Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 23 December – 29 December 2023
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments
Russians continued to advance in Ukraine; Although in terms of territorial gains, Russians captured a similar area as two weeks ago, the intensity of their ground attacks was reduced. It is too early to say whether this is the beginning of a larger operational pause or just a regrouping;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast; Cross-border infiltration operations also continued;
Russians made marginal gains towards Kupyansk as the overall situation in the Luhansk Oblast did not change;
Russians progressed near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, while Ukrainians retook some land near Vuhledar;
Russians again captured some terrain near Robotyne; the overall situation in the region did not change;
Ukrainians maintained their limited presence on Dnipro’s left bank; The shooting down of three SU-34s decreased the intensity of Russian air strikes, but air operations are unlikely to cease; Last week, Ukrainian missiles also destroyed a large landing ship in Crimea, another significant blow to Russian maritime and air defence posture;
On Thursday, Russians launched the second-largest air and missile attack on Ukraine; They targeted civilian and residential areas, but also Ukrainian missile and drone production facilities;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 44 Russian attacks (47 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 43 Russian attacks (no change) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 175 Russian ground attacks (261 two and 344 three weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian Forces repelled 22 Russian attacks (51 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched 44 air strikes on the Russian equipment and personnel concentration areas, one ammunition depot, and five anti-aircraft missile system sites. Ukrainian missile troops hit six artillery systems, five command posts, 12 equipment and personnel concentration areas, eight ammunition depots, and three anti-aircraft missile systems.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated some ten square kilometres (compared to two and a half two weeks ago) of land, while Russians captured around 27 square kilometres (no change compared to the previous period). Although we maintain our assessment that the Ukrainian ability to make gains is very limited, it is also noteworthy that last week saw a significant decline in Russian ground attacks. In their centre of gravity near Avdiivka, Russian assaults decreased by 50% over the past two weeks, while the Bakhmut area saw no changes. Whether this signals the exhaustion of Russian offensive potential, a short pause, or the beginning of a longer recess is unclear at this stage. We nevertheless assess that Russians will continue to attack Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Robotyne, even if the intensity of these attacks declines due to shortages in manpower and equipment. Events that unfolded last week also appear to have contradicted what we wrote in the previous monitor issue. Namely, we assessed that Russians could “sustain the current tempo of attacks for the next few weeks”. Last week’s decline was significant, but the next week will show whether it was short-lived.
Apart from ground operations, last week featured three other important events.
The shooting down of Russian Su-34s
Firstly, on Friday (22DEC), the Ukrainian Air Force command claimed to have shot down five Su-34 medium-range fighter-bomber/strike aircraft, four of which were over southern Ukraine. We understand these aircraft were conducting bombing missions using FAB-family UMPK (Unified Module for Gliding and Guidance) bombs, especially aimed at Ukrainian positions in Krynky and around Robotyne. The first Russian attack using such capability occurred on 24MAR2023. A week later, the spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force, Yuriy Ihnat, labelled KAB bombs a new threat. Since late March, Russian bomb strikes started popping across a wider front, from the Sumy and Cherikhiv to the Kherson Oblasts, although, at that time, they were still sporadic and predominantly concentrated on Zaporizhihia and Kherson regions. Ihnat claimed on 17APR2023, that Russians launched about 20 guided bombs daily across Ukraine, while Kyiv lacked capabilities to address this threat. In early November, Ihnat stated that Russians increased the intensity of guided bomb strikes, which were delivered by Su-34s and Su-35s and that they were occurring across the entire front. At the same time, the number of bombs employed daily increased to 50. Inhat recognised that the only way to suppress such strikes was to limit the operations of Russian strike aircraft.
A month later, Ihnat asserted that there had been cases of Russians using about 100 guided bombs per day.
