Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 29 May – 4 June 2023 (Weekly update)
Situational report
BLUF: The overall strategic operational-strategic situation did not change in Ukraine last week. The Donetsk Oblast remained the centre of gravity where most of the fighting occurred. However, as Russian attacks brought no frontline changes, Ukrainians became visibly active and reportedly liberated some territories near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk Oblast and in the Svatove direction in the Luhansk region. Russian air and missile strikes decreased compared to two weeks ago, probably indicating that Moscow still lacks resources to sustain high-tempo of attacks.
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
Last week delivered no major changes in Ukraine as most battles occurred near Masiutivka in the Kharkiv Oblast, Bilohorivka in the Luhansk Oblast and Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk Oblast; Russians made no gains in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast, while Ukrainians reportedly progressed in the Donetsk region;
Despite deploying Storm-Z to the Kharkiv Oblast, the frontline did not move last week; Battles near Masiutivka continued; Russians may have attempted to conduct a cross-border strike near Zelene but were pushed back;
In the Luhansk Oblast, and the Kreminna-Lyman axis in particular, remained the heaviest shelled region in Ukraine; Ukrainians reportedly launched a counterattack near Bilohorivka and Svatove and recaptured some of the previously lost territories in the area;
Ukrainian operations near Bakhmut were suspended early in the week as Ukrainian probably regrouped; Wagner forces were also leaving the town, being replaced by Russian airborne formations; Compared to previous weeks, the past seven days were calm in this sector;
In the Donetsk Oblast, Russians reportedly made minimal gains near Kamyanka, while Ukrainian counterattacks south of Vuledar and Velyka Novosilka achieved some tactical successes;
Chechen forces appeared in the Zaporizhihia Oblast, probably to increase Russian defence posture there (or serve as blocking units); No frontline changes occurred in the region, but Kyiv continued deep strikes on Russia’s C2 and logistics centres;
No changes occurred in the Kherson Oblast;
We recorded no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces; Noteworthy was an Iskander drill involving “special equipment”, a euphemism that typically stands for nuclear weapons;
Russian missile and drone attacks were visibly reduced last week, probably indicating that Moscow still lacks the capacity for sustained drone and missile campaigns;
Russian Volunteer Corps reportedly launched another raid into the Belgorod Oblast, once again undermining Moscow’s assertions that the border is secure and its ability to protect Russian territory;
Executive summary
On Saturday, 3JUN, Wall Street Journal published an interview with the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky. He believed Ukraine was ready for the counteroffensive, although some key capabilities were missing. Zelensky said he “would like to have some things, but we can’t wait for months”. Zelensky also highlighted Russia’s air superiority over Ukraine, which could undoubtedly lead to the deaths of many Ukrainian soldiers. These comments indicate that Western combat aircraft are the key capability that is missing.
Nevertheless, it appears that within a month, Kyiv made good progress in finishing the creation and training of new brigades. In early May, Zelensky said that Ukraine needed more time to launch the counteroffensive against Russia, adding that some armoured vehicles promised by the West had yet to arrive. At the same time, official Ukrainian channels released a video asking for silence, adding that the start of the counteroffensive would not be announced.
In the meantime, Ukrainians paused operations on Bakhmut’s flanks. Officially, it addresses the new situation following Wagner’s withdrawal from the city and the deployment of new Russian units to Bakhmut. However, on the other hand, Ukrainian counterattacks, especially north of Bakhmut, never really gained good traction as Ukrainians quickly found themselves outgunned by Russian artillery. The situation south of the city looks slightly better, but again, Ukrainians are far away from reaching Klishchiivka, let alone capturing it. It is essential to remember that many Ukrainian sources reported almost constant gains near Bakhmut over the past few weeks. However, as these advances were never collaborated by visual evidence, we correctly made no changes to the frontline near Bakhmut. What will now happen in this sector will be telling about Moscow’s short-term plan. Wagner is reportedly being “rotated out” of the city, and based on UK MoD’s assessment, it is being replaced by elements of two Russian airborne divisions. If Russians now attack Chasiv Yar (or in general in the westward direction), then it will probably mean that Moscow is confident in its ability to sustain offensive operations. However, if no attacks happen, then it is likely that Moscow will wait for the Ukrainian counteroffensive and assess its options then. The next two weeks will be crucial in this aspect.
