Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 26 August – 1 September 2023
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments
Although last week saw no operational, let alone strategic, changes, Ukrainians appear to have penetrated the first line of Russian defences in the Orikhix axis; Although the event is not a turning point in this war, it highlights continued and successful attempts to push Russians from their positions in the southern parts of the country;
Russians made no gains in the Kupyansk axis in the Luhansk Direction, and although the intensity of their attacks presumably decreased, Russians did not abandon their efforts to reach Kupyansk;
Ukrainians made small gains south of Svatove, but apart from that, no frontline changes occurred in other parts of the region;
The overall situation in the Donetsk Oblast direction remained unchanged; Frontline changes reportedly occurred near Klishchiivka, where Russians conducted several counterattacks;
In the Southern Direction, following the liberation of Robotyne, Ukrainians “flattened” the frontline by successfully attacking Russian lines west towards Verbove; while no major changes were reported in the Velyka Novosilka sector, Ukrainians reportedly approached Zavitne Bazhannia and Pryyutne;
Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast near Dachi and carried out harassing attacks across the river’s bank in other parts of the region;
Russian use of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones remained limited; Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 97% of incoming cruise missiles and 94% of kamikaze drones;
Before we move further, we have a housekeeping note. Next week’s update will be different. Instead of analysing weekly events in Ukraine, we will publish an assessment of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the June-August timeframe. Although Ukrainian attacks are ongoing, we thought that a three-month mark offers a good opportunity to reflect on what we have seen so far.
Below is a little teaser, which shows frontline changes between JUN-AUG2023.
Executive summary
Undoubtedly, last week’s most important event was the penetration of the first Russian defensive line east of Robotyne in the Orikhiv axis. This development was very publicised within the analyst community and world media alike.
Before we go further, Let’s quickly go back to what we wrote last week: “It also appears that since mid-week, they (Ukrainians) have attempted to push east towards Verbove to level off the frontline and prevent Russians from cutting off Ukrainian forces south of Novodanylivka. It is also east of Robotyne, where Ukrainians are slowly reaching Russian anti-tank fortifications, so their progress could face further difficulties. So far, we continue to see Ukrainians attacking south along one axis, which makes it easier for Russians to concentrate their defences, forces, and artillery and thwart Kyiv’s movement.”
The breaching of the Russian Surovikin line indeed happened west of Verbove (or east of Robotyne) and not south of Robotyne towards Tokmak. In this context, we correctly described last week’s Ukrainian operations, which sought to level the frontline and erase salient Ukrainians found themselves in. Ukrainian attacks, however, are still too narrow (both south- and eastward) to deliver a speedy breakthrough. But what is most interesting is not necessarily what Ukrainians have been doing but what Russians have not yet done.
Namely, during the initial days of the counteroffensive in the Orikhiv axis, Russians drew Ukrainians into a fire sack where the ATGMs, minefields, and artillery thwarted Ukrainian advances.
A similar situation developed last week southeast of Robotyne last week. Ukrainian advances were very narrow. Although a few Ukrainian brigades were located in the area, Russians, in theory at least, had more units deployed in this axis, and the situation favoured a heavy use of aviation and artillery to stall Ukrainians. A counterattack would then push them back. Yet, although some localised Russian attacks did happen, Moscow did not conduct a larger operation to derail Ukrainian advances.
Worse still, early in the week, reports surfaced that Russians deployed elements of the 76th Air Assault Division from the Kreminna to the Orikhiv axis. Although the division was engaged in attacks on Ukrainian positions near Kreminna, the deployment of the 76th Air Assault Division to Orikhiv meant the activation of operational reserves. This, combined with a lack of a coordinated and decisive response to forming a Ukrainian salient, appear to suggest a significant degradation of Russian combat potential in this sector. As a result, Ukrainian further gains are likely.
Despite this, especially given the 76th Division movement, we do not foresee a larger collapse of Russian forces in the Orikhiv axis. Over the 90 days, Ukrainian advances averaged 110 meters a day (we previously stated that Ukrainian progress south of Orikhiv was 14 km. This was a mistake. Ukrainains advances were closer to 10 km. Apologies for this mistake).
