Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 23 September – 29 September 2023
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week's developments:
The past week brought only minimal frontline changes; They only reflected minor tactical shifts without a wider impact on the overall operational, let alone strategic outlook for the conflict; Ukrainians made no confirmed gains in the Orikhiv axis, while in the Velyka Novosilka areas, Russians continued launching counterattacks;
No frontline changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast; Russian artillery strikes continued across the region; Free Russia Legion forces reportedly entered Russia;
Battles across the Luhansk Oblast also continued, but without an impact on the frontline; Russians reportedly deployed elements of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army near Kreminna/Severodonetsk;
Ukrainian attacks on Kurdyumivka continued but led to no territorial gains; Russians launched several counterattacks near Klischiivka; No other changes were reported in the Donetsk Oblast direction;
In the Southern Direction, Russians launched several counterattacks in the Velyka Novosilka axis and deployed Storm-Z formations to stall Ukrainian counterattacks; Elements of Ukrainian marine brigades previously fighting in this axis were reportedly deployed to the Kherson Oblast; No changes occurred in the Orikhiv axis;
Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast near Dachi and carried out harassing attacks across the river’s bank in other parts of the region;
Russians continued striking targets across Ukraine using Shahed 131/136 drones; Kyiv claimed a very high interception rate of 86%; Last week only saw one major Russian missile attack;
Russians continued striking targets across Ukraine using Shahed 131/136 drones; Kyiv claimed a very high interception rate of 86%; Last week only saw one major Russian missile attack;
Although the past seven days delivered no major frontline changes, some potentially consequential developments occurred that may shape the battlefield over the coming weeks and months.
Firstly, Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, the Commander of the Tavria (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts) Operational and Strategic Group of Forces said in an interview with CNN that Ukrainian forces had broken through in Verbove and that Ukrainians continued to advance. He reinstated that Ukraine’s long-term objective was to break Russia’s “land bridge” linking Crimea with mainland Russia. Tarnavskyi also said that although the counteroffensive was not going as “fast as expected,” winter would not slow Ukrainians down. He claimed that although wet and soggy ground would impact the employment of heavy armoured vehicles, the Ukrainian approach focuses on small unit tactics without significant armoured support.
President Zelensky voiced similar views, saying that Ukraine would “do everything not to stop during difficult days in autumn with not good weather, and in winter”. But speaking about a possible breakthrough, Tarnavskyi said it would happen after Tokmak, adding that Russians relied on the depth of their defensive lines. The minimum goal, he continued, was Tokmak, but the overall objective remained to reach the state borders.
We covered Zelensky’s words last week, so let’s focus on what Tarnavskyi said. Firstly, one cannot talk about a breakthrough near Verbove. Ukrainians indeed breached Russian defensive lines west of the village, but no significant follow-on actions ensued to exploit this development. Ukrainians employed armoured combat vehicles to support their ground operations in the area, but no confirmed reports surfaced about any frontline changes resulting from these actions. If the trajectory of the current frontline shifts is any indication of future territorial gains, the battle for Verbove is unlikely to be quick and easy. Ukrainians fought for Robotyne for weeks, and we know that Russians deployed reinforcements near Verbove and Robotyne to slow Ukrainians down. Moscow’s approach is akin to what Ukrainians were doing last year: trade space for time, as Russians realise that Ukrainians could not generate sufficient momentum for quick gains and could not sustain the current tempo of operations.
Secondly, it is too early to expect a breakthrough “after Tokmak”. Assuming that Ukrainians will reach the city in autumn, their progress will likely be slow due to their approach (small unit attacks). Russians will, therefore, have time to adjust their posture and deploy reinforcements.
In the meantime, Ukrainians reportedly recommitted the 12th Separate Tank Battalion to battle (10th Corps), while the 47th Mechanised Brigade (9th Corps) was also seen in combat. This could indicate that over the coming weeks, Ukrainians will mix elements of both corps to maintain pressure on Russian forces in the Orikhix axis. In the meantime, Russians continued to build fortifications in southern Ukraine to hinder future advances of Kyiv’s forces. Although the tempo of such works is unlikely to be as high as during the first six months of 2023, we assess that Moscow will continue to fortify the Zaporizhihia Oblast to improve its defence in depth.