In the meantime, apart from conducting strikes on Russia’s rear areas using Storm Shadow missiles, Kyiv decided to step up the intensity of attacks on Russia from the Kharkiv Oblast. More than a week after conducting a raid on the border crossing near Kozinka, on 1JUN, the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) conducted another raid, but this time on Novaya Tavolzhanka and towards Shebekino. The latter is only 30 kilometres from Belgorod, compared to more than 80 from Kozinka. The latter attack thus brought Ukrainian units (RVC is organised and commanded by Ukrainian military intelligence) much closer to Belgorod. It is, therefore, clear that the Russian high command and regional administration did not learn any lessons from the previous incursions, which was evident by how easy it was for the RVC to push into Russia. Last week we wrote that “to deter similar attacks in the future, Moscow will need to deploy battalions across the entire border, from Novye Yurkovichi to Verigovka. It is unlikely there is a free capacity for such missions”. The attack on Novaya Tavolzhanka indeed confirmed a lack of spare but organised capacity for such missions, but also a little sense of urgency to quickly strengthen the border with any units in the aftermath of the Kozinka attack.
We would not like to talk about the specifics of the latest raid, mostly because details about it are too sketchy, and it is challenging to accurately portray what is happening and how far Ukrainians have progressed. There also appear to be information operations going on from both sides, making it even more difficult to discern truth from fiction. Nevertheless, there we would like to make some general observations.
Firstly, these attacks have a harassing nature. They are to force Moscow to respond to a growing threat to its territorial integrity and subsequently make it disperse its forces. The first assault was probably a test to see how Russians would respond. It was also relatively small, with a total of around 300 men deployed. Given that as of Sunday (4JUN), Ukrainians were still not dislodged from Novaya Tavolzhanka (the previous raid lasted one day) means that either defences in this area were very poor or/and Ukrainians allocated more forces for this attack. We believe sustaining such an operation for a few days is beyond the HUR capacity. As such, Ukrainian regular army formations are likely involved in the current attack as well, and therefore, the sustainability of the Ukrainian presence near Belorod is much higher compared to the raid on Kozinka. In such a case, the attack is part of a broader state strategy to destabilise Russia and increase Kyiv’s chances during the counteroffensive.
Of course, we do not know how long Kyiv could maintain its forces on the other side of the border. Still, it is not impossible for the Ukrainians to push deeper towards Belgorod if the situation permits.
If this happens, the likelihood of Russian nuclear threats will undoubtedly increase. It is very condition-based. Under the Russian military doctrine, Moscow reserves a right to a nuclear strike when its territorial integrity is under threat. So far, but based only on open-source reports, we have seen no indications that Russia was preparing for such a development. Early this year, we looked at Russian nuclear exercises since FEB22 and military press reports on such drills. We found no evidence that Russian nuclear forces exercises more often compared to previous years, especially during two operational defeats: the withdrawal from Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts. However, if Ukrainians advance in the Belgorod Oblast and Russians suffer big operational defeats in Ukraine, leading to the collapse of its forces, for instance, in southern Ukraine, the threat of a nuclear escalation will likely increase.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv direction
Last week did not deliver any changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. The situation in the region remains deadlocked. Ukrainians’ defensive operations are sufficient to prevent Russians from making any gains. For the past month, Russian attacks focused on Masiutivka, but despite deploying an array of units (Strom-Z, operational units), Moscow made no visible progress in this sector. This, of course, raises questions about their ability to make any advances in the entire region.
We assess that no significant frontline changes will occur in the Kharkiv Oblast until the Ukrainian counteroffensive starts. The frontline, in general, may become unstable, leading to a domino effect across the entire line of contact.
Last week, Russians also assaulted Ukrainian positions near Krohmalne, but it is too early to say whether this geographical expansion is a permanent feature or an ad-hoc measure to poke Ukrainian defensive lines in search of weak spots.
Interestingly, Russians attempted to conduct a cross-border attack for the first time in months. This time, according to the Ukrainian General Staff, they attacked Ukrainian positions Zelene in the Kharkiv Oblast but were presumably repelled. Neither Russia nor Ukrainian sources reported any frontline changes in this direction. It is possible that this attack was a Russian response to the Ukrainian Belgorod raid that occurred on 22MAY. If this hypothesis is correct, Russians will try to respond in kind as Ukrainians continue to conduct cross-border raids. Our baseline assumption is that Russians presently do not have the free capacity to launch regularly, and RVS-like attacks and their assault will be sporadic.