In this context, on 22DEC, the Ukrainian Air Force reportedly shot down three Su-34s in the southern parts of the country. Two more aircraft were hit in the Donetsk Oblast and the Mariupol area. A Su-30 was also downed over the Black Sea. Kyiv did not provide any information about how the 22DEC event transpired. However, it has been widely speculated that Ukrainians brought Patriot SAM batteries closer to the front, which allowed them to engage aircraft flying straight from Crimea.
Regardless of how Ukrainians operated, already on 23DEC, the Ukrainian Operational Command “South” claimed that Russian aviation had reduced the use of guided aerial bombs in the south. A Ukrainian source further added that Russians launched three times fewer strikes than a day before. However, we understand that Russian KAB strikes never fully ceased. On Thursday (28DEC), Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, claimed that the Russians continued to use guided bombs. On Wednesday (27DEC), for instance, Russians launched seven bombs on Ukrainian infrastructure on Dnipro’s right bank in an attempt to cut off supplies to Ukrainian forces fighting near Krynky on the left bank. Humeniuk noted that there were no significant changes in the tactics of launching KABs but a change in the “density of these strikes”.
To sum up, a week after Ukrainians reportedly downed three Russian Su-34s, Kyiv observed a decrease in the number of guided bomb strikes. At the same time, although “day after” saw a significant drop, the numbers began to rise gradually. The key point is that Russian attacks never stopped, and we assess that they are unlikely to stop. The Russian Air Force has a long history of being complacent – that’s why the attack was successful in the first place. Russians have likely amended the tactics and will continue the strikes as Ukrainians cannot maintain such high-value assets as a Patriot battery close to the frontline for extended periods.
The sinking of Novocherkassk LLS
On the night of 26DEC, Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, claimed that Ukrainians had launched a successful attack that destroyed a Russian large landing ship (LLS), Novocherkassk (Ropucha-class, Project 775) in Crimea. Later, the Ukrainian Air Force clarified that at around 02:30, its aircraft launched cruise missiles on Novocherkassk while it was in port in Feodosia. They did not specify how many and what kind of missiles were used. Russian MoD confirmed that the ship was damaged using guided missiles. Sevastopol News later reported that 74 sailors were killed during the strike, and 27 were wounded. Explosions following the strike showed a very large blast, which indicated that the ship was carrying ammunition.
Satellite imagery acquired by Maxar confirmed the total destruction of the vessel.
Russian LSS Novocherkassk in Feodosia, before and after the strike (Image source: Maxar)
The strike also sank the T-43-class training vessel ‘UTS-150’ and severely damaged nearby port infrastructure.
We assess that more attacks on Crimea are highly likely during the coming months.
Russian 29DEC missile strikes
Lastly, on Friday, Russians conducted the second-largest missile attack on Ukraine to date. Altogether, they launched 158 projectiles, which included Shahed 131/136 drones, air defence, cruise, ballistic, and anti-ship missiles. On the first day of the war, Russians launched 160 missiles. Ukrainian air defence was reportedly successful against less demanding targets (cruise missiles and Sheheds). At the same time, it did not intercept any Iskanders or Kinzhal ballistic missiles (the full breakdown is below in the Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine section).
Russians hit Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv, and Zaporizhizhia, killing dozens and wounding more than 100. They destroyed a shopping centre and residential blocks but also targeted defence facilities, some of which were connected to missile and drone production. It is, therefore, clear that Russians predominantly sought to degrade Ukrainian ability to conduct missile and drone strikes, especially long-range ones.
In the meantime, on Thursday, the Polish Operational Command reported that a missile had ventured into Poland. Initial reports indicated it crashed near the border with Ukraine. However, the Polish General Staff clarified mid-day that a foreign object violated the Polish air space at 7.12 AM, leaving the Polish territory after less than three minutes. They confirmed the object as a Russian cruise missile. Polish and Allied radar systems reportedly tracked the missile’s flight path at all times.
