Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 27 March – 2 April 2023 (Weekly update)
Situational report 27 March – 2 April 2023
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week delivered no operational or strategic changes in Ukraine; Despite Russian commitment to offensive operations near Bakhmut and Adviivka, the overall operational tempo may have decreased on both sides;
No major events took place in the Kharkiv Oblast; Russians continued to artillery strike Ukrainian civilian areas daily, while ground attacks delivered no frontline changes; Ukrainians may have conducted some cross-border ground assaults;
Russian tempo of ground attacks remained reduced in the Luhansk Oblast; Some tactical shifts probably happened, but Russians made no gains in the region;
For another week in a row, all Russian attacks around Bakhmut were repelled; However, they noticeably made gains in the city and may have captured the Bakhmut city administration building; Ukrainians remain committed to the defence of Bakhmut and despite heavy losses, nothing indicates a pullback is planned; Russian assaults on the city have not culminated;
Russians made no confirmed gains near Avdiivka, but their attacks in this area will likely continue this week;
The attackers made no progress in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast;
No major events occurred in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast; Ukrainians conducted at least three high-precision missile attacks on Melitopol to degrade Russian troop mobility;
No changes took place in the Kherson Oblast; Ukrainians conducted a drone strike on the Russian military presence in Gvardeyskoye;
The exercise tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained high, but the focus shifted to mechanised formations; The uptick in the number of Russian heavy transport aircraft flying to Belarus suggests the deployment of air defence systems;
General outlook
Last week did not deliver any significant changes in Ukraine as the war remains in its transitory phase. Russians claimed to have captured Pervomaiske (which was not confirmed independently) and progressed in Bakhmut. Apart from these developments, the frontline remained deadlocked across entire Ukraine.
Over the last few weeks, Russians stepped up efforts to degrade Ukrainian artillery capabilities. On the one hand, as stated in our summary of the field trips to Ukraine, Russians use loitering munitions for counterbattery fire. On Sunday, a video on social media appeared showing a Lancet hitting a Polish-supplied Krab 155-mm SPH and an ammunition supply truck. The application of loitering munition may form a part of a larger systemic change. A Polish analyst, Colonel (ret.) Maciej Korowaj stated last week that new counterbattery subunits had been created, which deploy UAVs, loitering munitions, and reconnaissance assets and have access to artillery support and aviation. They are subordinate to combat support units and traverse the frontline, often in civilian cars, to find and destroy Ukrainian artillery systems. However, by looking at the number of artillery systems that the Russian MoD report to have destroyed, we have hardly seen a big change. On the other hand, the number of Russian artillery systems destroyed by Ukrainians decreased last week, which could indicate a degradation of Ukrainian artillery capability. Nevertheless, the Russian emphasis on effective counterbattery fire is evident.
Last week, Ukrainians conducted at least one (reportedly three) high-precision strikes on a motive power (locomotive) depot in Melitopol. It could be the start of a Ukrainian campaign to reduce Russian ability to move its forces in this theatre and to battle-shape southern Ukraine for the upcoming offensive. If so, we are in the early stages of this process, and undoubtedly, an uptick in high-precision strikes will indicate in which area Kyiv plans to counterattack.
Nothing speaks better on the current posture of Russian forces deployed in Ukraine than discussions about the upcoming offensive. Surely, on a tactical level, Russians appear to have the initiative. They conduct daily attacks on Ukrainian positions, capture land occasionally, and maintain the overall pressure of opposing forces. However, strategically, nothing changed post-Kherson and post-mobilisation. Ukrainians conducted two successful operational-level counteroffensives in the second half of 2022 and continue to have the upper hand strategically, which will continue at least until the end of 2023. When going through military reports, no one mentions any potential Russian offensives. Moscow is awaiting Ukrainian attacks and likely plans to respond to them as they develop. As such, strategically, the Russian posture in Ukraine remains defensive.
On Monday, 27MAR, Estonian news outlet ERR published an interview with the Ukrainian Defence Minister, Oleksii Reznikov. He stated that Kyiv might begin a counteroffensive in April or May, but everything depended on weather conditions. He added that it was not yet decided whether newly arrived Leopard 2 MBTs would be involved in the upcoming attack.
