Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 27 January – 02 February 2024
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Russians continued to capture new territories in Ukraine, although the pace of these advances continued to be slow; Tactical developments still favour Moscow, but the overall operational outlook remained largely unchanged;
Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and continued to conduct cross-border infiltration operations;
Following the capture of Krokhmalne two weeks ago, over the past seven days, Russians seized Tabaivka and Rusanivka in the Luhansk Oblast; Russian objective is fixed on reaching the Oskil River;
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Mariinka; They extended territorial control in Avdiivka, but overall, gains were marginal last week;
Russians also captured some territories in the Zaporizhzhia and western Donetsk Oblasts, but the overall operational situation remained unchanged;
Ukrainians maintained positions near Krynky on Dnipro’s left bank; Russian attacks proved futile;
Last week saw no Russian missile attack, while Russians employed Shahed kamikaze drone daily; Russian ground attacks decreased, while air, (battlefield) missile, and air strikes increased;
Executive summary
According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 29 Russian attacks (39 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 37 Russian attacks (45 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 236 Russian ground attacks (176 two weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian units repelled 12 Russian attacks (14 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 56 Russian concentration areas and six anti-aircraft missile systems. The Ukrainian missile troops hit one concentration area, 20 artillery systems, two electronic warfare stations, one radar station, six air defence systems and five ammunition depots.
Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated approximately 3.74 square kilometres, while Russians captured around 44 square kilometres. The Ukrainian posture remained defensive, while Russians remained offensively committed across almost the entire front.
Despite Russian gains, last week did not fundamentally change the situation in Ukraine. Russians continued to attack across the entire front, while Ukrainians, whose posture remained defensive, resorted to tactical counterattacks. We expect to see no major changes in this regard until the end of the winter. The UAF does not possess capabilities (artillery shells and equipment) or manpower, allowing them to wage a larger counterattack. Russians, on the other hand, continue to deploy trained reserves to Ukraine, although objectively, their impact on the frontline has been less than impressive. Russians continue to advance, but the tempo of forward movement, especially against their personnel losses, remains unfavourable. Yet, despite that, we assess that although the intensity of attacks will undoubtedly fluctuate, Russians will continue attacking, especially since Ukrainians are the weakest since mid-2022.
The Zaluzhny saga
The Ukrainian Chief of General Staff, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has reportedly been removed from his post last week. This piece of news is nothing especially new. Reports about President Zelensky firing Zaluzhny were circulating since the start of the week, and despite the WaPo article, they still have not been officially confirmed. Although interestingly, the early reports were vehemently denied. The Friday story met hardly any opposition. Does the removal of Zaluzhny from the post herald bad news for the Ukrainian war effort? Probably.
Before we talk about the negatives, let’s focus on the positives. One positive point, to be precise. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have been suffering from dual command since the start of the war. On the one hand, the General Staff was making plans and trying to implement them. On the other hand, the Zelensky administration had its vision of how to defend and attack and which part of the front to defend at all costs. It is no secret that these two bodies’ plans did not often converge, which objectively harmed the Ukrainian war effort. The departure of Zaluzhny removes this problem. Zelensky is now taking full responsibility for the decisions the GS makes and does not make. Ultimately, this is a good development as it removes the uncertainty about who commands the UAF.
Now let’s talk about cons. Zaluzny has been widely well-regarded by Ukrainian troops. His removal will likely dent their morale, but we do not expect a decrease in the overall willingness to fight, at least initially. However, as reported, Zelensky and his protégé, the Land Forces Commander, Colonel Oleksandr Syrskyi, prefer to hold out terrain to bleed Russians out. Such an approach incurs significant manpower losses on the Ukrainians and is widely criticised by the troops. Ukrainians will likely maintain, or maybe even intensify, such a way of conducting defensive operations.