In the evening, however, due to Russian long-range aviation activity, Poles activated two F-16 pairs supported by a NATO’s tanker aircraft. They were later joined by two unspecified US aircraft (pair). Warsaw also placed its air defence system on high alert.
Polish political-military sources have not provided any detailed information about what occurred. It is unclear what missile flew into the airspace, what path it followed and where it came from. Some sources suggested that the missile flew from Belarus into Poland before heading for western Ukraine. In this context, the missile sought to test the Polish air defence system deployed near the border with Ukraine. We hope the Poles will soon be more open to discussing Thursday’s events. Although the key aspect of the event is that it did not lead to any escalation, we nevertheless expect similar indicents in the future.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Monday (25DEC)
The Ukrainian Parliament’s website published a draft law proposing to lower the conscription age from 27 to 25 years.
The Latvian Delfi news outlet informed that Latvia provided Ukraine with more than 270 vehicles confiscated from drunk drivers.
Tuesday (26DEC)
The British MoD informed that the first six Ukrainian pilots completed their basic training program organised by the Royal Air Force on F-16 multirole combat aircraft.
Taiwan expanded the list of sanctioned goods for Russia and Belarus to prevent Taiwanese products from being used for military purposes. The new list includes equipment for producing semiconductors and certain medicines and chemicals.
Russian Important Stories news outlet informed that Russians imported western-made scopes (and optical equipment) worth RUB16 billion in 2022-2023. They were officially dedicated to hunting weapons, but in reality, at least some of them were used during the Russo-Ukrainian war by Russian personnel.
Wednesday (27DEC)
The Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office sentenced the Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin (in absentia), to 15 years of imprisonment and confiscation of property due to his “collaboration and encroachment on the Ukrainian territorial integrity”.
The United States Department of Defence announced an additional military aid package to Ukraine. It is worth USD250 million and includes NASAMS and Stinger missiles, components to air defence systems, missiles for HIMARS, 105 and 155-millimetre artillery rounds, TOWs and AT-4 systems and small-round ammo with other equipment.
The Spanish Council of Ministers agreed with the European Commission to provide Ukraine with up to EUR237.5 million in financial aid.
Thursday (28DEC)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with Pope Francis to discuss a potential peace formula with the Russian Federation.
Ukrainian officials informed that a Russian mine in the Black Sea damaged a Panama-flagged bulk carrier heading to the Danube port. Two members of its crew were injured.
Friday (29DEC)
At least one Russian missile entered Polish airspace during the latest mass missile strike. According to the Polish General Staff, it belonged to the Russian Armed Forces and left the airspace after three minutes.
The Ukrainian National Bank introduced a new historically low exchange rate for Ukrainian UAH to USD – it was raised from UAH37.62 to UAH37.98 for 1USD.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
Last week, we did not observe major redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ military units.
Nevertheless, available data confirmed that Ukrainians repositioned elements of the 43rd Mechanised Brigade from Svatove to the Kupyansk axis of the Luhansk direction.
Limited information also appeared regarding the movement of Russian units.
Moscow withdrew elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment from the Kherson direction to the Horlivka axis (Donetsk direction).
In this direction, we also identified and localised elements of the 345th Air Assault Regiment (104th Air Assault Division). The division has been deployed in the area for months.
In the Luhansk direction, Russians slightly repositioned the 432nd Motor Rifle Regiment (mobilised) during recent attacks. We moved the unit from the Kupyansk to the Svatove axis.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past seven days.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Veterynarne, Hatyshche, Budarky, Huriev Kozachok, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Berestove Topoli, Kupyansk and Kozacha Lopan, Dvorichna, Velykyi Burluk, Stroivka and Bolohivka.
