Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 28 October – 03 November 2023 (Weekly update)
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
*Please note there will be no Ukraine update next week. We will be on a field strip with limited access to the internet*
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week brought minimal frontline changes in Ukraine; Both sides progressed slightly, but neither Russians nor Ukrainians were able to convert tactical gains into operational successes; Russians maintained the initiative and, despite heavy losses, continued attacks near Avdiivka;
The overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged as Russians continued to strike Ukrainian civilian areas with artillery; Russian sources reported an increase in Ukrainian military presence in the region;
Russians maintained attacks in the northern parts of the Luhansk Oblast Direction (formally Kharkiv Oblast), where they reportedly captured some terrain; the deployment of new forces to the region may allow Russians to sustain their operations;
The frontline near Avdiivka only saw minimal changes, although Russian sources reported that Russian units crossed the rail line and attacked Svatove; Russian losses remained high, but their tempo of attacks decreased compared to previous weeks; No further changes in the Donetsk Oblast were reported;
Marginal frontline changes occurred in the Southern Direction, where both sides captured some terrain; The overall outlook for the counteroffensive remains unchanged;
Ukrainian units maintained their bridgeheads on the Dnipro’s left bank; They made no progress in land;
Last week, Russians launched several cruise missiles and their employment remains limited; The number of launched Shahed 131/136s increased, but still, Ukrainians claimed to have shot down all incoming drones;
Executive summary
The past week brought continuity in terms of warfighting trends. Ukrainians continued attacks in the Kherson Oblast, the Orikhiv axis and south of Bakhmut. Russians remained offensively committed in the Avdiivka and Kupyansk axes. Unconfirmed reports indicate they progressed in both areas, but this forward movement was marginal. Ukrainians liberated some ground, too, but from the strategic perspective, these gains did not impact the direction in which this war was drifting.
Russians continued to prioritise attacks to encircle Avdiivka, where most of their attacks last week occurred. Yet, based on Ukrainian General Staff reports, the number of Russian assaults decreased, even though their determination did not. We also saw fewer armoured vehicles destroyed, which could indicate a shift in tactics. The loss of hundreds of pieces of equipment forced Russians to focus on small-unit assaults on Ukrainian positions, especially in the northern flank, where Ukrainian fortifications are poorly developed. At the same time, any land grab is immediately followed by new Russian fortifications that increase the offensiveness of Russian defence if Ukranians counterattack. In this context, the Russian tactic near Avdiivka resembles the Ukrainian approach in the Southern Direction. Russian attacks are, however, larger and include a degree of Russian air space control over the battlefield.
We expect Russians to continue focusing on the Avdiivka axis, but it is very difficult to predict what gains they will make over the next days and weeks. Nevertheless, we continue to maintain that Russians are beginning to dominate the battlefield and are retaking the initiative despite some ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations in the Kherson Oblast.
Indeed, if we look at the intensity of Russian attacks, despite some exceptions, the numbers continue to be very high.
Particularly noteworthy is the uptick in Russian artillery strikes, which coincides with the delivery of North Korean shells to western Russia.
In this context of a changing combat environment, is the Ukrainian counteroffensive over? Based on Ukrainian officials’ comments, it seems that it is. If we remove the Kherson Oblast from the equation, Ukrainian gains in the south since the start of October were minimal and inconsequential. More importantly, the Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, admitted that the war entered an impasse as neither side is able to achieve a breakthrough. The interview is interesting in that it discusses (faulty) Ukrainian assumptions (that Kyiv could attrit Russians to achieve a breakthrough) or the capabilities Ukraine needs to win the war.
If the West wants to prepare Ukraine for 2024, it should already start committing some resources towards this objective. From the Ukrainian partners’ perspective, the biggest bottleneck is the number of available equipment. Because of donations to Ukraine, many stocks have already been depleted to the point that they endanger the military posture of given countries. Poland, for instance, donated almost 400 tanks, some of which came from operational forces. The same goes for IFVs or APCs. It is difficult to see how Poland would be able to respond to any contingency scenarios in its neighbourhood as, from the quantity perspective, the armed forces are the weakest since the end of the Cold War. Apart from the US, there is no more equipment to give to Ukraine. Although Ukraine has lost relatively few armoured vehicles since June, the West will struggle to help Ukraine set up new army corps.