Until the offensive starts, we will unlikely see big changes on the battlefield. Russians will continue attacks in priority areas, and Ukrainian tactical counterattacks will be limited, but the frontline, in general, will see no changes.
Weather forecast
(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days unless otherwise stated)
Spring has arrived in Ukraine. This week’s temperatures are not expected to fall below 11°C (52°F) during the daytime and 4°C (39°F) during the nightime. On Wednesday, the maximum temperature will rise to 19°C (66°F).
The Kreminna area will be very warm. Nights will be slightly chilly, with temperatures dropping to 7°C (44°F). However, days will deliver 16°C, 19°C, and 17°C (60°F, 66°F, 63°F) on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively. The remainder of the week will likely be colder at 13-14°C (55-57°F). Rain is expected on Monday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday.
The Bakhmut area will follow a similar pattern. The temperature will increase until Wednesday, when it is expected to reach 18°C (62°F), followed by slightly older weather until the end of the week at 13°C (55°F). Rain is also expected on Monday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday.
The Zaporizhzhia region will also experience mild weather this week. Although at nights the temperature will drop to 4°C (39°F) on Monday, the rest of the week will deliver temperatures ranging from 6°C to 10°C (42-50°F) during nights. The region will see temperatures reaching 17°C (62°F) on Wednesday during the daytime. A fall is expected after mid-week, but still, the temperatures should stay above 12°C (53°F). Rain is expected every day throughout the week.
Undoubtedly the weather is improving, especially when it comes to increasing temperatures. However, high precipitation will continue to “weaken” the ground to sustain heavy movements.
Last week we wrote that a medium-term (30-day) forecast showed transitional weather until 20APR, when the temperatures are to permanently rise above 10°C (50°F) during the day and 5°C (41°F) at night. This forecast is largely maintained this week. Precipitation is forecasted to be relatively in April in Ukraine.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 404 aircraft (+1), 228 helicopters (+3), 3,641 UAVs (+54), 415 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 8,510 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+95), 1,077 MLRS launchers (+4), 4,440 field artillery guns and mortars (+45), as well as 9,270 units of special military vehicles (+144).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 174,550 personnel (+4,000), 3,595 tanks (+23), 6,947 armoured combat vehicles (+39), 2,631 artillery systems (+56) and 527 MLR systems (+5), 279 anti-aircraft systems (+2), 306 aircraft (+1) and 291 helicopters (0), and 2,249 UAVs (+33), 5,486 vehicles and fuel tanks (+51), 911 cruise missiles (0), 18 warships and boats (0) and 282 pieces of special equipment (+14).
Looking at figures provided by the UGS, last week marked a significant reduction in Russian losses almost across the board. The only exception was combat aircraft (0 vs 1). Russians reportedly lost fewer men (5,640 vs 4,000), tanks (63 vs 23), armoured combat vehicles (94 vs 39), artillery systems (63 vs 56), and MLRS (15 vs 5). It is unclear what caused this change. On the one hand, attacks in the Luhansk Oblast decreased in intensity, but this is not a new development. On the other hand, Russians continued to be heavily committed to attacking Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Perhaps
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
Military situation in Belarus
Last week, despite a notable political event and personal changes in the Belarusian military leadership, the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained unchanged. At the same time, training activities refocused from artillery to mechanised forces. On the other hand, the number of flights of Russian transport aircraft to Belarus visibly increased, which might suggest the transfer of additional Russian equipment.
From a political perspective, the annual speech of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on Friday was the week’s main event. In the beginning, Lukashenko noted that the address was a political dialogue between the state leadership and citizens to discuss “life topics”. But he also underlined that this year’s event would be mainly focused on the issue of Belarusian sovereignty and independence, which, in his view, were currently in unprecedented danger. The Belarusian leader spoke about the changing philosophy of the world order, claiming that most world conflicts are caused by the fierce western desire to “subjugate” the whole world. Such actions, he continued, were carried out by penetration of the political life through government or opposition representatives, as well as so-called state elites.
Lukashenko directly referred to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, mentioning several Belarusian attempts to “return peace” to Russia and Ukraine. He proposed even deploying neutral troops (peacekeepers?) on the demarcation line, but the Ukrainian side rejected all his proposals. Lukashenko once again appealed to Ukrainians, inviting them to the peace talks, claiming that in case of any new conflict, everyone would forget about Ukraine and weapons deliveries would stop. Referring to the potential Ukrainian counteroffensive, the Belarusian President noted its possible consequences, which might break the entire negotiation process and even start a nuclear war.