Last week, Moscow again launched a range of missile and artillery attacks on mostly civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast. They specifically targeted Vovchansk, Kivsharivka and Novoosynove, Kharkiv, Hlushkvika, Hlyboke, and Bohuslavka.
The Russian MoD reported a wide range of activities conducted by its forces in the region. Firstly, they claimed that the TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system engaged the Ukrainian 103rd Territorial Defence Brigade (TDB) near Novoselivske. As such, the Russian 20th NCB Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army) may operate in the region (in the Russian Ground Forces, TOS-1 units are embedded within the CBRN Brigades. Reports from early 2023 also suggested that airborne units would be equipped with TOS-1s, but no known formations are deployed in the Kharkiv Oblast.
Russians also claimed their 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Movchanove station. The 14th and 92nd TDF brigades were also air-struck by Russian aircraft, while Ukrainian positions near Lozova and Zapadne were hit by artillery throughout the week. The MoD asserted 13 attempts to rotate troops were disrupted within the 6th CAA area of responsibility.
Luhansk direction
The situation in the Luhansk Oblast did not undergo any significant changes last week, although Ukrainians probably conducted successful offensive operations near Serhiivka.
Most of the fighting occurred along the Novoselivske – Bilohorivka line, where Russians launched multiple assaults on Ukrainian positions. Despite this, the frontline remained intact.
According to Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, Russian artillery strikes peaked on Thursday when they fired 632 times from artillery at the Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk – Lyman direction. Unfortunately, Cherevaty provides daily breakdowns irregularly, but based on the data he offered last week, the intensity of Russian artillery strikes fluctuated between 491 and 632 strikes per day. Consequently, the Kupyansk-Lyman area remained the heaviest-shelled region in Ukraine.
Early in the week, a Ukrainian source reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) liberated more than ninw square kilometres in the Svatove area. Specifically, Ukrainians pushed Russians over the Zherebets River and captured Serhiivka while Russians set up their defensive lines in Rayhorodka. Information about this development remained under the radar for most of the week. Russian sources did not confirm these developments. On Friday, Ukrainian bloggers reaffirmed that the village remained under Kyiv’s control.
Russians launched several assault attempts on Novoselivske but failed. Likewise, no changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Russian assaults on Terny, Torske and Nevke were equally unsuccessful.
When it comes to the Kreminna area, positional battles continued near Dibrova and the Serebryanysky forest, but they brought no frontline changes. Russian MoD reported multiple times last week about the Russian air strikes on the positions of the 67th Mechanised and 95th Airborne Assault Brigades in the forest, claiming that both units suffered heavy casualties. This information, however, remained unverified.
However, Ukrainians reportedly counterattacked near Bilohorivka. Russian sources reported that early in the week, Ukrainians regained the positions they had lost to the northeast of the village. This probably resulted in the increased operational tempo of Russian frontline aviation, which conducted multiple air strikes on Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka.
(We give medium confidence to the number of combat units displayed on our maps. A brigade/regiment deployed near the frontline does not mean the unit is at full strength. In fact, many Russian formations deploy only one or two battalions. The data on Russian fortifications comes from Brady Africk).
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The frontline remained relatively stable throughout the week. However, from the larger perspective, the Donetsk Oblast Direction remained the most contested part of the front, where both sides continued conducting a mix of defensive and offensive operations.
The northern part of the front was relatively calm. Russians launched no significant attacks on Spirne, Verkhnokamyasnke or Vyimka. No assaults were also reported near Ivano Darivka, where the frontline also solidified.
The frontline remained stable in Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, and Vesele. According to the Russian Kremlin-linked journalist, Russian troops tried to counterattack near Bila Hora and Orikhovo-Vasylivka, but these attempts were pushed by. Ukrainian sources did not report changes. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources said change near Khromove, Bohdanivka, Hryhorivka and Minkivka.
On Friday, Ukrainian sources reported that the Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Major General Oleksandr Syrskyi, had visited the Bakhmut area. There he claimed that the situation in the Bakhmut direction had changed as Russians decreased “active actions” (presumably ground attacks) but increased artillery strikes. Syrskyi added that while Russians appeared to have abandoned taking offensive actions in the Bakhmut area, this impression was inaccurate. The lull in Russian military activity, he explained, was caused by the rotation of Russian units. The UK MoD claimed that Russian Airborne forces, the 106th Airborne and 76th Air Assault Divisions, were deployed to the city.