Moscow will likely continue to attempt to degrade Ukrainian attacks in-depth and attrit its combat potential, forcing it to fight for every trench to the point when Ukrainians can no longer sustain the current tempo of attacks.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
Last week delivered no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russias continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Rublene, Ambarne, Bolohivka, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Odnorobivka, Cherneshchyna and Ivanivka, Vovchans’ki Khutory, Poldoly and Kupyansk, Huriv Kozachok, Druzhelyubivka and Vil’khivka.
According to Hanna Malyar, the Deputy Ukrainian Minister of Defence, Moscow maintains three groups of troops covering the state border in Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions to deter Ukrainian cross-border attacks and, simultaneously, fix Ukrainian troops near the border to prevent their redeployments to other parts of Ukraine. She added that Russians continued shelling civilian areas and conducting cross-border sabotage and reconnaissance activities.
We confirm that Ukrainians divide these forces into Force Grouping (FG) Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod. However, it is unclear how big these groupings are and what capabilities they field. So far, however, we have seen no indications that they are being prepared for ground attacks towards Chernihiv, Sumy or Kharkiv Oblasts.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
After weeks of Russian increased tempo of ground attacks in the Luhansk Oblast, the past week saw no significant developments and a probable decrease in Russian activity.
According to Roman Vlasenko, the head of the Severodonetsk District State Administration, Russia’s security services continued to search for saboteurs or citizens cooperating with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A particular focus is on young people. Vlasenko added that Russian occupation authorities had also conducted “conversations” with those who renounced Russian citizenship to encourage them to change their minds. Such “conversations” have been carried out across the entire territory captured by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion in FEB2022. Ukraine does not currently release any data confirming the number of Ukrainians who chose to accept Russian citizenship, and neither does Russia. But, at the same time, we assess that these numbers are generally low based on similar campaigns conducted by Russians last year in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.
On Thursday (31AUG), Artem Lysohor, the Luhansk Military administration head, said that Russians continued to attack the Ukrainian positions in the region. He stated that the pressure became more intense over the past week. Despite this, however, he said Ukrainian units had advanced to more favourable positions in some areas. On Wednesday (30AUG), Nevske alone was struck over 22 times.
The Commander of Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, also claimed last Friday (25AUG) that Moscow was transferring newly formed brigades and divisions to the Kupyansk and Lyman directions to resume active offensive operations. If this was indeed happening, we have not yet seen any impact on the frontline situation.
Five days later (30AUG), Syrskyi further explained that the situation on the Eastern front remained difficult, as Ukrainians continued to hold back the Russian offensive in the Kupyansk – Lyman sector. The heaviest battles took place in vicinity of (IVO) Raihorodka and Kovalivka, where the Russians tried breaking through Ukrainian defences using assault units and armoured vehicles. Simultaneously, Russians were regrouping, bringing new units in from the Russia proper to increase troop density and combat capabilities.
In mid-July, Serhiy Cherevaty, the then head of the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces press service, said that Russians had gathered some 100,000 troops, 900 tanks and 555 artillery systems between Lyman and Kupyansk. On Wednesday (30AUG), Ilya Yevlash, the current spokesperson of the Eastern Group, claimed that in the same area, Russians had now accumulated 110,000 troops (including rear and support units), almost 1,000 tanks, 1,500 armoured combat vehicles, 650 artillery systems and almost 400 multiple launch rocket systems. As such, Ukrainians continue to see an increase in units and equipment in the Luhansk Oblast. Based on these numbers alone, we can assume that Russians added at least one tank regiment worth of MBTs and probably four other regiments worth of men. The influx of both thus appears steady, and it is unclear when Russians will reach a point when they consider their capabilities to be sufficiently developed to conduct more organised and larger ground attacks.
In this context, Russian sources reported last week that due to the accumulation of Russian potential in the region, Syrskyi had asked the General Staff for additional reserves. Still, this request was denied as the focus remained on the Southern Direction. No Ukrainian source confirmed such requests were made, and it is difficult to confirm the veracity of such claims.
Malyar, too, commented on the situation in the region. On Monday (28AUG), she said that Russians were setting up minefields along the border in Belgorod Oblast to prevent Ukrainians from launching cross-border attacks. Near the front, they sought weaknesses in Ukrainian defences to break through and exploit. Regrouping was occurring in the Lyman sector, while unsuccessful Russian took place in IVO Novojehorivka, southwest of Kreminna, Bilohorivka in the Luhansk region and Vesele in the Donetsk region.