On the artillery front, the west is lagging, too. Even with a modest 6,000 artillery shells fired per day, Ukraine needs more than 180,000 shells a month or more than 2,000,000 annually. The west produces slightly more than 50,000 shells per month, with Ukrainians adding probably another 20,000-30,000 (although their production capacity is unclear to us at this stage). Regardless, the demand highly outstrips the supply, and even if the United States reaches 100,000 produced shells per month in 2025, Ukraine’s needs may still be unfulfilled. In the meantime, Russian domestic production is on the rise, while North Koreans will alleviate short-term deficiencies.
The prospects for Ukraine in 2024 do not look bright, especially with the looming 2024 US presidential elections. Without a significant increase in military equipment donations, stalemate is the best-case scenario for Ukraine in 2024.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units for which we don’t know their current whereabouts. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides as well.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No significant changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Kindrashivka, Kurylivka, Vovchansk, Kozacha Lopan, Borova, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Ivanivka, Kyslivka, Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, Starytsya and Berestove.
On Monday (30OCT), a Russian source reported about “curious” Ukrainian movements in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions. The source said there were many rumours among members of Ukrainian units regarding a possible activation of the Russian Forces in this direction, and the Ukrainian armed forces were preparing for such an option. In addition to regular sabotage and reconnaissance group activity near the border with Belgorod Oblast, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces had arrived in Kharkiv Oblast to inspect the area north of Kharkiv. An air defence system had been reinforced across the region, which included additional mobile air defence units on pickup trucks, eight anti-aircraft guns and two man-portable air defence systems deployed in Kozacha Lopan. Also delivered to Rus’ki Tyshky were 250 units of C-5K unguided aerial missiles deployed on launchers based on pickup trucks. Up to 700 people arrived in Tarasivka to supplement the units near Kharkiv. Ukrainian reserve reportedly includes the 3rd Tank Brigade, 1st Special Purpose Brigade and unspecified territorial defence units.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
The past week brought no confirmed frontline changes in the region, although Russian sources reported some gains made near Lyman Pershi late in the week.
According to a Ukrainian source, the autumn weather forced Russians to reduce the use of drones, but this did not affect aviation activity. The main Russian forces were still concentrated in the Kupyansk direction but were also trying to attack east of Terny in the Lyman direction.
A Ukrainian soldier who fights in the Kupyansk direction claimed on Saturday (28OCT) that the intensity of hostilities in the previous weeks was relatively high and generally higher than during the summer period. This was evident in the number of assault operations conducted by the Russians daily and in the equipment they used. The Russians achieved some successes in the forest (no specifics were provided), primarily driven by Ukrainian “management” problems. Russian attacks are linear: first, the artillery prepares the battlefield, and then assault forces move to capture Ukrainian strongholds.
A soldier also noted some developments in Russian UAV operations. Drones equipped with grenades arrive every 8-10 minutes over the positions the Russians plan to assault. As a result, the Russians drive the infantry into dugouts, disrupting Ukrainian reconnaissance and fire systems. As such, Ukrainian units’ ability to conduct effective defence is low. Organisation of an effective electronic warfare system is a mandatory element for units at the battalion level and above.
According to the Russian journalist, on Sunday (29OCT), Russian units continued to attack near Stepova Novoselivka, Synkivka and Petropavlivka. Still, the source said that no changes were recorded on the frontline. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks. Another Russian source also claimed on Sunday that the Russian forces continued to retain the initiative. Still, the Ukrainian command deployed reserves to derail Russian attacks, which slowed the push towards the Oskil River. Interestingly, the source added that Ukrainian reinforcements in the area had been withdrawn from Zaporizhzhia, indicating that the counteroffensive was over and that Ukrainians had moved to conduct strategic defensive operations.