Secondly, Zaluzhny has been pushing for a new wave of mobilisation for months. Zelensky, on the other hand, “does not believe that this mass mobilisation of men between the ages of 18 to 27 is desirable or warranted at this point”. In his CNN piece, Zluzhny stated that Russians had the advantage in mobilising personnel, adding that Ukrainian state institutions could not increase intake without “unpopular measures” (mobilisation). Ukraine needs mobilisation. It cannot reasonably incur losses, replace them and prepare new units in mass for the next offensive by relying only on forced mobilisation. Ukraine needs a mass intake to hold the line, rotate units fighting since the start of the war and train new formations to avoid past mistakes. Currently, Ukrainian troops are insufficiently trained, mostly because the time for training is limited to a minimum due to the need to plug in manpower gaps. Russians, on the other hand, are constantly training and creating dedicated Storm companies (company tactical groups) motorised rifle, airborne, and naval infantry formations, whose sole purpose is to assault and capture Ukrainian positions. The development process is widespread, organised, and structured. Russian capacity and effectiveness for assaults will only increase. At the same time, the Ukrainian ability to defend will be based on reconnaissance and strike UAVs, inadequately trained personnel, or exhausted troops. With each passing week, the discord between both armies’ ground forces will grow. While we see efforts to improve UAV capabilities, little is done on the troop quantity and quality side. And what is already being done is inadequate. UAVs alone will not dislodge Russians from Ukraine. Kyiv needs infantry, artillery and armoured vehicles.
Ukraine entered 2024 in a very difficult situation, with Western supplies at their lowest levels and with Russians attacking almost across the entire front. Ukraine’s position also results from decisions Kyiv made and didn’t make. How Ukraine adapts to the current situation will be critical for the course of this war and Ukraine’s future.
Noteworthy events pertaining to the war
Saturday (27JAN)
The Greek Kathimerini news outlet informed that the government decided to hand over “obsolete” weapons systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Although no exact details were provided, reports suggested the delivery of S-300 and Tor air defence systems and Osa and ZU-23-2 anti-air systems.
Sunday (28JAN)
Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense, Lt. Gen. Ivan Havryliuk, claimed that France would provide 3,000 155-millimetre artillery rounds monthly to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Russian Deputy Minister of Defence, Col. Gen. Yunus-bek Yevkurov, visited Libya, where he met with Supreme Commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar.
Monday (29JAN)
The inspectors from the United States Defense Department, the State Department, and the United States Agency for International Development arrived in Kyiv and met with Ukrainian officials. According to the official statement, the visit supports “oversight and accountability for U.S. assistance to Ukraine”.
Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office, Andriy Yermak, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, jointly with the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, met with leaders of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky informed that 880,000 personnel currently serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Ivan Havryliuk, stressed that Ukraine signed a joint memorandum with Belgium meant to develop bilateral relations in the field of arms production.
The Swedish Armed Forces provided data about the Swedish government’s decision to transfer an unspecified number of ScanJack 3500 mine clearing systems to Ukraine.
Tuesday (30JAN)
The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers submitted another version of the draft law on mobilisation to the Ukrainian Parliament – Verkhovna Rada. The new draft covers additional entitlements for citizens related to rest periods, financial compensations, as well as their legal protections and mobilisation exemptions.
Wednesday (31JAN)
The German government announced the delivery of another package of military equipment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It included 24 FFG APCs, four Bandvagn 206 vehicles, a Biber bridge layer, three Visent vehicles, as well as more than 1,000 155-millimetre artillery rounds, missiles to the IRIS-T system, other equipment and 194,000 food rations.
German State Secretary of Defence Simone Meller informed that Germany would train 20,000 Ukrainian soldiers in 2024.
European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell claimed that European states could supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces with 500,000 artillery rounds by MAR24 instead of the promised million.
Russia and Ukraine exchanged their POWs, involving about 200 soldiers from each side.
CNN informed that the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Gen. Valery Zaluzhny might be relieved from his position by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by the end of the week.
Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces Gen. Martin Herem stressed that the Russian Armed Forces likely caused recent GPS jamming in Europe.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the full integration of occupied Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation would be finished by 2030.
Ukrainian Ambassador in China Pavlo Riabikin claimed that China was invited to participate in discussions on a potential Ukrainian peace formula.
Thursday (01FEB)
European Council President Charles Michel informed that all 27 leaders of the European Union member states agreed to provide Ukraine with a USD54 billion support package.
Friday (02FEB)
Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba stressed that Ukraine and its partners would decide on the fate of frozen Russian assets in 2024.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence informed that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) had detained the acting Head of the Military-Technical Policy, Development of Armaments and Military Equipment Department of the Ukrainian MoD, Toomas Nakhkur. He was accused of corruption concerning the procurement of 100,000 artillery rounds worth USD40 million.
The Spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, condemned the Equador decision to provide Russian-made military equipment to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.
In the previous week, there were no notable Ukrainian unit redeployments.