Lukashenko also stressed that Poland was preparing for an attack on Belarus.
He said that Polish actions aimed to destroy Belarus using trained militias consisting of former Belarusian citizens. The President stated that his state would not attack any country, but the Belarusian Armed Forces would continue to train with their Russian counterparts. According to him, more than 500 Belarusian officers are involved in the training process of Russian service members. In addition, he said that “certain” military infrastructure recently announced by the Russian President had already been prepared. We presume he referred to a nuclear storage site meant to house Russian nuclear warheads in Belarus.
Lukashenko highlighted that he was even ready to deploy strategic nuclear munitions (ICBMs) in Belarus and informed about other activities to prepare the citizens for the potential conflict. According to Lukashenko, Belarus might use tactical nuclear warheads only in case of an attack on its territory. Also, he stated that warheads should be under Belarusian control if they are deployed to the country.
Lukashenko also announced another visit to Russia.
Alexander Lukashenko also made several personnel decisions throughout the week. On Tuesday, he transferred the Deputy Minister of Defence for Armament, Maj. Gen. Sergey Simonenko to the military reserve (due to illness) and appointed his current deputy, Maj. Gen. Andrey Fedin to the Simonenko’s position. Moreover, Col. Vitaly Shestak became the First Deputy Minister of Defence for Armaments (a position earlier occupied by Fedin).
Two days later, Lukashenko relieved the Commander of the Western Operational Command, Maj. Gen. Igor Demidenko from his position. According to the official statement, Demidenko remains at the disposal of the Minister of Defence until 9MAY. The reasons behind the decision remain currently unclear. No prior indications suggested that the change had a planned character and was part of ongoing staff changes. The current Head of the General Staff Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy, Col. Vladimir Bely, was appointed to Demidenko’s position.
Over the past seven days, the Belarusian military leadership representatives did not present any meaningful activities. They either took part in ceremonial or summarising events, such as the introduction ceremony of the new Deputy Minister of Defence for Armament (Thursday) and the solemn celebration of the 105th anniversary of Belarusian Armed Forces Rear Service (Friday.
However, an unspecified Belarusian MoD delegation participated in multilateral talks between Collective Security Treaty Organisation members (Tuesday-Thursday). Discussions were related to the upcoming joint CSTO exercises. According to an official statement, five joint training events will be held on Belarusian territory in 2023: “Combat Brotherhood”, “Interaction”, “Search”, “Echelon”, and “Barrier”.
On Saturday, the Commander of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces, Maj. Gen. Vadim Denisenko summarised the tactical exercise of the 103rd Airborne Brigade, which was the most important training event of the week. During the ceremony, Denisenko praised both the brigade’s servicemen and reservists and noted the difficulty of the exercise, which was held between 20MAR and 1APR. He provided no further details about the drill.
Last week, the training activities were fairly distributed among all Belarusian military formations. Among mechanised formations, a single field exit, as well as two tactical exercises, occurred. The first refers to the elements of the 7th Tank Battalion (11th Mechanised Brigade) that departed from the home garrison on Friday, while the latter pertains to the drills of the 1st Mechanised Battalion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade (Tuesday), as well as 358th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade (Friday). Moreover, an unspecified logistic subunit of the 120th Mechanised Brigade continued drills as a part of a combat readiness check. The unit was strengthened with additional personnel (likely reservists). The drill began with removing military equipment from long-term storage base(s).
The training actions were still visible amidst artillery formations. Between Tuesday and Thursday, elements of the 51st Artillery Brigade and other unspecified artillery formations took part in a complex bilateral exercise. In addition, live ammo firing was carried out by the elements of the 191st (19th Mechanised Brigade) and 350th Artillery Groups (6th Mechanised Brigade) on Friday. Notably, the latter subunit also held its tactical exercise on Tuesday.
On Tuesday, the Belarusian MoD reported about a continuation of the comprehensive inspection among the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) of the Minsk Oblast. Based on news reports, about 130 reservists were called up and located in the “Belino” sanatorium. Soldiers will form a territorial HQ and a rifle battalion that will undergo a series of training drills, finished with a command-staff exercise.
