Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 21 October – 27 October 2023 (Weekly update)
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
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Key takeaways from last week’s developments
Last week saw both sides making small gains. Ukrainian forces liberated some terrain in the Kherson Oblast, while Russians remained offensively committed in the Avdiivka axis, where they progressed slightly at a high cost; Operationally and strategically, the past seven days brought no significant changes;
The overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged as Russians continued to strike Ukrainian civilian areas with artillery;
Russians maintained attacks in the northern parts of the Luhansk Oblast Direction (formally Kharkiv Oblast), where they captured some terrain. Their objective of reaching Kupyansk remains in place; no further changes occurred in other parts of the region;
Russian forces approached the rain line north of Avdiivka and pushed Ukrainian units from the slag heap area; Their small progress came at a very high cost in terms of manpower and equipment; Russians also launched other attacks across the Donetsk Oblast Direction, but without a significant impact on the frontline;
Marginal frontline changes occurred in the Southern Direction, where both sides captured some terrain; The overall outlook for the counteroffensive remains unchanged;
Ukrainian units expanded bridgeheads on the Dnipro’s left bank and continued to progress inland slowly;
Last week, Russians launched just two cruise missiles and 40 Shahed 131/136s. Altogether, 40 projectiles were destroyed as the intensity of their employments decreased;
Executive summary
Before we go into the current situation in Ukraine, let’s first look at cumulative numbers provided by the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS). They claimed that over the past seven days, Ukrainian units repelled more than 58 Russian attacks near Synkivka, Petropavlivka, and Ivanivka in the Kupyansk axis. In the Luhansk Oblast, the Ukrainian troops repelled 35 ground attacks near Nadiya, Serebrayansky forest and Bilohorivka. In the Donetsk Oblast, the UAF repelled 199 Russian attacks near Keramik, Stepove, Avdiivka, Tonen’ke, Opytne, Nevel’s’ke, Avdiivka, Mar’inka, Pobjeda and Novomykhailivka. In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, they repelled all Russian attacks (without specifying how many attacks there were).
These numbers accurately show where Moscow’s focus is. First and foremost, Russians are concentrated on cutting off Ukrainian forces in the Avdiivka area. Secondly, they continued to attack Ukrainian positions east of Kupyansk with the objective of reaching the Oskil River. Ukrainian sources claimed last week that the main goal is to reach the Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi settlement, which features a strategic railway junction. In fact, in the Avdiivka axis, Russians are also fighting to unblock the Yasinovata-Donetsk rail line.
In this context, the battles we are currently witnessing may not necessarily be called “an offenisve” in the classical sense. Russians could be fighting to improve their positions and logistics before proper offensives begin. Indeed, capturing both railway junctions is key to improving logistics.
But it would also imply that Russians are weeks, if not months, before they can fully use rail lines in both axes. In the Avdiivka area, if they begin to envelop Ukrainian forces west of the city, it may force Kyiv’s units to pull back, thus gaining Russians access to the junction. However, in the case of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Russians are still some 18 kilometres from the settlement. On top of that, if the objective is to be able to use the junction there, Russians would not only have to cross the Oskil River but capture Kupyansk or at least push Ukrainians more than 30 kilometres from the Oskil to prevent field artillery strikes on Russian trains and platforms at Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi. Based on the current tempo of Russian gains, it appears unlikely that Russians would be able to reach the Oskil this year. However, the frontline situation could dramatically change if more troops are committed to battle on this axis. To recap, Ukrainian officials claimed in early October that in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction, Russians had more than 110,000 men, about 1,085 tanks, almost 2,000 armoured combat vehicles, more than 700 artillery systems and 500 multiple launch rocket (MLR) systems. The capability thus exists to launch a major attack. However, it is unclear whether Russians could simultaneously undertake two major attacks (Kupyansk and Avdiivka), especially given high artillery consumption and the need to overcome fortifications and minefields.
The past week has shown that Russians increased their attacks’ intensity in the Donetsk Oblast. A part of this effort seeks to fix Ukrainian units. Still, these attacks confirm what Rochan warned about in the previous UCM issues: Russians were likely to regain the initiative during autumn and would press Ukrainian units across the battlefield. A part of this effort would undoubtedly rely on North Korean ammunition, which started to arrive at Tikhoretsk.
