Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 9 January – 15 January 2023 (Weekly update)
Key takeaways:
Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;
Russians captured Soledar in the Donetsk Oblast and will now probably focus on attacking Bakhmut. The fall Soledar confirmed Russia’s limited capacity for sustained manoeuvre operations and exploitation of gaps in Ukraine’s defensive lines;
There were no confirmed changes in the Kharkiv Oblasts, although Russian artillery strikes mostly on civilian areas in the oblast continued;
Ukrainians probably progressed towards Kreminna in the Luhansk Oblast, but the overall progress in this axis was limited;
Apart from Soledar and Bakhmut, Russian’s tempo of attacks in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast decreased last week;
There were no confirmed changes in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts;
We saw no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces, and the exercise tempo significantly increased compared to previous weeks. Most notably, the 72nd Joint Training Center, which is the biggest mobilisational formation in Belarus, checked its readiness;
Although new Russian units arrived in Belarus, evidence shows that some formations have left the country. This indicates the ongoing rotation of Russian forces deployed to Belarus, although it seems that more troops are coming in than going out;
The number of Russian artillery attacks increased last week, averaging 74 strikes per day;
Following Gerasimov’s appointment as the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, expect no changes in how Russia will conduct its operations in Ukraine;
The deployment of 14 UK Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine, will have a very limited tactical impact. Still, strategically it is relevant as it may open up new avenues of supporting Ukraine militarily.
General outlook
Last week, after five months of fighting, Russian forces secured Soldear and pushed Ukrainian defenders to the T0513 road linking Siversk with Bakhmut. The capture of Soledar marks the first victory for Russia since Lysychansk was captured in early July 2022. However, since then, operationally, Russian posture has been predominantly defensive across Ukraine. Russians were pushed back from almost the entire Kharkiv Oblast and areas north of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast. Donetsk Oblast is the only region in Ukraine where Russians display an offensive intent, although the results of their determination to extend territorial control over the area are minimal.
In this context, the fall of Soledar changes nothing. Using their Wagner PMC proxies, Russia spent a lot of manpower and resources to capture the city. There are already unconfirmed reports claiming that the scale of losses on the Wagner side is so significant that the company is no longer a viable military formation. Most Wagner fighters comprised former inmates; recruitment from prisons reportedly stalled over the recent weeks. With heavy losses sustained near Soledar and Bakhmut and scant prospects of new personnel coming in, Wagner may find itself placed on the sidelines. If this happens, the Russian ability to capture neighbouring Bakhmut is far from a foregone conclusion. Soledar was seized mostly due to Wagner’s leadership willingness and capacity to maintain constant pressure on defending Ukrainians by constantly sending men to conduct frontal attacks. From Wagner’s perspective, such an approach is unsustainable over the following weeks. It is thus possible that a different tactic will be applied to Bakhmut that will seek to envelop Ukrainian forces deployed there.
The capture of Soledar brings Russians slightly closer to taking control over the remaining parts of the Donetsk Oblast, which is the key objective of the Russian second phase of this war. However, we do not expect Russian offensive operations to gather pace after Soledar and even if Bakhmut falls. Moscow still clearly lacks manpower and equipment to sustain constant pressure on Ukrainians and exploit any gaps in their defensive lines. Although Kramatorsk is only 30 km from Soledar (in a straight line), operationally, Russian forces are not yet ready to conduct a large-scale attack in the western direction. On top of that, areas east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are elevated, so Russians need to fight uphill.
We have also seen no indication that they were trying to shape the battlefield in preparation for such an operation. For a few weeks, Ukrainians have warned about a possible Russian attack from Kreminna (Luhansk Oblast) towards Lyman (Donetsk Oblast). Such an attack, especially if coordinated with a push from the south, would put additional pressure on defending Ukrainians and increase Russian chances of success in the Donetsk Oblast. However, it will not happen until mobilised reservists enter the fight. Out of officially 300,000 reservists drafted, 100,000 have already been deployed in various roles in Ukraine and nearby. Reports have claimed that, for instance, artillery specialists were retrained to undertake infantry tasks, which shows where the Russian priorities are.
But with 200,000 soldiers yet to be deployed, spring months will be challenging for Kyiv, especially if a new wave of mobilisation is announced. Some reports indicated that Russian personnel training in Belarus left the country last week and headed towards the Ukrainian border in the Voronezh Oblast. This would mean that the basic refresher course lasted around 2-3 months. Thus, reservists may start arriving to the frontline in bigger numbers soon. When this happens, attacks from Kreminna may materialise.
Leadership change
Last week, the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, was replaced by the Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov.
The change occurred unexpectedly. Surovikin received the Order of St. George, third class, for his courage, bravery and dedication directly from president Putin on 31DEC2022, and there were no indications that he had been underperforming. On the other hand, we do not know what objectives were put on him and to what extent they were fulfilled. He nevertheless managed to stabilise the situation in Ukraine with real prospects of commanding a large-scale operation during spring-summer. That said, Surovikin was nominated as Gerasimov’s deputy, and it is highly likely that he will continue to run the war.