Ukrainian bloggers reported on Sunday (29OCT) about battles near Lyman Pershyi. The following day (30OCT), the same source claimed that Russians had partial success near the village and Masyutivka on Thursday (2NOV). Russian gains reportedly came as a result of superiority in manpower numbers. The source added that the Russians were rotating personnel and deploying refreshed forces in many places in Luhansk Oblast, which indicated that they were preparing new large-scale attacks.
On Wednesday (01NOV), the Russian journalist reported that Russian troops captured new positions near Petropavlivka and Synkivka. Neither claim has been independently verified.
Also on Wednesday, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander, said the Russian objective was to capture Kupyansk.
When it comes to the frontline, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes near Orlianske, Ivanivka, Kyslivka and Krohmalne.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna and Svatove.
According to the Ukrainian source, on Wednesday (01NOV), Russian forces tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Stelmakhivka but were unsuccessful.
No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.
On Saturday (28OCT), the Ukrainian source claimed Russians had been driven back from the western outskirts of Serhiivka. No Russian sources confirmed this development. However, on Sunday (29OCT), the Russian journalist claimed that the Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Raihorodka and captured several new positions. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchnaka and Chervonopopivka. Also, no changes were reported near Nevske, Terny and Torske.
No significant changes occurred in the Kreminna area. Positional battles continued near Serebryansky forest and Divrova. On Thursday (02NOV), Ukrainians claimed that Russians intensified artillery shelling southeast of Yampolivka. The Russians were trying to attack in small groups, in particular near Dibrova and Serebryansky forest. However, the Ukrainian 63rd Separate Mechanised Brigade continued to hold their positions.
No changes were reported near Bilohorivka.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, over the past week, Russian units repelled 25 Ukrainian attacks by the 43rd, 54th Mechanised Brigades, 57th Motorised Brigades and the 68th Jaeger Brigade near Tymkivka, Synkivka and Nadiya. In addition, the Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters carried out air strikes against the Ukrainian concentration area of the 95th Airborne Assault Brigade and the 14th Mechanised Brigade near Synkivka and Stelmakhivka.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, Russian Army aviation strikes and artillery fire repelled 11 Ukrainian attacks by assault groups of the 24th, 63rd, 67th Mechanised Brigades, 5th National Guard Brigade, and 15th National Guard Regiment near Dibrova and Torske. In addition, the concentration area of the 67th Mechanised Brigade of the UAF was hit near Yampolivka. Russian artillery and aviation engaged the 5th National Guard Brigade’s assault formations. In addition, seven strongholds and three areas where Ukrainian equipment and manpower were concentrated were destroyed. The Russian bomber aircraft struck Ukrainian command and observation posts.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Russians sustained their attacks in the Avdiivka axis last week, although their tempo decreased. That said, unconfirmed reports indicated some small Russian progress in the area. No confirmed frontline changes were reported in the Donetsk Direction over the past week.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes/attacks near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same goes for Fedorivka, Rozdolivka and Vesele.
Positional battles continued near Vasiukivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. On Monday (30OCT), the Russian journalist said that Russian units tried to counterattack near Berkhivka but were unsuccessful. On Tuesday (31OCT), the same source claimed that Russian units tried to attack near Berkhivka and Bohdanivka, but no specifics were provided.
No changes were reported in Bakhmut.
Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, claimed on Monday (30OCT) that Russians switched from defence to active (offensive) operations near Bakhmut. He also said that the situation in the east remains difficult. He added that Russians had significantly strengthened their groupings in the Bakhmut area but did not provide any details as to what these changes involved. However, he added that the Russian objective was to stall Ukrainian advances and regain previously lost position using airborne units supported by Storm-Z (former convicts) detachments. The use of kamikaze drones was constantly increasing, he added.
A Ukrainian soldier who fights in the Bakhmut direction said on Saturday (28OCT) that Ukrainian troops advanced over the railway. We were unable to confirm this development. Battles in the area continued as of Sunday (29OCT). Still, the Russian source claimed on the same day that Ukrainian attempts to move over the railway line near Andriivka and Klishchiivka were unsuccessful and that they suffered heavy casualties. From the Russian perspective, attacks from Klishchiivka and Andriivka (including towards Zelenopilya) in the western direction continued for the remainder of the week but delivered no frontline changes.