Lastly, between 28-31AUG2023 in the Lyman-Kupyansk, Russians conducted over 43 ground attacks, more than 1,700 artillery strikes and more than 50 air strikes.
Moving onto the frontline, no changes occurred IVO Dvorichna, where neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes.
According to a Russian source, on Monday (28AUG), Russian forces captured two more Ukrainian strongholds in the Synkivka – Petropavlovka line. On the other hand, the Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians continue to be unsuccessful in their assaults IVO Synkivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes IVO Masyutivka, Lyman Pershyi and Vilshana.
Likewise, no major changes occurred IVO Svatove or Novoselivske. Ukrainians liberated some territories near Nadiya.
On Sunday (27AUG), the Ukrainian source reported that heavy battles continued IVO Novojehorivka, where Russians tried to regain lost positions. However, the source claimed that holding the line of contact across the river within existing boundaries was highly disadvantageous to the Russians, as all river crossings were vulnerable to artillery fire.
Two days later (29 AUG), the same Ukrainian source said that Russian Storm-Z units (former convicts) launched a massive attack at the height of 190.8 (?). Although Russians reportedly captured some positions using tanks, they did not reach the objective.
No changes occurred IVO Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka.
According to the Russian source, the Ukrainian troops tried to counterattack IVO Torske but were unsuccessful. No changes occurred IVO Terny, Yampolivka and Nevske.
On Sunday (27AUG), Ukrainian bloggers reported that some Russian units were being redeployed from the Kreminna area. The formations in question likely pertain to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division (104th and 234th Air Assault Regiments), redeployed to the Orikhiv axis in the Southern Direction. This process was probably concluded by mid-week as our sources claimed that elements of the 76th Air Assult Divisions were already committed to battle as of Wednesday (30AUG).
Despite this redeployment, the source added that battles in the Serebryansky forest remained dynamic. The Russians constantly exerted pressure using infantry, armour and artillery to push Ukrainian units south. Russian sources recorded no changes in this sector.
No changes were reported IVO Bilohorivka.
According to Yaroslav Yakimin, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, over the past week in the Kupyansk direction, Russian assault units captured five Ukrainian strongholds. In addition, Russian units repelled 23 Ukrainian counterattacks of up to a platoon each, supported by armoured vehicles from the 14th, 43rd, 44th, 67th, 115th Separate Mechanised Brigades, 25th Airborne Brigade and 68th Separate Jaeger Brigade. Russian aviation groups carried 29 strikes against Ukrainian concentration areas and 12 strikes on personnel and military equipment of the 14th and 43rd Separate Mechanised Brigades.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Svatove and Lyman direction, using aviation and artillery, Russian units repelled and thwarted 15 Ukrainian conducted by detachments of the 12th Azov Special Forces Brigade, 21st, 42nd, 63rd and 67th Mechanised Brigades. In Torske and the Serebryansky forest areas, Ukrainian assault detachments of the 21st, 42nd and 63rd Mechanised Brigades and the 12th Azov Special Forces Brigade of the UAF made ten attack attempts on Russian positions.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
No major changes were reported in the Donetsk Oblast Direction over the past week. Both sides remained focused on battles around Bakhmut, but while some territorial changes occurred, the overall operational situation did not change.
No changes occurred IVO Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes near these settlements.
Russian units conducted localised small-level attacks IVO Vesele during the weekend (26-27AUG) but were unsuccessful.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes IVO Rozdolivka, Vasiukivka, and Fedorivka.
On Saturday (26AUG), Russians reportedly counterattacked IVO Dubovo-Vasylivka and recaptured several previously lost positions. Positional battles continued IVO Orikhovo – Vasylivka and Berkhivka. As of Tuesday (29AUG), the situation IVO the latter was still difficult. Despite Ukrainian attacks, Russians maintained their positions, largely due to large reserves. On Wednesday (30AUG), Sirsky said heavy battles continued IVO Bakhmut, Kurdyumivka, Yahidne and Andriivka.
On Monday (27AUG), Malyar asserted that Russians continued hindering Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut axis. On the other hand, Russians also unsuccessfully attempted to regain the lost position IVO Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Klishchiivka.