However, Syrskyi made the key comment at the end. He confirmed that Ukrainian units had stopped advancing on the flanks a few days ago to perform “other essential tasks”, which include “taking appropriate measures aimed at restoring the combat capability of our units and disrupting Russian intentions”. In other words, Ukrainians are regrouping and probably deploying reinforcements to prepare for an increase in Russian ground attacks following Wagner’s withdrawal.
According to Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, in the Bakhmut direction, Ukrainian Armed Forces achieved the main goal in the city. Ukrainians exhausted Russians and killed many Wagner forces. They also forced Wagner to flee the city while the Ukrainian Armed Forces were now launching powerful strikes against the group. Cherevaty added that troops coming in to replace Wagner are not very motivated. However, Cherevaty also said that Russians increased the tempo of artillery strikes to cover the rotation of their forces in Bakhmut. According to Yevhenii Prihozhyn, the Wagner PMC Head, 99 per cent of group’s units had left the city as of Friday. The pullback is also confirmed by a Ukrainian soldier deployed near the city. By 5JUN, all Wagner forces are to leave the city.
Interestingly, Prihozhyn also accused the Russian MoD of planting mines on routes leading out of the city to hinder the withdrawal of Wagner from Bakhmut.
No changes occurred near Ivanivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Battles continued near Klishchiivka and the Siversky Donets-Donbass canal.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Krasnohorivka, Novokalynove, Keramik, Stepove, Berdychi and Kruta Balka. Early in the week, Russians increased the intensity of ground attacks south of Kamyanka. The source failed to provide detailed information about these attacks, which reportedly allowed them to seize new positions on the northeastern outskirts of Avdiivka. Ukrainian sources confirmed small Russian gains in this area, but they did not impact the tactical situation in this sector. No further changes in this area were reported throughout the week.
Apart from that, the Avdiivka area remained calm. We do not expect any changes in the area as Russian offensive capacity is minimal in this axis. Last week, we stated that DPR forces were redeployed from the Avdiivka area to Bakhmut to replace Wagner. However, no information appeared confirming their deployments.
The Ukrainian bloggers said Russian troops tried to attack near Pervomaiske, but this attack delivered no frontline changes. The Russian source said a meeting engagement occurred near Opytne, but no further information about its development was provided. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Severne, Tonenke and Nevelske, although an attack towards Severne was reported on Thursday.
The western part of Marinka is still under Ukrainian control. Russians launched multiple attempts on Ukrainian positions in the city but to no avail. On Tuesday, the Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainians improved their tactical positions near Pobieda and liberated around four square kilometres of the area.
On Thursday, Russian units resumed assault operations towards Novomykhailivka with artillery support near Pobieda. But as no further reports were made, we assume the attacks were unsuccessful.
Ukrainians reportedly conducted some limited counterattacks near Vuhledar. Russian sources claimed that they attacked towards Volodymyrivka and managed to advance and recapture up to 18 sq kilometres. They also entered Mykilski Dachi and forced Russians to retreat behind the Kashlagach River, southwest of the settlement.
On Monday morning (5JUN), the Russian MoD claimed that on Sunday morning, Ukrainians launched a large-scale offensive in five front sectors in the South Donetsk direction by employing six mechanised and two tank battalions from the 23rd and 31st Mechanised Brigades. The MoD said the attack’s initial objectives were not achieved, as Ukrainians lost more than 250 men, 16 tanks, three infantry fighting vehicles and 21 other armoured fighting vehicles. Unofficial sources added that the attack occurred along the Zolota Nyva-Novodonetske-Velyka Novosilka line. Combined with attacks southeast of Vuledar, this operation means that Ukraine is trying to break Russian lines along the 40 km front.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Last week again proved to be relatively stable in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. Russian concerns about the upcoming Ukrainian offensive somehow subdued or were not as pronounced as during previous weeks.
Nevertheless, the Russian journalist claimed that the deployment of Ukrainian forces into the region continued. However, he failed to provide any additional data or information to support his claims.
The Russian MoD claimed to have shot down two Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft, one of which was lost near Novoandriivka. Vladimir Rogov, an occupation official in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation near Lobkove on 29 MAY.