On the other hand, a Ukrainian soldier claimed on Tuesday (31OCT) that Russian forces managed to capture one position on the Bakhmut southern flank. A day later, Russian sources claimed that Russian troops had gone into counterattacks and recaptured several positions on the Klishchiivka – Andriivka – Kurdyumivka line, but this did not “seriously” affected the frontline (the attack may have involved freshly deployed forces).
Moving onto Avdiivka, the situation may have changed in the northern flank. According to the Russian source, on Sunday (29OCT), the Russian Forces shifted their focus to targeting Ukrainian positions in several areas to provide prerequisites for future attacks and reduce offensive losses. The source also stated that the UAF had deployed reinforcements to Avdiivka, which was supplied through Orlivka. Nevertheless, the source claimed that Ukrainians had withdrawn “headquarters structures” from the city.
Interestingly, the Ukrainian bloggers claimed on Sunday (29OCT) that not only were Russians concentrating their forces for a new attack, but they had also moved some forces from the Kupyansk and Lyman areas to the Avdiivka axis.
When it comes to the slag heap, the area is in the grey zone. Ukrainian sources said that it was unlikely that the Russians were using it as an observation post due to constant Ukrainian FPV operations, which was confirmed by Vitaliy Barabash, the Head of the Avdiivka City Military Administration, who said that the heap was under Ukrainian fire control. Ukrainian presence was noted near the heap on Tuesday (31OCT).
In the meantime, Russians reportedly deployed two more new (unspecified) brigades to the Avdiivka axis as Russian strategic offensive potential appeared unlimited.
On Wednesday (01NOV), Ukrainian sources claimed that the Russians had partial success near Novokalynove. Russians also reportedly crossed the railway line near Stepove. However, no visual evidence confirmed this development yet. The source also said that the corridor’s width supplying the Avdiivka axis is nine kilometres, and the main road through Orlivka and Lastochkyne was under Russian artillery fire control. In this context, the situation near Avdiivka closely resembles the ending stages of the battle for Bakhmut, with the difference that Russians are not currently present in Avdiivka. However, the push towards closing the encirclement is clear.
This does not mean that Russians do not attempt to enter the city. One such attempt occurred on Sunday (29OCT). Indeed, the Ukrainian bloggers claimed on Sunday and Monday (29 and 30OCT) that Russians were attacking Avdiivka head-on near Spartak and Kamyanka. On Monday (31OCT), they were reported to have achieved a tactical success near the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, but it is unclear what this involved. Nevertheless, as of Wednesday, Russians reportedly consolidated their positions near the plant.
Ukrainian sources denied information about Russian successes by claiming that while attacks near Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, Russians failed to gain a foothold there. Russians believe that control over the plant is key to controlling Avdiivka. It would firstly complete the operational encirclement of the city and, secondly, cut off the Ukrainian’s southern grouping from supplies.
On the southern flank, a Ukrainian source claimed on Sunday (29OCT) that Russians captured the quarry near Vodyane. Throughout the week, Russians continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Pervomasike, Sjeverne, Tonenke, Opytne and Vodyane, but without an impact on the frontline.
Russian attacks occurred daily as they wanted to achieve success through attrition.
On Thursday (02NOV), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops advanced north of Vodyane, but it is unclear what this involved.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks near Nevelske.
The Russian journalist claimed on Sunday (29OCT) that Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Mariinka. Indeed, Ukrainian sources also said on Sunday (29OCT) that Russians attacked the forest belt between Mariinka and Krasnohorivka. Despite ongoing attacks throughout the week, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any frontline changes in the area.
According to the Russian source, on Sunday (29OCT), Russians launched assaults on Ukrainian lines near Novomykhailivka and achieved some tactical success. However, the source said it was too early to talk about capturing the settlement. The Ukrainians had fortified the area, covering the eastern flank of the Vuhledar sector.