Nevertheless, the swaps are a demotion for both Gerasimov and Surovikin. Although Surovikin oversaw a withdrawal from Kherson, he consolidated Russian positions along the wider front. His approach also considered the growing offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the possibility that in some areas, Russian posture needed to be inherently defensive, at least in short to medium term. Hence, fortifications and defensive lines were created in the Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts. Although such an approach contradicts Russian doctrine, which emphasises speed, manoeuvre and preponderance of power, the current reality of the war is that Russian possesses none of these things. Surovikin probably did what he could with what he had available (manpower) while simultaneously trying to impact Ukrainian willingness to fight and force Kyiv to a negotiating table by conducting strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure targets. In this approach, he failed.
Gerasimov, on the other hand, is not an operational commander. He was the Chief of the General Staff for more than ten years. The last time Gerasimov commanded troops was also in 2012 when he was the Commander of Russian forces in the Central Military District. It is thus difficult to imagine that he would bring additional value to the overall command and control of Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Surovikin will remain within the C2 structure of the Russian theatre command. It is thus possible that whereas Gerasimov is officially the Commander or the face of the Russian command, it will be Surovikin who will, in reality, direct troops.
Changes at the top probably reflect the dynamic competition between different groups reporting to Putin. Undoubtedly, in recent weeks, we saw major disagreements between the Ministry of Defence and Prigozhin’s Wagner, which role was increasingly prominent. The nomination of Gerasimov may seek to curb Wagner’s growing influence, where Gerasimov would deal with the politics surrounding Russian operations, while Surovikin would command forces in the theatre.
Regardless, we do not expect any significant shifts in how Russia will conduct their operations in Ukraine, at least over the next three months. We will continue to see strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and residential areas, both of which are vital components of the Russian way of war.
Equipment for Ukraine
Last week opened up new avenues in Western military support for Ukraine. Firstly, Poland agreed to donate a company (Polish tank company has 14 tanks) worth of Leopard A2 tanks to Ukraine. This initiative is meant to be a part of a larger multinational effort to deliver many Leopard tanks to Ukraine.
At the same time, London announced plans to deliver 14 Challenger 2 tanks and around 30 AS90 self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine. Both of these proposals seek to achieve two things. Firstly, they aim to improve Ukrainian chances in combat operations during spring and summer. Secondly, they are to encourage Germany to open up its vaults and allow other countries to donate their Leopards to Ukraine and also send some of their MBT stock to the country. Despite this, at least as of Sunday 15JAN, Berlin remains untouched.
From the frontline perspective, the delivery of 14 tanks from the UK changes nothing. However, strategically, it opens up another support stream to Ukraine and connects Kyiv with Western supply chains.
However, there is a problem with this approach. If Leopards are Challengers are handed over to Ukraine, these will not be long-term commitments. The reason for that is not enough tanks are in Europe ready to be handed over without significant degradation of armoured potential. To make it worse, without a fast expansion of MBT production, Europe is essentially hallowing itself out of tanks over the next few years. This will expand already existing gaps in MBT fleets and degrade Europe’s ability to defend itself.
Poland is the only country in Europe which is buying tanks en masse. It is getting Abrams from the United States and K2s from South Korea to fill in gaps created by the delivery of T-72s and PT-91s to Ukraine. On 9JAN, Warsaw also announced plans to create a new infantry division. The 1st Legions Infantry Division will cover the border with Belarus and the Suwalki corridor. It will be the fifth division in the Polish Land Forces and the second to be created since 2018. By 2027 Poland plans to have 180 K2s, 116 M1A1 FEP and 250 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks.
No similar procurement plans are being pursued anywhere in Europe, and no conversations are being held on increasing the production rate of MBTs. In fact, the only MBT produced in Europe is Leopard 2A7. The UK and France no longer produce Challenger 2s and Leclercs.
Therefore, it seems that if Ukraine is to be sustained long-term, Abrams should also be included in future support packages, as only the US guarantees a stable and sufficient number of tanks to Ukraine.
Rotation in Belarus
Although we described it in more detail below, we would like to point out in the introduction that there is increasing evidence of a rotation of Russian forces in Belarus. Some trains carried personnel to Podgornoye in the Voronezh Oblast, placing them on a route to the Luhansk Oblast. However, we are in the early stages of this rotation. We are also unsure whether all units that began arriving in Belarus in October would be rotated.
Secondly, there are unconfirmed reports that the Russian 3rd Army Corps began arriving in Belarus. Being a training formation, this development, coupled with reported rotation, would indicate that Belelarus is serving only as a testing ground for Russian forces before being committed to battles in Ukraine.
Weather forecast
After a small freezing spell last week, the temperatures in the Kharkiv Oblast are expected to increase gradually, reaching plus 9 degrees Celsius on Friday (20JAN). The week starting 23JAN is again to see a drop in temperatures below zero. No rain or snowfall fall is expected
The weather in Bakhmut is to follow a very similar pattern.
However, Zaporizhzhia is to see an increase to 14 degrees Celsius on Thursday (19JAN) and then a gradual fall to subzero by 26JAN.