According to Ivan Fedorov, Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor, Russian forces continue constructing trenches on the outskirts of Melitopol that are large enough to accommodate equipment. He also said Russian troops were concealing equipment and manpower in the Bohatyr forest area but were also using the trees to build additional fortifications. He added that city’s residents reported many military trucks loaded with trees moving along the bypass road towards the Zaporizhzhia frontline.
Speaking of the frontline, a Ukrainian source stated that the manning level of Russian units in the Zaporizhihia Oblast is 65 per cent. He added that regular attacks on the ammunition depots and logistics routes increasingly reduced Russian defence capabilities.
Interestingly, Ramzan Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen, said that the Russian high command ordered Russian, Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard), and Chechen Akhmat forces to begin offensive actions along the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Kadyrov claimed that these units had already begun tactical preparations for offensive operations. Based on his words, the objective seems to preempt the Ukrainian attack. On Tuesday and Wednesday, Kadyrov posted footage of the Yug-Akhmat Battalion operating in the Orikhiv direction.
Despite this, we must note that we have noticed no significant uptick in Russian offensive actions recently. It is also unlikely that Russians have enough capacity to conduct offensive activities in the area, especially if they are to be centred around lightly equipped Chechen forces. Nevertheless, we will continue to monitor Chechen channels to see whether an unusual activity suggests increased deployments and operations in southern Ukraine. We assess that the role of the Chechen forces is to provide additional manpower to Russian units defending southern Ukraine and that their offensive potential is minimal.
On Friday, Ukrainian forces again conducted strikes on Berdyansk, presumably using Storm Shadow cruise missiles. It is unclear what was pursued, but repeatable strikes on the city suggest high-priority targets in the city.
According to Vladimir Rogov, Zaporizhzhia Oblast occupation official, on 30MAY, Ukrainian artillery struck the T0817 road connecting Vasylivka and Dniprorudne. He also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka on 30 MAY. These strikes may seek to pave the way for Ukrainian units that would be tasked with reaching the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
Kherson direction and Crimea
Last week’s developments in the Kherson Oblast continued to be limited to artillery exchanges and Ukrainian operations on islands in Dnipro Delta.
Russians maintained the relatively high intensity of artillery attacks. According to Ukrainian Operational Command South, on 1,2JUN and 29MAY, Russians fired 1,245 artillery (mortar, tube, gun) shells on targets across the region. Based on these reports, it appears that Ochakiv was particularly hit throughout the week.
Ukrainians responded by attacking Russian concentration areas in the Oleshky direction.
On Thursday, Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, said that Russia was preparing a large-scale missile attack from sea with the simultaneous use of drones. She added that Russians had not used sea-launched missiles for a long time and, therefore, they might be preparing a combined attack using Kalibr and kamikaze drones. Based on the number of Kalibr-equipped vessels currently stationed on the Black Sea, Russians could fire up to 16 missiles simultaneously. Still, the addition of air-launched cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea and UAVs from Crimea could complicate Ukrainian air defence efforts.
According to a Ukrainian source, Russians mined the Titan plant in Armiansk. The source claimed that Russians believe that Ukrainian forces would soon be on the administrative border with Crimea, and the plant’s destruction may hinder their forward movement.
In terms of Russian troop deployments, Andrey Alekseyenko, head of the Kherson Oblast occupation government, said that the Russian 34th Motor Rifle (Mountain) Brigade from the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) operated in the Dnipro River area.
Secondly, according to Serhiy Khlan, Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor, on 28 MAY, unspecified Chechen troops were deployed to the Arabat Spit in Kherson Oblast to serve as “blocking units” and prevent Russians from deserting their positions. He also added that Russians in the Kherson Oblast extended the recruitment effort for the “Margelov” volunteer battalion. Now, the recruitment is open for Russians across entire Russia, which according to Khlan, symbolises Russian failure to attract Ukrainian (and Ukrainian collaborators) citizens to serve in the unit.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 432 aircraft (+3), 236 helicopters (+1), 4,473 UAVs (+116), 424 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 9,382 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+60), 1,112 MLRS launchers (+12), 4,996 field artillery guns and mortars (+72), as well as 10,656 units of special military vehicles (+150).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 209,940 personnel (+3,340), 3,837 tanks (+40), 7,512 armoured combat vehicles (+56), 3,555 artillery systems (+130) and 583 MLR systems (+9), 344 anti-aircraft systems (+15), 313 aircraft (0) and 298 helicopters (0), and 3,175 UAVs (+182), 6,305 vehicles and fuel tanks (+113), 1,132 cruise missiles (+76), 18 warships and boats (0) and 479 special vehicles (+28).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
The past week showed a decreased tempo in the number of destroyed Russian artillery systems (MLRS excluded). However, the moving average continues to show a long-term upward trend (since early December). Russian sources noted last week that the increase in the number of artillery platforms destroyed stems from an ability to conduct counterbattery fires, especially in southern Ukraine.
