Key takeaways:
Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;
According to the Ukrainian General Staff data, the number of Russian artillery strikes was the highest since 7SEP2022. The trend remains upward.
There were no frontline changes in the Kharkiv Oblasts. On the other hand, Russians increased artillery attacks on regions near the border in Ukraine's northern oblasts;
There were no confirmed changes in the Luhansk Oblasts. However, Ukrainians are increasingly pressed near Kreminna, where elements of two Russian airborne divisions are reportedly stationed;
Russians captured more territory north and south of Soledar;
Russians inched closer to Bakhmut's city centre;
Southwest of the city, the attackers are also closing in on the main ground line of communication linking Bakhmut with Konstantinovka;
Russians launched an attack on Vuhledar. But it appears that the assault failed to meet its objective;
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhihia Oblast, but no visual evidence was produced to confirm their claimed territorial gains;
There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainians launched an ambitious raid on a Russian position on the Dnipro's left bank;
We saw no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Although the number of exercises decreased, the overall tempo was heightened.
General outlook
Strategically and operationally, last week did not deliver any significant changes in Ukraine. Russian operations and attacks remained constant, and so did their size. Moscow increased the geographical scope of these attacks, but they are still limited by the number of troops that Russians employ in these assaults. The only exception is the Bakhmut-Soledar sector, where Wagner PMC fighters supported by Russian operational formations continue to charge Ukrainian positions and steadily increase their territorial gains.
The main indicator we are looking at of when Russians may further step up their attacks is the deployment of reservists into the fight. So far, there were no reports about such developments, apart from the elements of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (2 MRD) that were reportedly moved from Belarus to Russia. This force can deliver around 5,000 men.
Last week, apart from the Bakhmut-Soledar area, there were three main "axes of advance" or zones where Russians attempted to break through Ukrainian defensive lines. Firstly, Moscow's forces continued to push Ukrainians out of their positions near Orichiv in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. These attacks most likely failed. Russians did not produce any evidence to confirm their forward movement. Secondly, quite unexpectedly, Russians attacked Vuhledar in the Donetsk Oblast. Information about their progress is quite limited and contradictory. Ukrainians assert that all attacks were repelled, while Russians maintain that their forces reached the village's outskirts. Despite assaults in Orichiv and Vuhledar, we assess they are opportunistic and seek to exploit Ukrainian weaknesses in these sectors. Russians did not deploy forces large enough to undertake sizable offensives that would break the deadlock and alter the operational picture in Zaporizhihia and Donetsk Oblast. Due to the small size of these attacks, it is also difficult to classify them as attempts to divert Ukrainian attention from the Bakhmut-Soledar area and force Kyiv to contend with Russian offensive actions across multiple directions.
However, this may be a prelude to what may come when reservists are deployed in bigger numbers. As stated above, we have not seen information to confirm how reservists are being deployed, whether they will be "echeloned" and sent to create new axes of advance across different directions or concentrated on one direction only. The first option can spread Ukrainians thin across the entire front. In contrast, the second allows Moscow to focus on one main area of operations, create a centre of gravity, and subordinate all auxiliary actions to the main effort.
The third effort occurred near Kreminna. It is too early to discuss its implications yet, but some developments in this sector are noteworthy. Firstly, for the past few weeks, some Ukrainian sources claimed that Moscow might launch an offensive from Kreminna towards Lyman. At that time, we saw no indications confirming a build-up of Russian forces for such a mission. In fact, we continue to assess that a large-scale mechanised/tank attack is unlikely due to disruptions to logistics and Ukrainian HIMARS that strike any larger Russian base/concentration area near the line of contact. However, last week, Russians may have pushed Ukrainians from areas around Dibrova and, according to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), launched an attack on Yampolivka. There were also reports about the deployment of elements of two airborne divisions near Kreminna. Their presence always indicates preparations for offensive actions. We, therefore, expect more battles in this area over the coming week.
When it comes to the Soledar-Bakhmut axis, Ukrainians continue to be on the defensive. Russian efforts to dislodge defending forces from Bakhmut and neighbouring villages are ongoing. Their last week's progress was slow but steady, and we saw no indications suggesting that the Russian effort in this zone was nearly exhausted. Russians are confirmed to have captured two villages (Blahodatne and Krasnopolivka) near Soledar and are moving to cut off the main supply road leading to Bakhmut. The battle for Bakhmut is grinding, but Russians are determined to achieve the objective. While we do not expect the city's fall this week, it is clear that the overall situation is deteriorating for Ukrainians.
Situation in Belarus
Below is the summary of last week's events in Belarus, placed into a broader context of the war in Ukraine.
The key to note is that there were no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Officially, no decisions were made last week that would bring their deployment to Ukraine closer. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko was very active last week, but again, none of the comments he made about the current situation indicated that such a decision is being considered.
