Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 30 September – 6 October 2023

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Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• The past week saw only marginal frontline changes without a larger operational impact; However, Russians visibly increased ground attacks, which translated into more tactical gains as Ukrainian operations are becoming increasingly defensive;

• No frontline changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast; Russians hit two residential areas with Iskander missiles, killing dozens of civilians;

• Battles across the Luhansk Oblast continued, but without an impact on the frontline; Russians continued to deploy forces into the region and on Friday, multiple sources noted a significant increase in Russian ground activities near Synkivka;

• Ukrainian attacks on Kurdyumivka continued but led to no territorial gains; Russians again launched several counterattacks near Klishchiivka, some of which were successful. Russians captured some territory south of Mar’inka;

• In the Southern Direction, Russians maintained the initiative in the Velyka Novosilka axis; Ukrainian attacks near Verbove were pushed back;

• Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast and carried out harassing attacks across the river’s bank in other parts of the region;

• Russia further increased the tempo and number of Shahed 131/136 drone attacks on Ukraine; Such attacks occurred almost daily over the past seven days but caused little damage as the interception rate is high;

  

  Map 1. Frontlines in Ukraine – an overview – 5OCT2023

Executive summary

Last week, again delivered no major changes in Ukraine, although by looking at the terrain Russia captured, it seems that Moscow is slowly regaining the initiative.

From a broader perspective, last week, we largely saw the continuation of previous operations and trends. Firstly, all Ukrainian attacks were repelled in the Orikhiv axis in the Southern Oblast. This area remains Ukraine’s centre of gravity, but Russians still appear confident they can weather the storm. Ukrainians made no gains there over the past seven days, and without employing significant reinforcements, it is unlikely that they will progress, let alone achieve a breakthrough.

Based on Russian sources’ reports, Russians have effectively stalled Ukrainian attacks in the Velyka Novosilka axis. The redeployment of Ukrainian marines further degraded Kyiv’s ability to conduct attacks as more reports indicate Ukrainians morphed towards a more defensive posture. Indeed, Russian forces conducted numerous counterattacks in the area and recaptured some previously lost territories. As such, the Vylka Novosilka axis, which has always played an auxiliary role, is now probably only tasked with fixing Russian presence to prevent troop redeployments to other pressing areas.

Ukrainians will be able to push forward, but only if they deploy new forces to combat. Yet, we have seen no indications that reinforcements are being committed, although some rotations did occur last week. Last week, we noted that Ukrainians were mixing 9th and 10th Corps units together and employing them in the Orikhiv axis. This development appears to indicate that manpower is finite (obviously), and Ukrainians may have reached a point when they will recommit formations bundled together. We thus expect no major Ukrainian territorial gains in the south over the next week.

In one of the previous UCM issues, we said both sides were on the other side of the “offensive spectrum”. Ukrainian units require reinstation of combat capabilities after four months of heavy fighting, while some Russian formations in the north remain largely uncommitted. Last week, Ukrainian official sources again claimed that the number of Russian forces and equipment increased compared to July and August assessments. On Friday, Russian sources said a Russian attack in the Luhansk Direction commenced. Still, so far, this has not been substantiated with any evidence suggesting a more-than-normal attack. Nevertheless, the threat of a larger Russian attack from the Luhansk Oblast persists.

Over the last week, Russians continued striking Ukrainian targets using Shahed kamikaze drones. The tempo of these strikes increased compared to previous weeks. In fact, the number of Sheheds used in these attacks last week was the highest since the end of May when Russian strikes peaked at 54 vehicles employed on 28MAY. This was followed by a very steep decline, and only in early July did the strikes begin to increase. A few months ago, it was clear that Russians could not sustain such a high tempo. However, assuming that the Russian facility to produce Shaheds domestically is either already running or soon to start operations, sustainment will be less of an issue. As WSJ reported, Russia plans to manufacture 6,000 vehicles within the next couple of years, meaning eight drones will be assembled/produced daily. Additional imports from Iran will provide more vehicles.

However, potentially a significant blow to Ukraine’s war effort came from Washington as US future military support is in jeopardy. While in September, Congress passed the funding to keep the government open for 45 days, the bill excluded military support for Ukraine, last week, the speaker of the House of Representatives, a supporter of Ukraine,  Kevin McCarthy, was ousted.