Similarly, the TDF exercise started a day later in the Korelichsky and Novogrudok regions. It will likely involve a similar number of service members participating in theoretical and practical drills until 21APR.
When it comes to Belarusian SOF and air components, on Thursday, personnel from the 38th Air Assault Brigade conducted parachute jumps from the Il-76MD aircraft over the Brestsky Training Ground. MiG-29 and Su-30SM fighter aircraft from the 61st Fighter Aviation Base carried out several training flights. The significant activity of the Belarusian air component was also observed a day earlier.
Among more specialised formations, the 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion conducted a field exit on Monday, while the Repair Battalion of the 30th Railway Brigade participated in a special-tactical exercise a day later. Between Monday and Friday, snipers from the Western Operational Command took part in the best sniper and sniper pair contests held at the 11th Mechanised Brigade’s base.
Over the past seven days, the amount of Belarusian military equipment observed on the move was minimal. Four transfers were noteworthy:
A single S-300 launcher with a radar station and a truck were moving in Dolaty village;
An R-434 radio relay station with about five trucks were moving in Nesvezh;
About 20-30 BTRs, several armoured vehicles and trucks (most likely of the 103rd Airborne Brigade) were moving towards Vitebsk from Polotsk;
The movements were observed on Wednesday.
Unofficial sources reported the presence of a military echelon with more than 20 BTRs (80/70MB1), about 20 trucks and light vehicles and three Kayman armoured cars spotted in Minsk on Saturday.
Last week, at least six Russian An-124 heavy cargo aircraft arrived in Belarus. According to unofficial sources, they likely brought S-300/S-400 launchers (battalion set(s)). The unrelated photos published by the Belarusian security forces confirmed the presence of S-400 air defence complexes at the Gomel Airport, which might suggest that the launchers were transported to Belarus via air. Indeed, on Monday, the road movements of at least one S-300/S-400 launcher were reported between Novaya Buhalovka and Sozh;
Several training flights of Russian air assets deployed in Belarus were also observed. It pertains to unspecified fighters (Tuesday and Wednesday) and rotary-wing aircraft (Friday).
Please click here to access the summary list of Belarusian exercises.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
Although last week delivered no frontline changes in the Kharkiv Oblast, Russians extended ground attacks to include areas around Hrayanykivka, Masiutivka and Krohmalne. Yet, despite this extension, Russians made no territorial gains in the region as all of their attacks were repelled. The attackers are not capable enough to push through Ukrainian defensive lines and achieve any tactical, let alone operational, successes. In fact, this deficiency is evident throughout Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast, where except for Dvorichne, Russians have not captured a single village for months.
Russians conducted no ground attacks into the Kharkiv Oblast from Russia proper last week. However, according to a Russian source, “Ukrainian saboteurs” tried to push through Russian defences near Lomakovka in the Bryansk Oblast. Russians claimed to have detected the group and hit it with artillery, forcing a withdrawal. A similar attempt (same source) reportedly occurred near Cheremoshnoe in the Belgorod Oblast. However, in this instance, we assess that the village was hit with artillery (no ground attacks occurred), causing issues with the power supply.
As the weather improves, we can potentially see an increase in activity in both oblasts. However, we have seen no reports suggesting the deployment of reinforcements, which are necessary if Russians plan to start conducting more robust offensive operations.
We continue to assess that the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army is the main formation running operations in the Kharkiv Oblast. The CAA remains one of the weakest armies in the Russian Ground Forces, which confirms that the Kharkiv Oblast remains the low-priority area for the high command.
To compensate for ground forces’ weaknesses, Moscow continued to rely on artillery strikes to attack Ukrainian targets across the Kharkiv Oblast. Most attacks hit civilian targets, although Ukrainian reports indicate that no military targets are ever engaged. For instance, Russians reportedly fired nine missiles from S-300 air defence systems on Thursday alone. They flew in from the Belgord Oblast and exploded in and near Kharkiv. Imprecise as they are, it is difficult to imagine that Russians really seek to destroy any military targets with 5V55 missiles.