However, underneath the official surface of public pronouncements is the activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Although the number of exercises decreased last week, the drill's overall tempo and size remained heightened and increased. Before the war, Belarusians did not practice brigade-level deployments. They typically deployed a couple of battalions supported by an artillery battalion or a company for joint Russo-Belarusian drills, such as Zapad or the Union Shield. Still, any exercises hardly ever went beyond battalion level. Currently, however, it is typical that a brigade deploys two battalions for an exercise, which is a significant shift compared to previously organised manoeuvres.
This month, two existing mechanised battalions (339th, 358th) practised manoeuvre operations with artillery support. At least in one instance, according to the data provided by Belarusian MoD, the two battalions were deployed at a training range simultaneously.
The 4th Tank Battalion from the 19th Mechanised Brigade also underwent a readiness check early in the month.
Particularly noteworthy was the removal of trucks from long-term storage from the 11th Mechanised Brigade's base. It may indicate that Belarusians are preparing to accommodate their armed forces' increased size (mobilisation). On the other hand, this appears to be a singular event, as no further efforts to remove equipment from storage were announced.
We will continue to monitor these developments closely.
According to Ukrainian sources, the number of Russian troops in Belarus decreased to fewer than 6,000 men as the 2nd MRD of the 1st Guards Tank Army redeployed to Russia. We cannot confirm this development as the weather over Belarus has been cloudy over the past couple of weeks. Thus we cannot obtain a visual confirmation of changes at Belarusian training ranges.
Russian fortifications
We have added a new layer to our Scribble Map, which shows Russian fortifications that Russians have established over the past few months. The data is based on satellite imagery and created by Brady Africk.
These fortifications clearly show areas Russians consider to be to most threatened. The first area is the Luhansk Oblast, where Moscow began setting up defences in the immediate aftermath of the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive. The line runs from Troitske, near the border with Russia, to Popasna in the Donetsk Oblast. However, there is a gap between Kreminna and Lysychansk, where no fortifications were established. Russians may hope to channel the movement of Ukrainian units in this direction. Secondly, it is interesting that, as far as this data shows, no defences have been set up in depth in the Luhansk Oblast. It is clearly visible compared to how they were placed in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. There, defensive lines not only run along major roads but also around cities such as Tokmak.
Weather forecast
No changes in the weather forecast are expected. The temperatures in the Svatove-Kreminna area will hover around 0 degrees Celsius during the day for the entire week. However, whereas rain and snowfall were limited last week, this week is to see snow showers across the Luhansk and Kharkiv Oblast.
The Bakhmut area is expected to be slightly warmer, with temperatures increasing to 3 degrees Celsius during the latter half of the week. Precipitation is will deliver a mix of snow and rain.
The forecast for Zaporizhzhia is very similar for both temperatures and precipitation.
As such, the current weather forecast does not indicate that any window of opportunity will arrive next week. Temperatures around 0 degrees Celsius also guarantee muddy terrain that will hinder the movement of armoured vehicles.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 381 aircraft (+5), 204 helicopters (+1), 2,980 UAVs (+49), 402 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 7,670 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+69), 995 MLRS launchers (+10), 3,956 field artillery guns and mortars (+69), as well as 8,218 units of special military vehicles (+70).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 126,160 personnel (+5,400), 3,197 tanks (+52), 6,366 armoured combat vehicles (+98), 2,195 artillery systems (+51) and 453 MLRS (+8), 221 anti-aircraft systems (+1), 293 aircraft (+6) and 284 helicopters (+7), and 1,947 UAVs (+75), 5,037 vehicles and fuel tanks (+191), 749 cruise missiles (+47), 18 warships and boats (+1) and 199 pieces of special equipment (+6).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russians continue to use more than 5,000 men weekly, roughly equivalent to 2/2.5 regiments worth of men. Particularly interesting were also Russian losses to aircraft and helicopters. Last week, the UGS reported that Russians lost three Ka-52s attack helicopters and three Su-25 close air support aircraft.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 381 aircraft (+5), 204 helicopters (+1), 2,980 UAVs (+49), 402 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 7,670 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+69), 995 MLRS launchers (+10), 3,956 field artillery guns and mortars (+69), as well as 8,218 units of special military vehicles (+70).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 126,160 personnel (+5,400), 3,197 tanks (+52), 6,366 armoured combat vehicles (+98), 2,195 artillery systems (+51) and 453 MLRS (+8), 221 anti-aircraft systems (+1), 293 aircraft (+6) and 284 helicopters (+7), and 1,947 UAVs (+75), 5,037 vehicles and fuel tanks (+191), 749 cruise missiles (+47), 18 warships and boats (+1) and 199 pieces of special equipment (+6).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russians continue to use more than 5,000 men weekly, roughly equivalent to 2/2.5 regiments worth of men. Particularly interesting were also Russian losses to aircraft and helicopters. Last week, the UGS reported that Russians lost three Ka-52s attack helicopters and three Su-25 close air support aircraft.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, last week saw an increase in Russian artillery attacks. A particular rise was visible in the Sumy and Chernivich Oblasts, which do not see any ground operations. Almost all strikes hit border areas, but it is unclear whether Russians targeted civilian areas or attempted to hit Ukrainian military presence.
Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts saw decreases, but despite this, the upward trend in artillery strikes across the front was maintained.
The lowest number of locations hit occurred on 28JAN when 81 settlements and cities were hit. On 24JAN, 111 targets were struck, the highest number since 7SEP.
Based solely on this data, we only see a steady increase in the scale of Russian artillery strikes.
Military situation in Belarus
Regarding the military situation in Belarus, the last week was relatively calm.
Despite several political events, no unexpected decisions affecting the Belarusian Armed Forces were made. We also did not also any changes in the tempo of Belarusian military formations, which remained heightened. That said, there was a decrease in the number of observed military transfers.
Over the past seven days, all political developments were linked to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. On Monday, he participated in the annual meeting with the highest military officials responsible for state border protection.
After highlighting the character of the gathering, Lukashenko spoke about the specific circumstances of this year’s meeting. He stated that Belarus faced a difficult situation around its borders due to the increasing numbers of refugees trying to reach Belarusian soil. It pertains to the Ukrainians escaping the war and refugees from Asia. As noted by the Belarusian president, the dynamically changing environment necessitates supporting the State Guards formations with subunits of the Belarusian Army. The event ended with approving a new plan regulating measures to secure the Belarusian border.
A similar event with Lukashenko’s presence occurred a day later when he met with various state security officials. During Tuesday’s convention, he spoke about the functioning of Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Government (in exile), Belarusian volunteer formations and activities of Belarusian neighbours. Lukashenko stressed that both groups are financed directly by the special services of foreign states. Belarusian fighters fighting against Russia in Ukraine should be trailed per wartime laws. Lukashenko also shortly referred to Ukraine’s actions, noting the “duplicity” of the Ukrainian leadership. According to Lukashenko, the potential peace-seeking steps taken by Ukraine, connected even with attempts to sign a bilateral non-aggression pact between Ukraine and Belarus, are followed by Kyiv’s aggressive rhetoric and belligerent activities. This statement indicates that Ukraine sought to sign a peace treaty with Belarus. We have not been able to confirm the veracity of this claim yet.
On Tuesday, Lukashenko signed a new decree regulating the issue of spring conscription.
Last week, the activity of the Belarusian military leadership was limited. Nevertheless, some were noteworthy.
On Monday, shortly after the meeting with Alexander Lukashenko, the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich briefly commented on the situation on the borders and provided some details linked to the tactics used by the Belarusian military. As noted by Gulevich, the difficulty of the current situation around Belarus makes military involvement in state border protection unquestionable. According to the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, radiotechnical, air defence and electronic warfare (EW) subunits will remain deployed near Ukrainian territory to provide an air defence umbrella and defeat any potential air space violators. Gulevich also stressed that Belarusian Army prefers to use EW means in such scenarios as they present the most cost-effective way of combating air threats.
On Saturday, the Chairman of the State Border Committee, Lt. Gen. Anatoly Lappo, made similar statements. During his interview for the Belarusian Channel One, Lappo stated that 463 flights along the Belarusian borders were made in 2022. Most of them had a reconnaissance character and were carried out by NATO airframes. They were also correlated with the unprecedented presence of military aviation near Belarus (Poland and the Baltic States).
The Chairman of the State Border Committee talked about the lack of discipline among Ukrainian servicemen that led to border provocations, as well as the “fascist methods” used by the Polish Border Service while dealing with refugees trying to cross the Belarusian-Polish border.
Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich also visited the Ruzhansky Training Ground to observe ongoing Russo-Belarusian aviation drills. He stated that the exercise required the creation of the proper flight order, which was necessary to perform the task effectively and safely.
On Thursday, the Belarusian officers responsible for the safety of the military service took part in a meeting organised by the Head of the Main Military Inspection, Maj. Gen. Ivan Boguslavsky. The event took place at the 7th Engineering Regiment’s base and involved a practical demonstration of the proper use of technical devices used by the Belarusian Army. During the event, Boguslavsky presented a report on the state of military service safety in 2022 and awarded selected officers special gifts.
At the same time, the Assistant to the Minister of Defence for Ideological Work, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky visited Gymnasium No. 50 in Minsk. His visit had an informational character and was used to inform students and the institution’s employees about the current military-political situation around the state. Kasinsky claimed that the education of young people is crucial because they are especially exposed to fake information, which potential state enemies can use. That’s why school subjects relating to “informational hygiene” should be introduced in the future in the curriculum.