Despite freezing temperatures last week, no uptick in armoured operations occurred, and we expect to see no changes in this regard this week.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 372 aircraft (+7), 200 helicopters (+1), 2,882 UAVs (+34), 401 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 7,525 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+76), 982 MLRS launchers (+10), 3,836 field artillery guns and mortars (+49), as well as 8,052 units of special military vehicles (+196).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (killed) 115,290 personnel (+4,120), 3,106 tanks (+37), 6,183 armoured combat vehicles (+53), 2,094 artillery systems (+39) and 437 MLRS (+6), 217 anti-aircraft systems (+2), 286 aircraft (+1) and 276 helicopters (+4), and 1,872 UAVs (+23), 4,846 vehicles and fuel tanks (+45), 749 cruise missiles (26), 17 warships and boats (+1) and 187 pieces of special equipment (+4).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, opposing forces suffered heavy personnel losses last week. Russians lost 4,120 men compared to 4,450 and 4,670 soldiers two and three weeks ago. This gives 13,240 men lost within three weeks, the equivalent of six motor rifle regiments. Nevertheless, the trajectory of Russian losses, as reported by the UGS, is decreasing, which is surprising, especially given last week’s events related to Soledar and the reportedly hefty casualties suffered by the Russian side when fighting for the city. On the other hand, a possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the intensity of Russian attacks in other areas significantly decreased, although UGS’ reports did not indicate this change.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, last week confirmed the downtrend in Russian artillery strikes. The largest falls were recorded in the Donetsk and Kherson Oblasts. Especially the latter was visible. Attacks on Soledar and the redeployment of artillery assets near the city could explain the decrease in the Donetsk Oblast. As such, whereas the geographical scope of these attacks may have decreased, the intensity may have increased.
Artillery strikes averaged 74 per day, higher than two weeks ago when this number stood at 65. On 8JAN, Ukrainians recorded only 43 locations hit, the lowest number since 22NOV. It was the third lowest day since the data on Russian artillery strikes was started to be collected (summer). Nevertheless, since 8JAN, the number of strikes gradually increase,d reaching 88 on 14JAN.
Military situation in Belarus
Last week, the military-political situation in Belarus mostly stayed the same. But, while the activity of political representatives in the military sphere was significantly reduced, training activities increased significantly. During the week, the Belarusian Army was strengthened with new military equipment and participated in several joint training events with the elements of the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, the Russian Forces significantly increased their presence in Belarus. Nonetheless, some indicators also suggested that the rotation of Russian forces in Belarus was ongoing.
Last week, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made only one major decision that affected the Belarusian Armed Forces. On Thursday, he signed Decree No. 7 and appointed the new Head of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Alexander Bas. Bas replaced Maj. Gen. Andrey Nekrashevich, who was relieved from his position and transferred to the military reserve on 21DEC due to his age. Until the appointment, Maj. Gen. Alexander Bas served as the Deputy Commander of the Western Operational Command. He graduated from the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School and the Belarusian Military Academy and passed through various military positions during his service. Initially, he served as the Commander and staff officer of tank formations, later on as an intelligence specialist in the 38th Air Assault Brigade and the Ground Forces Staff and even as the Head of the 72nd Joint Training Center and Chief of Staff of the 6t and 11th Mechanised Brigades.
On Monday, Lukashenko met with the Secretary of the Union State, Dmitry Mezentsev. The meeting had a working character and was linked to the implementation of 28 joint programs. During the meeting, Lukashenko declared his readiness to create a joint Russo-Belarusian media holding and expressed the necessity of updating the current Union State agenda and discussing it with the broader groups of state officials. He emphasised the need for economic consolidation, which should be carried out as soon as possible.
Over the last week, we noted a visible increase in the activity of Belarusian military officials, particularly related to the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, and the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Valery Revenko.
On Tuesday, Volfovich commented on the development plans of the Polish Armed Forces.
He referred to the idea of the formation of the Polish fifth division that would be facing the Belarusian direction. According to Volfovich, such plans show both unfriendly Polish policy as well as the aggressive posture of the state towards Belarus, the Union State, and even the whole CSTO. The Secretary of the State Security Council also highlighted the intensification of the NATO military operations and increasing militarisation of the Baltic States.
Three days later, Volfovich visited the Minsk Suvorov Military School. After getting acquainted with the educational and material base of the school, he gave a speech to young “Suvorovities”. Specifically, he highlighted the necessity of paying particular attention to historical memory. According to him, this will allow the formation of an objective attitude towards the past and strengthen the unity of the Belarusian people.
The activity of Col. Valery Revenko was internationally focused. On Wednesday, Revenko participated In the accreditation meeting with the Turkish Military Attache, Col. Atakan Sarach, during which he presented Belarusian views on international security issues and discussed bilateral military cooperation. A day later, the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department was involved in another convention. This time he met with the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates in Belarus, Ibrahim Salim Mohammed Al-Musharrah. At the same time, Revenko’s subordinates participated in the visit of 18 foreign military attaches to the Belarusian State Aviation Academy.
Last week, the Belarusian Armed Forces inducted a battery of TOR-M2K to the equipment of the 15th Air Defence Brigade located in Fanipol. The official ceremony was held on Friday and was attended by the Commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces, Col. Andrey Lukyanovich, as well as his Deputy For Ideological Work, Col. Anatoly Bulavko and the Head of the Air Defence Forces, Col. Kiril Kazantsev.
During the ceremony, Lukyanovich noted the glorious traditions of the formation and its good training results achieved during the last academic year (1st place among AFADF formations). According to him, the 15th Air Defence Brigade is strategically important. That’s why this formation received a new weapon system. The TOR-M2K battery includes 4 x 9A331MK launcher, 1 x 9T244 transport-loader vehicle and 1 x 9B887M2K maintenance vehicle. Belarusian TOR-M2K systems are a high-mobile version of the TOR anti-air complex as they are wheeled, not tracked. They are equipped with GLONASS/GPS equipment and night vision devices. Moreover, the system can reportedly fire on the move.
