Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 22 May – 28 May (Weekly update)
Situational report 22 May – 28 May
BLUF: The situation in Ukraine remained largely unchanged last week. Most fighting occurred near Masutivka in the Kherson Oblast, Bilohorivka in the Luhansk Oblast, near Bakhmut and Avdiivka in the Donetsk Oblast and on islands on the Dnipro Delta. The frontline, however, barely shifted. Russians significantly increased the intensity of kamikaze drone strikes.
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
The previous week delivered little frontline changes in Ukraine; Most battles continued to occur in the Donetsk Oblast, where both sides conducted limited ground attacks; The frontline in other parts of the country barely moved; On the surface, the situation appears to have stabilised, but many indicators suggest we are getting closer to a big Ukrainian push;
No changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast, where Russians made no progress despite deploying Storm-Z troops;
In the Luhansk Oblast, Russians were mainly focused on the Bilohorivka area, where they made some unconfirmed gains; However, all Russian attacks were repelled in other parts of the region;
In the Donetsk Oblast, Russian attacks brought no frontline changes; Ukrainians may have progressed north of Avdiivka; A Russian attack on a dam on the Karlivka Reservoir will probably have a very limited impact on Ukrainian ability to support their forces near Pervomaiske and Marinka;
Having captured 99 % of Bakhmut, Wagner forces reportedly started transferring the responsibility for the city’s occupation to DPR forces; Ukrainians claimed to have made gains on northern and southern flanks, but many claims remained uncorroborated;
The situation in the Zaporizhihia Oblast did not change as both sides’ activities continued to be subdued; Russian sources claimed Ukrainian units had been deployed to staging areas, while Kyiv launched several deep strikes on Russian rear areas;
Ukrainians probably made some gains on the Dnipro Delta islands in the Kherson Oblast;
Although we noted no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Minsk and Moscow signed an agreement on the deployment of nuclear warheads to Belarus;
Russians stepped up drone attacks, while Ukrainians reported a significant increase in the number of Russian field artillery systems destroyed;
A decision to provide F-16s to Ukraine could increase its air force’s capability in air-to-air combat, but they are only likely to be delivered to Ukraine in Q42023 at the earliest;
Russian Volunteer Corps launched a raid into Russia in the Belgorod Oblast, once again undermining Moscow’s assertions that the border is secure and that its ability to protect Russian territory;
Executive summary
Although from operational and strategic perspectives, last week did not bring any significant changes in Ukraine, both sides stepped up efforts to degrade OPFOR capabilities.
Wagner forces reportedly started pulling back from Bakhmut, where they are to be replaced by Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) formations, which were in turn diverted from Avdiivka. It still remains unclear what will happen to Wagner, but attacks towards Chasiv Yar appear unlikely, but so does the total withdrawal from Ukraine. In fact, we expect the organisation to reappear in other parts of the front. At the same time, Russians stepped up missile drone strikes on targets across Ukraine. 48 Shahed 131/136 drones were intercepted two weeks ago, compared to 65 last week. On the night of 28/29MAY alone, Russians launched 54, and Kyiv claimed 52 were downed, bringing the total to 117 interceptions between 22-29MAY. Ukrainians claimed that Russians recently significantly improved the effectiveness of their missile attacks as some strikes affected Ukraine’s war effort. However, as Kyiv refuses to provide any information about the damage caused by these strikes, it is difficult to assess the scale of the devastations or their long-term impact on Ukraine’s war posture. Nevertheless, it means that Russians adjusted to the threat posed by the Ukrainian new air defence umbrella and are at least partly able to circumvent western-supplied systems.
Last week, Russians also hit a dam on the Karlivka Reservoir. Russians probably sought to degrade the Ukrainian ability to sustain their forces between Pervomaiske and Marinka. The most recent reports from this area indicate that this objective was not attained.
Ukrainians continued operations around Bakhmut. Official Ukrainian military sources claimed daily advances. However, there is little visual evidence to support these assertions. We assess that Ukrainians did not significantly strengthen their forces near Bakhmut, let alone with units equipped with Western-supplied kit. It means that Kyiv does not plan any significant actions around Bakhmut in the near future. It also confirms our last week’s view on General Syrsky’s comments about the operational environment of Bakhmut – not only doesn’t Kyiv have enough forces in the area for this mission, but the currently deployed forces lack heavy armour and momentum to pursue such a goal. While we do not exclude the possibility of Ukrainian gains around Bakhmut, Kyiv is far away from retaking the initiative in this area.
Speaking of the initiative, Ukrainians made some gains in the Cherkessky Island in the Kherson Oblast, on the river’s left bank. This progress indeed brings them closer to crossing Dnipro. That said, the terrain in this particular area is particularly hard for conducting and sustaining attacks on Russia-controlled parts of the Kherson Oblast, so it is not yet obvious whether Kyiv’s ambition is to establish a permanent presence near Zabaryne. These attacks could be a part of battle-shaping efforts forcing Russians to defend the parts of the front where the counteroffensive would not occur. We expect mixed signals from Ukrainians, although the focus on southern parts of Ukraine is clear. Last week, Ukrainians launched several missiles on Russian targets in Mariupol and Berdyans’k, probably hitting command centres, logistics facilities, and troop deployment areas.
But the most important, yet short-lived, event occurred in the Belgorod Oblast, where the Russian Volunteer Corps (click here for more information about the corps) personnel launched a raid on the border crossing near Kozinka on 22 MAY. Not only did Ukrainians capture the crossing, but they also pushed towards Glotovo, with smoke seen also seen over Gora Podol, some seven kilometres from the border. If Gora Podol was indeed reached, then the attackers were some ten kilometres from the Belgorod-22 national-level nuclear storage site (see information about Belarus). Following the incursion, the area under RVC control was announced as “demilitarised”. Ukrainians denied involvement in the attack, while Sergei Shoigu, Russian Minister of Defence, claimed that the attackers lost 70+ men during the raid. However, our sources on the Ukrainian side stated that the RVC troops lost fewer than ten men.
By any count, the attack was “light”. RVC sent in at least two tanks, an APC and several other lightly armoured vehicles, such as US-supplied MRAP vehicles. But it was enough to send shockwaves across the Russian political-military establishment and social media. This led to bizarre scenes where the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, personally led Russian troops into action near Glotovo. On the civilian front, Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced the creation of seven territorial defence battalions for a total of 3,000 men.
Interestingly, it had been the second time Gladkov made this commitment (previously in December), so failures to respond to the growing threat of cross-border attacks were likely common. In the meantime, regional authorities spent more than USD132 million to construct fortifications in the Belgorod Oblast to hinder the movement of Ukrainian forces in the oblast. However, while “dragon’s teeth” are good against tanks, their utility in stopping fast-moving MRAP vehicles that can bypass fortifications at speed is questionable. Lastly, the attack confirmed another Russian weakness. The border areas are poorly defended by regular Russian units. Whether the raid will result in the redeployment of some forces and capabilities to the border remains to be seen. But to deter similar attacks in the future, Moscow will need to deploy battalions across the entire border, from Novye Yurkovichi to Verigovka. It is unlikely there is a free capacity for such missions.