When it comes to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south, there are no big updates. The 47th Mechanised Brigade was reportedly redeployed from the Orikhiv Axis to the Avdiivka area, confirming where Ukrainian emphasis is in the southeastern parts of the front. Coupled with the redeployments of marine brigades to the Kherson Oblast from the Velyka Novosilka axis, the Ukrainian presence in the south does not feature sufficient capabilities to achieve a breakthrough. It also appears that the Ukrainian focus has shifted from the south to defensive operations near Avdiivka, Kupyansk, and cross-river attacks in the Kherson Oblast. Last week, Ukrainians liberated some ten sq km2 on Dnipro’s left bank and expanded two bridgeheads. However, there is still a threat that if Russians deploy large forces, Ukrainians could be pushed back towards Dnipro. Likewise, we also do not assess that with the currently deployed forces, Ukrainians could make significant gains in land, and a substantially larger effort would be needed to move past Oleshky or Nova Khakovka.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
As promised last week, we have added more charts to complement the text below. Previously, we looked at the timeline of changes in the number of Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. From this update, we will provide a breakdown of these units per type. We hope it will be much easier to pick up changes in specific directions that could indicate a major event could occur. We need to reiterate two important caveats. Firstly, we attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units for which we don’t know their current whereabouts. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides as well.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past week. According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Pershotravneve, Synkivka, Dvorichna, Borova, Hatyshche, Budarky, Kurylivka, Pletenivka and Zybine. Also, on Saturday (21OCT), Russian artillery struck Kupyansk, where it damaged civil infrastructure.
A Russian source claimed on Monday (23OCT) that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were building fortifications in the northern parts of the Kharkiv region, specifically along the Vovchans’kto Kharkiv route.
No cross-border land attacks occurred.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Last week delivered no confirmed frontline changes in the region, although Russian attacks continued in the northern part of the Luhansk Direction.
Ukrainian bloggers wrote on Saturday (21OCT) that Russians had increased their attacks in many areas in the Luhansk Oblast. They added that almost all Ukrainian gains made by the 95th Separate Air Assault Brigade throughout the summer were lost since the start of autumn (Rochan places this brigade east of Kupyansk). These alleged Russian gains further confirmed that Moscow is determined to continue attacks in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction. The source also added that recently, Russian combat operations had shifted from the southern (Zaporizhzhia) to the east direction (Bakhmut-Avdiivka) areas. The source believed that the initiative in the autumn-winter campaign would be on the Russian side. At the same time, Ukrainian forces would move into the defensive, which aligns with Rochan’s medium-term assessment. The source also claimed that, in recent weeks, the employment of Storm-Z units had dropped significantly. The losses incurred by the Russians were enormous, but still, they were not significant on the scale of the country.
Yuriy Fedorenko, commander of a UAV strike company of the 92nd Separate Mechanised Brigade (now 92nd Assault Brigade), claimed that one Russian group of soldiers could use 50 FPV drones per day. The UAF did not have such a resource. Indeed, the biggest difference between Russian and Ukrainian use of FPVs was their number. Ukrainians would only launch FPVs when they had primary and secondary targets confirmed to ensure a strike would occur. On the other hand, Russians deploy FPVs without pre-determined targets. They constantly fly over the battlefield; if there is no hit, another drone is deployed.
Denys Yaroslavskyi, a Ukrainian commander of an intelligence unit, claimed on Tuesday (24OCT) that Moscow’s objective is to capture Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, which is an urban-type settlement on the left bank of the Oskil River. It is also a strategic railway junction. To this end, Russians had been bombing river crossings near Kupyansk to limit Ukrainian support for the settlement and cut off ground lines of communications.
Also on Tuesday (24OCT), a Russian source said that Russian troops continued their attacks on Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk. Over the past few days, the Russian forces had dislodged the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade forces from several strongholds through localised attacks supported by artillery, which reportedly resulted in significant Ukrainian losses. Ukrainian Territorial Defence units and the 40th Artillery Brigade were mining the approaches to the forward lines to complicate the Russian forces’ advance. The source also added that Ukrainian reinforcements began to arrive to strengthen the front lines in anticipation of a new phase of the Russian offensive. Unidentified Ukrainian units have been sent to Kupyansk from the Soledar direction and Zhytomyr Oblast. Also, 200 men from the 4th Brigade of the Operational Assignment (also known as 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade “Rubizh”), which is a National Guard brigade, and 300 men from the 15th Border Guard unit of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service were deployed to positions in Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka and Stelmakhivka.