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Last week brought a sharp decrease in the number of Russian air and missile strikes. Particularly visible was a reduction in Shahed 131-136 strikes. Russians fired 137 of these drones two weeks ago, compared to 82 last week. Moscow went from firing more than 20 drones in one day (peaking with 54 on 28MAY) to launching only three on 4JUN. As the chart below shows, Russians had their peak launch periods previously, followed by a steep decline in employing Shaheds (late Dec-early Jan, and early May). It probably means that Russia is still unable to sustain a high tempo of Shahed operations due to an insufficient number of platforms in use.
The reduction of missile strikes was also clear. Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 29 missiles (out of at least 29 fired – data is incomplete), compared to 71 interceptions two weeks ago (82 fired). In this case, too, it seems that Moscow cannot maintain a sufficiently high tempo of missile attacks to degrade Ukraine’s war effort. It is possible that the strikes that occurred two weeks ago sought to deplete Kyiv’s missile stock, but given that there were no follow-on attacks to exploit this weakness, it is likely that the strikes failed to achieve the desired objective.
Lastly, when looking at the USG’s data on the number of Russian attacks (ground, missile, air, MLRS), then we clearly see that ground assaults peaked in 13MAY when the battle for Bakhmut was ongoing and had been sharply decreasing since then. The current 7-day average stands at only around 20 attacks per day, compared to 45 in mid-May. MLRS strikes also decreased from 1069 in the first half of May to 990 in the latter. However, missile strikes increased from 148 to 220 (facilitated mainly by the ongoing air campaign, so this rise could be short-lived) and air strikes from 782 to 834.
Military situation in Belarus
BLUF: Last week delivered no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Exercises continued, but their size and tempo were reduced compared to previous weeks. However, an Iskander drill involving “special equipment”, which probably indicates nuclear munitions, particularly stood out.
Over the past seven days, the military situation in Belarus remained stable. A few noteworthy developments took place, but they had no impact on the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
From a political perspective, two significant events occurred on Tuesday and Thursday.
Firstly, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko dismissed the current Chairman of the State Border Committee, Lt. Gen. Anatoly Lappo and transferred him to the reserve.
By the presidential order, the current Head of the Grodno Border Group, Col. Konstantin Molotov, replaced Lappo.
Molotov was born in Krasnoarymesk (Russia) and is a graduate of Almaty Higher Border Command School (1993), Russian FSB Border Academy (in 2004), as well as Belarusian Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2011) and Academy of Public Administration (2019). From 1993 to 2014, he served in various border troops units. Since 2014, he headed the Grodno Border Group.
During the appointment ceremony, Lukashenko spoke to Molotov about the problematic situation on Belarusian borders. The Belarusian President instructed him to use the former service members’ potential to reinforce the border’s protection. He noted the experience of Lt. Gen. Anatoly Lappo but also mentioned that all Border Guards, Internal Troops and even military special forces reserve personnel should participate in reserve drills as part of the border service subunits.
Two days later, Belarusian President met with the heads of the special services of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) members. During the gathering, Lukashenko provided some hawkish statements. Firstly, he noted that certain states try to undermine CIS states’ authority, but later on, he referred directly to the Russo-Ukrainian war. The Belarusian leader claimed the conflict started many years ago when certain countries pushed Ukraine towards war. He highlighted the Russian (and Belarusian) “mistake” of not resolving the Ukrainian problem earlier when the Ukrainian Armed Forces had no actual capabilities or readiness.
The Belarusian President also spoke about the preparation of illegal armed groups to seize power in Belarus. According to him, such units are being created and trained in Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Ukraine. Lukashenko even mentioned the foreign attempts to create sleeper cells in Belarus.
Regarding the political sphere, the Belarusian House of Representatives considered the draft law on the “People’s Militia” on Wednesday. The Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, personally attended the meeting and provided some details on the document.