We adjusted the position of the 127th Territorial Defence Brigade, which was moved from the Kharkiv direction to the Horlivka axis of the Donetsk direction. At least two battalions from the unit are likely fighting independently in different areas. However, the most recent data suggest that soldiers of the brigade are present in the vicinity of Horlivka.
Besides, over the past seven days, the recently formed POMSTA Brigade of the Ukrainian Offensive Guard was incorporated into our database and Scribble Maps. We documented the appearance of several new Russian formations and units, with a predominant focus on the Donetsk and Luhansk directions.
In the Donetsk direction, we observed the presence of the mobilised 1140th Motor Rifle Regiment (Donetsk axis) and the 333rd Artillery Brigade remaining subordinate to the 2nd Army Corps (Bakhmut axis).
Regarding the Luhansk direction, we confirmed the presence of the mobilised 1045th Motor Rifle Regiment, as well as the recently formed 272nd Motor Rifle Regiment (47th Motor Rifle Division, 1st Tank Army) in the Kupyansk axis.
Based on open-source reports, we also moved the 263rd Motor Rifle Brigade (MOB) into the Belgorod area.
Following the incorporation of BARS units into our database last week, we added the largest Russian volunteer and PMC formations on Friday. As a result, our database and maps now also include nine such formations, predominantly reconnaissance-assault brigades of the Russian Expeditionary Volunteer Corps. One-third of these formations were positioned in the Bakhmut axis of the Donetsk direction. The whereabouts of the remaining units are pending verification.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Udy, Kozacha Lopan, Ohirtseve, Vovchansk, Budarky, Kolodyazne, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka and Berestove, Veterynarne, Lukiantsi, Okip, Starytsa and Kupyansk.
On Tuesday (30JAN), a Russian source stated that Russian forces hit an oil depot in Zmiiv in the Kharkiv region. An intense fire started at the facility. On the same day, Oleh Synehubov reported that Russians used six UAV Shahed-136 drones and hit civilian infrastructure and private residential buildings in Zmiiv. Another Ukrainian source confirmed that Russians indeed hit an oil depot during the Tuesday attack.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
In the Luhansk Oblast, the Russians continued to attack in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes, where they slightly advanced. Operationally, the situation remained unchanged.
On Sunday (28JAN), the Ukrainian source claimed that the Russians advanced in the forest area west of Synkivka. The source explained that Ukrainian difficulties arose as different battalions from various brigades held different positions, and there was no real interoperability or exchange of information between them. The source added that measures were introduced to stabilise the situation and prepare to retake lost positions. Some Russian sources confirmed on Sunday (28JAN) that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka but also captured Tabaivka to the south. The source explained that the weakness in holding Tabaivka was that the settlement was in a lowland between two ridges and was filled with mud. It was difficult to hold on to it without controlling the two heights near the village. On Monday (29JAN), the Russian Ministry of Defence said that Russian troops captured Tabaivka completely. Volodymyr Fityo, spokesperson for Ukrainian Ground Forces Command, declined this claim but said that heavy fighting continued near the settlement. Also on Monday, another Russian source said that the Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Tabaivka and regained control of some of their lost positions.
However, some Russian sources claimed that the UAF lost control of a part of Synkivka due to constant Russian attacks in the forest area west of the village. The assault on Kyslivka also occurred, from where the Ukrainians had partially withdrawn the forces of the 43rd Mechanised and 10th Mountain Assault Brigades. Indeed, a Ukrainian soldier confirmed on Tuesday (30JAN) that Russian forces managed to capture several Ukrainian positions near Synkivka, as Russians enjoyed artillery fire advantage.
On Wednesday (31JAN), Russians again reportedly captured new positions near Synkivka. However, the source stressed that the attackers did not break through Ukrainian defensive lines in the area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets also stated on Wednesday (31JAN) that elements of the Russian 25th Motorised Rifle Brigade established a foothold in a forest area north of Synkivka. Ivan Shevtsov, spokesperson for the 15th Mobile Border Guard Detachment “Steel Frontier”, claimed that Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi remain the main target of the Russian forces in the Kupiansk sector. He added that Ukrainian units had enough ammunition and equipment for defence.
On Wednesday (30JAN), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that the Russian forces brought more vehicles to the Kupyansk and Svatove axes, and the number of infantry increased many times.
The Russian source said on Tuesday (30JAN) that elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army continued operating in the Svatove direction southeast of Kupyansk and managed to destroy a Ukrainian stronghold in an unknown area.