So far, the US Congress has approved around USD113 billion for Ukraine, of which over half (USD62 billion) has been allocated to the Pentagon. These funds have been used to provide Ukraine with equipment, training, intelligence data, etc, but to support Europeans in their military procurement. In total, USD44 billion has been spent on military aid for Ukraine.

Under previously passed spending bills, the US administration still has some USD5.6 billion to spend on Ukraine’s military aid. But even if this runs out, Washington’s military support will continue as many funds have been spent on medium- and long-term contracts, although arguably, without further packages, Ukraine’s ability to sustain its operations will probably decline. The Republicans control the House of Representatives, and its new speaker will likely be against further support for Kyiv.

The military aid for Ukraine is now a hostage of domestic US politics and infighting between both the Democrats and the Republicans. The latter also needs to clarify its stance on the issue, which will be very difficult given the current pre-election climate. The support for the war on the Republican side has been declining for months (from 85% in MAR2022 to 50% in SEP2023) as many argue, including Donald J. Trump, a 2024 Presidential candidate, that the funds spent on Ukraine could be better used elsewhere.

Ukraine thus enters autumn with a lot of concern. The counteroffensive has not delivered the expected results, the US support is in danger, the relationship with its Polish ally is in pieces, while North Korea reportedly started artillery supplies to Russia. At the same time, Moscow continues to threaten Ukraine’s positions in the north. The next three months will be tough.

Ukraine battle map

Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv Oblast Direction

(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).

Last week saw no frontline changes in the Kharkiv Direction.

According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Kucherivka, Kopanky, Kindrashivka, Borova, Vovchansk, Ivashky, Petropavlivka, Kozacha Lopan and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi. On Monday (02OCT), the Russians launched five S-300 missiles at the outskirts of Kharkiv and damaged civilian infrastructure. They also struck Kupyansk with a guided aerial bomb. Six residential buildings were damaged as a result of the second strike.

According to a Russian source, on Sunday (01OCT), a Ukrainian group of four soldiers attempted to break through the Russian border into the Kursk region territory near Nikolaevo-Dar’ino, but this operation was repelled. It seems that it was a small infiltration/reconnaissance attempt. But by no means it was uncommon. We understand that Ukrainians conduct similar attempts regularly.

Two days later (03OCT), the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) stated that their drones hit elements of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Russia’s Belgorod Region. Reports indicated 20 explosions, but we have not been able to confirm the veracity of this story.

On Thursday (05OCT), a Russian missile hit a cafe and a shop in Hroza, Kupyansk district. Other sources claimed that the missile hit when locals gathered for a memorial service of a killed Ukrainian soldier. The strike killed at least 51 people.

In the early morning of Friday (6OCT), missiles (presumably two Iskanders) hit a residential area in Kharkiv, killing at least one and injuring dozens.

It remains to be seen whether such attacks will be sustained. However, it is clear that Iskander missile attacks were deliberate as the system is a precision-guided munition. Moscow sought to deliver significant infrastructural damages and a mass loss of life in these attacks.

Luhansk Oblast Direction

Likewise, the frontline in the Luhansk Oblast remained largely unchanged over the past seven days. Most battles again occurred in the northern part of the direction, but the reality was that positional battles were reported across the entire region between Synkivka and Bilohorivka. Russians may have progressed near Makiivka.

Roman Vlasenko, the Head of Severodonetsk District Administration, claimed on Tuesday (03OCT) that Russian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast had increased again, including aviation and artillery strikes.

On the same day (03OCT), a Russian source claimed that, over the past few weeks, Russian air strikes had destroyed at least five crossings in the Kupyansk direction. Undoubtedly, there has been a concentrated effort on the Russian side to degrade the Ukrainian ability to move forces and supplies over the Oskil River and probably to isolate the battlefield. So far, we don’t know how successful Russians have been in their attempts and whether Ukrainian logistics suffered greatly as a result. Based on low-quality satellite imagery, it appears that Ukrainians mitigate existing conditions with pontoon bridges, but high-precision weapons could easily destroy them. Russian attacks on bridges could be one of the indicators that an organised Russian attack is being prepared.

