Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 9 September – 15 September 2023
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
The past two weeks saw very limited frontline changes across Ukraine; Ukraine’s small unit tactics saw them progress slightly near Robotyne and Verbove in the Orikhiv Axis and south of Bakhmut; Russians, on the other hand, made minimal gains in the Luhansk Direction; Neither side displayed a decisive advantage that would allow them to make more rapid gains;
Russians continued artillery and missile attacks on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast but made no attempts to conduct cross-border attacks;
Russians made marginal gains in the Luhansk Oblast as their attacks in the Kupyansk axis continued; Yet, the overall operational situation in the region remained unchanged;
Ukrainians reportedly liberated Andriivkaand made some gains near Klishchiivka, which confirmed Ukrainian focus on operations south of Bakhmut; Apart from that, while some frontline changes occurred in the southern parts of the Donetsk Direction, they were minimal without an impact on the overall picture;
In the Southern Direction, Russians attempted to cut off exposed Ukrainian units east of Robotyne but lacked the capacity to deliver any meaningful impact on the situation in the Orikhiv axis; Following breaching the first line of Russian defences near Verbove almost two weeks ago, Ukrainian progress was marginal;
Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro’s left bank in the Kherson Oblast near Dachi and carried out harassing attacks across the river’s bank in other parts of the region;
Ukrainians conducted two high-profile attacks on Crimea last week, which destroyed elements of the Russian S-400 air defence system and severely damaged at least one ship;
Executive summary
Although the past week brought some interesting developments, the overall outlook for the war remained unchanged as neither side made any operational, let alone strategic, gains.
But let’s start with things that remained unchanged. After breaching the first line of Russian defences in the Orikhiv axis (near Verbove) almost two weeks ago, Ukrainian progress in the area was minimal. The frontline was flattened slightly, alleviating the pressure on Ukrainian units operating southeast of Robotyne. Two weeks ago, we warned about a possible Russian counterattack towards Novodanylivka, and indeed, such a development took place. However, the attempt was too small and lacked sufficient strength to alter the frontline to threaten the encirclement of Ukrainian units. Nevertheless, until the salient is “removed”, we will maintain that the threat of a Russian counterattack towards Novodanylivka will persist.
In mid-September, the counteroffensive had already been taking place for more than 14 weeks. The progress has decisively slowed down as both sides returned to their approach of managing attrition. Neither side is able (or willing) to deploy significant forces to alter the course of operations in the south, and based on open-source reports, we see no changes in this approach on the horizon. Although another Ukrainian push in the Orikhiv axis is possible, we maintain what we wrote a few weeks ago: the Ukrainian counteroffensive will probably begin to lose tempo (albeit already very slow) in late summer-early autumn.
But it is interesting to see what will happen during autumn. Last year, operations in the Zaporizhihia Oblast were visibly subdued, especially compared to other areas such as the Kherson Direction or the Bakhmut axis. Reports and satellite imagery suggest that Russians continue to establish fortifications in the Zaporizhihia Direction, which means that Ukrainians will face more engineering obstacles if they progress. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian 9th Corps was pulled back from the frontline mid-July. If it is now being regenerated with the objective of being recommitted to battle in the Orikhiv axis, then Ukrainian attacks will likely continue over the next weeks. Another issue is artillery ammunition and barrels availability as we assess Ukrainians are unlikely to maintain the current tempo of firing 8,000 shells a day.
Nevertheless, Kyiv will need to maintain pressure on Russians in the Southern Direction not to lose the initiative and hard-won territorial gains.
Secondly, Ukrainians probably captured Andriivka and Klishchiivka south of Bakhmut late in the week. The liberation of the villages comes after Ukrainian forces launched counterattacks in the Bakhmut axis in mid-May, while the battle for Klishchiivka started in July. Since May, Ukrainians liberated more than 50 sq km in areas south of Bakhmut and are now expected to continue attacking east. Despite these gains, the overall operational picture around Bakhmut remains unchanged.
One of the Ukrainian approaches for the next few months could also aim at the Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Over recent weeks, we have seen an intensification of Ukrainian attacks on BSF ships and ground-based forces. On 4AUG, a naval drone hit a Russian Ropucha-class large landing ship, Olenegorsky Gornyak, at the Novorossiysk naval base. Since then, several attacks have been foiled by the Russians, which confirm ongoing Ukrainian operations to damage BSF’s capacity to operate and launch missile attacks on Ukraine’s territory from the Black Sea. Indeed, on 14SEP, footage was released showing a naval drone approaching a Vasily Bykov-class patrol ship.