A Russian source reported last week that elements of Ukrainian marine brigades were redeployed from the Velyka Novosilka axis to the Kherson Oblast. Although we cannot substantiate this claim yet, if confirmed, it would also indicate that the scale of Ukrainian offensive activities there would decrease (marines were one of the most important fighting components south of Velyka Novosilka). This development comes among reports on increasing Russian counterattack operations in this axis.
Secondly, as mentioned in the text below, the newly established 25th Combined Arms Army was deployed to the Luhansk Oblast to rotate experienced units there, which will then be sent to the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. If the unit is indeed to be used for rotation, then the Russian presence in the south will be augmented with experienced personnel. If there is no rotation and the 25th CAA is only used to strengthen the Russian grouping near Kreminna, it will mean that Russians are confident that their current forces in the south are sufficient to break down Ukrainian attacks, especially among reports about the additional deployment of Storm-Z formations.
Whether we are seeing a culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is too early to say. We cannot entirely exclude a black swan event for Russia or further Ukrainian gains, either. When looking at available data regarding troop movements, reported military activities on both sides, the trajectory of events, and public statements, it is probable that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is slowly entering a new phase of decreased activities in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. On the other hand, by deploying marine forces to the Kherson Oblast, Ukrainians may seek to impose a dilemma on Russians as to which areas require more protection. Moscow may be forced to ease its presence in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, which may open up a window of opportunity for Ukrainians.
The next few weeks will provide answers as to where Russian and Ukrainian military operations are headed in the near term.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
As expected, no changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past week.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Kupyansk, Kotivka, Yurchynkove, Vovchansk, Kozacha Lopan, Dvorichna, Synel’nykove, Holubivka, Blahodativka and Vilcha, Borova, Velyka Shapkivka.
A Ukrainian source reported on Thursday (28SEP) that the Freedom of Russia Legion (Ukraine-based and Ukraine-commanded paramilitary group comprising Russian citizens) conducted assault operations on the territory of the Belgorod region. According to preliminary data, the raid occurred near Starosel’e and Terebreno. The group’s Telegram channel announced, “there are no wounded or dead among the Legionnaires, we are working according to plan. Leave the tales about minefields to Konashenkov (Lieutenant General., Chief of the Department for Information and Media Affairs of the Russian MoD). We continue to cleanse our house of Putin’s filth.” No further information about the state of these attacks and their objectives appeared online since the original announcement.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Likewise, the frontline in the Luhansk Oblast remained stable.
On Sunday (24SEP), a Russian source claimed that the UAF had stabilised the situation in the Kupyansk area, using transferred reserves. They even conducted localised counterattacks. The source also said no significant changes occurred near Synkivka, Petropavlivka and Masyutivka. On the other hand, Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu said on Tuesday (26SEP) that Russian units had significantly expanded the control zone near Sinkivka and Petropavlovka. Still, we were unable to substantiate these claims. On Tuesday, another Russian source asserted that Russian troops seized new positions near Kyslivka, through which a critical logistical route P07 passes. However, the source stated that a part of the village, which sits on elevated positions, was still controlled by Ukrainian forces.
Artem Lysohor, the Luhansk Oblast Military Administration head, stated on Tuesday (26SEP) Russians continued to press along the entire frontline. Lysohor added that Russians assaulted Ukrainian positions from early morning until the afternoon, and they usually occurred in several waves, including heavy equipment. Aviation was also very active. Despite the intensity of Russian strikes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) held their positions throughout the week.
On Monday (25SEP), a large explosion was recorded in Sorokyne, which Ukrainian bloggers attributed to a strike on a Russian ammunition depot.
According to Roman Vlasenko, the Severodonetsk district administration head, the Russians had suffered significant losses in the Luhansk region in August and September, which forced them to deploy reserves. Vlasenko added that despite these losses, Russians were preparing for assault operations and logistics to sustain further attacks. Vlasenko’s claims should be looked at with a grain of salt. Russians likely could not have suffered large losses while simultaneously preparing for offensive operations. This would suggest an abundance of manpower. So either the claim about their losses is not true, or no preparations for offensive actions are ongoing.