One of the artillery strikes also hit Bogodukhiv, where 13 residential buildings and a kindergarten were damaged. Residential and commercial buildings were also damaged in Dvorichna on Wednesday. On that day, Ukrainians counted over 150 mortars, tanks, and artillery hits throughout the oblast.
Luhansk direction
Similar to the Kharkiv Oblast, Russians made no confirmed gains in the Luhansk Oblast last week. Although tactical and frontline shifts probably happened, the attackers did not manage to capture a single settlement (or more). It appears that the tempo of their attacks remained reduced, further diminishing their chances of making a breakthrough.
It is still unclear whether this decrease in the number of attacks is by choice or design. In other words, we do not know whether the unsuccessful winter campaign led to a significant erosion of Russian capacity to conduct attacks forcing them to scale them down, or whether the reduction was made on purpose to prepare forces for an increased tempo of attacks during spring.
Regardless, looking purely at the scope of military activity, the Luhansk Oblast is the second most important theatre for Russians in Ukraine. Their operations near Kreminna and towards Slovyansk, unsuccessful as they have been, nevertheless seek to pave the way for further gains in the northern parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Operationally, last week, Russians continued ground assaults from Svatove to Bilohorivka. As stated, these attacks brought no territorial gains.
Ukrainians shared some details on Russian losses in the Luhansk Oblast. For instance, according to Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, there were 20 ground battles in the Kupyansk and Lyman sectors on 30MAR. As a result, 54 Russians were killed and 133 wounded. Four Russian tanks were also destroyed – three T-72s and one modern T-90 “Proryv”.
Altogether, Russians conducted more than 300 attacks on Ukrainian positions in March along the Kypyansk-Liman line, according to Cherevaty. He added that in this area, Russians undertook more classic operations that involved mechanised and armoured formations, contrasting their operations in Bakhmut, which were based on “small tactical groups” (assault groups).
No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Russians conducted several attacks throughout the week, but all were pushed back. Positional battles also continued near Novoselivske and Kuzemivka, but the overall situation in this sector is unclear. Russians may have taken some territory near the former, but battles there were very locally confined without impacting the overall situation in this part of the oblast.
Last week we noted the appearance of a video which showed a Russian tank in Makiivka. We said that Russians probably did not capture the village, but battles were ongoing near it. However, Ukrainians claimed this week that the video was old and had been made in autumn.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka.
Throughout the week, Russians informed about assaults near Nevske and Terny, but no information appeared about their successes in this area.
The same pertains to the Kreminna area. Positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest and near Dibrova. Some sources indicated limited Russian gains near the latter, but no visual evidence confirmed any changes. Interestingly, a Ukrainian source claimed on Friday, that Ukrainian territorial defence units were mainly involved in the defence of the “Lyman direction”. If true, this allows Ukrainians to spare operational (regular) formations and prepare them for the spring offensive. Russian 3rd Speztnaz Brigade is also reportedly deployed in the Serebryansky forest.
No confirmed changes also occurred near the Bilohorivka area. On Wednesday, Russian bloggers claimed that Russians made some gains in this sector, but he did not confirm how (in)significant they were. On the other hand, Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Ukrainian units had taken some territory east of the settlement.
Ukrainians reportedly redeployed reserves to Bilohirovka (which could have been force rotations). Ukrainians also claimed to have killed 100 Russians and destroyed two armoured vehicles near the village during the week.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Two weeks ago, we wrote that the Russian focus in the Donetsk Oblast was firmly placed on Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Wagner PMC fighters predominantly ran operations in Bakhmut, while Russian regular army formations (and incorporated proxies) attacked Avdiivka. But while Wagner continued progressing towards Bakhmut city centre, Russians made no confirmed advances in Avdiivka, thus again highlighting weaknesses in the capabilities of their conventional forces.
Looking at the frontline, Russian attacks on Spirne and Verkhokamyanske failed to deliver any gains. The same pertains to Vesele, Rozdolivka and Vasiukivka.
Russians also did not advance near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Min’kivka, meaning their offensive momentum in this area petered out. We currently assess that the attackers are unlikely to progress until Bakhmut is captured, as battles there “suck in” most of the available resources.