Although last week, the number of training actions carried out by the Belarusian military formations decreased, the exercise tempo, in general, remains heightened.
The joint Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise ran throughout the whole week.
All Belarusian air bases (Baranovichi, Machulischy, Lida and Luniniets) were involved, and elements of the Russian 14th Fighter Aviation Regiment (6th Air and Air Defence Army, Western Military District), supported by A-50 AEW&C aircraft, Su-34 bombers and several attack and utility helicopters. Last week, despite “standard” training actions mainly linked to reconnaissance, close air support and suppression of enemy’s air defences missions, joint aviation components practised the deployment of air assets to alternate airfields on Belarusian and Russian territory. The drills also involved Belarusian radiotechnical and air defence elements, used to practice their intended tasks in a real environment and against air assets.
Similarly, almost throughout the whole week, elements of the 120th Mechanised Brigade were undergoing combat training classes. These drills were conducted by the 339th Mechanised Battalion and 355th Tank Battalion, which trained the 227th Combined Arms and UruchchaTraining Grounds, respectively.
Two more Belarusian mechanised formations (6th and 11th Mechanised Brigades) were also involved in the training actions. On Tuesday, elements of two mechanised battalions (78th and 202nd) from the 6th Mechanised Brigade likely conducted field exits, presumably combined with the readiness check (Wednesday) and BMP-2 shooting exercises (Thursday). At the same time, the subunits of the 11th Mechanised Brigade were involved in the anti-sabotage and anti-air drills on Monday and the combat readiness inspection on Friday. Most importantly, a logistic subunit of the 11th Mechanised Brigade started removing military trucks from the long-term storage. Altogether, dozens of trucks were withdrawn from storage. All of them underwent technical inspection on Saturday. It is unclear where these trucks will be sent to, but there are two options: they can be returned to storage, inducted into service, or handed over to Russia.
Belarusian Special Operation Forces were also active last week. On Wednesday, the 38th Air Assault Brigade started a combat check of recently adopted BTR-82A APCs. A day later, these vehicles were used to train afloat driving at the Brestsky Training Ground.
Besides, Belarusian military formations have also already started training for the upcoming Army Games 2023. Preparation drills were held in the 30th Railway Brigade (“Steel highway” competition). At the same time, the 72nd Joint Training Center hosted a contest for the best tank crew member to find potential candidates for this year’s “Tank Battalion” episode.
Last week, the number of observed Belarusian military movements remained low. Surprisingly, a significant part consisted of anti-air or air defence systems complexes or their elements. The most notable observed systems were TOR-M2K, S-300/S-400 (launchers) and OSA anti-air systems. An R-142N command-staff vehicle was also spotted on Monday. The movement of a single Belarusian military echelon carrying six unspecified vehicles (BTRs or tanks) was reported on Wednesday.
The decreased reported movement of military equipment was also evident in Russia’s case. Unofficial sources reported only three military trains. Moreover, they were either empty or consisted of only a few trucks (or passenger cars). Regarding the road activity, noteworthy transports were observed only on: Monday (dozens of trucks), Tuesday (BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicle and several trucks) and Saturday (dozens of trucks with 6-8 Toyota Hilux pick-ups). This decrease might be connected to the rotation of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division from Belarus to the Russian territory that the British Ministry of Defence recently reported. According to an official intelligence update, most of the formation was rotated to Russia after completing the training course. Moreover, some of those subunits are presumably already engaged in combat actions in Ukraine.
On Wednesday, a representative of the Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR), Vadim Skibitski, provided some data on the presence of the Russian Armed Forces elements in Belarus. According to him, 5800 Russian (ground) service members are deployed to Belarus. Skibitski also informed that they are accompanied by at least one Iskander missile battalion, three MiG-31K fighters and an unspecified number of S-300 and S-400 air defence complexes.
We have been trying to confirm these numbers. However, our access to satellite imagery is limited due to bad weather over Belarus.
Below is the summary of last week’s Belarusian training activities. Click here to access data for the entire month.
28JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Ruzhansky Training Ground, as well as Baranovichi and Machulischy air bases and unspecified airbases (airfields) in Russia, Russian A-50 AEW&C plane and MiG-31K fighter(s), likely Belarusian fighters and helicopters);
27JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Baranovichi, Machulischy, Luniniets air bases and unspecified Russian airbases (airfields), Russian A-50 AEW&C plane and MiG-31K fighter(s), likely Su-30SM and Su-34 fighter(s) and unspecified helicopters);
27JAN: Continuation of the military equipment removal from long-term storage (likely home garrison, presumably logistic subunit of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
27JAN: Start of the combat readiness check (unspecified location, likely 105th Mechanised Battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
27JAN: Engineering training classes (presumably Uruchcha Training Ground, 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
27JAN: Start of the air defence combat duty (unspecified location, elements of the 1st Air Defence Regiment)
27JAN: Field exit combined with live ammo firing exercises (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, at least one tank company of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
26JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Brestsky Training Ground, and Baranovichi, Machulischy, Orsha-Bolbasovo, Luniniets?, as well as unspecified Russian airbases (airfields), Russian A-50 AEW&C plane and MiG-31K fighters, and Mi-8-MTV-5 helicopters);
26JAN: BMP-2 firing classes (Gozhsky Training Ground, unspecified mechanised subunit of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);
26JAN: BTR-82A afloat driving classes (Brestsky Training Ground, elements of the 38th Air Assault Brigade);
26JAN: Continuation of the combat training (Uruchcha Training Ground, 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
25JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Baranovichi, Machulischy, Lida Osovtsy and presumably Luniniets air bases, as well as the Ruzhansky and Brestsky Training Grounds, Russian A-50 AEW&C plane and MiG-31K fighters, as well as Belarusian Il-76MD cargo plane and Su-25, YAK-130 airframes, and helicopters of both states);
25JAN: Combat readiness check (unknown location, unspecified immediate response subunit(s) of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);
25JAN: Continuation of the combat training classes combined with the removal of military equipment from the storage base and anti-sabotage actions (presumably home garrison, likely logistic subunit of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
25JAN: Continuation of the combat training (Uruchcha Training Ground, 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
25JAN: BTR-82A combat check (Brestsky Training Ground, unspecified battalion of the 38th Air Assault Brigade);
24JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Machulischy and Lida air bases?, Russian MiG-31K, as well as Belarusian An-26 cargo aircraft and probably helicopters of both states);
24JAN?: Possible field exit combined with combat training classes (Presumably Gozhsky Training Ground, elements of the 78th and 202nd Mechanised Battalions of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);
24JAN: Continuation of the combat training classes combined with the removal of military equipment from the storage base and anti-sabotage activities (likely home garrison, various subunits of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
23JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Baranovichi and Lida air bases?), both Belarusian and Russian fighters/bombers (inc. MiG-31K, YAK-130 and Su-25) and Russian A-50U AEW&C aircraft);
23JAN: Continuation of combat readiness check (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, 358th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
23JAN: Combat training classes combined with the removal of military equipment from the storage base (presumably home garrison, various subunits of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv/Luhansk direction
We continue to see no evident changes in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast. Some Ukrainian commentators predict Russian attacks from the Kreminna area towards Lyman. Still, apart from one indicator (deployment of airborne forces), we see no preparations for large-scale employment of Russian troops in areas near the frontline. So far, we have only seen elements of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division redeployed from Belarus to areas in the Voronezh Oblast. Yet, we have not independently confirmed their deployment to the frontline.
Moving away from the frontline last week, Russians launched multiple artillery strikes near the state border in Charnihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts, where no ground operations are conducted. Russians thus continue to harass Ukrainian forces deployed in these areas, fix them there, and also target residential areas to inflict damage to civilian property. It is possible that, if there is a Russian offensive in any part of Ukraine, Moscow will increase artillery fires near the state border to draw Kyiv’s attention to these areas. In conjunction, Russians may also launch ground assaults on Ukrainian positions, although the last such attack occurred more than a month ago. Nevertheless, the threat of such actions persists.
As stated, last week did not deliver any confirmed changes to the frontline. Both sides are preoccupied with positional battles; whereas some tactical changes could have occurred, they had no impact on the operational picture.
In the Kharkiv Oblast, Russians maintain their positions east of Dvorchina and occupy the remaining few per cent of the oblast. The Russian MoD informed last week about the destruction of Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in this area. However, the reality is that both sides are highly likely reconnoitring each other’s positions constantly, so ambushes and small ground battles occur regularly.
Moving south, the battle for Novoselivske continues. However, it is difficult to map precisely which territory each side controls. Some sources say that Ukrainians pushed Russians to Kuzemivka, while some suggest that Novoselivske is still contested. Regardless, the capture of both villages will bring the UAF close to Nyzhnia Duvanka (12 km away), but still, Russians are probably digging in near Nauholne. Kobylka River also flows west of the village, potentially hindering Ukrainian operations in this direction.
Ukrainians made no progress last week towards Svatove. Russians attempted to push Kyiv’s forces from Makiivka over the Zherebets River, but Ukrainian defensive lines east of the village remained unscathed.
There are still no confirmed reports about the situation in Chervonopopivka. Last week, Ukrainians claimed their forces severed the R-66 road going through the city. However, no visual proof was produced to confirm this development. The village remains contested.