Speaking about Russian forces in the region, Ilya Yevlash, the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group spokesman, said that the 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) replaced the 41st CAA and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, both of which had suffered heavy losses. The 25^th CAA, he continued, was reportedly fully manned, and its strength increased (from a reported 15,000 men two weeks ago) to 17,000 soldiers. The army is deployed near Kreminna, specifically to the west and south of the city.

On Thursday (05OCT), Yevlash claimed that in the Lyman-Kupyansk direction, the Russians had concentrated about 1,085 tanks, almost 2,000 armoured combat vehicles, more than 700 artillery systems and 500 multiple launch rocket (MLR) systems.

To put these numbers into perspective, in mid-July, Serhiy Cherevaty, the then-head of the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces press service, said that Russians had gathered some 100,000 troops, 900 tanks and 555 artillery systems between Lyman and Kupyansk. On 30AUG, Yevlash claimed that Russians had accumulated 110,000 troops (including rear and support units), almost 1,000 tanks, 1,500 armoured combat vehicles, 650 artillery systems and almost 400 MLR systems in the same area.

Looking at this data alone, within a month, Russians increased the number of tanks in the Luhansk Oblast by 85, artillery systems by 50, armoured vehicles by 500, and MLR systems by 100.

When it comes to the frontline, no changes were reported near Dvorichna. The same goes for Kyslivka, Synkivka, Petropavlivka and Masyutivka, where neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

On Friday (6OCT), several Russian sources claimed that Russians launched a counterattack near Synkivka, including increased artillery and aviation strikes. It is unclear how big the attack was and whether it heralds a wider shift in Russian operations in the region.

Positional battles continued near Novojehorivka without an impact on the frontline.

No changes occurred near Svatove and Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.

According to a Russian journalist, on Monday (02OCT), Russians conducted a ground attack near Makiivka but were unsuccessful. However, two days later (04OCT), the same source claimed that Russian units captured several positions near the village. No changes occurred near Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. The same goes for Nevske, Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske.

The overall situation near Kreminna remained stable. Positional battles continued in the Serebryasnky forest and near Dibrova, but no changes were reported during the week.

No changes occurred near Bilohorivka.

According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Kupyansk direction, Russian aviation carried out air strikes on temporary deployment points of the Ukrainian 25^th Airborne Brigade, 32^nd, 43^rd, 44^th, 47^th (?), 115^th Mechanised Brigades, 103^rd TDF Brigade and the 7^th Rifle Battalion near Berestove, Terny, Kopanky, Cherneshchyna and Novolubivka. Also, the Ukrainians attempted to rotate units of the 32^nd Mechanised Brigade to forward positions in the Stepova Novoselivka area but failed due to Russian artillery fire. Artillery from the 6^th CAA also prevented a Ukrainian rotation (14^th Mechanised Brigade) near Petropavlivka. Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters and attack aircraft carried out 13 missile and bombing strikes against Ukrainian concentration areas of the 14^th and 32^nd Mechanized Brigades, the 40^th Rifle Battalion and Territorial Defence units near Ivanivka, Synkivka, Berestove and Kyslivka.

According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson,  Russian aviation and artillery repelled 17 attempted attacks by elements of the 21^st, 63^rd, 67^th Mechanised Brigades, 12^th “Azov” Special Forces Brigade and 5^th National Guard Brigade near Torske, Yampolivka and Dibrova. Russian frontline aviation also struck Ukrainian concentration areas near the Kuzmyne, Hryhorivka, Torske and Serebryasnky forest.

Map 2. Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts, 30SEP – 6OCT2023

(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)

Donetsk Oblast Direction

Both sides again focused their operations south of Bakhmut but had no overall impact on the frontline. Ukrainian troops continued their attack near Klishchiivka and Andiivka, where they managed to cross the railway. Battles for Kurdyumivka continue.

During the week, no changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same goes for Rozdolivka, Fedorivka, Vasyukivka and Vesele.

According to a Russian source, Russian units were entrenched in Orikhovo-Vasilievka. The source also claimed that the Ukrainians had concentrated forces at the Siversk axis to intensify actions in the Kreminna direction to possibly resume attacks towards Soledar. On the other hand, Ukrainian bloggers denied the claim about the loss of Orikhovo-Vasylivka by saying that according to the commander of the 23^rd Battalion of the 56^th Separate Motorised Brigade, the village remained under Ukrainian control.