On Tuesday (31OCT), Russian sources reported that the 36th Motor Rifle and the 200th Artillery Brigades engaged Ukrainian positions north of Mykylske. Two days later, on Thursday (02NOV), Ukrainians hit a Russian convoy near the village. Ukrainians claimed to have destroyed 18 pieces of equipment, including at least eight tanks and three MT-LBs.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks near Pobieda.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units repelled 12 Ukrainian attacks near Chervone, Andriivka, Kurdyumivka, Klishchiivka and Mariinka. Russians also claimed to have destroyed two platoon strongholds of the 77th Airborne Assault Brigade near Bakhmut. Russian artillery also destroyed the Ukrainian ammunition depot near Bilohorivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
The past week delivered no frontline changes in the region.
Velyka Novosilka axis
In the Velyka Novosilka axis, no significant changes occurred. Positional battles continued. On Wednesday (01NOV), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that the Russians launched an assault near Shevchenko, where they progressed. Russian sources did not report any changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske, Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, Levadne. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Levadne.
On Wednesday (01NOV), the Ukrainian source said that battles continued near Pryyutne. No further information was provided. Russian sources did not report changes/attacks.
The Orikhiv axis
Moving west, the Russian source claimed on Sunday (29OCT) that the intensity of the combat operations in the Orikhiv axis decreased. However, Ukrainian attempts to push the frontline in some areas continued. The same source said that the Ukrainian 3rd Brigade of Operational Assignment (also known as Spartan Brigade) attempted to cut into the defence between Kopani and Robotyne but failed due to Russian artillery fire.
The Ukrainian armed forces’ attacks on the Kopani and Robotyne line continued for several days. The source said that west of Robotyne, three Leopard tanks and four American Bradleys were hit in three days. At the same time, UAF activity persisted between Robotyne and Verbove, where three Leopards were reportedly destroyed on Sunday.
Ukrainian sources said on Sunday (29OCT) that battles continued near Nesteryanka, Kopani, west of Robotyne, on the outskirts of Novoprokopivka and southwest of Verbove, but they led nowhere. On Monday (30OCT), the Russian source asserted that after several unsuccessful attempts, Ukrainians regrouped at the Kopani – Robotyne – Verbove line. Some new subunits were deployed to the frontline, too.
On Tuesday (31OCT), the Russian blogger claimed that the UAF managed to make some advances from the Shcherbaky direction towards Myrne and west of Robotyne village. The source said that the UAF sought to expand the offensive front horizontally. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks.
On Wednesday (01NOV), the same Russian source said Ukrainian units managed to expand their zone of control to the west of Robotyne. This claim has not been independently verified. However, on Thursday (2NOV), the Ukrainian source confirmed that Ukrainians managed to occupy one of the heights near Robotyne. Russians responded by introducing new forces to the battle and launching multiple counterattacks.
A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Thursday (02NOV) that Russians continued to try to retake Robotyne and prevent the Ukrainian troops from capturing Novoprokopivka.
No changes occurred near Pyatykhatky.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South Donetsk direction, Russian artillery and (fixed- and rotary- aircraft) hit 118th Territorial Defence Brigade, 72nd Mechanized Brigade, 79th Airborne Assault Brigade, 58th Motorised Infantry Brigade and the 128th Territorial Defence Brigade’s concentration areas near Novomykhailivka, Katerynivka, Vodyane, Vuhledar, Zolota Nyva, Urozhaine and Staromaiorske. With artillery support, Russian units blocked ten Ukrainian rotation attempts near Novomykhalivka, Mykylske, Malynivka and Urozhaine, Staromaiorske and north of Pryyutne.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
According to the Russian source, on Saturday (28OCT), battles occurred near Poima, Pishchanivka, Pidstepne and Krynky, but their outcome is unknown.
