Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 25 November – 01 December 2023 (Weekly update)
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Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week did not deliver any strategic or operational changes in Ukraine; Russian posture remained offensive in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka axis; Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank;
Although it has not been independently confirmed, Russians claimed to have progressed near Bakhmut and Avdiivka; Ukrainians may have also advanced south of Krynky;
Russian operations in the Kharkiv Oblast remained focused on artillery strikes and border infiltration missions;
Russians maintained pressure on Ukrainian units in the northern parts of the Kupyansk axis, where they conducted numerous attacks, mostly done by units composed of former convicts; No changes in other parts of Luhansk Oblast were reported;
In the Donetsk Oblast, Russians reportedly captured Khromove near Bakhmut and progressed by an industrial zone in the southeastern approaches to Avdiivka; No other changes were reported across the region;
Russians were very active near Bakhmut, where they reportedly made some gains; The same pertains to the Avdiivka area; The overall situation in the Donetsk Oblast remained unchanged;
The frontline in the Southern Direction saw marginal changes, especially in the Valyka Novosilka axis, where Russians may have captured a Ukrainian stronghold;
Ukrainians tried to extend territorial control of areas near Krynky on Dnipro’s left bank to expand the existing bridgehead, but these attempts failed to deliver meaningful gains; Russian sources claimed that a large force was being assembled to push Ukrainians back over the river;
Last week, Russians conducted the largest Shahed 131/136 drone attack since this capability was introduced in September 2022; Altogether, 75 vehicles were launched, and Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 74;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), the Ukrainian units repelled 26 Russian ground attacks near Syn’kivka and Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past seven days. In the Luhansk Oblast, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) pushed back 36 Russian ground attacks near Stel’makhivka, Serebryans’ke forestry. In the Donetsk Oblast, the Ukrainian troops repelled 240 Russian attacks near Terny, Yampolivka, Torske, Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and east of Pivnichne, east of Novobakhmutivka, south of Novokalynove, Sjeverne, Stepove, Avdiivka, Tonenke, Pervomais’ke, Krasnohorivka, Mar’inka and Novomykhailivka, Staromaiors’ke, Vodyane and Prechystivka. In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the Ukrainian forces repelled 30 Russian attacks near Robotyne and Verbove.
The UGS also added that the Ukrainian Air Force launched 29 air strikes on the Russian personnel and equipment concentration areas and five air strikes on Russian air defence systems. The Ukrainian missile and artillery formations hit six command posts, five air defence systems, 13 artillery systems, 18 personnel and equipment concentration areas, five ammunition depots and one electronic warfare station.
Above all, this data confirmed that the Russian centre of gravity remained firmly placed on the Avdiivka axis. Ground attacks across the entire Donetsk Oblast increased from 228 two weeks ago to 240 this week, of which Avdiivka likely significantly contributed to the overall figure.
Over the past seven days, Ukrainians liberated some nine square kilometres of territory, while Russians captured half of this number. Yet, these numbers do not accurately portray who has the initiative. Although Ukrainian forces made marginal gains southeast of Klishchiivka, Russian forces continued to deploy forces to retake the village and push west to capture neighbouring heights. However, Russian sources, including the country’s Ministry of Defence, claimed mid-week that Russian units recaptured Khromove, a village on Bakhmut’s western approaches. It had already been under Russian control, which ended in mid-May when Ukrainians launched counterattacks near Bakhmut, pushing Russians east in the area. The intensity of Russian attacks near Khromove increased a few weeks ago, slowly being translated into territorial gains. Ukrainian ability to counterattack is limited to platoon-sized formations supported by artillery, which also suffers from shell hunger.
We do not expect to see major changes in this part of the front. Russia will likely continue attacking, but they are unlikely to achieve a tactical breakthrough due to the stiff Ukrainian resistance and poor weather.
Moving south, over the last week, Russians increased the intensity of ground attacks near Avdiivka. Supported by artillery and aviation, Russians were pushing through an industrial area on the southeastern approaches to the city, although they had not entered Avdiivka yet. Battles were also ongoing northwest of the city, where Russians also made marginal gains near Stepove. The village is still under Ukrainian control. So is the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, which Russians have unsuccessfully tried to capture for weeks.