Positional battles continued near Berkhivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes.

No changes were reported in Bakhmut.

In early September, an aerial reconnaissance operator from the Ukrainian 92^nd Separate Mechanised Brigade claimed that Wagner personnel had returned to the Bakhmut front. The soldier said that the group’s presence was partly intended to compensate for personnel shortages on the Russian side. This was later confirmed by official Ukrainian sources, which stated that former mercenaries who were previously in Belarus signed a contract with the Russian MoD and moved to Ukraine and Africa. The exact number of Wagner fighters arriving in Ukraine has not been reported, although some Ukrainian sources said 500 were deployed, while official Russian channels provided no estimates.

An unofficial Russian source suggested that about 10,000 PMC fighters were sent to Bakhmut, but he later clarified that it was all just a rumour. We have seen no estimates to indicate that Wagner had 10,000 in total.

On Monday (02OCT), a Ukrainian soldier claimed that the first casualties among Wagner’s fighters had already appeared in the Bakhmut direction. However, some sources claimed that the Wagner personnel were also reported in the Kreminna area and that in the Southern Direction, they “pop up here and there” on the front line. Still, these claims have not been independently verified. It seems that Moscow is deliberately spreading rumours about Wagner’s presence across the entire front to exert psychological pressure on Ukrainian forces. Yet, we assess that the number of Wagner personnel is too small to have an operational impact on the war. With their recruitment significantly scaled (or maybe even non-existent currently), it is difficult to see how the company would grow throughout the war. It is also almost certain that it will not reclaim the status it had in late 2022-early 2023.

Moving onto the frontline, on Monday (02OCT), Ukrainian units reportedly crossed the railway between Klishchiivka and Andriivka and ceased attacks to consolidate their gains. On the other hand, the Russian journalist claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to try to get behind the railway line near Andriivka. After artillery strikes, Russians counterattacked near Klishchiivka to regain the initiative. However, the source noted that in terms of positions taken, the UAF was in a more favourable position. Another Russian source claimed on Saturday (30SEP) that Ukrainian attempts to break through the railway line failed due to Russian counterattacks. Kurdyumivka remained under Russian control.

On Tuesday (03OCT), Russian sources said that Russians conducted a counterattack near Andriivka, but no further information was provided. However, a Ukrainian soldier said on the same day that the counterattack indeed happened but was repelled. On Wednesday (04OCT), the Ukrainian soldier said that Ukrainian units had made a foothold over the railway. According to him, the Russians conducted an offensive operation at night to recapture the lost positions but were unsuccessful.

No changes occurred near Ivanivske and Bila Hora. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

The Russian journalist said on Monday (02OCT) that Russian troops become more active in the Niu-York area. The source added that Russian units had tried to attack near Yurivka after air strikes on Ukrainian positions. No further information about this development was provided. Ukrainian sources did not report changes.

According to the Russian source, also on Monday and Tuesday (02/03SEP), Russian troops conducted two ground attacks near Stepove. No further data was provided on these attempts.

Also, the Russian source claimed that on Monday (02OCT), Russians tried to attack near Novokalynove. No further information about this development was provided. However, the source added that the Russians dramatically increased their offensive operations’ intensity and geographical scope. So far, this information remains unverified. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes/attacks. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Keramik, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Vesele and Kamyanka.

In the Avdiivka area, according to the Russian source, on Monday (02OCT), Russian units tried to advance on the southern approaches to the city but were presumably pushed back. Indeed, the Ukrainian source said that the Russian attack was unsuccessful.

According to the Russian source, on Monday (02OCT), the Russian unit resumed attacks near Pervomaiske. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.

Ukrainian bloggers added that on Monday (02OCT), a Russian unit tried to attack Ukrainian positions near Opytne but failed. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes near Tonenke, Sjeverne, and Vodyane during the week.

According to the Russian source, Russians attacked Ukrainian positions in Mariinka on Monday (02OCT), Tuesday (03OCT) and Wednesday (04OCT), but it remained unclear whether they made any gains. Ukrainian sources claimed on Monday (02OCT) that all Russian attempts to attack near Mariinka were unsuccessful. On Tuesday (03OCT) and Wednesday (04OCT), Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.