According to a Russian source, on Sunday (22OCT), Russians continued to conduct an offensive near Synkivka and Pertopavlivka, but no detailed information about these attacks was provided. The source also claimed that the UAF tried to counterattack in this area. Ukrainian sources did not report any frontline changes. On Monday (23OCT), the Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian troops continued to implement “stabilisation measures” near Lyman Pershyi. The source, however, failed to provide detailed information.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Ivanivka, Kyslivka and Krohmalne. The same pertains to Dvorichna, Svatove, and Novoselivske.
According to Ukrainian sources, battles continued near Raihorodka as of Sunday (22OCT), but the source failed to provide any detailed information. Russian sources did not report any changes/attacks. On Monday (23OCT), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that the Ukrainian troops also conducted stabilisation measures near Raihorodka. On the other hand, the Russian journalist wrote on Monday (23OCT) that the UAF had counterattacked near Raihorodka, and part of the Russian positions moved into the “grey zone”.
Russian forces reportedly continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Makiivka as of Sunday (22OCT), but no further information about this was forthcoming. But no further information was provided. Russian sources did not report changes/attacks. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near the Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka areas. Also, no changes occurred near Nevske, Terny, Yampolivka and Torske.
No significant changes occurred in the Kreminna area. According to the Russian source, on Sunday (22OCT), positional battles continued west of Kreminna, but no changes were recorded. On Saturday (21OCT), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russians significantly increased pressure south of Dibrova, but it is unclear what these measures involved. On Monday (23OCT), a Russian journalist said that positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest and near Dibrova, but no frontline changes were reported.
On Thursday (26OCT), a Ukrainian soldier asserted that near Kreminna, Russian Storm-Z units lost 60 of their 100 stormtroopers in a single assault in a few hours as a result of Ukrainian artillery fire. Their objectives were not met.
No changes occurred near Bilohorivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units repelled 53 Ukrainian attacks by the 14th, 32nd, 41st, 43rd, 54th, 67th, 115th Mechanised Brigade, 57th Motorised Brigade and 68th Jaeger Brigade near Nadiya, Synkivka, Ivanivka, Novojehorivka, Serhiivka and Tymkivka(?). in the Kupyansk direction. Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber carried out air strikes on Ukrainian concentration areas of units of the 41st, 43rd Mechanised Brigades and 57th Motorised Brigades, the 15th Border Guard Detachment and the 7th Separate Rifle Battalion near Kivsharivka, Hlushkivka, Pischane, Nevske and Stepova Novoselivka. In addition, heavy flamethrower systems struck Ukrainian manpower in the hideouts of the 32nd Mechanised Brigade near Tymkivka(?).
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units repelled 40 Ukrainian attacks by the assault groups of the 21st, 24th, 51st, 53rd, 63rd, 67th, 110th Mechanised Brigades and the 1st Special Purpose Brigade in the Lyman direction. Russian artillery struck Ukrainian concentration areas of the 21st and, 63rd, 67th Mechanised Brigades’ near Torske, Serebryansky forest and Yampolivka. Also, the 12th Special Forces Brigade came under Russian artillery fire near Hryhorivka. A field ammunition depot of the 53rd Mechanised Brigade of the UAF was destroyed near Pervomaiske.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Russian forces continued attacks near Avdiivka. They achieved minor successes and advanced slightly. However, operationally, these gains had no impact on the overall situation. No frontline changes occurred in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast Direction.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. Ukrainians claimed on Saturday (21OCT) that Russians had become more active near Vasyukivka, but it is unclear what specifically this change invoked. However, two days later (23OCT), a Russian source said that Russian troops had captured the village by recapturing previously lost positions and taking new strongholds. However, Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks near this settlement. We have also seen no visual evidence confirming his development. As such, we have not made any frontline changes in the area.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Rozdolivka, Fedorivka and Vesele.
On Sunday (22OCT), supported by artillery, Russian troops reportedly counterattacked near Khromove and near Bohdanivka. Ukrainian bloggers confirmed that Russians launched attacks near these settlements, adding that they had increased pressure in the Bakhmut axis’ northern flank and achieved partial success during these counterattacks.