Lastly, Russian sources reported on Friday that their units planted a Russian flag in the western parts of Mariinka. Similar to Avdiivka, Mariinka has been a frontline city since 2014. Following the FEB22 full-scale Russian attack, Ukrainians actually managed to capture some territory and retake the village. However, since the early days of the war, the frontline near Mariinka barely changed. The village is now totally destroyed and will hardly offer any utility to Russian forces if they capture it.
Russians are also slowly retaking the initiative in the Southern Direction, where last week they conducted numerous attacks on Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka axes. Given that Ukrainians have been redeploying their forces from the south to reinforce defensive lines in more pressing areas, we assess that the danger is real for Kyiv to start giving hard-fought gains in these areas, too.
Lastly, Ukrainians maintained forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They made no progress despite their attempts to move farther south from the Krynky area. Both Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed over the past seven days that their positions were constantly hit by artillery and aviation. Although Ukrainians can reinforce and resupply these forces, the threat of a big Russian attack to push Ukrainians over the river persists. Indeed, Russian sources have reported that Moscow was accumulating their units to launch an attack, seeking to achieve this very objective. It still remains unclear what exactly the purpose of this Ukrainian operation is. Kyiv’s units in this operation (marine brigades) had already been exhausted after months of constant battles in the Velyka Novosilka axis. As such, their combat effectiveness was degraded when Ukrainians crossed the river. Keeping a bridgehead just for its sake is also counterproductive. Ukrainians are exposed, logistics are problematic, and CASEVAC is time-consuming, which probably leads to increased mortality rates. Ukrainians are also spending more artillery shells supporting this operation than they can afford, especially given that there are pressing issues in other areas (Bakhmut, Avdiivka). It therefore seems likely that the decision to support this operation is more political than military. It presents an image of Ukrainian forces constantly counterattacking, and constantly maintaining pressure on Russian forces, especially in such a priority area as the Kherson Oblast.
Following our trip to Ukraine, we wrote the following line: “With small exceptions (Kherson and Orikhiv), Ukrainians are now on the defensive along the entire front, which will likely necessitate the creation of fortified lines (…)”. On Friday (01DEC), President Zelensky, said that Ukraine had to accelerate the construction of fortifications, especially near eastern towns in Donetsk Oblast (Avdiivka and Bakhmut?) and between Kupyansk and Lyman. Undoubtedly, Kyiv considers that these areas are the most threatened by Moscow.
Also on Friday, President Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the armed forces from 2.039 million to 2.209 million. The number of uniformed personnel will increase by 170 thousand from 1.15 to 1.32 million. It is the second time that the size of the armed forces has been extended since the war started. It could mean that preparations for a new wave of mobilisation are ongoing.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Tuesday (22NOV)
The Bulgarian Parliament approved the transfer of 100 BTR-family APCs to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Thursday (23NOV)
The Washington Post reported secret Russian-Chinese talks about the possibility of building an underwater tunnel connecting Russia and Crimea. Talks took place in late October.
Friday (24NOV)
Germany will provide Ukraine with four additional IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defence systems under a package worth more than EUR1.3 billion. Systems are to be delivered from 2025.
Saturday (25NOV)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky informed that “partner countries” have committed to transferring warships to Ukraine to enhance the safety of vessels moving through the so-called “grain corridor”.
Sunday (26NOV)
Kyiv launched 35 drones that targeted Moscow, Tula, and Smolensk.
Monday (27NOV)
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new Russian budget with a 25% increase in military spending. Russian defence and law enforcement spending now amounts to almost 40% of federal expenditure.
Former US State Secretary Mike Pompeo claimed that the United States
would support Ukraine irrespective of the results of the 2024 US Presidential elections.The Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Justice, Iryna Mudra, stressed that Ukraine would not sign a peace agreement with Russia if it did not contain (financial) reparations.
The Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council, Oleksiy Danilov, claimed that Russia activated (spy) sleeper cells during the last two months to incite anti-government sentiments and “exploit tensions” related to the potential conflict between Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky and Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhnyi.
The Chairman of the Ukrenergo (the main and state-controlled Ukrainian operator of the electricity transmission system), Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, informed that the company would receive EUR24.5 million from Germany to strengthen the country’s power system.