According to the Russian source, on Monday (02OCT), Russian units resumed their attacks near Novomykhailivka, but with air support. No changes occurred near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.

According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Donetsk Direction Russians repelled 35 attacks by Ukrainian assault groups of the 53^rd and 110^th Mechanised Brigade, 79^th Air Assault Brigade, 59^th Motorised Brigade, 5^th Assault Brigades, 118^th and 241^st Territorial Defence Brigades in Soledar, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Mariinka directions. Russian rocket troops and artillery struck the training camp at the 10^th  Mountain Assault Brigade training range and temporary deployment points of the 42^nd Mechanised Brigade and 26^th Artillery Brigade. They also hit an ammunition depot near Oleksandrivka, Konstyantynivka, Petrivka and Raihorodok. Russian aircraft struck the temporary deployment points of the 110^th Mechanised Brigade and 79^th Airborne Assault Brigade in Novomykhailivka and Avdiivka. Also, Russian aviation hit 15 Ukrainian concentration areas. Artillery also struck three ammunition depots in Krasnohorivka, Bilohorivka and Kramatorsk, and elements of the  24^th Mechanised Brigade near Toretsk.

Map 3. Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian fortifications, 30SEP – 6OCT2023

Southern Ukraine direction

Over the past seven days, Ukrainians made marginal gains in the Orikhiv axis, while no progress was recorded near the Velyka Novosilka.

Velyka Novosilka axis

On Saturday (30SEP), the Russian source reported that the intensity of Ukrainian attacks had significantly decreased in the Velyka Novosilka axis, which the source attributed to rotation and reequipment of deployed formations. Two days later (2OCT), Russian bloggers noted that after the withdrawal of Ukrainian Marine brigades to the Kherson Oblast, the 58^th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 128^th Territorial Defence Brigade and the 1^st UAF Presidential Operational Task Force Brigade were tasked with conducting offensive and defensive operations in the axis.

No frontline changes occurred near Novomaiors’ke and Novodonets’ke.

The same pertains to  Urozhaine. However, the Russian source said that Ukrainian operations near the village had a defensive character, although he added that there is an expectation that Ukrainians would resume the offensive in the second week of October to reach Staromlynivka.

In the meantime, another Russian source claimed that on Monday (03OCT),  Ukrainian assault groups from the 128^th Territorial Defence Brigade supported by mortar units attacked the Russian Forces’ positions west of Staromaiorske but were unsuccessful.

Russians also reportedly attempted attacks near Pryyutne on Sunday (01OCT), and Russians had seized the initiative in the area. Although the results of these attacks are unclear, Ukrainians claimed they were partially successful.

The Orikhiv axis

Moving onto the Orikhiv axis, according to the Ukrainian source, heavy battles continued west of Verbove. Ukrainians had partial success near the T-0803 road. However, the source claimed on Saturday (30SEP) that the UAF could not gain a foothold north of the road near Verbove due to constant Russian counterattacks that involve “elite paratrooper units”. The source added that Russian airborne units were deployed north and south of the village, and these formations were more difficult to defeat than the ones Ukrainians fought against in August.

As we stated numerous times in UCM, in an ideal scenario, Ukrainians try to avoid urban battles because they are too costly and time-consuming. Instead, they attempt to create conditions (encirclement) to force Russians out of villages or cities. The deployment of Russian airborne formations around Verbove means that Ukrainians will likely need to fight for the village inside. Until they secure the flanks, they will be constantly harassed by Russian counterattacks from the north and south. The information about constant Russian counterattacks also implies that Moscow does not seem to suffer from debilitating manpower problems in this area.

The Russian source claimed on Saturday (30SEP) that Ukrainian forces also reduced the intensity of the attacks in the Orikhiv axis. Some brigades were withdrawn to the rear to replenish and reconstitute their combat power. The blogger added that the Ukrainians went on the defensive in several areas. Another Russian source claimed that due to heavy losses, the units of the 3^rd Battalion, 117^th Separate Mechanised Brigade and 82^nd Airborne Assault Brigade were once again rotated out and replaced by the 65^th Separate Mechanised Brigade. The source claimed that the UAF plans to attack the heights south of Robotyne with the forces of the 65^th Brigade.