No changes occurred in Bakhmut. On Wednesday (29AUG), Malyar claimed the Russians were trapped and could not leave the city. She explained that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had reached many dominant heights around Bakhmut, meaning they could interdict movement in, out and within the city. This claim requires explanation. Malyar most likely referred to the Ukrainian fire control of Bakhmut and the roads leading to the city, meaning that these areas are within the range of Ukrainian artillery fire. While this could indeed be the case, we find it highly improbable that the intensity of Ukrainian artillery fire around Bakhmut is so high that Russians cannot freely move around this sector. Ukrainian Artillery attacks undoubtedly happen, but Kyiv lacks ISR and artillery capacity to interdict all movements in Bakhmut and IVO the city.
On Saturday (26AUG), Russian sources reported that Russians counterattacked IVO Klishchiivka to push Ukrainians from heights west of the village, a claim that Ukrainians did not confirm. Three days later (29 AUG), the Russian journalist confirmed further Russian attacks IVO the village, adding that Ukrainian forces were on the defence in this area.
Probably in response to Russian actions around Klishchiivka, Malyar said that Ukrainian defence forces drove the Russians out of their positions to the east and in the central part of Klishchiivka. We could not confirm this claim either. But she added that the total area liberated in the Bakhmut sector was 44 square kilometres, probably since mid-May. Between 21-27AUG, Ukrainians recaptured one square kilometre of land.
Ukrainians probably advanced IVO Andriivka during the weekend (26-27AUG). A Ukrainian soldier deployed IVO Bakhmut explained that Ukrainian forward movement IVO the village continued despite Russian mining efforts and the deployment of reserves. But he also admitted increased Russian use of drones, mortars, artillery, and mines, making the UAF advance difficult.
Last week, there were also sporadic Russian attacks IVO Ivanivske, but they were unsuccessful.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes IVO Novokalynove, Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Vesele and Kamyanka.
Attacks towards Avdiivka from Kruta Balka continued, but Russians made no progress.
IVO Nevelske, Russians attacked Ukrainian 59th Separate Mechanised Brigade’s positions to recapture previously lost positions. However, we understand that these attacks delivered no results.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes IVO Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Severne, and Vodyane.
Russian attacks IVO and in Mariinka again continued but were unsuccessful.
No changes occurred IVO Pobieda, Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson, over the past week, Russian aviation struck Ukrainian positions in the Lysychansk, Soledar-Bakhmut and Oleksandro-Kalynove areas. Russian attack helicopters also attacked Ukrainian units IVO Bohdanivka, Andriivka and Klishchiivka. Russian ground units repelled a Ukrainian attack IVO Nevelske.
Russians claimed to have destroyed an ammunition depot of the 93rd Mechanised Brigade IVO Druzhkivka. Russian aviation also launched a missile and bomb attack on a concentration area of the 79th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade IVO Krasnohorivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
In the Velyka Novosilka axis, Ukrainians focused on restoring combat capabilities. Attacks, nevertheless, occurred but had a probing character, mainly due to the Russian significant fire advantage.
Following the capture of Robotyne, Ukrainians continued to make territorial gains in the Orikhiv axis, seeking to widen the salient and prevent Russians from conducting counterattacks that would threaten Ukrainian positions IVO Robotyne.
The situation in the western part of the Orikhiv axis remained unchanged.
The Velyka Novosilka axis
Ukrainian activity in this axis was limited throughout the week. However, Russian sources claimed that Ukrainians suffered significant losses and were forced to pull up more reserves and armoured vehicles to the front.
On Tuesday (29AUG), a Russian source said that Ukrainians were seeking to break out of the vicious fighting IVO Staromaiorske and Urozhaine to regain momentum in the offensive, which, at that time, resembled a series of positional battles without significant movement. The immediate Ukrainian objective is to reach Zavitne Bazhannia and then Staromlynivka. It was IVO the former, where Ukrainian units captured a group of Russian soldiers 600 metres from the village.
Ukrainians reportedly advanced towards Volodyne, forcing a Russian withdrawal from several positions. This development, however, has not been independently confirmed. A video was posted online on Thursday (31AUG), reportedly showing a Ukrainian FPV drone strike on a Russian vehicle north of the village.
Moving to the east, on Tuesday (29AUG), Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainians captured unspecified Russian positions north-east of Pryyutne, as a part of the village fell into the “grey zone”. Although Ukrainians probably did not enter the village, the loss of ground forced Russians to commit Storm-Z units.