Canada would provide 11.000 Colt C7 and C8 assault rifles (M-16/CAR-15 family) to Ukraine.
Tuesday (28NOV)
Ukrainians killed the Deputy Commander of the Russian 14th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Zavadsky.
The wife of the Ukrainian HUR head, Lt. Gen. Kiril Budanov, had been reportedly poisoned.
Wednesday (29NOV)
Ukraine fully synchronised its energy system with the European grid, allowing it to import up to 1,700 MW in case of shortages.
Thursday (30NOV)
Various sources reported explosions in a railway tunnel near Severomuysk in the country’s far east. Ukraine has been suggested as a culprit.
The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter Szijjártó claimed that Hungary would never supply weapons to Ukraine.
Friday (01NOV)
Putin signed a decree authorising an increase in Russian Armed Forces from 2.039 million to 2.209 million; The number of uniformed personnel will increase by 170 thousand, from 15 to 1.32 million.
Zelensky urged acceleration in establishing fortifications in the east and north (Kypyansk-Lyman)
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides as well.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past seven days.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Kozacha Lopan, Vovchansk, Synkivka, Kucherivka, Pershotravneve, Ivanivka, Kyslivka, Krokhmalne, Udy, Alisivka and Bochkove, Mala Vivcha, Dvorichna, Petropavlivka, Berestove and Kamyanka.
Ukrainian sources claimed on Monday (27NOV) that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups intensified operations in border regions. Artillery attacks increased as well.
This information is in line with what we previously wrote in the UCM. Russian SOF forces conduct regular infiltration missions to gather intelligence on Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv, Cherikniv and Sumy Oblasts and to fix at least a part of Ukrainian territorial defence forces (TDF) there. Currently, we assess that the likelihood of a major Russian incursion into these oblasts is small. That said, on Sunday (26NOV), the Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Serhii Naiev, said that Russian attacks may spillover beyond Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions, especially if Russian defence production continued to increase and Western support dwindled.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Although no confirmed frontline changes occurred in this direction over the past seven days, both sides reported increased Russian ground attacks.
Indeed, on Saturday (25NOV), the Ukrainian source claimed Ukrainians repelled most of the Russian attacks but not all. In some areas, the attackers advanced. On the other hand, and slightly contradicting the previous statement, the source added that there had been some positive news for Ukrainians, too. Russian personnel also surrendered more often. Ukrainians also noted that Russians were demotivated, and it was increasingly difficult for the command to assemble assault groups.
Deteriorating weather has also had an impact on combat operations. Throughout the week, Russian use of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft was limited due to bad weather. Russians thus focused on artillery attacks.
Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, claimed on Monday (27NOV) that in the Kupyansk direction, Russians predominantly used Shtorm-Z (former inmates) and Shtorm-V (former inmates who signed a contract with the Russian MoD) units. He also noted the presence of “Wagner” forces in assault operations. Sirsky added that battles near Ivanivka Synkivka continued. The same goes for the Serebryansky forest. He, however, did not provide any updates on whether Russians had progressed in recent weeks in these areas.
The northern areas of the Luhansk Direction continue to be Russia’s centre of gravity in this part of Ukraine. Ukrainian sources asserted on Saturday (25NOV) that Russians continued to advance near Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka and that they regained their lost positions near Ivanivka. This is confirmed by Russian sources, which added that Russian units, supported by long-range weapons, managed to take new positions near Synkivka. The source, however, stated that Russians were unable to achieve a breakthrough due to the mass use of mines by Ukrainians.
Russians also reportedly pushed Ukrainians away near Lyman Pershyi as a result of the deployment of “newly mobilised resources”. So far, however, we have made no changes to our frontline map due to a lack of visual evidence confirming Russian gains in the area.
Moving south, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Krohmalne, Dvorichna, and Svatove.
On Monday (27NOV), a Russian attack on Ukrainian positions near Novoselivske was pushed back. No further attacks were conducted in this area for the past seven days.
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka, Raihorodka, Makiivka, Ploshchanka and, Chervonopopivka, Nevske, Terny, Yampolivka and Torske.