According to Khrenin, the document had been prepared following the instructions of the Belarusian President, MoD, Ministry of Internal Affairs and other state bodies. It was also based on the Ukrainian experience of creating volunteer formations in territorial subjects in 2022. The new act is meant to engage volunteers who will not be conscripted (elderly, dismissed from service due to health reasons, etc.) to create People’s Militia subunits, which will be responsible for the secondary tasks (protecting properties, ensuring martial law) on their local territories. Provincial governments and territorial bodies of internal affairs will directly supervise those subunits.
Besides, Khrenin also spoke about the military-political situation in the region. He mentioned the Russo-Belarusian measures to ensure border security. According to him, a recent decision linked to deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus is likely enough to “cool the aggressive character and belligerent rhetoric” of Western neighbours.
On Thursday, most Belarusian high-rank military representatives directly participated in the official gathering related to the latest combat readiness check of the 11th Mechanised Brigade. Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin and the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich led the event to sum up exercise results. They both noted that the current combat and mobilisation readiness system of the Belarusian Armed Forces corresponds with possible challenges and threats to military security.
Last week, Belarusian military officials underwent two important meetings with their Russian counterparts. This refers to the Head of the Verification Directorate of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Yuri Rakitsky, who participated in the 61st Meeting of the Russo-Belarusian Advisory Group on Arms Control on Wednesday, as well as his supervisor, Col. Valery Revenko, who met with the Russian delegation of the National Center for Reducing Nuclear Danger a day later. During the second meeting, Russians and Belarussians pointed out the necessity of creating a new arms control system in Europe.
On Friday, the Commander of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces (SOF), Maj. Gen. Vadim Denisenko participated in a solemn weapon-handling ceremony linked to the formation of the Belarusian SOF’s new electronic warfare (EW) subunit. According to the Head of the Electronic Warfare Directorate, Col. Igor Danilchyk, the unit would neutralise the enemy’s UAVs and communications systems and deploy electronic defence measures. The subunit probably received R-934UM GROZA and GROZA-S (?) systems.
Over the past seven days, the Belarusian Armed Forces continued military exercises. Until Friday, called-up Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) reservists participated in the command-staff exercise in the Leninsky district of Minsk focused on three main issues: protecting the important facilities, neutralising the enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups, and operating on checkpoints.
Secondly, the missile forces’ control and special armament exercises particularly stood out. The first one engaged the Iskander Battalion of the 465th Missile Brigade, which practised commanding the missile fire missions with “special” munitions (probably nuclear warheads). Drills occurred on the 43rd Missile and Ammunition Arsenal territory and at Osipovichi Training Ground, where selected technical support subunits (reinforced with reservists) trained to provide munitions for Tochka-U and Osa systems. Between Monday and Friday, they also neutralised enemy UAVs and reconnaissance groups.
In addition, on Tuesday, the Belarusian Chief of Communications, Col. Vadim Romaniv, started training specialists in radio and satellite communications of the Minsk garrison. A day later, the 19th Mechanised Brigade hosted a drill linked to the security measures at hazardous production facilities. Notably, it was personally led by the Chief of Belarusian Military Inspection, Maj. Gen. Ivan Boguslavsky.
On Wednesday, more than 200 servicemembers of the 38th Air Assault Brigade conducted parachute jumps over the Brestsky Training Ground using Mi-8MTV5 helicopters.
The command of the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade informed placed movement restrictions near the Maryina Horka Training Ground, where constant firing drills are planned until 30NOV.
Over the past seven days, only a few transfers of Belarusian military equipment can be considered noteworthy:
A Vostok-E/D radar that was moving in Baranovichi – Monday;
Eight S-300/S-400 launchers that were moving from Sloboda towards Privolnyy – Monday;
A single R-440 satellite communication system that was moving towards Mikaschevichy from Starobin – Wednesday;
Two Ural trawls towing two Su-27 fighters that were moving from Baranovichi towards Samokhvalovichi – Thursday;
Notably, the satellite imagery from 25MAY confirmed the expansion of the so-called “Khrenin’s line” – a line of defensive fortifications (including dragons’ teeth) located near Kalinino village.
Last week, the Belarusian MoD officially confirmed the Russian part of the Union State Grouping rotation. According to the press statement, the planned rotation is another measure of strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Union States (after the arrival of S-400 air defence systems). Currently, unspecified combined arms and tank formations are arriving in Belarus.