A similar situation is in the Kreminna area. The sector remains heavily contested, with no confirmed frontline changes made last week. Battles continue to range in forested areas south of Kreminna, where Ukrainian progress is impeded by minefields Russians have established.
Russians also remain deeply entrenched in Kuzmyne, while it is possible that they also control Dibrova. Last week, the Ukrainian General Staff noted that a Russian assault was repelled near Yampolivka, meaning that Russians started more significant attacks towards Zarichne the previous week.
That said, Russian sources claimed that Russian units had dislodged Ukrainians south of Kreminna and controlled the territory near the Siversky Donetsk River. It is unclear what this statement implies. The nearest river bank is just one kilometre from Kremmina, but we were unaware of any Ukrainian presence in this area.
According to the Ukrainian source, Russians reinforced the defences near the city with the 56th and 108th Parachute Regiments of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division. There were reports on Tuesday night about Kreminna being targeted with high-precision munitions. The attack may have sought to strike elements of the Russian 76th Air Assault Division deployed to the city. If there are any indications about Russian preparations for a larger attack, then the deployment of airborne formations is one such marker.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Russians continued to pressure Ukrainian units in the Soledar-Bakhmut area and increased their attacks near Vuhledar. Apart from these two sectors, the frontline remains unchanged despite heavy artillery and ground attacks. Therefore, this part of the weekly update will again primarily focus on these two areas.
Ukrainian soldiers confirmed the pull back from Soledar, particularly from the Sіlj train station, which administratively belongs to Soledar. For the past couple of weeks, we maintained that the fate of the Ukrainian presence in Soledar was sealed.
Russian operations north of Soledar are limited by the Bakhmutka River, which “protects” the left flank of the Russian advance. Wagner PMC fighters captured Krasnopolivka, which they failed to take over two weeks ago. But attacks on Rozdolivka commenced. Relying on Bakhmutka as a natural obstacle, it is possible that the Russian objective would be to reach Siversk from the south and attempt to trap Ukrainian forces around Vyimka. That said, the tempo of the Russian advance is incremental. They only managed to cover some four kilometres in this direction within a week. Siversk is located around 20 km from Krasnopolivka, so Wagner still has plenty of fighting ahead.
South of Bakhmut, on Sunday, 29JAN, Russian forces crossed Bakhmutka and captured Blahodatne. From Pidgorodne, they extended attacks south of Krasna Hora. Operations around the village suggest that Russians are trying to encircle Krasna Hora and force Ukrainian to retreat from the settlement.
The situation in Bakhmut remains essentially unchanged. Russians may have captured several blocks in residential areas of the town (eastern parts), but the defensive lines were not broken. It is clear, however, the current priorities lie in assaults on villages around Bakhmut, not on Bakhmut.
South of Bakhmut, Russians fully control Opytne and Ivanhrad. Following battles for Klishchiivka, Russians finally captured the village. This not only allowed them to fire control the T0504 road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka, but they also started assaulting Ukrainian positions south of Ivanivske. If the village falls, the only viable supply route to Bakhmut will lead through Chasiv Yar, but the Russian ability to strike the road with artillery will come with ease.
We assess that Ukrainians will not defend Bakhmut ferociously. It seems that Ukrainians slowly pull back under the weight of Russian attacks. However, this is by choice rather than necessity. If Kyiv really wanted to defend the city, it had the appropriate capability to do that. One of our sources deployed near Bakhmut told us that the objective is to bleed Russians out slowly and, if necessary, pull back in an organised manner. If the current tempo of operations is maintained, the city may fall by winter’s end.
The second most notable event last week was the Russian attack on Vuhledar. The situation there is vague as both sides present contradictory information. We know the Russian attack is led by elements of the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades (Pacific Fleet). Russians reportedly launched a series of attacks north from Pavlivka and Mykilske. That is confirmed. According to Russian sources, Ukrainian defences south and east of Vuhledar were broken, and Russians entered the village. However, not only do Ukrainian sources deny such development, but also Russians produced no visual evidence to confirm their recent reported gains. Opposite Russian naval infantry units is the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, one of the best-trained and experienced units in the Ukrainian Ground Forces. Our assessment is that whereas some tactical changes may have occurred, Russians did not enter, let alone capture Vuhledar and that the situation in this area remains stable.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Last week’s situation remained largely unchanged in the Zporozhihia Oblast. Both sides focused on positional battles. Russians maintained the overall initiative, but the impact of their ground assault on the frontline was minimal.
To recap, according to Russian sources, two weeks ago, Russian units launched several attacks on Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhihia Oblast, mainly south and southwest of Orikhiv. Whereas Ukrainian sources stated that these attacks did not bring any changes to the frontline, various Russian sources said that several settlements were captured. These included Mala Tokmachka, Mali Scherbaky, Lobkove, and Kamyanka. However, no evidence was ever produced to support such claims. We have also not seen any footage confirming Russian increased territorial control in this part of the oblast. It is apparent that these claims were exaggerated, and small-scale attacks that occurred since then will not break the deadlock.