The overall situation remained unchanged in the Kreminna area. Battles continued in the Serebryansky forest and near Dibrova, where neither side was victorious. On Monday (27NOV), a Ukrainian soldier claimed said that Russians had tried to break through the Ukrainian defences using a large number of infantry and vehicles. The attack was, however, repelled using infantry, tanks, and artillery.
No changes were recorded near Bilohorivka.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army repelled 21 Ukrainian attacks from the 14th, 43rd Mechanised Brigade, 57th Motorised Brigade and 15th National Guard Brigade near Pershotravneve, Ivanivka, and Yahidne. In addition, the 1st Tank Army hindered the Ukrainian attempt to rotate elements of the 43rd Mechanised Brigade at the forward positions near Ivanivka and Yahidne. Russian aviation struck deployment areas of the Ukrainian 43rd Mechanised Brigade near Petropavlivka and Kurylivka. Heavy flamethrower systems (TOS-1s) hit Ukrainian concentration areas of the 14th Mechanised Brigade, 101st, 103rd, and 105th Territorial Defence Brigades near Ivanivka, Kyslivka, Kotlyarivka and Synkivka.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, Russians destroyed 200 targets over the past week, including four command and observation posts. They also hit five Ukrainian concentration areas near Serebryanka, Yampolivka, Dibrova and Torske.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Russians made marginal gains near Bakhmut and Avdiivka. No further changes were reported in the entire region.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka and Vesele.
On Sunday (26NOV), the Russian journalist claimed that the Russians were conducting offensive operations near Khromove and achieved tactical gains. Attacks in this area and Bohdanivka continued throughout the week, and on Wednesday (29NOV), Russian sources (including the Russian MoD) claimed that Khromove had been taken. The attacks were reportedly mostly driven by elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne Division. So far, we have seen no visual confirmation validating these assertions.
Russians also reportedly advanced near the Berkhivka Reservoir.
Early in the week, Russian sources reported that Ukrainians reinforced Chervone with the 23rd Battalion of the 1st Presidential Brigade as Ukrainian units deployed in this sector suffered heavy casualties. The redeployment of a battalion from the 1st Separate Special Forces Brigade from Kharkiv Oblast was also being finalised in Chasiv Yar. The special unit will reportedly rotate the 77th Airmobile Brigade, which will restore its combat capability.
No changes occurred in Bakhmut. Ukrainians are on the defensive, and we expect no changes in their posture in this area, at least until spring.
Syrskyi claimed on Monday (27NOV) that Russians also continued attempts to force Ukrainian troops out of their positions in Klishchiivka. He added that to achieve this objective, Russians had intensified the use of kamikaze drones. On the other hand, he claimed that Russian losses in the Bakhmut, Kupyansk, and Lyman sectors included 8,690 personnel and 1,002 pieces of damaged and destroyed equipment, including 109 tanks, 175 armoured combat vehicles and more than 200 artillery systems and mortars.
A similar description of the situation near Bakhmut was confirmed by a Ukrainian troop, who said that Russians were moving from trench to trench, amassing forces, and assaulting Ukrainian positions often. The attackers used many different drones, from small FPVs to large attack ones. Russians also attach small EW transmitters on some UAVs to jam Ukrainian communication. The source also added that Russians did not experience shell hunger.
The overall situation south of Bakhmut did not change. However, both Ukrainian and Russian sources confirmed in various reports published throughout the week that Russians were actively attempting to dislodge Ukrainian units from Klishchiivka and nearby heights. During the weekend, Russians reportedly made some gains within the village, but it is unclear what this involved.
The Ukrainian bloggers said that on Monday (27NOV), the Russians became more active in the Mayorsk area. Since then, however, no further information has appeared in open sources confirming frontline changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near the slag heap on the western outskirts of Horlivka, where battles recently occurred.
Ukrainian sources claimed on Saturday (25NOV) that Russians attacked Ukrainian positions near Novokalynove and achieved partial success there as a result. Further south, Russians maintained pressure on Ukrainian lines in Stepove and managed to reach the western outskirts of the village. Ukrainians claimed to have conducted “successful stabilisation measures” to normalise the situation. This likely involved the deployment of reserves and counterattacks.
Russians also continued attacking the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, but according to Ukrainian sources, almost all attacks were repelled.