Oleh Synehubov claimed on Sunday (24DEC) that the Russians would not abandon their intentions to re-attack Kharkiv. Currently, the main goal of the Russian forces in the Kharkiv region was to recapture Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, a major rail hub. Yet, despite this, Synehubov added that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were constantly improving their technical (capabilities) and human resources (manpower), reliably holding their positions and repelling Russian attacks. The UAF were also building fortifications in the region and strengthening mobile air defence groups. More than 100 such groups operate in the region, one of the highest numbers per region in Ukraine. Their main objective is to protect critical infrastructure from UAVs.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred over the past seven days in the Luhansk Oblast. Russians continued their attacks in the Lyman and Kupyansk directions. They made some territorial gains but without a significant impact on the frontline.
On Saturday (23DEC), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that the Russians continued their attempts to gain a foothold near Synkivka, and battles there continued. Heavy infantry battles also occurred near Ivanivka. According to Russian sources, the attackers managed to advance slightly near Synkivka during the weekend. However, no further information suggested what this involved.
These gains likely resulted from intensified Russian attacks that reportedly occurred during the weekend. Russians used UR-77 Meteorit mine clearing vehicles to remove minefields but also to psychologically influence Ukrainian personnel (degrade their will to fight), the source explained. A soldier also said that the UAF carried out assault operations and regained ground in some places, but again, it is unclear where this occurred. On Thursday (28DEC), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops made progress near Synkivka, where two crucial UAF strongholds had been taken. The source said the Ukrainian 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade suffered the highest losses in this area. Since October, the brigade has been withdrawn twice to the rear area to restore its combat capability.
No frontline reports appeared pertaining to the situation between Lyman Pershyi and Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Saturday (23DEC), the Russian journalist stated that Russian troops had managed to push back Ukrainian units near Terny. The source said this was the crucial village through which the Ukrainian grouping on the left bank of the Zherebets River was supplied. The village was less than four kilometres from Russian forward positions. On Saturday (23DEC), the Ukrainian blogger also confirmed that the Russians made significant progress east of Terny. Attempts to advance continued throughout the week, but we understand they delivered no results. Russian sources did not report changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Also, no changes occurred near Torske, Nevske and Yampolivka.
In the Kreminna area, no significant changes occurred. On Saturday (23DEC), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that heavy battles continued near Serebryansky foresty. On Tuesday (26DEC), a Ukrainian soldier asserted that southwest of Kreminna, Russians managed to take two Ukrainian positions. The soldier said that Ukrainian positions were outnumbered by 1:5 as Russians possessed a significant advantage in manpower. On Tuesday (26DEC), the Ukrainian blogger added that the Russians started to attack more actively and “massively” in the forest with a large number of troops involved. Despite this, all attacks were repelled. The source added that the Russians seemed to be acting in a hurry. The Russian sources claimed on Tuesday that the Russian offensive in the Serebryansky forest continued and that they managed to advance up to three kilometres in some places. However, the Ukrainians were putting up fierce resistance.
In Bilohorivka, the Ukrainian source claimed on Saturday (23DEC) that the Russians were trying to improve their tactical position near the river. No further information was provided. Russian sources did not report changes/attacks.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk direction, Russian troops repelled 13 Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka. Operational-tactical aviation units carried out six missile-bombing strikes on the temporary deployment sites near Synkivka, Pishchanivka and Berestove. In addition, heavy flamethrower systems carried out strikes on a Ukrainian concentration area near Kotlyarivka.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman axis, near Torske and Serebryansky forestry, Russian units repelled six Ukrainian attacks. Russian fixed- and rotary-wing aviation struck Ukrainian concentration areas near Dibrova. Artillery fire hit Ukrainian positions near Torske and Serebryansky forestry, as well.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Over the past week, Russian troops continued to conduct offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Mariinka axes. They made marginal gains. As such, the operational outlook has not changed.
On Saturday (23DEC), the Russian source claimed that the UAF counterattacked near Verkhnokamyanske and managed to recapture some land. However, the source added that despite this event, Russians had the initiative in this area. On Tuesday (26DEC), the Russian journalist stated that Russian troops tried to attack near Vesele but were unsuccessful. On Wednesday (27DEC), the Russian journalist said that Russian troops tried to attack near Vesele but were unsuccessful.