On Monday (23OCT), a Russian journalist claimed that the Russian forces counterattacked from the Berkhivka area and managed to push back Ukrainian positions by 1.5 km. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks in this area. However, the following day (24OCT), Ukrainian sources said that Russians had advanced in the forest belt northeast of Khromove.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka.
No changes were reported in Bakhmut.
Moving further south, on Sunday (22OCT), Russians reportedly attempted to recapture positions near Andriivka. The source, however, failed to provide any detailed information about the attack. Another Russian source also claimed on Sunday that battles on the line Klishchiivka – Andriivka – Kurdyumivka continued, adding that the Ukrainian troops couldn’t break through the railway line. The source also said that the UAF couldn’t establish complete control over Klishchiivka and Andriivka and break towards Kurdyumovka. Another Russian source added that the intensity of Ukrainian attacks recently decreased somewhat in this area. Ukrainian source said on Sunday that battles continued near these settlements but failed to provide any detailed information. On the other hand, the Ukrainian soldier claimed on Tuesday (23OCT) that the front line had long been behind the railway. The soldier also said that Ukrainian troops were trying to outplay the Russians regarding resource allocation along the entire frontline.
The same source claimed on Monday (23OCT) that the UAF had liberated about six square kilometres south of the Bakhmut sector over the last week, although we have seen no visual evidence confirming the change.
Ukrainian bloggers wrote on Monday (23OCT) that the Russians had partial success near the T-0504 road, attacking from Bakhmut towards Ivanivske. The source said that if the Russians continued to pressure in this direction, it would create problems for attacking Ukrainian forces (presumably operating near Klishchiivka).
Russian sources did not report changes/attacks. No changes occurred near Bila Hora and Niu-York. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions around Avdiivka throughout the week. On Sunday, a Ukrainian source said that Russians launched a large-scale attack on the slag heap. At that time, the Ukrainian 110th Mechanised Brigade published footage showing Russians attacking using three armoured units from three directions. The source claimed that the first convoy consisted of more than 13 tanks, and armoured vehicles were seen moving toward Vesele. A second armoured convoy, the same size, was moving towards the slag heap from the north and attacked head-on through the road between Krasnohorivka and the Ukrainian stronghold. The 3rd Russian armoured unit was detected west of Krasnohorivka, heading south to attack the Ukrainian left flank. Some Russian sources claimed following the attack that Russians had managed to establish control over the heap. Around Tuesday, a Russian flag was planted on the heap, but a Ukrainian drone promptly destroyed it. At that time, the area probably remained in the grey zone in that Russian presence on the heap was only temporary. Russian losses were substantial and included up to 16 BTR armoured personnel carriers, 15 BMP infantry vehicles, seven tanks, one MRAP, one UR 77 demining equipment, and two MT-LB armoured fighting vehicles.
On Monday (23OCT), the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russian troops had advanced west of Krasnohorivka and came close to the railway line near Stepove. The bloggers added that the Russians had stopped using heavy equipment and were simply overwhelming Ukrainian positions with men. Russians also reportedly had enough manpower for this approach.
Indeed, the Ukrainian soldier who fights in the Avdiivka direction claimed on Monday (23OCT) that the Russians continued to push new reserves into the battle. The Russians were attacking in groups of 30 personnel, but due to Ukrainian artillery strikes, only 5-10 soldiers reached designated positions. As a result, Russians would send another group every 20 minutes.
Russian source, on Tuesday (24OCT), claimed that there was “total activity” of Russian forces on the Donetsk front. The Russians continued to conduct an offensive near Stepove and managed to reach the railway. The source also said that Russian troops captured the heap. As a result of heavy battles, at least one battalion from the Ukrainian 47th Mechanised Brigade battalion was reportedly transferred to Ocheretyne and Novobakhmutivka from the Orikhiv axis. The Russian source added that Ukrainian losses were growing, claiming that 1,000 Ukrainians were killed and 60 pieces of equipment destroyed (unclear in what timeframe).
On Wednesday (25OCT), a Russian source said that Russian troops were already operating over the railway, but this development was not independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources did not report changes. On the other hand, a Ukrainian source claimed on Thursday (26OCT) that Ukrainian troops destroyed a Russian infantry fighting vehicle west of Krasnohorivka. The source added Ukrainians had their positions near the site of the explosions, meaning that either the vehicle was destroyed by a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group operating behind the frontline or Russians were pushed back.