On Friday (26JAN), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that a new Russian reserve arrived at Lyman Pershyi, 90% of whom are 18-20 years old.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Petropavlivka and Ivanivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
On Sunday (28JAN), Russian sources claimed that Russian troops attacked near Stelmakhivka, but no changes were recorded. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
No changes occurred near Novovodyane. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
On Sunday (28JAN), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops were active almost all along the line of contact in the Luhansk region. The Russian troops attacked near Yampolivka, Terny and Torske. However, the source said no significant changes were recorded on the front line. The Ukrainian blogger on Sunday (28JAN) also said that Russian attempts to attack near Terny were unsuccessful. A Ukrainian soldier said on Sunday (28JAN) that the attackers were pushing heavily in the Torske direction. He explained that the Russians were no longer attacking in small groups. Now, they deployed 20-40 men per attack. On Monday (29JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that the Russian forces had advanced towards Terny. On Wednesday (31JAN), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that the Russians attempted a night assault in the Yampolivka direction but were unsuccessful. A soldier said that the primary goal of the Russians in this area was to regain control over Lyman. On the other hand, the Russian source claimed on Thursday (01FEB) that the Russian forces continued to advance near Terny and Yampolivka and managed to reach some Ukrainian positions.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
In the Kreminna area, no significant changes occurred. Positional battles continued in the Serebryansky foresty and near Dibrova. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Friday (26JAN) that the 25th Combined Arms Army (mobilised) moved into the Kreminna area. The Russian sources did not report changes. Positional fighting continued west and south of Kreminna on Tuesday, 30 (JAN), but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Russian source claimed on Tuesday that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment continued to operate in the Kreminna direction.
In the Bilohorivka, Russian sources reported on Sunday (28JAN) that Russian troops tried to attack Ukrainian positions near the settlement from the southeast and northeast but without success. The Ukrainian soldier claimed on Monday (29JAN) that the day before (28JAN), the Russians attacked with a tiny group of six fighters and one IFV. On Thursday (01FEB), the same source said that the Ukrainian forces had taken back some important positions near the dam near Bilohorivka. However, the soldier added that these positions had been recaptured about eight times because they constantly changed hands. Also, Russian aviation causes a big problem in the area. The Russian sources did not report changes.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk axis, Russian units repelled eight Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka and Terny.
According to Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in Lyman’s direction, Russian units of the Centre Group of Forces, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Torske.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The Russians continued attacks near the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novobakhmutivka axes over the past week. They progressed in some areas, but no significant changes were recorded.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka. The same goes for Vasiukivka, Rozdolivka and Fedorivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
The Russian source stated on Saturday (27JAN) that Bohdanivka was already mainly in the “grey zone”, as both sides were positioned on opposite sides of the settlement. The source said that Russian forces had withdrawn from the centre of the village but were pulling fresh reserves and equipment into the area, which was confirmed by Ukrainian sources on Sunday (28JAN). Yet, despite this, on Monday and Tuesday (29-30JAN), Russians reportedly indeed launched attacks on Ukrainian positions in Bohdanivka and Ivanivske but were unsuccessful.
On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier claimed on Wednesday (31JAN) that the situation near Ivanivske was “extremely” challenging. He did not provide detailed information but added that the Russians lost at least three tanks there the day before (30JAN). The same Ukrainian soldier added on Thursday (01FEB) that according to Russian intercepted communication, the attackers wanted to enter Chasiv Yar by March. So far, however, Ukrainians held their positions in all areas.
Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet), 331st and 299th Airborne Regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut area.
Another Russian source stated that Russian forces advanced southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on Monday (29JAN) showed elements of the Russian 102nd Motorised Rifle Regiment (150th Motor Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army) capturing and clearing positions southwest of Bakhmut in the Dachi area along the T0504 Bakhmut – Ivanivske road.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Khromove, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka.
In the Bakhmut alone, no changes occurred. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
The situation south of Bakhmut remained largely unchanged. On Sunday (28JAN), the Russian source claimed that the Russian units, supported by artillery, attacked Ukrainian positions near Andriivka and the heights northwest of Klishchiivka. Another Russian source stated that on Sunday (28JAN), Russian units continued to pressure the heights northwest of Klishchiivka, where heavy fighting had been ongoing for over a week but without success for either side. This came despite reports that Russians had deployed reserves into the area and were planning to increase the intensity of attacks towards Klishchiivka in the coming days. Russian attacks near Klishchiivka were sustained with varying degrees of intensity over the whole week, but they led to no confirmed gains. Some reports alleged that Russians overextended the attack, which led to a tactical Ukrainian counteroffenisve. No visual evidence confirmed such developments.