Ukrainian sources did not report any changes.
No changes occurred near Spirne and Vyimka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Rozdolivka, Sakko i Vantsetti and Fedorivka.
On Saturday (23DEC), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that Russians had continued to conduct “an active offensive operation aimed at Chasiv Yar“. In Bohdanivka, the attackers managed to advance 300-500 metres into the village. Russians were also firmly entrenched to the north of Bohdanivka. The source added that Russians were gathering more forces near the village to continue attacks. Near Khromove, the UAF continued to hold their positions. At the same time, the Russians were increasing pressure on Ivanivske along the road and from the Dachi area. It appears that Russians expect that with Bohdanivka under their control, the Ukrainian defence of Chasiv Yar will crumble, and Ukrainians will be forced to pull back.
On Monday (25DEC), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops continued to attack Bohdanivka and towards Ivanivkse and managed to progress. Ukrainian sources alleged that Russians deployed elements of the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment and the 72nd Separate Motor Rifle Brigade in the area. The latter refused to carry out orders. However, we cannot substantiate this information.
Russian attacks near Bohdanivka continued on Tuesday and delivered some gains. However, Ukrainian drones were effectively degrading Russian forward movement. The source, however, also said that the Russians had managed to advance east of Ivanivske.
On Wednesday (27DEC), Russian sources claimed that Russian troops continued to attack near Bohdanivka and achieved partial success. However, no detailed information was provided. Ukrainian sources did not report changes, either. Another Russian source said on Thursday (28DEC) that battles were ongoing near Khromove. However, the source said that Chasiv Yar was on higher ground than neighbouring areas, and it was difficult to advance without suppressing Ukrainian artillery. The source also noted the active use of American AN/TPQ-50 counter-battery stations, which were present in sufficient numbers to degrade Russian efforts to suppress Ukrainian firing positions. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Thursday (28DEC) that the situation at the front was difficult, not so much in the Avdiivka axis as in the Bakhmut axis. The soldier said that the reason behind the deteriorating situation near Bakhmut was the deployment of fresh Russian reserves, which propelled Moscow forward. As such, in the Bakhmut axis, Russians captured more land than in the Avdiivka area.
The same soldier also asserted that radio intercepts confirmed that Russians had brought the remnants of the Wagner PMC to the Bakhmut direction (Shtorm-V units).
In Bakhmut alone, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Sunday (24DEC), the Russian source claimed that the Russians attacked Ukrainian positions near Andriivka and Klishchiivka. The source said that Russian troops were advancing near Klishchiivka from the northeast and along the heights from the northwest. A Ukrainian soldier also claimed on Sunday that heavy battles continued near Andriivka and Klishchiivka. The attackers were trying to get to the heights, but the UAF continued to hold their positions. On Tuesday (26DEC), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that battles for the height 215.7 continued, as Russians could not capture this important area. Attacks persisted throughout the latter half of the week but without reported frontline changes.
According to the Ukrainian bloggers, during the weekend, Russians started more attacks to approach Ocheretyne. The source said that every day, the Russians entered Stepove, and every day, the UAF pushed them back from the village. Also, a large-scale Russian attack occurred on 22DEC near Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, but the source said that the UAF repelled it. With artillery support, they also tried to advance towards the UAF-controlled Novobakhmutivka. Similar attacks occurred during the first part of the week. However, the attackers reportedly achieved some success near Ocheretyne, forcing Ukrainians to pull back.
Interestingly, the Ukrainian source asserted that in some cases, only Russian armoured vehicles conducted attacks, as infantry had refused to fulfil orders. We cannot verify the veracity of these claims, but it is noteworthy that it had been the second time such a comment was made last week in two different directions.
The Russian sources claimed on Tuesday (26DEC) that heavy battles continued near Novokalynove. Another Russian source said that with artillery support, Russian troops tried to advance towards Novobakhmutivka. On Wednesday (27DEC), the Russian source claimed that the meeting engagements occurred near Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant.