On Tuesday (26SEP), Ilya Yevlash, the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group spokesman, said that the Russians formed 12 assault companies in the Lyman – Kupyansk direction, which included about 2,000 people. At the same time, Yevlash asserted that the Russian forces’ capacity degraded since they previously fought as battalion tactical groups and now they only used companies. The last time we saw Russians fighting with BTGs was last year. As such, we are unsure whether Yevlash’s claims are correct. If they are, Russians can generate sufficient forces, especially given that their attacks were platoon- or company-sized so far.
Nevertheless, two days later, on Thursday (28SEP), he claimed that Russians were preparing for an offensive operation in the Lyman-Kupyansk sector. He added that while they had previously been reinforcing their fortifications in this area, the number of air strikes in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction had increased significantly. In this area, Russians reportedly deployed 15,000 strong and newly established 25th Combined Arms Army. Based on his conversations with the Ukrainian General Staff and General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, a British journalist said that Russians were forced to commit the new grouping about six weeks earlier than planned and that the unit was used to rotate other forces in the Kreminna axis.
Prior to that, on Monday (25SEP), Russians released a video showing a missile strike on a bridge over the Oskil River in Kupyansk with a Kh-38 guided missile. The bridge reportedly collapsed. Undoubtedly, the strike sought to degrade Ukrainian logistics east of the river and prevent Ukrainians from being able to support their forces east of Kupyansk. This could be an indication of impending Russian attacks. On the other hand, two weeks ago, Russians conducted a similar strike on the bridge, and despite reports about its destruction, it appears that the first strike was unsuccessful.
When it comes to the frontline changes, none occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to the Russian journalist, the Ukrainian Forces improved their positions near Novojehorivka. However, the source said the critical height near the village was still in the “grey zone”.
On Thursday (28SEP), the Ukrainian blogger maintained that between mid-August and mid-September, the 68th Jaeger Brigade, supported by the 43rd, 32nd Mechanised Brigade, 95th Air Assault Brigade and the 15th Border Guard Detachment, repelled numerous Russian attacks on Novojehorivka and the heights near the village. At the moment, they have lost their offensive potential in the area.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes. The same pertains to Novoselivske.
According to the Russian source, no changes occurred near Terny and Torske, where positional battles continued. Also, no changes were reported near Makiivka, Ploshchanka, Chervonopopivka, Yampolivka and Nevske.
In the Kreminna area, according to the Russian source, battles continued in the Serebryasnky forest and near Dibrova, but no changes were reported. Ukrainian sources also claimed that no changes were recorded.
According to the Russian journalist, Russian units tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka but were unsuccessful.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Kupyansk direction, Russian units of the “Western” group of troops, supported by air and artillery fire, struck Ukrainian concentration areas of the 25th Airborne Brigade, 14th, 43rd, 66th and 92nd Mechanised Brigade in Miasozharivka, Synkivka, Pishchane Berestove, Cherneshchyna and Ivanivka. The frontline aviation carried out an air strike on the temporary deployment point of units of the 44th Mechanised Brigade and the 68th Jaeger Brigade in Kopanky and Pershotravneve. In the defence belt of the 1st Tank Army, the Ukrainians attempted to rotate units of the 25th Airborne Brigade but failed due to Russian artillery fire. An ammunition depot of the 113th Territorial Defence Brigade was destroyed near the Lyptsi settlement.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, last week, 12 attacks by Ukrainian assault groups of the 63rd, 67th Mechanised Brigade, the 5th Brigade of the National Guard and the 12th “Azov” Special Forces Brigade were repelled near Torske, Dibrova and the Serebryansky forest. Also, near Torske, Yampolovka and Dibrova, Russian artillery hit Ukrainian concentration areas of the 63rd and 67th Mechanised Brigades. Russian aircraft carried out four strikes on command and observation posts in the Serebryanka area and hit a Ukrainian concentration area in the Serebryansky forest and Hryhorivka.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
After capturing Klishchiivka and Andryiivka south of Bakhmut, Ukrainian forces made no further gains in the area, although attacks on Kurdyumivka continued.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. On 25SEP (Sunday), the Russian source claimed that Russian artillery fired at the Ukrainian positions in Spirne and Vesele.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Rozdolivka, Fedorivka and Vasiukvika. According to the Russian journalist, Russian forces took the initiative northwest of Bakhmut. Specifically, from the Dubovo-Vasylivka area, they attacked in two directions – towards Hryhorivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. The source, however, failed to provide any detailed information about these developments. Denis Pushylin, the DPR occupation head, somehow confirmed this development by asserting that the Russian Armed Forces improved their positions northwest of Bakhmut, advancing near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Berkhivka.