No changes occurred near Kurduymivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
The Russian source claimed on Sunday (28JAN) that on the northern flank of the Avdiivka axis, the Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian lines near Stepove but with less intensity. However, the situation remained “tense” for Ukrainians. The Russian Forces also continued to assault easter approaches to the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant. The Ukrainian source stated on Sunday (28JAN) that Russian troops launched assaults near Novokalynove but were unsuccessful. Attacks near Stepove and Novobakhmutivka followed on Monday (29JAN), but they too, led to no frontline changes.
On Tuesday (30JAN), battles near Stepove continued and reportedly resulted in Russian gains near the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant. These claims, however, remained unsubstantiated. On Wednesday (31JAN), the Russian attacks near Stepove reportedly visibly decreased. The source said both sides concentrated on the Avdiivka axis’s southeastern section.
No changes occurred in the Avdiivka. The Russians continued to shell the city heavily. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin stated that Russian forces launched 24 glide bombs at Avdiivka on Tuesday (30JAN) alone.
On Sunday (28JAN), the Russian sources claimed Russian forces continued their assault operations near Pervomaiske. There also was an attempt to advance towards Tonenke. After the artillery strikes, the city of Avdiivka was attacked from the southeast in an attempt to expand the bridgehead on the outskirts of the city. Another Russian source added that the UAF had not stopped attempting to counterattack near the Tsarska Ohota fortified area recently occupied by the Russian forces. The source said that up to several infantry battalions were deployed to the area. If confirmed, it means that Ukrainians are defending the area forward, conducting multiple counterattacks to stall and attrit Russians. Such an approach is risky, delivers high casualty rates, and is unlikely to lead to long-term control over the battled area.
North of Opytne, the Ukrainian units had to retreat to more favourable positions. Yet, despite this, on Monday (29JAN), the Russian source claimed that the heavy battles had slightly slowed down south of Avdiivka. Ukrainians continued to counterattack near Tsarska Ohota, which failed to deliver any gains. Russians, too, could not extend attacks west and northwest, mostly due to Ukrainian artillery and UAV coordination.
Russians also reportedly continued to attack near Pervomaiske and Opytne, where they achieved partial success, but again, these claims were unsubstantiated. On Wednesday (31JAN), geolocated footage was published by a Ukrainian source, indicating that Russian forces marginally advanced along Sportyvna Street in the southernmost residential area in Avdiivka. The Russian source claimed on Wednesday (31JAN) that Russian forces advanced along a front up to 500 meters wide to a depth of 300 meters along Chernyshevskoho, Sportyvna, and Soborna Streets in southern Avdiivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Sjeverne, Vodyane and Nevelske.
On Sunday (28JAN), the Russian source claimed Russian forces continued assault operations near Novomykhailivka and Heorhievka, where, neat the former, they reportedly advanced. Russian forward movements southwest and north of the settlement were further confirmed on Tuesday (30JAN).
The source added that, although the situation was complicated, Russians continued to seize the tactical initiative for the future encirclement of the settlement.
A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Sunday (28JAN) that in the Mariinka direction, the Russians started to use smoke shots on mortars to cover their assaults. Still, the situation had been generally quiet. The soldier also added that communication intercepts confirmed Russians complaining about North Korean shells, which would occasionally tear barrels apart. Their gunpowder was also prone to failure.
Another Ukrainian soldier claimed on Saturday (27JAN) that FPV drones proved to be much more effective for defence in the Mariinka direction. Like the Ukrainian forces, the Russians did not have effective portable electronic warfare systems, so when they were on the move during an assault and outside the range of stationary electronic warfare, assault teams became very vulnerable. FPV drone use partly compensates Ukrainians for the shortage of artillery ammunition.