No changes occurred in Avdiivka. Speaking about the situation in the city, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Valeryi Zaluzhny, said on Tuesday (26DEC) that in 2-3 months, Avdiivka may face the same fate as Bakhmut (total destruction). He further explained that if Ukrainians “don’t have enough force and we (will) see what is better to save people, we will make that decision. We will save the people and then recapture it. It will depend on the situation.” This statement appears to indicate that Zaluzhny considered pulling back from an area if he deemed it necessary. This contrasts previous Ukrainian operations, particularly in Bakhmut, where the city was defended too long, which resulted in significant Ukrainian manpower losses and high artillery expenditure.
Also, speaking about the situation around Avdiivka, the spokesman for the Joint Press Centre of the Tavriia (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Defence Forces, Oleksandr Shtupun, claimed that there was currently no real threat of encirclement of Avdiivka. He explained that Moscow was losing 300-400 troops daily (killed and wounded). Although Russian attacks were persistent, Shtupun explained that Ukrainians were pulling up reserves and regrouping to address the situation.
On the southern flank of the Avdiivka axis, Ukrainians claimed on Saturday (23DEC) that Russians were trying to gain a foothold at the crossroads south of Sjeverne. They also continued to advance into the middle of Pervomaiske, aiming to cut off the Ukrainian positions closer to Pisky. On Sunday (24DEC), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops were attacking Ukrainian positions near Nevelske, Pervomaiske and Sjeverne and on Monday, Russians reportedly advanced near the former two villages.
Russian troops also continued to attack Ukrainian fortified areas in southern (and south-eastern) approaches to Avdiivka. On Tuesday (26DEC), the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russians were storming the positions south of Sjeverne and that they continued to attack UAF positions in Pervomaiske. Attacks in these areas continued throughout the latter half of the week, but no information appeared confirming territorial gains.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke and Opytne.
On Saturday (23DEC), Ukrainians asserted that Russians had captured a Ukrainian position southwest of Mariinka. Although Ukrainians allegedly progressed near Novomykhailivka, Russians shifted the main axis of attack along the ravine to the centre of the village to cut off the main part of UAF forces in the eastern part of the settlement. The Russian source claimed that on Sunday (24DEC), the Russian Forces continued their assault near Novomykhailivka on the southern and southeastern outskirts of the village. They also conducted an offensive west of Mariinka, but no detailed information was provided. On Monday (25DEC), Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said at a meeting with Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation, that Russian troops have completely liberated Mariinka. On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier claimed on Monday (25DEC) that Ukrainian forces controlled a few streets. However, 90% of the settlement was under Russian control.
Speaking about the situation in the city, Zaluzhny explained on Tuesday (26DEC) that the city no longer existed and that Ukrainian troops were still in the northern part of Mariinka. Defending forces had also prepared a defensive line outside this settlement, but the General said it no longer existed.
Ukrainians, nevertheless, worked on building fortifications outside of Mariinka.
A Ukrainian soldier who fights in the Novomykhalivka area claimed on Tuesday (26DEC) that Russians were losing 1-3 pieces of equipment, 20-30 personnel killed and another 30-40 wounded per day. That said, he explained that despite this, Russians still had a significant manpower advantage over Ukranians.
Later in the week, Russian forces attacked the southern and southeastern outskirts of Novomykhailivka, but without much success. Similar actions occurred near Pobieda and towards Heorhiivka, leading to some tactical gains.
The Russian source said these settlements were crucial to enable an offensive on Novomykhailivka from the north and opened the way to the most critical Ukrainian logistics hub in Kurakhove, which supplies the Vuhledar units.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Vuhledar.
Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Commander of the Tavriia (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Operational Strategic Group, in an interview with BBC Ukraine, claimed that the situation at the front has not yet reached a stalemate but admits that the situation is complicated. The Russians have intensified their actions almost along the entire frontline. We understand their strategic goal is the elimination of Ukrainian statehood. He also added that Ukraine had stepped up the construction of fortifications, but the big problem was the lack of ammunition. The Russians were rapidly developing electronic warfare and increasing the use of FPV drones.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units repelled four Ukrainian attacks and struck the Ukrainian concentration area near Klishchiivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
Last week saw marginal frontline changes in the Southern Direction, where Russians advanced slightly near Robotyne. No other confirmed advances were recorded.
No changes occurred in the Velyka Novosilka axis over the past week. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian soldiers reported changes. The same goes for Novodonetske and Novomaiorske, Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, Pryyutne, Levadne.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Ukrainian bloggers claimed on Saturday (23DEC) that the Russian troops continued “meat assaults” near Robotyne but did not progress. The source also added that the Russians were suffering enormous losses.
On Monday (25DEC), the Russian journalist said that the Russians attacked Ukrainian positions near Robotyne but failed to provide additional data. However, he added that Russians had opened up a new axis of attack, this time towards Hulyaipole. In this case, too, it is unclear what this event involved. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
On Tuesday (26DEC), the Ukrainian source warned that a critical situation occurred west of Robotyne, where the attackers increased artillery and KAB bombs. In addition, the Russians dropped “chemicals” on the position of one of the mechanised brigades. So far, we have seen no evidence indicating the use of chemical agents by Russians.
The Russian source claimed on Tuesday (26DEC) that the Russian Forces tried to advance on the western approaches to Robotyne village after artillery strikes. They also conducted a counterattack from Verbove’s direction. The source said that the line of contact has not changed.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novofedorivka and P’yatykhatky.
According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South-Donetsk direction, Russian motorised rifle units supported by artillery repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Novomykhailivka. Russia’s air and artillery strikes hit Ukrainian strongholds and temporary deployment areas near Novomykhailivka, Konstantynivka, Antonivka, Prechystivka and Urozhaine. They also disrupted three attempts to rotate forces near Novomykhailivka and two near Staromaiorske.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
No significant changes occurred in the Kherson direction. Despite the Russian ground attacks, the Ukrainian units continue to hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro river near Krynky. As in the last week, Russian and Ukrainian sources provided minimal information about what occurred in the area.
The Ukrainian blogger claimed that on Saturday (23DEC), the Russians continued to lose manpower and equipment. On Saturday, the Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that Russians lost three Su-34s. It is unclear how this occurred, but it is likely that Ukrainians pulled in some of their Patriot SAM batteries closer to the frontline and engaged them at standoff ranges. It is also unclear who provided targeting data, but some sources also suggested that NATO AWACS assisted Ukrainians in this successful operation.
The Russian journalist claimed that on Monday (25DEC), the Russian troops tried to attack the Ukrainian units near Krynky but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report changes. On the same day, a Ukrainian soldier asserted that the Russian Federal Security Service had brought a complex for intercepting and listening to telephone conversations to the left bank.
No frontline changes were reported throughout the week. Although, on Wednesday (27DEC), the Russian source said that part of the Krynky settlement was still under Ukrainian control. Russian units continued to attack, but no changes were recorded. The source said that the Ukrainians could still rotate personnel in the village.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 564 aircraft (+10), 263 helicopters (+2), 10,206 UAVs (+251), 445 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+3), 14,383 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+132), 1,190 MLRS launchers (+1), 7,447 field artillery guns and mortars (+117), as well as 16,833 units of special military vehicles (+261).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 357,520 personnel (+6,170), 5,953 tanks (+116), 11,033 armoured combat vehicles (+190), 8,417 artillery systems (+167) and 938 MLR systems (+6), 620 anti-aircraft systems (+9), 329 aircraft (+5) and 324 helicopters (0), and 6,539 UAVs (+174), 1,620 cruise missiles (+8), 23 warships and boats (+1), submarines 1 (0), 11,215 vehicles and fuel tanks (+271), and 1,254 special vehicles (+37).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
Between Saturday and Thursday (23-28DEC), Russians conducted only one missile strike involving two missiles. The strike involved one Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missile and a Kh-31P anti-radiation missile. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, both targets were shot down.