On Friday, unofficial sources reported the movement of two Russian echelons into the country. The first one included at least seven passenger cars and appeared at Baranovichi-Tsentralnye Railway Station, while the second consisted of at least 21 vehicles (MAZ trucks, BRMD-2) and was spotted in Vitebsk (likely heading towards Orsha). Moreover, Russian An-26 (RF-36008) cargo aircraft arrived in Belarus on Wednesday.
Throughout the week, the Russian forces’ activities were mainly linked to aviation drills. Between Monday and Friday, the Russian Mi-8 helicopter(s) conducted at least one training flight daily.
Outlook for the week of 5JUN-11JUN
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
“Due to the increased intensity of Russian attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast and the employment of Strom-Z troops, we now assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will advance by capturing one village or more. Artillery attacks on civilian population areas will almost certainly continue.” Russians made no progress in the region last week.
Score: 0.5/1
“We are also slightly changing the scenario for the Luhansk Oblast, including the Kreminna area. While it is unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the region, we assess there is a roughly even chance that they will gain some territory near Bilohorivka. We assess that it is unlikely that the village will be taken this week.” Although we were largely correct when it came to the broader region, Russians made no confirmed progress near Bilohorivka.
Score: 0.5/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we assess that there is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture some territory, especially north of Avdiivka.” This assessment was partly correct in that Ukrainians progressed in the Donetsk Oblast but near Vuhledar. However, the previous week may have marked a shift in Ukrainian operations in the region, which may now focus predominantly on offensive actions.
Score: 0.5/1
“Regarding Bakhmut, from the Russian perspective, the city is taken. While some pockets of resistance could appear, the reality is that the city had been captured. Given the Ukrainian unwillingness to conduct offensive operations in an urban environment, it is unlikely that they will conduct a counteroffensive in the town. However, they are likely to continue pushing on the flanks. At the same time, we assess that Wagner’s attacks will likely pause this week to reorganise and regroup.” Wagner indeed did not conduct any attacks, and neither did Ukrainians. The latter’s assaults on the flanks stopped mid-week, presumably to reinforce and regroup.
Score: 1/1
“We do not anticipate any significant changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian and Russian ground attacks will likely continue. It is highly unlikely that the Ukrainian counterattack will begin this week.” This prognosis was correct.
Score: 1/1
“We assess that it is likely that Ukrainians will continue to make progress on islands in the Dnipro Delta in the Kherson Oblast. We anticipate no large-scale operations in this direction this week.” Ukrainians made no confirmed gains last week in the region.
Score: 0/1
Final score: 3.5/6 (58%)
The forecast for the week of 5-11JUN
Last week we slightly exaggerated the impact of Storm-Z troops on the situation in the Kharkiv Oblast. Although the tempo of ground attacks near Masyutivka was maintained, Russians made no progress in this area. Consequently, we assess that it is unlikely that they will make any progress in the region this week (capture one village or more).
We are also decreasing the likelihood of Russian progress near Bilohorivka. It is unlikely that they will advance near the settlement. The situation in other parts of the Luhansk Oblast is unlikely to change (Russians are unlikely to make any progress in the region).
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains, but we do not anticipate Moscow to capture one village or more. However, it is likely that Ukrainians will liberate some territories. We are primarily focused on the frontline situation near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka, where Ukrainians reportedly pushed Russians back southwest and southeast of the settlement.
Regarding the Bakhmut area, we do not expect Russians to commence ground attacks towards Chasiv Yar (or in the western direction in general) this week. However, the intensity of Russian artillery attacks will possibly be high. We share the same view on the Ukrainian posture. While some ground assaults will probably occur, we expect no bigger Ukrainian push on Bakhmut flanks this week.
We continue to foresee no changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Limited Ukrainian and Russian ground attacks will likely continue, but it is unlikely that the frontline will shift this week. It is unlikely that the Ukrainian counterattack will begin this week.
We assess that it is likely that Ukrainians will continue conducting operations on islands in the Dnipro Delta in the Kherson Oblast, and there is roughly even chance that they will advance in these areas. We anticipate no large-scale operations in this direction this week.
"These comments indicate that Western combat aircraft are the key capability that is missing" - CAS and artillery work best together. Substitute one for the other and combined arms warfare is much, much harder. See "Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and Close Air Support in the US Army" by John J. McGrath, USAR, ret'd, from Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010. You should be able to find it free online.