On Wednesday (31JAN), the Ukrainian source said that after heavy artillery barrages, Russian forces had tried to advance on UAF positions with a large mechanised assault near Novomykhailivka. A Ukrainian soldier claimed that on Thursday (01FEB), during the assault, the Russians used 12 heavy vehicles, more than half of which were hit by minefields and FPVs. Yet, despite this, with heavy artillery support and a large number of infantry deployed, the Russians still managed to push Ukrainian forces out from several positions. Russian gains were confirmed on Wednesday (31JAN), as the attackers had managed to expand their zone of control by capturing Ukrainian strongholds. The source said that further advances would make it possible to create conditions for the operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Novomykhailivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pobjeda and Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units successfully repelled seven Ukrainian attacks near Shumy and Bilohorivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
Battles in this direction remained subdued, but Moscow maintained the overall initiative.
The Russian source claimed that on Saturday (27JAN), the Russian troops, with artillery support, attacked Ukrainian positions near Zolota Nyva but were unsuccessful. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Urozhaine and Staromaiorske.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Staromaiorske.
On Saturday (27JAN), the Russian journalist stated that the Russian forces had attacked from Pryyutne but without success. On the other hand, the Ukrainian source claimed on Monday (29JAN) that Russian troops had advanced near this settlement, but it is unclear what this progress involved. The Russian source also stated that on Tuesday (30JAN), Russian forces managed to advance north of Pryyutne.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodarivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.
In the Orikhiv axis, the Russian source claimed that on Saturday (27JAN), the Ukrainian troops managed to regain several positions west of Robotyne, as Russian forces were active near Novoprokopivka and Verbove. On Sunday (28JAN), the same Russian source described the situation as “push-pull”.
Ukrainian personnel assessed the situation in the Orikhiv axis as difficult. Russians were actively pushing, but the UAF held their positions despite the attackers bringing in large reinforcements at short intervals. The soldier complained that Ukrainians lacked long-range missiles to destroy Russian equipment as it entered the region. He added that there were many targets in Russian-controlled territories, and if they had been destroyed in advance, there would be no such influx of reinforcements.
On Wednesday (31JAN), the Russian journalist claimed that the Russian forces again tried to attack and seize the initiative west of Robotyne, but the UAF held their positions. Also, battles continued near Novoprokopivka and Verbove. However, no changes were recorded. A Ukrainian soldier also said on Thursday (01FEB) that the UAF had repelled many Russian assaults in the last two days without much loss of positions.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novoprokopivka and Novofedorivka.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near P’yatykhatky.
According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units repelled eight Ukrainian attacks near Pryyutne. Ukrainian attempts to reinforce forward positions near Vuhledar and Staromaiorske were also disrupted by artillery and heavy flamethrower systems.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
No significant changes occurred in the Kherson Direction. Ukrainian forces continue to hold a bridgehead on Dnipro’s left bank despite Russian counterattacks.
The Russian sources claimed that on Saturday and Sunday (27-28JAN), battles continued near Krynky. The source said that the UAF continued to employ drones and artillery strikes to sustain its presence in the area. The Russians responded by using FABs with UMPKs on Ukrainian positions north of the river. The Russian source said that the “drone war” continued. The Ukrainians have concentrated UAV operator units near Krynky. At the same time, each boat delivering supplies and personnel over the Dnipro is equipped with EW kits, making it challenging for Russian forces to use FPVs effectively.
On Monday (29JAN), Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, asserted that Ukrainians expanded the bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River. At the same time, she added, the front line is quite flexible, and Russian positions in this area were better fortified than those of the UAF. The Russians also had a better supply route to provide them with everything they needed, unlike the Ukrainian forces, whose logistics were complicated due to the Dnipro River.
A Ukrainian soldier also said on Monday (29JAN) that the Ukrainian forces continued to destroy the Russian troops on the left bank. They were in a worse position (did not explain why) but had a simplified route to deploy reserves and logistics support. On Wednesday (31JAN), Humeniuk claimed that Russian forces recently intensified infantry assaults on Ukrainian positions and that 70 per cent of Russian personnel sustained casualties in these assaults. She stressed that Russian forces on the left bank were attempting to increase FPV drone use up to 70 drones per day but that Ukrainian forces could regularly down half of them with small arms fire and electronic warfare systems.
Crimea
On Wednesday (31JAN), Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk confirmed that published geolocated footage showed a Ukrainian strike at the Belbek Air Base. Additional geolocated footage published on 31JAN showed large smoke plumes rising from the airfield. The Russian source claimed that the Ukrainians fired 24 missiles at the target, of which five were not intercepted. The source said three aircraft sustained damages, including two Su-27s and one Su-30. Two were reportedly seriously damaged, and one was beyond repair. The strike also killed 12 personnel and wounded more than 10. Natalia Humeniuk also said on Thursday (01FEB) that five missiles hit a target in Crimea on Wednesday (31JAN).