No other source, either Russian or Ukrainian, reported any changes in these areas.
A Ukrainian soldier who fights in the Bakhmut direction claimed that Russians also tried to counterattack near Berkhivka but were unsuccessful.
On Wednesday (27SEP), Ilya Yevlash claimed that Wagner Group personnel returned to the eastern parts of Ukraine. Those previously deployed to Belarus signed a contract with the Russian MoD and were sent to Africa or Ukraine. However, Yevlash said these forces did not pose such a threat as a year ago, mostly because they lost Yevgeny Prigozhin. We believe that while Prigozhin played a key role in assuring a continuous stream of supplies to his forces, his impact on the overall military command of the formations was limited. As a result, a decrease in Wagner’s combat effectiveness does not come with the loss of Prigozhin. It will stem from a decrease in the number of personnel available for combat. As Wagner was cut off from recruiting inmates months ago, its ability to generate sufficient force is significantly degraded. Indeed, the Ukrainian Border Guard Service clarified that there were more than 6,000 Wagner personnel in Belarus before the pullback occurred. The deployments to Africa and Ukraine led to a decrease in their number in Belarus, reaching 1,000 as of Monday (25SEP).
No changes were reported in Bakhmut.
Moving further south, according to the Russian source, heavy battles continued in the Klishchiivka – Andriivka – Kurdyumivka line. The UAF continued their attacks toward the railway in Klishchiivka to push the Russian forces back. The source added that Ukrainians controlled the southern part and the centre of the village, both sides deployed reinforcements and conducted local counterattacks.
Another Russian source said that Russian artillery actively fired at Ukrainian positions in Klishchiivka and confirmed Ukrainian continuous attacks towards the railway line. A Ukrainian soldier held the UAF repelled Russian counterattacks near Klishchiivka, confirming that Russian operations included defensive and offensive operations.
However, on Wednesday (27SEP), Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian personnel had crossed the railway in some places and were consolidating their positions near the railway line.
On Thursday (28SEP), a Russian source maintained that Ukrainian attacks continued to be successfully repelled by Russian forces near the railway. The course confirmed that Ukrainians had moved reinforcements to sustain their attack tempo. On the other hand, Russians reportedly deployed personnel from the PMC Redut, who had previously served in PMC Wagner. The Ukrainian soldier also confirmed that Wagner units were present in the Bakhmut direction, adding that some Wagnerites were also sent to the Lyman-Kupyansk direction, where they were used to create assault groups.
The Ukrainian source said that battles for Kurdyumivka continued as Ukrainians pounded the village with artillery. No further changes were reported near the village.
According to Ilya Yevlash, Ukrainians were “reaching” the Bakhmut – Horlivka road Russians were using to move supplies around and were working to cut off others. The frontline is some three kilometres from the road, and given the current trajectory of Ukrainian gains, it may take several weeks for Ukrainians to reach the T0513 road. It is unclear what other roads Yevlash was talking about.
No changes occurred near Ivanivske and Bila Hora. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novokalynove, Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Vesele and Kamyanka.
In Avdiivka, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes.
According to the Russian journalist, Russian units tried to advance near Sjeverne but were unsuccessful. Another source claimed that Russian Forces conducted a successful offensive near Opytne and captured several strongholds. Most of the fighting involves Storm Z units.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Vodyane and Nevelske.