When it comes to Avdiivka, Russians attempted to attack the city from the south on Sunday (22OCT). On the same day, the Ukrainian source published a video claiming that the Ukrainian Bradley-equipped 47th Separate Mechanised Brigade was indeed operating in the Avdiivka axis.
Another Ukrainian source also confirmed this development, adding that many units were being redeployed to Donetsk Oblast from different directions. On Monday (23OCT), a Ukrainian journalist claimed that Russians couldn’t pass through Ukrainian minefields and engineering barriers. The logistical routes to support the city, which the Russians tried to cut off, continued functioning. However, the situation continued to be complicated.
Vitaliy Barabash, the Head of the Avdiivka City Military Administration, claimed on Monday (23OCT) that Russian troops were trying to cut the road to Avdiivka. He said that the logistics were very complicated. The 22-kilometre road to the city was constantly under fire, day and night. This made it very difficult to evacuate personnel and civilians and bring aid and supplies in. If weather permitted, Russians would launch Orlan-10 UAV to monitor the road, and any military presence would immediately result in an artillery strike.
Oleksandr Shtupun, the spokesman for the joint press centre of the Tauride (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Defence Forces, claimed on Thursday (26OCT) that since the beginning of the Russian’s active offensive near Avdiivka, Moscow had lost more than 5,000 men in killed and wounded, as well as up to 400 pieces of armoured vehicles.
According to the Russian source, in the southern parts of the Avdiivka axis, on Sunday (22OCT), Russian troops tried to attack near Sjeverne. The source failed to provide any detailed information about this development. On Sunday, Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians achieved partial success near Vodyane. On Tuesday (24OCT), a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops tried to counterattack from the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant and also near Opytne and Pervomaiske. The source said that Ukrainian units tried to occupy the „grey zone” but failed due to Russian artillery fire.
Another Russian source claimed on Thursday (26OCT) that the road through Lastochkyne was under Russian fire control, which means that no ammunition could be transported through it. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks near Tonenke during the past week.
According to the Russian journalist, on Sunday (22OCT), Russian forces continued attacks near Mariinka and Novomykhailivka. On Monday (23OCT), Ukrainian journals claimed that Russians became more active near Mariinka. Indeed, since 18OCT, the number of Russian ground attacks doubled, including up to 50 daily kamikaze drone attacks. The journalist believes that, by becoming more active here, the Russians want to draw attention away from Avdiivka, located 40 km northeast of Mariinka. On Tuesday (24OCT), the Russian source said that after artillery preparation, Russians attacked Ukrainian positions near Pobieda. It is unclear whether they made any progress.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks near Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled 12 Ukrainian attacks and hit 23 concentrations areas of the 77th Airmobile Brigade, 5th Assault Brigade and 10th Mountain Assault Brigades near Kurduymivka, Klishchiiivka, Soledar and Berkhivka. Also, Russian troops, supported by aviation and artillery, struck Ukrainian concentration areas near Vasiukivka, Andriivka, Rozdolivka and Kurdyumivka. The Russian units, supported by aviation, artillery fire and heavy flame-throwing systems, repelled one Ukrainian attack near Bohdanivka. Also, Russian fire was directed at the temporary deployment points of the 53rd Mechanised Brigade and the 38th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment.
Southern Ukraine direction
The overall frontline situation in the Southern Direction did not change, although Russians may have progressed slightly in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
Velyka Novosilka axis
Russians reportedly attacked Ukrainian positions near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske on Sunday (22OCT), but it is unclear whether this led to any territorial gains. Two days later (24OCT), the same source again claimed that Russians attacked in the same areas but were unsuccessful.
However, on Wednesday (25OCT), Russian troops were reportedly gradually pushing through Ukrainian lines. Following the withdrawal of Ukrainian marine brigades, the core of Ukrainian forces in the region comprises the 118th, 127th and 128th Territorial Defence Brigades (TDBs).
The Russian offensive was coming from the Pryyutne direction along the forest belts to the north near the Balka Grusheva(?), where they achieved some successes. Due to a manpower shortage, the UAF relied on small drones and mortars to attack Russian positions. Another Russian source claimed on Wednesday that Russian units had indeed advanced near Pryyutne.
No changes occurred near Staromaiorske and Urozhaine and near Levadne and Pryyutne.