On Tuesday (28NOV), Russian sources said that poor weather forced both sides to adjust their actions, although Russians continued assault operations near Novokalynove, which reportedly were partly successful.
No changes occurred within Avdiivka. Another constant development was Russian artillery strikes on the city, which were heavy and occurred daily.
On the southern flank, early in the week, Russians reportedly advanced in the “industrial zone” and entered the southeastern part of Avdiivka. The source also added that Russians captured Ukrainian positions initially established in 2015. These developments reportedly resulted from the deployment of armoured vehicles from the 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division). Russians spent the latter half of the week demining the area and consolidating their positions before further attacks.
However, no visual confirmation has surfaced confirming these gains.
Russian sources claimed that based on intercepted Ukrainian communications, the defenders suffered from the artillery ammunition shortage. Nevertheless, engagements throughout the entire Avdiivka axis were very high.
They also assaulted Vodyane using mostly infantry. The Ukrainian source also said that the Russians tried to attack Pervomaiske from the Pisky direction daily and always failed as the Ukrainian 59th Motorised Brigade put up stiff resistance.
Russians also reportedly advanced from Kruta Balka, but their attacks near Sjeverne failed. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke and Nevelske.
On Sunday (26NOV), the Russian source asserted that Russian troops continued to attack Mariinka and Novomykhalivka but were unsuccessful. However, on Friday (01DEC), Russian sources reported that the settlement had been taken.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pobieda and Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk direction, Russians repelled 13 Ukrainian attacks of the 5th Assault, 24th Mechanised Brigade and 79th Airborne Assault Brigades near Shumy, Maryinka. They also struck manpower and equipment concentration areas of the 5th, 80th Assault Brigades, 28th, 30th, 42nd and 93rd Mechanised Brigades near Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Bohdanivka, Kurdyumivka, Andiivka. Russians also hit the Ukrainian concentration areas near Andriivka, Khromove, Rozdolivka, Kurdyumivka, and Vasyukivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
Last week saw no changes in this direction, although increased Russian attacks were notable. We continue to maintain that the Ukrainian offensive potential has been exhausted, and no major attack is likely until spring.
Velyka Novosilka axis
Over the past seven days, Russian forces continued to push both between Pryuutne and Staromayorske and near Prechistivka.
On Friday (24NOV), Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian attacks southwest of Staromayorske. The same source also noted Russian offensive actions a day later (25NOV), east of Staromayorske and south of Zolota Nyva.
Also, on Saturday (25NOV), the Russian MoD informed that Russians disrupted two Ukrainian rotation attempts near Urozhayne. They also targeted concentration points of the 127th Territorial Defence Brigade (Urozhayne, Staromayorske, Makarivka and Novopil). The same source noted that Ukrainian forces conducted a single attack near Pryuutne. However, it was repelled by Russian artillery and aviation.
On Monday (27NOV), the Russian source reported about an unspecified number of attacks by the 394th Motor Rifle Regiment (127th Motor Rifle Division, 5th CAA) in the Pryuutne-Staromayorske line. These attacks reportedly pushed out soldiers of the 128th Territorial Defence Brigade and reinforced Russian positions in the area. They also likely forced the redeployment of additional Ukrainian subunits (175th Territorial Defence Battalion of the 121st Territorial Defence Brigade) to the area. The geolocation of the attack’s footage indicates it occurred between Staromayorske and Pryuutne.
On Wednesday (29NOV), Ukrainians reported two more Russian attacks south of Prechistivka. Both were repelled. The Russian MoD informed about another fire attack on elements of the 128th Territorial Defence Brigade near Urozhayne.
The central part of the Orikhiv axis
Last week, Russians likely increased their offensive activity in this part of the frontline. A decreased Ukrainian presence in the area may have influenced the Russian decision to increase the tempo of their attacks. Throughout the week, Russians counterattacked near Robotyne and Verbove.
On Friday (24NOV), Ukrainian General Staff reported at least seven such attacks, which, however, did not alter the frontline.