According to the Russian source, Russian units continued to conduct offensive actions near Mariinka and Krasnohorivka. The source claimed that the Ukrainians abandoned a stronghold near Krasnohorivka, where Russian units advanced. No progress was made near Mariinka.
According to the Russian journalist, with artillery support, Russian units tried to attack towards Novomykhailivka. The source failed to provide any detailed information about this development. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
No changes occurred near Pobieda and Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Donetsk direction, elements of the 54th, 93rd Mechanised Brigade, 59th Motorised Brigade, 79th Air Assault Brigade and 5th Assault Brigade conducted 28 attacks near Avdiivka Berestove, Spirne, Klishchiivka, Nevelske, Mayorsk, Mariinka and Vodyane. All attempts, he said, were repelled by the Russian units assisted by aviation and artillery support. Also, an ammunition depot of the UAF 10th Mountain Assault Brigade was destroyed near Zvanivka.
According to Petro Andryushchenko, an advisor to the Ukrainian Mayor of Mariupol, Russians are building a direct railway connection to Mariupol and Volnovakha to “solve military and civilian logistics issues.” He noted that “if successful, this will make it possible to include the existing Mariupol-Aslanove-Kalchyk-Volnovakha line in the direct connection to Taganrog and Rostov-on-Don.
Indeed, some OSINT sources reported last week about the ongoing construction of rail lines near Staromar’ivka.
Southern Ukraine Direction
Last week, the Commander of the Ukrainian Tarvia grouping, Brig. Gen. Oleksandr said that Ukrainian forces had breached Russian defence lines near Verbove. But he also noted that any breakthrough would only happen “after Tomak”, and the city (reaching it?) is the minimum objective for the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Ukrainian sources claimed that the logistic situation of the Russian forces in Tokmak was so bad that Russian servicemen were forcing local citizens to give them pet, canned goods and food.
On the other hand, the Mayor of Melitopol asserted that Russians continued to create fortified lines and recently established such positions north of Tokmak.
Russian sources, on the other hand, published footage with captured officers of the Ukrainian 82nd Air Assault, as well as 116th and 118th Mechanised Brigades. They claimed that Ukrainians lacked combat experience and had low morale.
Velyka Novosilka axis
The situation in the Velyka Novosilka axis remained stable last week. Ukrainians conducted limited ground attacks, while Russian artillery strikes intensified to hinder the forward movement of Ukrainian forces.
Two weeks ago, some Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainians entered or even liberated Novomaiors’ke. However, all Ukrainian attempts to attack the village over the past week were repelled. Novomaiors’ke is still under Russian control.
On Friday (22SEP), Russians claimed to have conducted a fire attack on Ukrainians deployed in Staromayorske, Novodonetske and Pryuutne. According to the Russian MoD, artillery also destroyed the ammo depot of the 1st Tank Brigade near Zeleny Gai.
On Tuesday (26SEP), the Russian source claimed that Ukrainians tried to attack Russian positions in Zavitne Bazhannya but were unsuccessful.
No changes occurred near Pryyutne. According to the Russian journalist, Ukrainian units also attempted to attack Russian positions near the settlement, but all attacks were pushed back. Moreover, on Wednesday (27SEP), the same source stated that Russians conducted counterattacks, successfully capturing several positions north of the settlement. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
On Sunday (24SEP), the Russian source declared that the Ukrainians in the Velyka Novosilka axis were exhausted and were rotating to resume offensive operations. The objective remained unchanged: to break through to Staromlynivka either through Zavitne Bazhannia or from the direction of Pryyutne. The source said the primary Ukrainian efforts were now concentrated in the Orikhiv and Bakhmut directions.
On the other hand, Ukrainian bloggers said that the Russians were strengthening the Velyka Novosilka section of the front with Storm-Z units (former inmates). Their impact on the fighting grew along with their numbers, even though they served as cannon fodder.