Moreover, on Tuesday, the Spokesman of the Belarusian MoD informed about the end of data clarification activities. Lt. Col. Inna Gorbacheva stated that about 95% of Belarusian citizens “showed their understanding of the difficult political-military situation and appeared in the military enlistment offices to update their contact data”. The remaining five per cent were sick or abroad. In this regard, the statement of the Military Commissar of the Brest region, Col. Oleg Konovalov, should be mentioned. On Friday, he stated that the restrictions on leaving the territory of Belarus would be applied to Belarusian citizens who have not passed the data verification. Nevertheless, the Belarusian MoD denied his statement shortly after and noted that all citizens can still update their data in the local military enlistment office.
Also on Friday, the Deputy Military Commissar of the Malorita Region, Mjr. A. Korolkov, met with the local representatives responsible for military registration in organisations, enterprises and institutions of the region.
Over the past seven days, the training workload of the Belarusian Armed Forces was immense. It included several inspections, field exits, verifications measures, standalone exercises and various drills.
Undoubtedly, the most important training event started on Wednesday, when the 72nd Joint Training Center began its readiness check. The unit serves as the main mobilisation base of the Belarusian Armed Forces. According to the Head of the Center, Col. Vadim Surov, the Belarusian Minister of Defence order initialised the check, which increased the combat readiness level of the subordinated subunits and military formations. It is known that training drills were presumably carried out also on Friday and included the removal of military equipment from storage bases and its preparation for the training marches. Such actions were undertaken by the 72nd Joint Training Center’s Separate Communications Battalion. These comments and data strongly indicate that the centre tested the deployment of its assets outside of the base. To reiterate, the 72nd Joint Training Center is the main mobilisation component of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The centre stores some 200 MBTs, 490 ACVs, 240 APCs, and 180 artillery pieces. We do not know how many pieces of this equipment are at good readiness.
A similar combat readiness check started on Monday and involved a few North-Western Operational Command military formations. The practical actions began with the field exit of the 4th Tank Battalion elements (19th Mechanised Brigade) that departed from the home garrison and went towards the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground. On their way to the range, tankers crossed the pontoon bridge over the Berezina River, prepared earlier by the forces of the 7th Engineering Regiment. The crossing was presumably carried out on Monday/Tuesday night and involved the elements of the 740th Air Defence Regiment, which provided an anti-air umbrella. The 4th Tank Battalion continued its training throughout the week.
Element of the 11th Mechanised Brigade conducted a field exit on Wednesday. According to official information, the drill was carried out as a part of Russo-Belarusian combat coordination measures and was held directly under the Commander of the Western Operational Command, Maj. Gen. Igor Demidenko.
The practical actions involved at least one mechanised company that returned to its garrison a day later.
Referring to the joint Russo-Belarusian training activities, at least one OSA anti-air battery (of the 740th or 147th Air Defence Regiment) started combat duty in the unspecified location as per the decision of the Commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces, Col. Andrey Lukyanovich (Wednesday). Two days later, two 2S1 batteries of the 11th Mechanised Brigade were presumably involved in the joint training drills that the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj observed. Gen. Viktor Gulevich.
When it comes to the standalone training actions, the following events should also be mentioned:
Field exit of the Peacekeeping Company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade (Wednesday);
Tank firing classes of the 6th Mechanised Brigade crews (Wednesday);
Gathering of battalion-level commanders, chief of staffs and deputy commanders of Belarusian SOF formations (Wednesday);
The annual gathering of military divers (Wednesday);
Off-road driving classes of the 336th Reactive Artillery Brigade’s drivers (Thursday);
Last week, despite high training activities, the number of observed Belarusian military movements was not high. Reported transfers included trucks, BTRs and BMPs, and other light vehicles. Some of them were transported via rail. Nonetheless, S-300 launchers (Wednesday and Friday) and GMZ-2 minelaying vehicles (Friday) were also observed.
On the contrary, the observed activity of the Russian Armed Forces was very high. On Thursday, Belarus was visited by the inspection of the Russian MoD headed by the Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces and Army Gen. Oleg Salyukov, commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, Gerasimov’s deputy. Officially it was linked to the inspection of the Russian part of the joint grouping and was aimed at checking the quality of combat coordination and readiness.
Regarding the movement of Russian equipment in Belarus, most of it occurred via rail. However, the exact number of military echelons that arrived in Belarus still needs to be clarified. Inferring from unofficial data, it is safe to assume that number of spotted trains exceeded 20. Despite dozens of trucks and light vehicles, Russians brought armoured vehicles, towed and self-propelled artillery systems, division-level communications assets and TMM-3M2 heavy bridges.
What is worth noticing is the fact that the Belarusian Union of Railway Workers provided information about the possible rotation of Russian forces deployed in Belarus. This hypothesis was supported by information linked to the departure of a few military echelons. One of them was spotted on Wednesday. It presumably transported about 400 Russian service members from Belarus to the Voronezh Region. Nonetheless, additional information to confirm this development is needed.
Regarding the general activity of the Russian Armed Forces, the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Operational Directorate, brig. Gen. Alexei Hromov stressed on Thursday that under the guise of ZAPAD-2023 and UNION SHIELD-2023, the Russian Armed Forces would deploy additional forces in Belarus that might be used for another ground offensive against Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander, Lt. Gen. Sergey Naev, claimed that there was no threat of ground invasion from the Belarusian territory.