Near Verbove, an ATGM squad of the 7th (Mountain) Air Assault Division reportedly destroyed an unspecified Ukrainian vehicle. South of Novouspenivske, Russians eliminated a Ukrainian 2A65 howitzer with a Lancet UAV. In addition, soldiers of the Russian 64th Motor Rifle Brigade (35h CAA, EMD) used a UR-77 demining vehicle to strike Ukrainian positions near Polohy. At the same time, a BOBR subunit published a video showing a strike on a civilian bus, likely near Robotyne.
On Saturday (25NOV), the Ukrainian side informed about 11 more unsuccessful Russian attempts to restore previous positions near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka. At the same time, Russian MoD reported two attacks of the 117th Mechanised Brigade north of the latter village.
According to the official Russian data, attacks brought no success. Unofficially, Ukrainians might have reinforced their positions west of Robotyne.
After the weekend (27NOV), Ukrainians continued their offensive actions. The Russian side reported two attacks of the 33rd Mechanised Brigade near Robotyne, which were repelled by Russian artillery and aviation. Nevertheless, north of Novoprokopivka, presumably a Ukrainian mine destroyed a Russian BMP-3. Moreover, a few hundred meters to the east, a kamikaze UAV of the Wild Division subunit
(82nd Air Assault Brigade) struck and likely damaged a Russian T-90M tank. On this day (27NOV), Russians also conducted several counterattacks – west of Verbove and near Robotyne, however, without any results.
On Tuesday (28NOV), Russian sources published a video of a single Russian attack near Robotyne.
As noted, it engaged elements of the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) and 1430th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB). Unofficially, it resulted in the loss of a single Russian BTR. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that at least three such attacks appeared in this area.
Subsequently (28NOV), the Russian side informed about a single Ukrainian attack near Robotyne.
Officially, the attack was repelled. On this day, both sides provided several videos presenting captured servicemen.
On Wednesday (29NOV), the Ukrainian General Staff reported eight Russian attempts to restore earlier positions near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka. The same source also noted five such attempts west of Verbove. However, this also resulted in no territorial gains.
On the other hand, recent Russian counterattacks near Robotyne and Kopani (started on Monday – 27NOV) were successful and reportedly allowed Russians to push out Ukrainians by 800 metres.
The western part of the Orikhiv axis
Last week, no direct fighting occurred in this part of the frontline.
Russians maintained and even increased the number of artillery firing missions, mostly aimed at Pyatchatki, Stepnohirsk, Mali Scherbaky, Kamyanske and Plavni.
On Monday (27NOV), soldiers of the Russian 392nd Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB) struck a Ukrainian concentration area near Pyatchatki. Two days later (29NOV), Ukrainians (128th Mountain Assault Brigade) struck a Russian Tor air defence system near Burchak.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
No changes in this direction have been confirmed to have occurred over the past week, although Ukrainian sources reported some advances south of Krynky.
Throughout the weekend (25-26NOV), no changes occurred on the Dnipro’s left bank. Ukrainians maintained their positions in Krynky as Russians continued to hit it with KAB bombs and artillery. They also reportedly launched limited counterattacks, but it is unclear whether they succeeded.
Also, on Sunday (26NOV), Ukrainians attempted to approach Poima but were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the Russian source added that the UAF bridgehead in the village remained stable. Ukrainians also conducted regular rotations and munition supply.
From an air operations perspective, the early part of the week was heavily influenced by the storm, which passed through the Black Sea and heavily impacted drone operations.
By mid-week, Russians reportedly concentrated large forces on the Poima-Krynky line, indicating that they were preparing a larger attack on Ukrainian positions to dislodge them from the bridgehead in this area.
Describing Russian tactics, a Ukrainian soldier claimed Russians were not digging trenches south of Krynky but instead focused on digging foxholes under fallen trees. The source added that with such an approach, it was impossible to see where Russian positions were, which made the movement and strikes difficult.
Despite this, on Tuesday (28NOV), Ukrainians reportedly achieved partial success in the forest areas southwest of the village. However, the source added that Ukrainians had minimal resources in this area, while the Russian forces had assembled a potent strike force.