To summarise last week’s events in this axis, we may be starting to see a decrease in Ukrainian operations. On the one hand, Russians reported that marine units were redeployed to the Kherson Oblast (see below). The deployment of additional Storm-Z units indicates Russian comfort in deploying poorly trained and equipped personnel to stall Ukrainian attacks. At the same time, expandable Storm-Z units bleed Ukrainian formations that were earmarked for the counteroffensive. Yet again, we see a situation where Ukrainians attrit their forces against units with no value for Moscow.
The Orikhiv axis
Ukrainian attacks on this axis continued but brought no confirmed frontline changes.
On Sunday (24SEP), Russian sources declared that Ukrainians restarted active offensive operations. They managed to approach the outskirts of Novoprokopivka, get closer to Verbove and improve their positions on the flank near Novofedorivka.
A day later, another source said that Ukrainian units expanded their control near Novoprokopivka and reached the northern part of the settlement.
Indeed, a video posted on Sunday by Russian sources showed two Ukrainian soldiers being engaged (and killed?) by a Russian soldier in the village. Still, it is unclear whether Ukrainians made a permanent foothold in Novoprokopivka.
The Ukrainian source said that Russians were conducting counterattacks to slow the Ukrainian move forward, which would indicate that the manpower problem was not an issue. Nevertheless, Ukrainians believe that losing the heights east of Novoprokopivka would endanger their defensive positions.
On Sunday (24SEP), Russians also launched counterattacks near Robotyne. Three days later, Ukrainians added that battles continued west and south of the village.
On Thursday (28SEP), Russians claimed that all battles in the Orikhiv axis continued at the Robotyne – Verbove line, where the Ukrainian armed forces tried to cut into the Russian defence. In other places, no changes occurred.
The same source added that the Ukrainian command was rotating its forces and did not plan to cease attacks. Elements of the 71st Jaeger Brigade were sent to the rear to recover, while assault groups of the Ukrainian SOF arrived at the line between Robotyne and Verbove. Also, two German-made Leopard 2A6 tanks from the 12th Separate Tank Battalion (10th Army Corps) were spotted on the front line.
No changes occurred near Pyatykhatky. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Ivan Fedorov, the Mayor of Melitopol, to the north of Tokmak, a new fortification appeared on both sides of the road leading to Robotyne.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units, air strikes, artillery, and heavy flame-throwing systems struck on deployment points of the 127th Territorial Defence Brigade near Pryyutne and Malynivka and the 72nd Mechanised Brigade of the UAF in Konstantynivka. Russian aircraft and artillery fire hit the 56th UAF Motorised Infantry Brigade concentration areas and the 110th Territorial Defence Brigade near Urozhaine and Staromaiorske. In addition, air strikes by assault and army aviation hit concentration areas of the 31st, 72nd Mechanised Brigade, 58th Motorised Infantry, 79th Airborne Assault Brigade and 38th Marine Brigade of the UAF near Staromaiorskoe, Volodymyrivka, Mykylske, Urozhaine and Solodke. Also, Russian artillery fire destroyed an ammunition depot north of Mykylske.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
On Sunday (24SEP), a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions on islands in the Dnipro River delta. The source claimed that Ukrainian forces had created a “bridgehead” near Oleshky and expanded their positions near Pidstepne on the left bank of Kherson Oblast.
Another Russian source added that Ukrainian forces expanded their positions on the southwestern part of Kozatskyi Island. In addition, Ukrainians reportedly redeployed elements of its marine brigades into the region. This involved 6,870 personnel, 46 tanks, 223 armoured vehicles and eight artillery pieces.
Interestingly, the same source claimed that elements of the 35th, 36th and 37th Marine Brigades arrived in the Kherson Oblast. The arrival of the 38th Marine Brigade and seven artillery battalions is also expected. The source said that all of these units had been withdrawn from the Velyka Novosilka axis, which is why there was a decrease in Ukrainian activities. If confirmed, this would probably indicate a major decrease in activities in the Velyka Novosilka axis. But at the same time, it may force Russians to (re)deploy units from other formations and ease Russian presence in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. So far, we have seen no indications suggesting Ukrainian preparations for river crossing operations.