Ukrainians conducted a few small-scale attacks meant to “flatten” the frontline, but due to a small level of commitment, these attacks brought no frontline changes.
On Wednesday (30AUG), the Russian source claimed that the 35th Naval Infantry Brigade was withdrawn from the battlefield to restore its combat capability. This measure was met with the deployment of the 23rd and 31st Mechanised Brigades IVO Rivnopil (also on 30AUG). A few days earlier (25/26AUG), Ukrainians also strengthened their combat grouping IVO Levande with unspecified territorial defence forces, while subunits of the 79th Air Assault Brigade arrived IVO Pryuutne.
The Orkhiv axis
Ukrainians reinforced their positions and intensified their attacks both south and east of the Robotyne throughout the week.
Last week, we warned that the Ukrainian attack south could dangerously expose Ukrainian forces IVO Robotyne as the axis of advance was too narrow. This situation was addressed by the Ukrainian command, which employed elements of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade towards Verbove. A subsequent video from this attack showed Ukrainians fighting west of the village but behind the first line of Russian defences (Suriovikin line). There were also reports about Ukrainians reaching Novoprokopivka, but they remained unconfirmed.
Nevertheless, the 82nd Air Assault Brigade reportedly suffered significant losses and elements of the 118th Mechanised Brigade were deployed to assist its operations west of Verbove. At the same time, the 15th National Guards Brigade, KARA DAG and the core of the 118th Separate Mechanised Brigade were moved to Mala Tokmachka to form the second-echelon force to be used in case of a breakthrough. It was also near this settlement where Ukrainians deployed 12 D-30 guns and five AS-90 SPHs. The 148th Rifle Brigade was deployed north of Orikhiv.
According to the Ukrainian source, Ukrainian troops attacked Russian positions north of Novopokrovka. The northern part of the settlement went into the „grey zone”. So far, this development has not been independently confirmed.
The same source also said on Tuesday (28AUG) that the Ukrainian Armed Forces advanced close to Dorozhnyanka, driving the Russians out of a small stronghold in the village.
The Ukrainian forces also tried to attack towards Kopani, but the Russian Forces held their ground.
According to Ivan Fedorov, Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol, the Russian Armed Forces were preparing to evacuate representatives of Tokmak occupation authorities due to the approaching front line. He noted that regular explosions in the city and the gradual advance of the UAF were turning the city into a frontline city.
The situation in the western part of the frontline remained stable.
A significant increase in Russian fire activity was reported between Friday and Tuesday (25-29AUG), when Russians almost daily targeted Pyatchatki, Stepove, Lukyanivske Mali Scherbaky, Kamyanske and Plavni.
On Monday (28AUG), Ukrainians conducted a UAV strike on temporary barracks used by the “Akhmat-1” subunit of the Russian Rosgvardia in Energodar.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
Ukrainians maintained their positions on Dnipro’s left bank and continued limited raids on Russian positions across the south of the river.
Fighting was also ongoing on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta, where Ukrainians deployed small landing groups. However, another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian attempts to gain a foothold on the islands were unsuccessful. Probably to improve fire support for assault groups, Ukrainians deployed the 406th Artillery Brigade to the Kherson – Tyahynka area.
Last week (29AUG), a video appeared online showing the raising of a Ukrainian flag in Dachi. Describing the current situation in the area, the Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian operations were very difficult. In August, Russians increased aerial reconnaissance missions, making it “deadly” for Ukrainians to operate near the river (indeed, a video was posted by Russian sources allegedly showing an artillery attack on Ukrainian boast on the Dnipro’s right bank). However, the source confirmed that the video was made in Dachi, which confirms that at least some limited presence was located there as of Tuesday. Indeed, Serhiy Khlan, a Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Council member, said the video had a symbolic character.
According to Roman Kodryan, a Russian Dnepr Group of Forces Spokesperson, in Burhunka and Sadove, Russian soldiers destroyed three small, fast-moving vessels. At the same time, three temporary deployment sites IVO Ochakiv, Tyahynka and Mykylske, were hit, and an ammunition depot IVO Dmytrivka was destroyed.
On Wednesday (30AUG), Ukrainian forces conducted limited raids on Kherson Oblast’s left bank. On the same day, another source claimed that Ukrainian assault units from the 126th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade landed northwest of Pidstepne. At the same time, the 406th Artillery Brigade fired at Stara Zbur’ivka and Kozulikhsky Island from the Novodmitrivka – Bilozerska line.