Despite optimistic reports from Bakhmut published by Western media (such as this one) and official pronouncements, the situation in the city deteriorated last week. Russians continued to attack the city from the south, east, and north. Although Russians did not progress in encircling the city, they made relatively significant advances within Bakhmut. Firstly, pro-Russian reports suggested that the entire area of the AZOM industrial site was captured. At the very least, battles were ongoing in the southern parts of the complex. They also attacked the area of Rose Alley.
Battles were also reported near Mariupolska Street, along Korsunsky Street and near the city centre. Russians said they progressed in the southern parts of the city. They also reportedly crossed the Bakhmutovka River. Battles moved from Nyzhnia Street early in the week to further west near the Bakhmut city administration building and a football stadium. The former was allegedly captured on Sunday.
A Ukrainian soldier deployed in the city stated that the Russians’ main tactic is to get into the centre of Bakhmut because the intensity of attacks outside the city has slightly decreased, which confirms our abovementioned assessment. He added that Russians use a lot of drones for better situational awareness and to improve the precision of their artillery and mortar fires. Several Ukrainian units reportedly had come under mortar fire during short movements, which confirms almost constant surveillance.
The soldier did not see a possibility of the city being enveloped, but the situation was dynamic, and changes occurred daily. According to the Commander of Ukrainian Land Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Russians, trying to capture the city, threw all their best units into the battle. Syrskyi added that the main task was to eliminate as many Russians as possible and create conditions for a successful counteroffensive. According to Serhiy Cherevaty, in the Bakhmut sector, on Monday, Russians opened artillery fire 194 times, of which 70 strikes occurred in the city. Cherevaty also claimed that 19 combat clashes took place near Bakhmut and 14 directly in the town. Russians lost 86 killed and 117 wounded (presumably on Monday). Based on the data we gathered during the trip to Bakhmut, as of early March, Russians had a 5:1 advantage in artillery fires.
Although Cherevaty noted that early in the week, the number of hostilities in the Bakhmut sector decreased slightly, he recognised that this reduction in activity could have been linked to a regrouping of Russian forces. Indeed, the tempo of attacks increased late in the week.
The Russian 98th Airborne Division, which we knew was operating in Bakhmut, also became more involved in supporting Wagner throughout the week. On Friday, the Russian Izvestia news outlet, published a story claiming that TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems would be handed over to Russian airborne forces, likely due to their increased role in assault operations.
We cannot share any numbers, but our sources fighting in Bakhmut claimed that Ukrainian losses are very severe.
Last week, Ukrainian and Russians assessed that the opposing forces were losing 500 men daily in the Bakhmut area, translating into 15,000 men monthly. Although we believe this estimate is too high, the casualty ratio is more accurate. We assessed that as of early March, the ratio stood at 1:1/1:2 (Ukrainian vs Russian), and based on information we received from the city, the last month marked no improvements for Kyiv.
Based on these reports, we cannot say that Russian operations in Bakhmut have culminated. They continue to make incremental but steady gains, probably at a high cost too. So far, the Ukrainian optimism about the defence of Bakhmut and the degradation of Russian (and Wagner) capacities for future ground attacks seems unfounded. It needs to be stressed that we believe that Ukrainians can successfully defend Bakhmut and continue to attrit Russian forces. The question is, at what cost? Many Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the city see the current battle as being too costly in terms of manpower, especially given that better defensive positions are established west of Bakhmut. Nevertheless, the political-military command remains committed to defending the city at (almost) all costs.
Russians conducted attacks along the Predtechyne – Ivanivske line, but no changes were reported there last week.
According to a Russian source, Russians hit on a temporary Ukrainian deployment site in Konstantynivka. Earlier, locations of UAF reserves moving from the Dnipropetrovsk region were also hit by the Russian forces in Druzhkivka.
Moving further south, no changes occurred between Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Stepove and Keremik, but assaults had no impact on the frontline. They also did not capture any new territory south of Avdiivka. Indeed, besides reportedly capturing Kamyanka two weeks ago, Russians made no progress in this sector.
Elements of the 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade (previously the 3rd DPR Brigade) ran a series of attacks on Ukrainian positions near Novobakhmutovka. They were unsuccessful.
A video was published on Thursday reportedly showing Russian assaults on Ukrainian positions near Voydane. Ukrainian ATGMs destroyed most vehicles.