Last week brought some changes in how Russian narratives were shaped. Russian sources no longer supported claims of Russian gains. Nevertheless, some sources continued to assert that some offensive actions were indeed occurring, but their tempo was “unhurried”. We continue to maintain that Russian attacks in the Zaporizhzhia have an opportunistic character and exploit Ukrainian weaknesses in this direction.
All of this confirms that Russian units are primarily engaged in positional battles and that no large-scale attacks are ongoing. This view corresponds with what Yevhen Yerin, Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Defense Forces, said last week. Yerin claimed that Moscow did not amass a large enough force to conduct a sizable offensive in the Zaporizhiha Oblast. He also added that Russian attacks typically include 10-men strong squads with artillery support. Such operations, even if successful, will not deliver any meaningful or long-term changes.
Natalya Humenyuk, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces, also claimed that Russian losses in the Orikhiv area were severe and forced Moscow to deploy reinforcements to sustain its presence there.
Last week, Vladimir Rogov, Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head, stated that Kyiv was preparing to attack Melitopol and Berdyansk in the coming months. Probably in response to this statement, other Russian bloggers made various claims about increased levels of readiness of Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv, sector.
Whereas the next Ukrainian offensive could likely happen in this direction, no indications suggest that there is a Ukrainian build-up.
Kherson direction
The situation in the Kherson Oblast remained unchanged. Both sides remain focused on artillery strikes and on conducting reconnaissance missions of each other’s positions on the banks of the Dnipro River.
Last week’s main event was the reported Ukrainian reconnaissance mission on the Dnipro’s left bank (southern bank). According to Russian and Ukrainian sources, there were two such operations.
The first one was conducted on the night of 23-24JAN. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Military Intelligence), also known as GUR, posted footage reportedly showing a special forces infiltration raid near Nova Khakovka (in fact, the attack occurred in Dnipryany). The service reported that Ukrainian special forces personnel destroyed a Russian command post during the attack and successfully retreated. However, Russian sources asserted that, whereas Ukrainians tried to infiltrate Russian positions, the attempt was repelled. Regardless, the footage suggests that the attack did happen, but its results were probably limited. Ukrainians claim to have killed 12 Russian soldiers. It is doubtful that Russians maintained a vital command post so close to the frontline.
Russians likely attempt to undertake similar missions, but the extent to which they are successful is unclear. For instance, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command claimed that a boat carrying a Russian sabotage group was intercepted on the Dnipro River during the week. The boat aimed at Potemkin islands, where, according to Natalya Humenyuk, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces, Russians improved their positions to monitor Ukrainian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River.
The second operation reportedly occurred on 25-26JAN. Russian sources claimed that Russian artillery prevented the landing again near Dniprany. There is no more information regarding the event. We have not been able to confirm whether the mission was at all carried out independently. However, given the success of the prior landing, it is likely that Russian sources made up the story about the second landing to show that Russian forces could repel such attacks and defeat Ukrainian units.
Ukrainians reported on 26JAN about air defence sirens activation near Karkinitsky Bay, presumably in response to a Ukrainian drone/missile threat. However, the exact reasons behind the activation are unknown.
We continue to expect no significant changes in this direction, at least until the end of winter. There are no indications that either Russians or Ukrainians are preparing a river-crossing operation that would change the status quo. Russian formations are dispersed to avoid being struck by Ukrainian high-precision missiles. Over the past couple of weeks, we have seen a decrease in the number of such strikes in this direction. It is thus highly likely that Russians adjusted their operations and activities and strengthened their operation security resulting in Kyiv having no targets to attack. Whereas HIMARS attacks are likely to occur in the future, we assess that they will be sporadic unless there is a big change in Russian behaviour.
Outlook for the week of 30JAN – 5FEB
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
This is what we forecasted last week:
“We continue to forecast no change for the Kharkiv Oblast. We do not anticipate a large-scale move by either side, although both will likely continue limited attacks along the line of contact.” This assessment was correct. No changes occurred, but positional battles continued across the frontline.
Score: 1/1
“The same can be said about the Luhansk Oblast. The situation is very unclear concerning who controls which village. It is thus difficult to forecast any changes. Nevertheless, we foresee no significant changes based on last week’s operations. Ukrainians are more likely to capture an additional settlement or two. Russian operations near Svatove will likely be predominantly based on active defence, while near Kreminna, there is roughly even chance they will move forward. The same pertains to Ukrainians. Their attacks near Svatove lack the power to change the frontline, but they remain heavily committed near Kreminna. Likewise, there is roughly a 50 per cent chance they will move towards the city next week.” This forecast mostly spoke about uncertainty in predicting the following week’s events. However, our assessment was correct in that there would be no significant frontline changes in either’s side ability to capture additional territory.