Russian sources claimed that the Russian command had ignored reports about the 205th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade suffering significant losses due to inadequate artillery support and poor leadership. The same source noted the Russian military command subsequently punished the brigade’s servicemen for speaking out about these problems. Reportedly, the problems with the brigade started when a former Donetsk People’s Republic 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade commander (alias “Skif”) was promoted to command the 205th Brigade. Skif’s command of the unit reportedly led to its destruction earlier in the war.
The “Atesh” partisan group claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on the United Russia party headquarters in Nova Kakhovka on Tuesday (29AUG). The attack reportedly killed three Russian personnel guarding the headquarters and destroyed documents related to the upcoming September 2023 regional elections.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 466 aircraft (+2), 247 helicopters (+1), 6,293 UAVs (+208), 434 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 11,587 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+95), 1,147 MLRS launchers (+3), 6,162 field artillery guns and mortars (+120), as well as 12,602 units of special military vehicles (+178).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 263,490 personnel (+3,860), 4,459 tanks (+81), 8,613 armoured combat vehicles (+92), 5,530 artillery systems (+169) and 735 MLR systems (+11), 500 anti-aircraft systems (+5), 315 aircraft (0) and 316 helicopters (0), and 4,421 UAVs (+65), 8,009 vehicles and fuel tanks (+219), 1,445 cruise missiles (+36), 18 warships and boats (0) and 831 special vehicles (+29).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change.)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
From the missile strikes perspective, the Russian missile campaign continued to underperform. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, Russians launched 37 cruise missiles, which Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 36. This gives an interception rate of 97%.
This largest attack occurred on Wednesday (30AUG) when Russians launched 28 Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles from 11 Tu-95MS strategic bomber aircraft operating from the Engels-2 Air Base. Kyiv claimed to have shot down all the missiles. This attack was combined with the largest employment of Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones since 19AUG. In total, 16 Shaheds were launched on Wednesday, and 15 were destroyed. Apart from this attack, one Shahed was also shot down on Monday (25AUG). We thus see that the Russian missile/kamikaze campaign not only has a reduced tempo but also its effectiveness is questionable.
Since the counteroffensive started (8JUN), Russians launched 372 cruise, ballistic and anti-ship missiles on ground targets across Ukraine. Out of this number, Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 258 missiles, with an interception rate of 69%, which seems plausible. In other words, 114 missiles hit targets across Ukraine, but the impact of such strikes on the overall outlook for this war is doubtful.
Outlook for the week of 2SEP-8SEP
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
“Regarding the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russians are highly likely to continue conducting offensive operations. This particularly refers to the northern parts of the region (Kupyansk axis). While they are likely to make progress there, we assess that there is a roughly even chance that they will capture a village. Moving farther south, we assess that it is unlikely that Russians or Ukrainians will capture any village in the region, but in this context, Russians are more likely to advance compared to Ukrainians.” Although the intensity of Russian ground attacks presumably decreased over the past week, we correctly anticipated no large frontline shifts. Neither side captured a settlement.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. But it is possible that they will progress IVO Klishchiivka. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are also unlikely to liberate any villages in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” This prognosis was also correct. Although some local frontline changes occurred, especially IVO Klishchiivka, neither side captured a village or more.
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely be very slow. Although Ukrainians are likely to capture some territory, they are unlikely to liberate a village across the entire direction. We continue to expect no major Ukrainian breakthroughs or a collapse of Russian defences in the south.” We correctly anticipated that Ukrainians would not capture a village across the entire direction. But we must add that Ukrainians made tactically significant gains west of Verbove, which we did not anticipate.
Score: 0.5/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank IVO the Antonivskyi Bridge. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 2SEP-8SEP
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. Still, we expect no significant changes as a result of these actions. While Moscow could make tactical gains, given the current force commitments, they are unlikely to capture a village or more across the entire direction.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. Gains IVO Klishchiivka are possible. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are also unlikely to liberate any villages in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. There is roughly even chance that Ukranians will capture Verbove, but Kyiv’s success in this sector depends on the quantity of reserves Russians pulled up to the area. Apart from Verbove, we expect that Ukrainians are unlikely to liberate another village in the entire direction.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank IVO the Antonivskyi Bridge. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.