Indeed, according to a Ukrainian source, the Ukrainian artillery’s activity significantly reduced the Russian troops’ offensive potential in many places where the latter tried to push through Ukrainian positions.
According to Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS), the following units are involved in operations around Avdiivka:
132nd Separate Motor Rifle is deployed near Novobakhmutivka – Novokalynove – Keramik;
136th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, 109th Separate Rifle Regiment and 207th Separate Rifle Battalion of mobilisation reserve of the 1st Army Corps are deployed near Novoselivka Druga – Novokalynove;
114th Separate Motor Rifle of the 1st Army Corps is deployed near Krasnohorivka – Stepove;
200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet covers Opytne – Avdiivka, Vodyane – Severne, Vodyane – Pervomaiske;
9th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps is deployed near Pisky- Pervomaiske;
5th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps, 102nd Motor Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motor Rifle Division of the 8th Army are deployed near Mariinka – Kurakhove.
We also understand that the 1st Army Corps’ 11th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, “Sparta” and “Somalia” battalions are also deployed near Avdiivka.
As we can see, Russians have deployed a rather weak mix of formations. Of course, pre-war, the 102nd Motor Rifle Regiment and the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade were formidable units, equipped for high-tempo operations. However, the 200th MRB was decimated during the first phase of the war, while the 102nd MRR had to be reconstituted as well. Consequently, attacks around Avdiivka are mostly run by equally devastated proxy formations.
In Mariinka, Russian infantry supported by tanks and artillery advanced towards the centre of the settlement and pushed Ukrainians from their strongholds near the district administration building, the fighting for which had been ongoing for several months. The impact of this development, if confirmed, is nevertheless limited on the overall tactical situation.
Last week, some Russian sources suggested that Russians captured Pervomaiske. However, we were not able to confirm this development. Russians indeed progressed slightly towards the settlement along the M04 road from Pisky in the first half of the week. However, the latter half reportedly featured a Ukrainian counterattack. Although we are uncertain where exactly the frontline runs, it is clear that Russians did not capture Pervomaiske.
No changes were reported near Vuhledar. Russian activities were mostly based on reconnaissance-in-force operations, which delivered no frontline changes. We continue to assess that the bulk of capabilities were diverted to support assaults Avdiivka, which in the eyes of the Russian command, have better chances of succeeding.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Last week was largely uneventful in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. Both sides’ activities were limited to artillery strikes. Ground activities were mostly focused on positional battles and local skirmishes.
On Wednesday, Ukrainians probably conducted a high-precision strike on Melitopol. Several explosions were heard in an airfield area. Russians, in their reports, admitted an attack on a motive power (locomotive) depot. Another source claimed that Ukrainians hit (three missiles) a railway power substation, causing short-lived power outages. Two more strikes targeting the depot were conducted until the end of the week.
We consider these strikes to be battle-shaping efforts seeking to degrade the Russian ability to move their forces across southern parts of Ukraine.
After these strikes, we expected an increased tempo of Ukrainian attacks on facilities supporting Russian forces’ movement. However, no other high-precision attacks took place last week.
Kherson direction and Crimea
Likewise, the overall situation in the Kherson Oblast did not undergo any changes.
Russians continued to shell the Ukrainian military, but mostly civilian targets. A Russian source stated that a Russian anti-radar missile destroyed a Ukrainian S-300 radar near Davydiv Brid.
A journalist claimed that Ukrainian artillery hit a Russian concentration area between Kostohryzove and Nechaeve.
According to Nataliya Humenyuk, the United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces, Russian artillery strikes from the Kinburn Spit decreased recently due to bad weather. She also added that Ukrainian artillery fires on Russian logistics and storage facilities degraded the intensity of Russian artillery attacks. However, little is known about the scope of the Ukrainian campaign to achieve this objective. Last week, a journalist claimed that Ukrainian artillery hit a Russian concentration area between Kostohryzove and Nechaeve. It remains unclear how many similar strikes occur on a weekly basis in this direction.
On a civilian front, according to Vladimir Saldo, the Kherson Oblast occupation head, Russian officials hope to open a railway between the Kherson Oblast and Crimea before the start of the summer season.
Russian officials struggle to fully implement the use of the Russian Ruble in areas they occupy. The occupation administration warned locals on 28MAR that anyone who refused to accept rubbles or attempted to sabotage its use in the region would face criminal prosecution.