The same source alleged that Russian border guards repelled a Ukrainian attempt to land forces on Mys Tarkhankut in Crimea on the night of 22/23SEP and 23/24 SEP.
Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, stated on Sunday (24SEP) that Russian forces had recently intensified aviation activity in the Kherson direction and conducted more than 20 strikes near Kherson and Beryslav on Saturday (23SEP). She also added that Russians were dropping bombs on Snake Island. Indeed, a day later, the Russian source claimed that Russian forces had struck Snake Island with two bombs and said that Ukrainian forces used the Island as a logistics base for sabotage and reconnaissance groups conducting operations against Crimea.
On Monday (25SEP), the Russian source published a video showing a drone strike on the Kulbakino Air Base in the Mykolaiv Oblast. The source claimed this was the third documented case of the destruction of Ukrainian MiG-29s, although we have not been able to confirm the veracity of this claim. Before that, two drones reportedly hit Ukrainian air assets at the Dolgintsevo airfield near Kryvyi Rih.
On 18SEP, Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on a Russian military headquarters in occupied parts of the Kherson Oblast. Based on Ukrainian Security Service reports, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty claimed on Tuesday (26SEP) that a Ukrainian strike had hit the headquarters of the Russian 24th Motorised Rifle regiment (70th Motorised Rifle Division) near Kherson, killing eight officers and wounding seven. Geolocated footage of the strike from SBU indicates that the headquarters is in Radensk.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 482 aircraft (+7), 250 helicopters (+1), 7,252 UAVs (+217), 438 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 12,210 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+183), 1,157 MLRS launchers (+3), 6,584 field artillery guns and mortars (+96), as well as 13,590 units of special military vehicles (+289).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 277,660 personnel (+2,710), 4,687 tanks (+43), 8,972 armoured combat vehicles (+81), 6,409 artillery systems (+232) and 794 MLR systems (+9), 536 anti-aircraft systems (+8), 315 aircraft (0) and 316 helicopters (0), and 4,991 UAVs (+133), 8,836 vehicles and fuel tanks (+146), 1,529 cruise missiles (+12), 20 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), and 912 special vehicles (+18).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Russian missile strikes decreased compared to the previous week. Only one strike was reported. On Monday (25SEP), Ukrainians claimed that Russians fired 12 Kalibr cruise missiles and two P-800 Onyx anti-ship missiles. In total, 11 Kalibrs were intercepted and none Onyxs.
Russian use of Shaheds 131/136 kamikaze drones was again increased. Two weeks ago, Ukrainians reported four strikes involving 84 vehicles, of which 68 were shot down (80% interception rate). Last week, there were three attacks involving 91 UAVs, of which 79 were shot down (86% interception rate). More importantly, since the start of September, Russians conducted 18 strikes in which 366 Shaheds were intercepted. Previously, this number of drones (367) was intercepted between 26JUN and 30AUG in 29 strikes. Therefore, the increase in the tempo of attacks and their intensity is clear.
Outlook for the week of 30SEP-6OCT
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.” Although Russians conducted no cross-border attacks and the overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged, personnel from the Free Russia Legion reportedly entered Russia’s territory. This information, however, remains unconfirmed.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. Still, we expect no significant changes as a result of these actions. While Moscow could make tactical gains, given the current force commitments, they are unlikely to capture a village or more across the entire direction. We expect no Ukrainian gains.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. 2) We assess that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, it is highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” This assessment was correct. Neither side made any confirmed territorial gains.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. Ukrainians are unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka.” Progress on both sides indeed continued to be slow as neither side made any gains.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.” This assessment was correct.
Final score: 5/5 (100%)
The forecast for the week of 30SEP-6OCT
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. There is a roughly even chance that they will make territorial gains, but they are unlikely to capture one or more villages. We expect no Ukrainian gains.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are unlikely to progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, it is highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. Ukrainians are unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka. But, we also add that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory, especially in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.
Currently, we would not like to assess the likelihood of a major Ukrainian cross-river operation as there are too many unknowns We may go back to such a scenario next week.