Last week, on 28SEP, the Russian MoD claimed that the Ukrainian 47^th Mechanised Brigade was withdrawn to the rear to restore its combat capability due to massive losses and the refusal of personnel to go into battle. However, throughout the past few days, videos appeared online showing the brigade’s Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Leopard tank in battles in the Orikhiv axis.

According to the Russian source, on Sunday (01OCT), Ukrainian troops supported by artillery attacked Russian positions near Novoprokopivka but were unsuccessful. Interestingly, Ukrainians reported a Russian counterattack near the village occurred a day later (02OCT). It also failed. In a tit-for-tat action, Ukrainians repeated the attack with heavy artillery support on Tuesday (03OCT). The Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian forces conducted an offensive near Novoprokopivka with heavy artillery support. Yet, no confirmed changes to the frontline occurred.

The overall situation near Pyatykhatky also remained unchanged.

On Saturday (30SEP), Russian bloggers noted that unidentified Ukrainian units had arrived in Hryhorivka, Stepnohirsk and Kamyanske and were setting up control points there. Several 82^nd Airborne Assault Brigade’s groups also took positions near Bilohir’ya. The source claimed that such activity in these areas could indicate a possible attack on Vasylivka and Polohy.

According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South Donetsk direction, Russian units of the Eastern Group of Forces, in cooperation with army aviation and artillery, struck Ukrainian assault detachments near Mykylske and repelled 11 attacks by the 127^th and 128^th Territorial Defence Brigades near Pryyutne, Rivnopil and Novomykhailivka. Russian artillery destroyed Ukrainian ammunition depots near Urozhaine and Pryyutne and temporary deployment points of the 128^th Territorial Defence Brigade and the 79^th Airborne Assault Brigade in Staromaiorske and Novomykhailivka. Russian aviation hit Ukrainian concentration areas of units of the 128^th and 129^th Territorial Defence Brigade in Staromaiorske, Urozhaine and Paraskoviivka.

Map 4. Frontlines in Orikhiv axis with Russian fortifications and Probable units involved in combat, 6OCT2023

Map 5. Frontlines in Southern Ukraine with Russian fortifications, 30SEP – 6OCT2023

Kherson Direction and Crimea

The past seven days delivered no changes in the overall rather stable situation in the Kherson Oblast.

According to the Russian source, on Thursday (05OCT), on Kozatskyi Island, Ukrainian units from the “Omaha” Tactical Group continued to hold a bridgehead. To reinforce the grouping, construction materials and ammunition to equip positions were delivered by six boats from Prydniprovs’ke and Sadove. Russian troops are actively firing aerial bombs and artillery at the island. Also, UAF sabotage groups are active near the Antonivskyi Bridge.

On Saturday (30SEP), the Russian source asserted that Ukrainian forces continued entrenching their presence on the islands and the left bank of the Dnipro. Units of the „Normandy” and “Grom” Tactical Groups deployed groups on the Oleksiivsky and Alyoshkinsky islands. At the Kozatsky Island, Ukrainians began to man and equip positions near the riverbed. The source added that a Russian reconnaissance group successfully raided one of the islands and took two Ukrainian soldiers prisoner.

Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, said on Sunday (01OCT) that Russian forces launched 16 guided aerial bombs at Kherson Oblast and targeted residential and agricultural infrastructure. The day before.

Also, she claimed that in September, in southern Ukraine alone, air defence forces shot down about 300 Shahed drones. According to her, 70-80% of the targets were shot down, forcing the Russians to adjust their tactics. On Tuesday (03OCT), she again stated that Russians used kamikaze drones and tactical aircraft to strike the Kherson region with guided bombs. Ukrainians noted that the intensity of Russian strikes during the day is not as high as during nighttime. As an example, she said that during the day, Russians could launch two MLRS strikes, but during the night, as many as 18. These strikes mostly target civilian infrastructure and residential areas.

Moving onto Crimea, a Russian source claimed on Tuesday (03OCT) that Ukrainians attempted an amphibious landing on Crimea near Cape Tarkhankut. The source added that Russian aviation prevented the landing. On the other hand, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR) published a video claiming that Ukrainian units conducted a successful landing operation in Crimea and managed to inflict fire damage on the Russian forces. No detailed information was provided. It is unclear whether both sides were talking about the same event.