When it comes to Crimea, Gvardeyskoye, which houses the 37th Composite Aviation Regiment (Su-24M and Su-25SMs), witnessed unspecified explosions on Wednesday. It is unclear where exactly the explosions occurred, but a Russian source stated that a Ukrainian drone was shot down near the city.
Outlook for the week of 03APR-09APR
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
“We maintain our views on the situation in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian artillery and missile attacks will continue, but ground attacks will unlikely deliver territorial gains.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
“The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast. Last week Russian tempo of attacks was visibly reduced, further diminishing the chances of capturing new territories. As we have seen no indications suggesting a change in Russian posture in the region, we will continue to assess that Russians are highly unlikely to extend their gains (one settlement and more) this week.” This prognosis was correct as well.
Score: 1/1
“Regarding the Kreminna area, in our view, chances are still remote that Russians will achieve a breakthrough in this sector. Positional battles delivering some minor changes on the battlefield are likely.” This forecast was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We maintain that the Russians will continue to sustain an increased tempo of their attacks this week in the Donetsk Oblast. Their focus will again be on the Avdiivka and areas west of Krasnohorivka. There is roughly even chance that Russians will capture one village or more in this part of Ukraine.” We were correct in anticipating Russian attacks near Avdiivka, but their offensive potential was too weak to deliver any frontline changes.
Score: 0/1
“Last week only saw incremental Russian gains in Bakhmut. There has been a lot of talk in open source about Russians running out of steam in Bakhmut and the consequent exhaustion of their offensive potential. We think it is too early to make this conclusion. We will change our assessment if this week does not deliver any noteworthy changes. However, until then, we assess that Russians are likely to progress in Bakhmut, but there is roughly even chance that they will capture new territory near Khromove, Ivanivske, or in areas further north such as Orikhovo Vasylivka or Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka.” We were spot in last week by saying that it was too early to discuss a culmination of Russian attacks in Bakhmut. Russians did make territorial gains in the city. We were also right in expressing doubts about Russians’ ability to capture more territory in areas adjacent to the town.
Score: 1/1
“We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. Ukrainians will likely start conducting more ground attacks this week. It is also possible that their posture in the region has changed from defensive to the one displaying more offensive characteristics.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 7/8 (88%)
Next week’s forecast
We expect to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russians will certainly continue to conduct daily artillery strikes on Ukrainian military and civilian targets across the region, while ground attacks will be limited and are highly unlikely to deliver any changes.
Events that unfolded in the Luhansk Oblast give very little room for optimism for the Russian side. Despite conducting (reduced) ground attacks across the entire frontline, Russians have been unable to capture one village or more for months. Last week saw a continuation of this trend. We continue to see no indications that any reinforcements have been deployed to the region, which supports our assessment that Russians are highly unlikely to extend their gains (one settlement and more) this week.
The same pertains to the Kreminna area. While some tactical shifts may occur, chances are still remote that Russians will achieve a breakthrough in this sector.
When it comes to the broader Donetsk Oblast, we are looking at two main areas where Russians could progress: Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Their chances of making territorial gains in other parts of the region are very limited due to a lack of manpower, equipment, and shell hunger. As such, it is unlikely that Russians will progress in other areas apart from Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Last week Russians did not progress in areas around Bakhmut, both north and south of the city. Russians appeared to have shifted their capabilities from Khromove, Ivanivske, or in areas further north such as Orikhovo Vasylivka or Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka. Their forces deployed in these locations are tasked with fixing Ukrainian units, while most Russian efforts are firmly set on capturing Bakhmut, where Russians made some gains. Despite various reports appearing in Western media and analytical centres suggesting that Russian offensive potential has culminated, we assess that Russians will likely continue to make steady gains this week. Despite heavy losses, we assess that it is unlikely that Ukrainians will leave Bakhmut this week.
Regarding Avdiivka, Russians will highly likely continue conducting ground attacks on Ukrainian positions near Avdiivka. But there is roughly even chance they will make tactical progress of capturing one village or more.
We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. Ukrainians will likely start conducting more ground attacks this week.
We forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but without an impact on the frontline. Both sides will certainly conduct artillery strikes across the Dnipro River.
We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.