Summary of main Belarusian training activities in January 2023
13JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness review (various locations, 72nd Joint Training Center);
12JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness check of the 19th Mechanised Brigade (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, elements of the 4th Tank Battalion);
12JAN: Continuation of the field exit (Losvido Training Ground, Peacekeeping Company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade);
12JAN: End of the field exit (home garrison, at least one mechanised company of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
12JAN: Off-road driving classes (Osipovichi Training Ground, drivers of the 336th Reactive Artillery Brigade);
12JAN: Readiness review (likely home garrison, 1st and 2nd battery of the SPH Battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);
12JAN: Tactical and combat training classes (unspecified location, elements of the 339th Mechanised Battalion);
11JAN: Field exit of OSA air defence subunit combined with the start of combat duty (unspecified location, presumably elements of the 147th or 740th Air Defence Regiments);
11JAN: Combat readiness check (unspecified training ground, at least one mechanised company of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);;
11JAN: Combat readiness check (likely home garrison, the 72nd Joint Training Center)
11JAN: Field exit combined with tactical exercises (Losvido Training Ground, Peacekeeping Company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade);
11JAN: T-72 firing classes (Gozhsky Training Ground, tank crews of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);
11JAN: Practical gathering of SOF officers (garrison of the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade, battalion level commanders, chief of staffs, and deputy commanders of the Belarusian SOF);
11JAN: Annual gathering of military divers (garrison of the 188th Engineering Brigade, military divers from various military formations);
11JAN: Practical gathering linked to the UAV use (unspecified location, UAV operators from the 40th Mechanised Battalion);
10JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness check of the North-Western Operational Command formations (unspecified area near Berezina River, 4th Tank Battalion, and elements of the 7th Engineering Regiment and 740th Air Defence Regiment involved);
9JAN: Combat readiness check of the North-Western Operational Command formations (227th Combined Arms Training Ground and Berezina River area, 4th Tank Battalion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade and 7th Engineering Regiment involved);
5JAN: Gathering dedicated to the organisation of combat training measures (Brest, Belarusian SOF subunit commanders);
4JAN: BTR-82A and BMP-2 firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, cadets of the 72nd Joint Training Center);
4JAN: T-72 indirect firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, tank crews of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
3JAN: Engineering training classes (unspecified location, elements of the 40th Mechanised Battalion of the 11th Mechanized Brigade);
3JAN?: Field exit combined with live ammo firing (230th Combined Arms Training Ground, 2S1 Battalion of the 841st Artillery Group of the 11th Mechanised Brigade).
4JAN: BTR-82A and BMP-2 firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, cadets of the 72nd Joint Training Center);
4JAN: T-72 indirect firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, tank crews of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
3JAN: Engineering training classes (unspecified location, elements of the 40th Mechanised Battalion of the 11th Mechanized Brigade);
3JAN?: Field exit combined with live ammo firing (230th Combined Arms Training Ground, 2S1 Battalion of the 841st Artillery Group of the 11th Mechanised Brigade).
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv/Luhansk direction
For another week in a row, nothing operationally significant occurred in the Kharkiv/Luhansk Oblast. Both sides remained active, conducting numerous (counter) attacks, however, the frontline remained stalemated.
There were no ground attacks on Ukrainian positions north of Kharkiv (third week in a row). Russians deploy some units near the border (on the Russian side) and continually threaten attacks to force Ukrainians to contend with another possible attack on the oblast. However, we continue to see no larger build-up on the Russian side to suggest that an offensive operation is being prepared.
Russians also continued to conduct artillery strikes on border areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and civilian and residential areas further back. In this respect, Russian behaviour has not changed, and we expect no changes going forward. Last week, according to Ukrainian sources, Russians fired rockets from BM-30 Smerch “heavy” MLR system on Kharkiv. Such systems (2S7, BM-30s and BM-27s) are the only assets that can attack Kharkiv from Russia, as all other battlefield systems lack the range. It remains to be seen whether this is a prelude to a broader artillery campaign against Kharkiv. Still, if Russia intends to push towards the Kharkiv Oblast, the city can become one of the main targets of artillery strikes.
But let’s start will artillery strikes. Apart from battlefield strikes, Russia launched numerous strikes on mostly civilian areas in border regions last week. Such strikes have been ongoing for several weeks already and closely resemble Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure in the Kherson Oblast. In the Kharkiv region, Russians, too, launch unguided missiles from S-300 air defence complexes or MLRS systems. The objective is to degrade Ukrainians’ willingness to fight and make their lives miserable by creating hardships (lack of electricity) and causing economic loss and death. Such measures are unlikely to deliver anticipated results. Despite this, as long as Russian artillery is deployed in border areas, the Russian artillery strikes will continue.
Moving south, neither side made progress near Dvorchina. The Russian MoD reported that Ukrainians operated sabotage groups near Kotlyarivka, Novoselivske, and Dvorichna, which is likely.