Russians claimed to have shot down a Ukrainian MiG-29 near Soldatske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Map 5. Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 30SEP – 6OCT2023

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 486 aircraft (+4), 250 helicopters (0), 7,572 UAVs (+320), 440 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+2), 12,361 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+150), 1,161 MLRS launchers (+4), 6,584 field artillery guns and mortars (+82), as well as 13,850 units of special military vehicles (+260).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 281,090 personnel (+3,430), 4,777 tanks (+90), 9,082 armoured combat vehicles (+108), 6,666 artillery systems (+257) and 806 MLR systems (+12), 540 anti-aircraft systems (+4), 315 aircraft (0) and 316 helicopters (0), and 5,158 UAVs (+167), 1,530 cruise missiles (+1), 20 warships and boats (0), submarines 1 (0), 9,015 vehicles and fuel tanks (+179), and 951 special vehicles (+19).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)

Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine

Russians increased the already very high tempo of drone attacks. Russians launched six attacks involving 167 Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones, of which 128 were shot down (77% interception rate). The only day when Shaheds were not utilised was Thursday (04OCT). So far, it seems that drone attacks do not focus on specific targets. Instead, they attack various targets across the entire country.

Map 6. Probable movements of Russian Shaheds, cruise and ballistic missiles during the 01OCT2023 attack (Yellow – Shehed, red – cruise, purple – ballistic) Source: Twitter.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, the number of missile strikes decreased. Only one such attack was reported last week, and it included a 9M728 (Iskander) cruise missile. It was shot down. No missile attacks on Ukraine’s power grid were reported. However, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that 39 various missiles were fired between 30SEP-6OCT.

As stated above, Thursday and Friday saw Russian missile strikes (probable Iskander) on civilian and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast. We don’t yet know what has caused these strikes or what drives Russian decisions to employ such capabilities against the civilian population. We don’t think that Russians can sustain such attacks using Iskander missiles on a daily basis.

We want the reader also to note the change in the number of reported (Ukrainian General Staff) Russian ground attacks. The number has been on a steady decline since early August. Back then, Russians averaged some 60 attacks per day, but by the end of September, this figure decreased to around 25. The moving average (7-day) showing Russian ground attacks started climbing for the first time in two months. It is too early to say whether this is the beginning of a new trend, manifesting in an increased tempo of Russian ground attacks during autumn and winter. A short-lived uptick already occurred at the beginning and the end of July. The next few weeks will provide the answer.

Chart 1. The number of reported Russian ground attacks since March 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart 2. The number of reported Russian air strikes since April 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart 3. The number of reported Russian MLRS attacks since April 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart 4. The number of reported Russian air strikes since April 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart 5. Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine (Shaheds excluded) (Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command/General Staff)

Chart 6. The number of Shehed 131/136 kamikaze drones interceptions (Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command)

Outlook for the week of 07OCT-13OCT2023

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.

To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Previous forecast

“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.” This assessment was correct. No changes occurred in the region.

Score: 1/1

“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. There is a roughly even chance that they will make territorial gains, but they are unlikely to capture one or more villages. We expect no Ukrainian gains.” Russian attacks indeed continued and delivered no frontline changes. Ukrainians made no gains, either.

Score: 1/1

“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are unlikely to progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, it is highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” This prognosis was correct. Russians captured no villages in the region, although they may have made marginal gains near Bakhmut. We were also correct in anticipating no territorial Ukrainian gains in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.

Score: 1/1

“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. Ukrainians are unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka. But, we also add that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory, especially in the Velyka Novosilka axis.” Ukrainians made no confirmed gains in the direction, while Russians reportedly reclaimed some territories in the Velyka Novosilka axis.

Score: 1/1

“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.” This assessment was correct.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 5/5 (100%)

The forecast for the week of 7OCT-13OCT2023

Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.

When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will make territorial gains. We expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.

When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. However, there is a roughly even chance that they will reclaim some territory in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are unlikely to progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. It is also highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.

Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. Ukrainians are highly unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka. But, we also add that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis. We expect no Ukrainian gains in this area.

In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.