The Orikhiv axis
According to the Ukrainian bloggers, battles continued near Novoprokopivka and Verbove as of Sunday (22OCT) but led to no frontline changes. The Russian source also added on 22OCT that positional battles continued along the Kopani–Verbove line, but no changes near these villages were recorded. On Monday (23OCT), Ukrainians reportedly attacked Russian positions near Kopani, Novoprokopivka and increased pressure on Verbove, but it is unclear what this involved. On the other hand, Russians increased pressure on defending Ukrainian units near Robotyne and Novorokopivka at the start of the week.
On Tuesday (24OCT), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops attacked towards Novoprokopivka but failed to provide detailed information about this development. The source also said that the Ukrainian forces did not engage in any active offensive action. However, the Ukrainian source said a sizable Russian attack near Novoprokopivka was repelled on Tuesday.
On Tuesday (24OCT), a Ukrainian soldier from the 46th Airmobile Brigade explained the situation on the Robotyne – Vervove line. He claimed the battles continued, but there was neither combat nor a moral victory over the Russians here. He added that only introducing new and fresh reserves could radically change the situation. He also noted that Russians were trying to stretch Ukrainian forces along the entire frontline. He added that the overall situation is unlikely to change without superiority in manpower and equipment and even more so without air support in this area.
The tactical side is that the Russians are dug in, settled down, and prepared their positions. The critical heights in the area are under Russian control. At the moment, there was a stalemate.
No changes occurred near Pyatykhatky. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South Donetsk direction, Russian units, supported by artillery, repelled a Ukrainian attack near Pryyutne. Four attempts to rotate Ukrainian troops near Levadne, Urozhaine, and north of Volodymyrivka were disrupted by Russian artillery fire. Also, an attempt to deliver ammunition to Ukrainian positions near Novomykhailivka was disrupted. Russian operational-tactical and army aviation, missile troops and artillery conducted five attacks on the Ukrainian concentration areas of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, 79th Airborne Assault Brigade, 58th Motorised Infantry Brigade and 128th, 102nd Territorial Defence Brigade near Vodyane, Novomykhailivka, Urozhaine, Shevchenko, Vuhledar and Malynivka.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
Over the past seven days, elements of UAF slightly expanded their presence on Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast, working on creating conditions that would enable the deployment of additional follow-on forces.
On Sunday (22OCT), Oleksandr Prokudin, Ukrainian Governor of the Kherson Oblast, claimed that Russians launched 12 guided missiles at the right bank of the Kherson region overnight.
The Ukrainian journalist posted a video on Sunday (22OCT) of the Ukrainian military being trained to cross rivers using German-made M3 Amphibious Rig vehicles, probably to highlight that Ukrainians were training to force Dnipro.
When it comes to the frontline changes, on Monday (23OCT), the Russian source said that Ukrainians advanced towards Krynky. However, a Russian counterattack with artillery and aviation support pushed the Ukrainian troops out of most of their positions near the village, practically forcing them back to the river bank.
The source claimed that the “Katran” strike group command moved additional units to Frolov Island. Also, four Ukrainian assault groups of the 88th Battalion, 35th Separate Marine Brigade, were transferred from Mykylske to the northeastern part of Oleshkinskyi Island, where they dispersed and set up observation posts. A group from the 36th Separate Marine Brigade arrived near the Antonivsky railway bridge. From there, another attempt to break through to Pishchanivka and Pidstepne was planned with the forces of the 35th Separate Marine Brigade. The source believed that, despite the losses, the Ukrainians planned to continue pushing through the Russian Forces’ defences on the left bank. Judging by the activity of the Marines at both the Krynky and Pishchanivka sections, the attack could seek to capture and seize a larger settlement, such as Radensk.
The Ukrainian source claimed on Monday (23OCT) that judging by the footage of a Russian drone, the Ukrainian Forces had taken a significant Russian fortification north of the Pishchanivka. The source said the Russians have also established defence lines here, although not as many as in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
Indeed, the Russian journalist asserted on Monday (23OCT) that the Ukrainian forces had pulled up reserves on the islands and again tried to break through to Poima and Pishchanivka with artillery support.
Another Russian blogger claimed on Tuesday (24OCT) that the Ukrainian forces, supported by artillery, tried to break through to the left bank near Pishchanivka and Pidstepne. Another Russian source claimed on Tuesday that the Ukrainian Forces’ main strike was planned from Hola Prystan’s direction. The Ukrainians were evacuating the civilian population on the right side of the Dnipro River opposite Hola Prystan. The source claimed that all Ukrainian actions east of Oleshky performed diversionary missions.