Not necessarily related to the ongoing situation in the Luhansk Oblast, near Shchastya, partisans may have destroyed a railway line along which Russians were bringing military equipment closer to the frontline. Before that, on 8JAN, the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Internal Affairs Ministry asserted that an unidentified group blew up a gas pipeline near the Lutuhyne, leaving 13,000 people without gas. Previously we saw no similar activities in Russia’s rear, which could have been attributed directly to Ukrainian partisans or sabotage groups. However, apart from these two events, no other similar attacks occurred in the Luhansk Oblast last week, so it is unclear to what extent these attacks were orchestrated by Ukrainians or are a part of a sustained campaign to attack Russian targets deep behind the enemy lines.
Moving to the Luhansk Oblast, stalemate is the best word to characterise the current situation. Neither side made any confirmed territorial gains, although Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainians pushed Russians out of Dibrova and the control over the village is now contested. This development probably marked the only change in Ukrainian control last week in the Luhansk Oblast. Attacks from south of Kreminna did not bring Ukrainians closer to the city.
Last week we noted that “several Russian sources claimed that Russians planned to conduct a large-scale attack from the Kreminna area towards Zarichne and Lyman. Indeed, according to Oleksii Arestovych, an advisor to the President’s Office, Russia has concentrated forces to attack Ukrainian positions in this direction.” There were no new developments in this context. No new information appeared about Russian forces deployed near Kreminna or about plans to conduct a larger attack towards Lyman.
Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategic (CDS) noted that near Shipylivka – Bilohorivka, Russians brought into battle the 206th Rifle Regiment of the mobilisation reserve of the 2nd Army Corps (AC) to support the 7th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade of the 2nd AC. CDS also claimed that elements of the 10th Tank Regiment, 6th Motor Rifle Division of the 3rd AC, were deployed near Stara Krasnyanka in anticipation of a Ukrainian attack in this area.
Despite the commitment of these formations to the fight, the frontline did not move in these areas last week.
According to Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, Ukrainians maintain the initiative in the Svatove and Kreminna axes. However, he also noted that large chunks of land in the Luhansk Oblast are mines, which decreases the tempo of UAF attacks. There were cases, he said, of Ukrainian troops being blown up when attacking Russian positions, so advances need to be carefully planned.
Moving towards Svatove, last week, a Ukrainian source stated that Russians were pulling up forces to strengthen offensive operations near Ploshchanka. The Russians control the village, but for several weeks already, Russians have been trying to push Ukrainians from Makiivka and over the Zherebets River. However, so far, these attempts have been futile. But, discussions about Russian reinforcements in this area could suggest rotation or plans for more concentrated efforts to achieve the abovementioned objective.
Chervonopopivka remains contested. We are not sure who controls the settlement if anyone at all.
In Novoselivske, Russians reportedly deliberately destroyed all houses and structures so that UAF would have no place to gain a foothold. But this also works both ways, the Russian ability to hold ground is also limited. So it is highly likely that the village is no man’s land. Ukrainians also claimed that the 60th Separate Motorised Rifle Battalion “Vitirani” arrived at Kuzemivka, which may indicate a Russian pullback from Nososelivske or preparations for an attack towards the village.
Russian sources claimed that there were two HIMARS strikes in the Luhansk Oblast: near Zolote and Chornukhyn.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The situation in the Donetsk Oblast was essentially unchanged compared to the previous week. The battles raged around Bakhmut and Soledar, while the situation in the remaining parts of the oblast remained the same.
As such, this chapter will primarily discuss the situation near Bakhmut and Soledar.
Undoubtedly, the most crucial event from last week was the fall of Soledar. Russians began attacks on the city in early August. The attack on the city was facilitated by the Ukrainian withdrawal from Popasna, which Russians captured around 8MAY. In this context, it took Russia around two months to push through 17 km of Ukrainian defences towards Soledar and then five months to take the city.
Within these five months, Russian, specifically Wagner PMC, progress in attacking Soledar was non-existent. Only in early January did the attackers start to move by capturing Bakhmutske around 5JAN and then Soledar around 13JAN.
There are a couple of things to consider when it comes to the fall of Soledar.
Firstly, at some point, the issue of capturing the city became a validation point for Wagner in their ability to conduct urban operations. The means of achieving the tactical objective were secondary. That’s why Wagner’s owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, comment about the fall if the city came too early when battles in the town were still ongoing.
During the battle, Ukrainian reports from the front often mentioned the sheer number of ground attacks on defenders’ positions. Clearly, there was no profound tactical idea behind how the attack should unfold. The Russians sought to overwhelm Ukrainian positions with the sheer number of troops and the intensity of ground attacks. These attacks were happening during the day and night to wear Ukrainians down and their ability to fight. Indeed, our sources claimed that the 61st Mechanised Brigade pulled back uncontrollably from around Bakhmutse, which allowed Russians to semi-encircle Soledar from the south, resulting in a significant deterioration in the Ukrainian ability to defend without reinforcements. Some social media reports suggested a successful Ukrainian counterattack. However, we were never able to confirm the veracity of this claim. We think that the UGS never planned to defend Soeldar at all cost and the withdrawal, apart from the 61st Mechanised Brigade, was orderly.
As such, we see three factors contributing to Russian success in Soledar. One was the Russian seemingly infinite supply of soldiers, disregard for the casualty rate, and a lack of Ukrainian tactical discipline.