On Thursday (01FEB), the Ukrainian Navy claimed that naval drones operated by the “Group 13” special unit of the Military Intelligence (HUR) hit and sank the Ivanivets Tarantul III-class (Project 12411 М) corvette on the Lake Donuzlav. The event marked the first sinking of a Russian surface combatant while manoeuvring by naval drones in this war. The vessel was hit by an unspecified number of drones (at least two), and following what appeared to be an internal explosion, Ivanivets sank. Drones were engaged on approach by the vessel’s machine guns, but it is unclear whether any drones were intercepted.
The event showed that Ukrainians would continue to hunt for Russian surface ships on the Western Black Sea, ideally to force Russians to abandon their operations in the area completely. Another objective is the complete withdrawal of Russian combatants from Sevastopol. The attack fell into the Ukrainian campaign seeking to degrade Russian ability to operate from Crimea. Strikes on air bases and ships in the region will continue throughout 2024 as they are part of Ukraine’s active defence strategy. The impact on the battlefield, however, is likely to be limited.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 568 aircraft (0), 265 helicopters (0), 11,620 UAVs (+365), 457 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+2), 14,880 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+88), 1,215 MLRS launchers (+5), 7,946 field artillery guns and mortars (+75), as well as 18,156 units of special military vehicles (+265).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 387,600 personnel (+6,460), 6,331 tanks (+66), 11,792 armoured combat vehicles (+155), 9,274 artillery systems (+192) and 978 MLR systems (+6), 663 anti-aircraft systems (+3), 332 aircraft (+1) and 324 helicopters (0), and 7,146 UAVs (+113), 1,847 cruise missiles (+2), 24 warships and boats (+1), submarines 1 (0), 12,316 vehicles and fuel tanks (+252), and 1,470 special vehicles (+45).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine
The Russian use of drones and missile strikes continued to be limited.
Last week, Russians did not launch a single mass missile strike on targets in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, on the night of Monday/Tuesday (29/30JAN), Russians launched one Iskander-M (9M723 ballistic missile). The missile was not intercepted.
However, Russians launched Shahed 131/139 strikes daily. However, the number of vehicles involved was relatively small. Altogether, Moscow was reported to have launched 81 vehicles, of which Kyiv claimed to have intercepted 47 (58%). The biggest impact on this figure had the Tuesday (30JAN) attack, which involved 37 drones, of which only 15 were shot down (40%). This was the lowest interception since Shaheds were introduced in SEP2022. The second lowest (42%) was reported on 31DEC.
Ground attacks increased slightly. Russians averaged 73 attacks per day, compared to 69 two weeks ago. The 10-day moving average, however, fell from around 80 to 70 attacks per day.
(Battlefield) missile strikes increased. Russians employed 39 missiles, and the overall number of daily attacks started rising as well. On the other hand, Russians still utilise fewer than ten missiles per day on average.
Airstrike data showed extreme fluctuations. For instance, Saturday and Sunday (27 and 28JAN) saw only eight and ten attacks. However, Monday (29JAN) delivered 114, followed by 99 and 94 air strikes conducted on Tuesday and Wednesday, respectively. Over the past few days, the tempo remained very high but without a frontline impact.
MLRS strikes also continued to climb. They bottomed on Saturday (27JAN) with 82 attacks and quickly increased to 129 on Tuesday (30JAN). This was the second-largest reported number since March 2023.
As such, we see a major increase in MLRS and air strike numbers and a limited rise in missile strikes. The only lagging data are ground attacks, which, on average, declined. This data mix could indicate preparatory activities for a major Russian attack.
The chart now features the number of fired Shaheds. This means we had to cut down the period shown on the chart. Otherwise, it is too cluttered. We still maintain the master dataset, which covers all strikes.
Outlook for the week of 3FEB2024 – 9FEB2024
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (increase in probability) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” Russians captured Tabaivka and approached Berestove.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. There is a roughly even chance (increase in probability) that they will capture one village or more.” Russians made marginal gains in the region but did not capture a single settlement.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” Russians indeed captured some terrain in the Velyka Novosilka and Orikhiv axes but did not capture a single village in the region.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.” This assessment was correct.
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 3FEB2024 – 9FEB2024
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote. We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.