However, on Friday (29DEC), Russians launched the largest attack on Ukraine yet. According to the command, Russians launched 122 projectiles, including 90 Kh-101 cruise missiles, eight Kh-22/32 anti-ship missiles, five Kh-59/31P missiles, 14 ballistic missiles (ballistic trajectory, including fired from S-300s, S-400 SAM systems and Iskander 9K723s) and five Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. Out of this number, Ukrainians reportedly intercepted 87 Kh-101s. The attack also involved 36 Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones, which Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 27. In total, the Ukrainian air defence reported 158 targets.
It does appear that the air defence network was overwhelmed as many missiles, which were expected to have been shot down (Kh-59/31P, Kizhals), weren’t. At the same time, we don’t know what Russians targeted. We have seen a lot of damage made to residential and civilian areas, but there were no reports about the destruction of military infrastructure.
The drivers behind the strike are also unknown. We assess that it is more likely that Russians wanted to, at least partly, avenge the loss of “Novocherkassk” LSS, which was destroyed by Ukrainian missiles on 26DEC in Crimea. There were no reports about Friday’s attack focusing on critical (energy) infrastructure but on Ukrainian ability to manufacture missiles and drones. It is, therefore, difficult to consider the attack to be a resumption of last year’s campaign to target the Ukrainian power grid. In the meantime, the winter in Ukraine has been mild, with temperatures reaching 8°C in Kyiv this week. Freezing temperatures (between -3°C and -1°C) are expected to engulf the northern part of the country from the mid-next week, so Russians could resume larger attacks then.
We also expect Russians to launch another large-scale attack on 31DEC2023 or 1JAN2024.
When it comes to the employment of Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones, they were used daily. Ukrainians reported 164 vehicles fired and 130 intercepted (80% interception rate). Compared to previous months, December has been the most intense regarding the number of Shaheds’ strikes. Between 1DEC-29DEC, Russians launched 552 drones in 26 strikes. In November, these numbers stood at 304 vehicles launched in 19 strikes, 226 in 18 in October and 396 in 19 in September. The increase is, therefore, vast. We expect Russians to maintain a relatively high tempo of Shahed strikes over the next few weeks.
Russian ground attacks started declining for the first time since late October. Last week, the attacks peaked at 98 attacks on Monday (26DEC) and before dropping to “as few as” 53 on Thursday (28DEC).
(Battlefield) missile attacks started rising slightly, but that’s the result of a minimal base. On Saturday (23DEC), Russians launched 11 strikes, the highest number in 10 days.
Reported air strikes rose sharply. On 17DEC, Russians averaged 30 air strikes per day. This number now stands at 56. This increase, however, did not translate to any significant territorial gains.
There were no significant changes in Russian MLRS use.
Outlook for the week of 30DEC – 5JAN2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This prognosis was also correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are no longer assessing the probability of Ukrainian advances, which we consider to be presently non-existent. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in both the Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes, but we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.” Russians indeed made some marginal gains in the region, but they had no impact on the overall situation in the region. However, Ukrainians also progressed a bit (Vuhledar axis), which contradicted our previous assessment that their offensive potential was non-existent.
Score: 0/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess chances are roughly even (no change) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” Russians indeed captured some terrain, but their ability to capture any settlement appears limited.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. They also may deploy additional forces. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 4/5 (80%)
The forecast for the week of 30DEC – 5JAN2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in both the Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes, but we assess that they are unlikely to capture a village or more in the region.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (increase in probability) that Russians will progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. They also may deploy additional forces. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) that they will capture one village or more.