The big question is whether such a scenario could be repeated elsewhere, most immediately in Bakhmut. Wagner’s losses had to be high, and it is unclear how combat effective the organisation is now. The next few days will give us some answers as to whether Russians will seamlessly switch to attacking Bakhmut. So far, it seems, a short pause occurred after the victory in Soeldar. At the same time, the intensity of Russian attacks in Bakhmut while Soledar was being fought over, especially over the past few days, decreased significantly, meaning that all available capacities were thrown into Soledar.
Wagner probably will not be able to conduct a similar operation in Bakhmut. Groud attacks will undoubtedly continue, but the organisation’s capacity to launch frontal assaults throughout day and night is now probably limited. It thus remains to be seen whether Russian army units will operate with Wagner formations to capture the next objective, despite ongoing tensions with the MoD related to who fights better and is more effective on the battlefield.
The successful attack on Soledar and achieved victory in Pidhorodne. Russians also launched assaults on Krasna Hora. Although the village has not been taken, we believe the road linking Soledar with Bakhmut is impassable and is now used as the main Ukrainian line of defence. It is also possible that the road linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk cannot be used either due to the proximity to the frontline. Consequently, the only passable ground line of communication goes through Chasiv Yar.
Also, last week, Russians reportedly fully captured Opytne. However, attacks on Klishchiivka were repelled. With the fall of Soledar, Russians may now focus on conducting an envelopment attack on Bakhmut, which could be achieved If they capture Krasna Hora-Berkhivka to the north and Klishchiivka-Ivanivske to the south. The next few days will provide some answers as to what attacking scenario will be followed.
Although the fall of Soledar was a victory for Russia, it changed little. Soledar was the first major city taken by Russians since the capture of Lysychansk in early July. But, on the other hand, since then, they suffered two operational defeats (withdrawals from Kharkiv and Kherson), and the frontline in the Donetsk Oblast barely moved since July. Between September and November, Russians lost more than 50 per cent of the territory they controlled at their peak in March 2022. So whereas the fall of Soledar is a defeat for Ukrainians, strategically, it changes nothing.
As stated in the previous UCM issues, during the summer, Russians lacked the personnel to exploit its tactical successes and pursue withdrawing Ukrainians, hence slow progress after tactical victories. This was visible after the fall of Popasna and Lysychansk. Now, however, they do have manpower numbers (Wagner, mobilised reservists), but they lack heavy equipment to conduct a swift manoeuvre. Consequently, even if Bakhmut is captured, any progress past the city will probably again be slow. We do not expect to see a collapse of Ukrainian defences if Ukrainians withdraw from the city.
Moving onto other front parts, the overall situation mainly remained the same.
South of Mayorsk, Russians improved their positions and approached Shumy.
Avdiivka remains firmly under Ukrainian control. Russians alternate ground with artillery strikes. First, they shell the city for two days and send infantry to break defensive lines. Such an approach has so far brought no results. But artillery again struck the town. We expect another wave of ground attacks within the next few days.
The control over Mariinka remains contested. We understand that both sides control around half of the city and that the line of contact is very close.
No changes occurred near Pavlivka – Vuhledar. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainians were creating a large grouping of forces near Vuhledar. Perhaps, their objective is to liberate Pavlivka. Russians have abandoned their plans to capture the Vuhledar as their offensive potential in this area completely petered out. They focus on entrenching their positions in Pavlivka.
Zaporizhzhia direction
Out of all directions of military operations, last week proved to be the least eventful in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. No major operations occurred in this oblast, and nothing indicates either side is preparing for a significant change in their operations in Zaporizhzhia.
Two weeks ago, Russians claimed to have captured Dorozhnyanka, some seven kilometres south of Hulyaipole. Although we could not confirm this development independently, last week, Ukrainians claimed to have retaken the village, which affirms that Russian offensive actions in this direction did occur. Despite this, the area around the settlement is contested, and it is unclear who controls Dorozhnyanka.
There were concerns from the Ukrainian side that freezing weather conditions would facilitate Russian reconnaissance operations in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. However, we understand that no increase in Russian military activity occurred.
Last week, Ukrainians struck Metitopol several times, mainly the Hidromash factory, which reportedly stored Russian equipment and housed personnel. Other strikes in the city included ammunition depots.
Ukrainians also shelled Tokmak, Enerhodar, and Mykhailivka.
Kherson direction
There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast last week. We continue to see no preparations for any offensive operations from either side. Both militaries remained focused on fighting for islands in the Dnipro delta and conducting artillery attacks on opposing forces. However, whereas Russians carried out attacks on civilian areas (Russia considers civilians legitimate wartime targets), Ukrainians emphasised Russian concentration areas, logistics bases, and command posts.
Regarding delta islands and Kinburn Spit, both sides maintain fire control over the area, but last week, no changes were reported on who controls which territory. Both sides undoubtedly deploy sabotage and reconnaissance groups to reconnoitre opposing forces’ positions and troop locations.
These Ukrainian strikes effectively push main Russian forces beyond the HIMARS range and thus force them to disperse. Indeed, Ukraine’s Natalia Humenyuk, Southern Operational Command Spokesperson, claimed last week that high-precision strikes degraded Russian ability to launch Iranian kamikaze drones from areas south of the Dnipro River. As a result, she said Moscow withdrew them to Crimea and Krasnodar Krai. HIMARS also reportedly forced Russians to abandon their plans to establish Melitopol as a regional logistics hub for Russian forces operating in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, according to Ivan Fedorov, Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol.