Score: 1/1
“Regarding the Donetsk Oblast, our prognosis will not undergo significant changes. Firstly, we maintain our view from previous weeks that the Russian ability to alter the frontline apart from the Svatove-Bakhmut area is non-existent. We thus expect to see no changes in the broader region.” Despite the increased tempo of attacks across the Donetsk Oblast (apart from the Bakhmut-Soledar area), Russians made minimal gains. They pertained to areas around Vulhedar where Russians may have captured several square kilometres. Let’s say that this several sq km cost us half a point.
Score: 0.5/1
“However, when it comes to the Soledar-Bakhmut sector, we assess that Russians will likely extend their territorial control south of Soledar. There is roughly even chance that Krasna Hora will fall. They are unlikely to be successful in their attacks north of Soledar. Russians will likely make some progress in Bakhmut by capturing several streets, but it is highly unlikely that Bakhmut will fall next week. The most critical situation is near Klishchiivka. Likely, Russian attacks in this sector will be increased. Russians may inch towards Ivanivske.” This prognosis was a mixed bag. Russians extended their territorial control in areas south of Soledar and north of the city. Our primary assumption was the main thrust would be placed on the southern axis; hence little progress was expected north of Soledar. We underestimated Wagner’s capacity to continue attacks. Russians captured Klishchiivka and are nearing Ivanivske. In Bakhmut, too, they made some progress, but it was incremental.
Score: 0.5/1
“Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian attacks will continue. It is also likely that they may seize other villages. That said, they are highly unlikely to lead to more considerable territorial gains. We continue to assess that this is not a preparation for a large-scale attack.” Russian attacks did continue. Whether they captured more territory is debatable (a lack of sources). However, the main point was that no significant gains were expected, which was correct.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast. Chances for an amphibious assault over the Dnipro River are remote. Battles for islands on the river will certainly continue. Russians will also certainly attack Ukrainian civilian areas north of the river, while Ukrainians will target Russian force and equipment concentrations north of Crimea.” There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue to train, while more Russian units will arrive in Belarus.” Belarusians indeed continued to train, but the overall posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces did not change. We may have been wrong in assessing that more Russian personnel would arrive to Belarus. Ukrainian military intelligence and the British MoD claimed last week that components of the 2nd Mechanised Division had been redeployed from Belarus to Russia. However, we saw no evidence to support these claims and no drawdowns of Russian presence in Belarus. We are waiting for the weather to improve to acquire the latest satellite imagery of Russian sites in Belarus.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 6/7
Next week’s forecast
We expect to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Both sides will highly likely continue positional battles and artillery strikes. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.
Based on last week’s operations, it is likely that no significant changes will occur in the Luhansk Oblast. Whereas some tactical fluctuations are highly likely, neither side can turn these into operational successes. We continue to see no evidence to suggest that Russians or Ukrainians are building up their forces for an offensive. That said, the deployment of elements of two airborne divisions near Kreminna is a noteworthy development, and if there was a Russian push, it could happen from this sector. It is highly unlikely that Ukrainians will capture Kreminna, but positional battles in this area will continue.
When it comes to the broader Donetsk Oblast, we expect to see no significant changes. Russian attacks will likely be repelled, as the attackers do not currently possess enough equipment or firepower to mount a sizable offensive force. There is roughly even chance that Vuhledar will fall, especially if no Ukrainian reinforcements are deployed.
However, as far as the Soledar-Bakhmut sector goes, we assess that Russians will likely extend their territorial control in this sector. They are likely to enter Krasna Hora and push towards the road linking the village with Bakhmut to the south. There is roughly even chance Russians will make progress north of Soledar.
In Bakhmut, unless Ukrainians start withdrawing, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains. Currently (next week), it is highly improbable that Ukrainians will pull back from Bakhmut. However, such a possibility exists. Everything will depend on the situation southwest of the city. If Ukrainian defensive positions crumble on the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka (especially near Ivanivske), the Ukrainian ability to defend Bakhmut effectively will be significantly degraded.
Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian attacks will continue. There is roughly even chance that they will seize other villages. That said, we maintain that Russians are highly unlikely to turn these potential gains into operational ones.
We foresee no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but they primarily seek to test and probe defences and reconnoitre OPFOR positions. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.
We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue its increased exercise tempo. Unless we have a visual confirmation about a pullback of Russian forces from Belarus, we would like not to make any predictions on whether or not more Russians will arrive therein. However, chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.
Would you please consider making all city/river names (no exceptions) link to google maps in future reports? This helps immensely, but only some names are currently linked that way. Thank you!