On Sunday (29OCT), Ukrainians confirmed that a major operation on the Dnipro’s left bank had been going on for three weeks. The source stated that part of the Krynky settlement was under Ukrainian control. Another Ukrainian source also claimed on Sunday (29OCT) that the operation to clear the village continued. On the other hand, Russian sources upheld that the general situation in Krynky remained stable. Although Ukrainians did not have a numerical advantage, they actively covered their marine forces with various artillery fires, including 80mm and 120mm mortars, tank and 155mm artillery rounds, including cluster munitions. These strikes were supported by various FPV and conventional drones, including Baba Yaga, which throws TM-62 mines.
A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Sunday (29OCT) that the Russians had brought in fresh reserves from the 177th Airborne Regiment, but their attacks on the left bank were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the soldier also added that Russians were already mining their rear positions (in case they were forced to pull back).
On Monday (30OCT), a Russian source claimed that the situation remained largely unchanged along the Dnipro River, although in Krynky, the Ukrainian 35th Marine Brigade held the central part of the village. The approaches to the village were shelled by Ukrainian artillery, preventing Russian troops from counterattacking. Ukrainians also reportedly reinforced their presence in the village with three assault groups.
After that, Ukrainians began to move westwards, slightly expanding the control zone. The 35th and 36th Marine Brigade units also made a bridgehead near a railway bridge and almost approached Poima. The Russian source said that Ukrainian tactical successes were highly costly, but Kyiv still had the resources to continue fighting.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 525 aircraft (+10), 254 helicopters (+1), 8,312 UAVs (+274), 441 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 13,135 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+175), 1,177 MLRS launchers (+8), 6,967 field artillery guns and mortars (+74), as well as 14,684 units of special military vehicles (+239).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 303,270 personnel (+5,590), 5,265 tanks (+120), 9,901 armoured combat vehicles (+175), 7,328 artillery systems (+166) and 854 MLR systems (+20), 566 anti-aircraft systems (+10), 322 aircraft (+2) and 324 helicopters (0), and 5,495 UAVs (+105), 1,551 cruise missiles (+13), 20 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 9,691 vehicles and fuel tanks (+178), and 1,034 special vehicles (+23).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Russian use of missiles increased last week compared to the previous period, but the scale of the strikes is still marginal. Over the past week, Russians launched four missile attacks, which involved seven missiles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down all. The missile mix included four Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missiles and three 9K728 cruise missiles.
In the same period, Russians also launched four drone attacks (compared to five attacks two weeks ago). They employed 57 Shaheds compared to 38 during the previous period. The increase is thus clear and could herald another large-scale use of Shaheds over the coming weeks. Ukrainians boasted all vehicles intercepted last week.
It is important to note that the 1NOV attack, which involved 20 UAVs and one Kh-59, was directed at a critical infrastructure target and military facilities.
The intensity of Russian ground attacks remained high compared to the summer period, but it has been steadily declining since its peak on 10OCT (108 assaults). Russians peaked at 100 attacks two weeks ago, but the highest number reached 70 last week. Russians now average 57 ground attacks per day, a decrease from 79 two weeks ago.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, on Tuesday, Russians conducted 97 airstrikes, the third largest figure since we started tracking this data in MAR2023. The number of Russian airstrikes increased last week to an average of 65 from 48 during the previous period.






Outlook for the week of 4NOV-10NOV2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.” This assessment was correct. No changes in the direction occurred.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” Russians indeed continued ground attacks in the region, but no confirmed frontline changes occurred.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area, but even then, we believe that they are unlikely to progress south of Bakhmut. 2) We assess that Russians are likely to make gains in the Avdiivka axis, and it is possible that they will reach Stepove. There is a roughly even chance that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.” This assessment was a mixed bag. On the one hand, Ukrainians made no gains as anticipated. On the other, although Russians captured a bit of territory, these gains were marginal.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. But, we also assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis.” This assessment was correct. No changes in the region occurred.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance that they will capture some land, but we think they will unlikely capture a village or more.” This prognosis was also correct.
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 5NOV-10NOV2023
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, even then, we believe they are unlikely to progress in this part of the front. 2) We assess that Russians are likely to make gains in the Avdiivka axis. There is a roughly even chance that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. But, we also assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance that they will capture some land, but we think they will unlikely capture a village or more.