Moscow’s engineering formations also continue to prepare the terrain for a probable Ukrainian counteroffensive over the Dnipro River. To this end, last week, trenches were reportedly being built near Radensk, Vovchanske and Kakhovka and between Molochne and Zaozerne.
Interestingly, the Russian side claimed they hit a large concentration area (200 men) of Ukrainian security personnel in Kherson, inflicting high casualties. However, this information has not been verified or independently confirmed. Other Russian strikes included Stanislav and Shyroka Balka.
Ukrainians reportedly struck Tavriisk, Oleshky, Nova Kakhovka, Hola Prystan, Skadovsk, and Zaliznyi Port.
Outlook for the week of 16JAN – 22JAN
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
This is what we forecasted last week:
“Last week saw increased Russian ground attacks east and southeast of Dvorichna in the Kharkiv Oblast. We largely expect these actions to continue. However, it is unlikely that Russians will turn this activity into a larger-scale attack or that it will deliver new territorial gains.” This forecast was correct. Some limited ground attacks happened in this area last week, but they did not bring any frontline changes, and nothing indicates they are a prelude to a larger attack in the future.
Score: 1/1
“We assess that there is roughly even a chance that the situation around Svatove in the Luhansk Oblast will change. The frontline in this sector is heavily contested and, with a couple of exceptions, largely frozen. Social media posts warned last week about the possibility of a Russian counterattack west of Kreminna. We would not like to attach a probability score to this event due to a lack of data, but we assess that Ukrainians will likely get closer to the city. We are unable to say whether they will reach the city next week.” There were no confirmed frontline changes in the Svatove area, although Ukrainians reportedly liberated several villages in the Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians also inched closer to Kreminna by pushing Russians out of Dibrova, but the progress towards Kreminna remains painfully slow.
Score: 0.5/1
“The situation in the Donetsk Oblast will remain fluid. It is unlikely that Russians will make even tactically significant gains in all areas, apart from the Bakhmut-Soledar axis. In this area, Ukrainian positions are increasingly pressed, and withdrawal is a real possibility. In this context, we assess that it is highly likely that Russians will move deeper into Soledar. There is roughly even chance that the city will fall. If Soledar falls, then Ukrainians may be forced to withdraw from Krasna Hora to avoid encirclement.” Firstly, we were correct in assessing that Russians are unlikely to extend their territorial control beyond the Bakhmut-Soledar. Last week we also warned about a withdrawal of Ukrainian forces, which occurred in Soledar. Although we expected that Russians would push into Soledar, we were uncertain about how quickly the city could be captured. Nevertheless, the general direction of action was rather clear. Last week’s events did not develop fast enough to threaten Krasna Hora, although there were already reports about Russian ground attacks on the village.
Score: 1/1
“Bakhmut is highly unlikely to fall next week, but Russians are likely to make progress in the city.” This assessment was correct. Russians slightly extended their control over the city and probably fully captured Opytne.
Score: 1/1
“Russians will also likely capture more territories near Bakhmut, such as Pidhorodne.” Apart from capturing Opytne, Russians also indeed captured Pidhorodne.
Score: 1/1
“It is highly unlikely that next week will deliver major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Although some tactically insignificant frontline shifts could occur, the situation will not change operationally. Ukrainians will continue missile strikes on Russia’s rear.” Last week did not deliver any changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
Score: 1/1
“The chances are remote that the situation in the Kherson Oblast will change. Neither side will conduct a river crossing operation. We expect to see no major ground attacks, but there is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture Potemkin Island. Ukrainian high-precision strikes will also continue on Russian areas north of Crimea.” This forecast was also correct.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 6.5/7
Next week’s forecast
Starting with the Kharkiv Oblast, it is unlikely that the frontline situation will change in this direction. Russian attacks likely occur, but they will highly likely be too small to alter the territorial control.
There is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will inch towards Svatove, but the reality is that Ukrainian offensive potential in this area petered out. But we believe that this is by choice rather than necessity. Russian counterattacks will almost certainly continue, but here again, we assess that they are unlikely to alter the frontline in a significant way (the capture of a few villages).
The same goes for Kreminna, Ukrainians will likely continue their forward movement, but the pace of this advance will be small. Whereas they may reach the city next week, the chances are remote that the city will be captured.
When it comes to Donetsk Oblast, we maintain our view from the last week. Apart from the Svatove-Bakhmut areas, Russian ability to alter the frontline is currently non-existent. Of course, a village or two could be captured, but it would hardly be a noteworthy success. With the bulk of capability (air power, artillery, and manpower) deployed to Soledar and Bakhmut, we believe that Russian attacks will be sustained in this area next week. There is a real prospect that Bakhmut will be surrounded from the east, south, and north. We are unsure to what extent Russians will be able to move their forces from Soledar and resume ground attacks on Bakhmut next week. If this happens fast enough, then it is likely that Russians will capture some territory in Bakhmut. However, it is highly improbable that the city will fall next week.
Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, we forecast no changes. Although there were some reports late in the week about deploying Russian forces into the oblast, we assess that this is not a preparation for a large-scale attack. The situation on the ground is highly unlikely to change.
Lastly, the same can be said about the Kherson Oblast. Chances for an amphibious assault over the Dnipro River are remote. Battles for islands on the river will certainly continue. Russians will also certainly attack Ukrainian civilian areas north of the river, while Ukrainians will target Russian force and equipment concentrations north of Crimea.