The Russian source said on Wednesday (25OCT) that Ukrainian assault groups of 35th, 36th and 38th Marine Brigades were transferred to various parts of the Oleshkinskyi Island and that the Ukrainians had gained a foothold at the crossroads near Dachi. They started moving towards Pishchanivka – Poima and Pidstepne – Kudasovo(?). The source added that all Ukrainian attacks failed due to Russian artillery fires. Russian Marines of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade continued clearing the Krynky village. Ukrainian troops were seriously entrenched in the village, but over the past 24 hours, Russian fighters almost succeeded in pushing Ukrainian units out of the settlement.
Russian journalist claimed on Wednesday (25OCT) that the Ukrainian forces, supported by artillery, continued their offensive attempts near Pishchanivka – Poima. The goal was to break through to the junction of the M-14 and M-17 motorways. He added that Russians were indeed attacking Ukrainian positions near Krynky, where Ukrainian marines managed to establish a bridgehead.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 515 aircraft (+11), 253 helicopters (+2), 8,312 UAVs (+208), 441 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 12,960 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+182), 1,169 MLRS launchers (+3), 6,837 field artillery guns and mortars (+56), as well as 14,684 units of special military vehicles (+221).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 297,680 personnel (+5,620), 5,145 tanks (+98), 9,726 armoured combat vehicles (+169), 7,162 artillery systems (+150) and 834 MLR systems (+12), 556 anti-aircraft systems (+8), 320 aircraft (0) and 324 helicopters (0), and 5,390 UAVs (+64), 1,538 cruise missiles (+3), 20 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 9,513 vehicles and fuel tanks (+143), and 1,011 special vehicles (+26).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Regarding Russian missile and kamikaze drone strikes, the past seven days showed a decrease in their use.
Ukrainian Air Force Command reported only two missile strikes. They occurred on 22 and 23OCT and involved a single Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missile. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down both missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported 36 battlefield missile strikes, compared to 52 during the previous week.
Over the course of the past seven days, Russians launched five Shahed 131/136 strikes, which involved 40 vehicles. Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 38 (95% of the total). More importantly, the intensity of their use decreased significantly. Three weeks ago, Russians averaged around 23 vehicles employed per strike. This number now stands at seven.
The intensity of Russian ground attacks remained high, although it is possible that it reached a short-term peak. Last week, the Russians launched 100 attacks on Friday (20OCT). Since then, the number decreased to 55 on Monday (23OCT), before rebounding to 70-80 throughout the week’s reminder. Russians now average 79 ground attacks per day, which is mostly driven by assaults conducted near Avdiivka and Kupyansk.
Outlook for the week of 14OCT-20OCT2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will capture one village or more. We expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.”This prognosis was also correct. Russians did not capture a village, while Ukrainians were focused on defensive operations.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, Russians will likely make some territorial gains (Klischiivka area). Without additional troop deployments, they are unlikely to capture one village or more over the next seven days in the Avdiivka area. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are unlikely to progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. It is also highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” We were right about Ukrainian actions, which are becoming increasingly defensive. However, Russian gains in the Klischiivka area were not independently verified, while Moscow did not capture a village or more in the entire region.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow, if non-existent. Ukrainians are highly unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka. But, we also add that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis. We expect no Ukrainian gains in this area.” Ukrainians made no gains in the Southern Direction, while Russians reportedly progressed slightly in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank. But we cannot assess whether they will decide to 1) deploy more forces 2) expand the cross-river attacks horizontally.” Ukrainians indeed maintained and expanded their presence on Dnipro’s left bank. And indeed, both events (deployment of additional forces and the expansion of horizontal attacks) occurred.
Score: 0.5/1
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 28OCT-4NOV2023
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area, but even then, we believe that they are unlikely to progress south of Bakhmut. 2) We assess that Russians are likely to make gains in the Avdiivka axis, and it is possible that they will reach Stepove. There is a roughly even chance that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. But, we also assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance that they will capture some land, but we think they will unlikely capture a village or more.
I am watching the Dnipro with interest, reading the US Army bridging ops manual, and building an essay on the history and historiography of bridging ops. This material is a good resource for understanding the state of the battlefield so I can make the writing applicable, thanks.