On Tuesday (28NOV), the Kherson Oblast occupation head, Vladimir Saldo, said he had spoken on Friday (24NOV) with Vladimir Putin and the military. Saldo claimed that everyone was determined to return to the city of Kherson to Russia.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 545 aircraft (+8), 256 helicopters (+1), 9,348 UAVs (+183), 442 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 13,735 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+149), 1,187 MLRS launchers (+2), 7,214 field artillery guns and mortars (+48), as well as 15,831 units of special military vehicles (+259).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 330,040 personnel (+7,140), 5,564 tanks (+68), 10,372 armoured combat vehicles (+116), 7,931 artillery systems (+98) and 912 MLR systems (+8), 602 anti-aircraft systems (+7), 323 aircraft (0) and 324 helicopters (0), and 5,976 UAVs (+176), 1,567 cruise missiles (+3), 22 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 10,399 vehicles and fuel tanks (+169), and 1,137 special vehicles (+29).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Russian use of missiles remained limited. Last week, Russians conducted four such strikes, which involved six missiles, of which four were shot down.
Last week, Russians conducted six Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drone strikes, which involved 151 vehicles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 136 drones (90% interception rate vs 83% two weeks ago). On Saturday (25NOV), Russians launched the largest Shahed attack since the introduction of this capability in September last year. Altogether, 75 vehicles were launched onto Kyiv, and Ukrainians claimed to have destroyed 74. The attack was conducted on the day when Ukrainians commemorated victims of Holodomor, a Soviet-induced famine that killed millions of Ukrainians between 1932-33. That said, it is possible that Russians used the attack to test the performance, readiness, and capabilities of Ukrainian air defence assets defending Kyiv during a saturation attack.
If we remove the Saturday attack from the chart, the average Russian use of UAVs has remained largely unchanged since late October.
That said, it is also possible that Russians used the attack to test the performance, readiness, and capabilities of Ukrainian air defence assets defending Kyiv during a saturation attack.
Looking at the average number of the past seven days, Russian ground attacks remained relatively stable. However, the latter half of the week saw a significant increase, reaching 101 assaults on Wednesday, the largest number since 10OCT (108) when the Russian offensive near Avdiivka commenced. We, therefore, may expect to see another wave of Russian attacks on this axis and probably some gains as well.
Ground attacks were coupled with increased use of (battlefield) missiles. Although the seven-day average has been largely unchanged for months, Russians launched 14 and 11 missiles on Tuesday and Wednesday, respectively, the largest two-day combined figure since 18-19OCT.
On Saturday, Russians were reported to have conducted 109 air strikes. This is the largest number since we started tracking this data (1MAR). The second highest figure was 108 attacks reported on 3OCT when Russians were preparing the battlefield for the ground offensive near Avdiivka.
However, it is noteworthy that the intensity of Russian MLRS strikes decreased last week and has continued to be on a downward trajectory since early November.
Despite this, we assess that it is likely that an increase in Russian ground, missile, and air strikes heralds another Russian push aimed at Avdiivka.
Outlook for the week of 02DEC-08DEC2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.” This assessment was accurate.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” This assessment was also correct. Russians did not manage to capture one settlement, while Ukrainians are firmly on the defensive.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, even then, we believe they are highly unlikely to progress (no change) in this part of the front. 2) We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to make gains in the Avdiivka axis. It is unlikely (decrease in probability) that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.” The outcome of this prognosis was a mixed bag. On the one hand, we correctly anticipated Russian gains near Avdiivka and a lack thereof in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. We were also right about the results of the Ukrainian attacks. However, we failed to predict Russian advances west of Bakhmut.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely (no changes) to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. We also assess Russians are highly unlikely (decrease in probability) to make similar gains across the entire region.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no changes) to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance (no changes) that they will capture some land, but we think they are highly unlikely (no changes) to capture a village or more.” This prognosis was also correct.
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 02DEC – 08DEC2023
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue.”
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We assess that Ukrainians can only wage limited counterattacks in the Bakhmut area and Avdiivka as their offensive potential is marginal. In this context, it is almost certain (decrease in probability) that they will not capture one village or more across the region. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely to progress (increase in probability) in both the Avdiivka and Bachmut axes.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (decrease in probability) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the entire region. We also assess Russians are highly unlikely (decrease in probability) to make similar gains across the direction (capture one village or more).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture some land, but we assess they are highly unlikely (no change) to capture a village or more.