last week Russian tempo of attacks was visibly reduced, further diminishing the chances of capturing new territories. As we have seen no indications suggesting a change in Russian posture in the region, we will continue to assess that Russians are highly unlikely to extend their gains (one settlement and more) this week.
Regarding the Kreminna area, in our view, chances are still remote that Russians will achieve a breakthrough in this sector. Positional battles delivering some minor changes on the battlefield are likely.
We maintain that the Russians will continue to sustain an increased tempo of their attacks this week in the Donetsk Oblast. Their focus will again be on the Avdiivka and areas west of Krasnohorivka. There is roughly even chance that Russians will capture one village or more in this part of Ukraine.
Last week only saw incremental Russian gains in Bakhmut. There has been a lot of talk in open source about Russians running out of steam in Bakhmut and the consequent exhaustion of their offensive potential. We think it is too early to make this conclusion. We will change our assessment if this week does not deliver any noteworthy changes. However, until then, we assess that Russians are likely to progress in Bakhmut, but there is roughly even chance that they will capture new territory near Khromove, Ivanivske, or in areas further north such as Orikhovo Vasylivka or Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka.
We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. Ukrainians will likely start conducting more ground attacks this week. It is also possible that their posture in the region has changed from defensive to the one displaying more offensive characteristics.
We forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.
We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.
Satellite Imagery Analysis
*!!!IMAGES BELOW CAN NOT BE SHARED PUBLICLY!!!*
We are sorry to say that despite our request, the images posted last time on Substack landed on Belarusian Telegram channels and then across Twitter. This is unacceptable. We only post them here because we trust you will not post them online elsewhere. If this happens again, I will refrain from posting any satellite imagery analyses in the future.
The 230th Combined-arms Training Ground Obuz-Lesnovsky, Baranovichi, Brest Region, Belarus
Airbus imagery acquired 19MAR shows a significant drawdown of Russian forces deployed at the 230th Combined-arms Training Ground Obuz-Lesnovsky, compared to the Airbus imagery obtained 06FEB
Imagery shows a significant reduction in the number of all vehicles, from almost 600 to 60. The removal of the field hospital indicates that Russian drills at the training range were completed.
On the other hand, a slightly increased number of tents in the field camp and vehicles still present at the range could suggest preparation for another deployment of Russian forces.