Over the last seven days, Ukrainians also captured drilling platforms with a Russian land surface surveillance radar to degrade Moscow’s ability to track surface movements. On top of that, Ukrainians conducted a double-tap attack on a Russian S-400 battery near Yevpatoria and carried out a mass missile strike on the Russian naval port of Sevastopol, damaging a dry dock with another large landing ship undergoing maintenance. A nearby diesel submarine could have also been damaged in the event.
Apart from the sinking of BSF flagship Moscow on 14APR2022, Ukrainians have not managed to sink another large ship as their naval drones appear to carry explosives too small to sink surface combatants. Although it is still too early, Ukraine may opt to damage the Russian BSF’s maintenance infrastructure in Sevastopol, which may have profound consequences for the BSF’s ability to carry out assigned tasks. In such cases, without dry docks, even damaged ships will be put out of service for a prolonged period, allowing Kyiv a much bigger freedom of movement in the Black Sea. Likewise, attacks on Crimea’s air defence network may cripple Moscow’s ability to protect the peninsula against cruise and ballistic missile strikes. The employment of ATACMS may further exacerbate these problems, although it is still unclear whether Ukraine will receive the system and, if so, what missile variant it will have. This will determine the depth of Ukrainian strikes against Russian critical military infrastructure.
The biggest problem for Ukraine will be the sustainability of such strikes, as the number of cruise missiles (Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG) received was limited, so it will likely be ATACMS. If attacks against BSF are to be successful, Ukraine needs to maintain pressure on BSF assets by conducting regular operations in the Black Sea.
Ukraine battle map
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The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
The past week delivered no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians focused on Rubizhne, Vovchansk, Kupyansk, Kyslivka, Kotlyarivka, Synkivka, Velyka Shapkivka, Izyums’ke and Kozacha Lopan, Vil’khuvatka, Vovchans’ki Khutory, Kutkivka, Velyka Shapkivka, Rubizhne and Velykyi Burluk.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Likewise, the past two weeks saw no frontline changes in the Luhansk Oblast.
Last week, Russian authorities held local elections in occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to elect regional legislatures, which, in turn, will appoint regional governors. Although the elections largely correspond with similar voting in Russia, in many cases, early voting commenced earlier than in Russia to ensure a high turnout. Russians also organised makeshift polling stations in public places and collected votes by going door to door. In addition, Russian passports were issued near polling stations.
At the same time, Roman Vlasenko, Ukrainian Severodonetsk City Head, claimed that Ukrainian local residents were spoiling ballots, damaging campaign materials, destroying election documents, and conducting arson attacks against polling stations to further challenge illegitimate elections in Severodonetsk.
More kinetic responses occurred elsewhere. On 9SEP, sabotage groups destroyed a car carrying ballots in Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast. Russian TV broadcasts in Crimea were also hacked and called for boycotts of the elections. In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainian drones destroyed polling stations in Berdyansk, Skelky, and Kamianka-Dniprovska. Ukrainians claimed to have identified more than 3,500 collaborators and Russian supervisors involved in organising and holding the elections.
Also in the south, on Thursday/Friday night (7SEP/8SEP), at least two explosions in one of the polling stations in Berdyansk occurred. On Friday (8SEP), Ukrainians targeted Polohy and struck residents of Penza, who arrived to control Russian elections in occupied territory.
Yet, despite this, it seems that for Moscow, the turnout was satisfactory. Russians reported turnout of 72.53% in the Luhansk People’s Republic, 66.83% in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, 74% in the Donetsk Peoples Republic and 62.23% in the Kherson Oblast.
When it comes to the frontline, on Tuesday (12SEP), Artem Lysohor, Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military administration head, said that Russians were not conducting large-scale attacks in the region because Ukrainian Forces inflicted significant losses on them between (04SEP-10SEP)
However, he claimed constant air, tank and artillery shelling along the entire frontline continued. He said Bilohorivka, Nadiya, Dibrova, Novojehorivka, and Serebryansky forest had been most struck. On Tuesday, Roman Vlasenko claimed that the epicentre of fighting was the Svatove district, where, although Russians lost the initiative, they continued to accumulate reserves.
On Monday (11SEP), Hanna Malyar, the Ukrainian Minister of Defence deputy, said that battles continued in the Kupyansk sector. Ukrainian forces successfully repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka. In the Lyman sector, the Russians continued to regroup troops. They also conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Berestove, Novoselivske and Novoyehorivka.
No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Throughout the week, Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian positions near Synkivka. A Russian source claimed that the Russian forces continued to pressure the UAF east of the Oskil River. Although these attacks continued throughout the week, they reportedly brought no significant frontline changes. Russian units captured several more strongholds, and Ukrainians in this direction suffered heavy losses and were forced to deploy reserves in the area. The UAF tried to stabilise the front through counterattacks. Another Russian source added that the Ukrainian command slowed down the advance of the Russian troops by deploying reserves, which reportedly came at the expense of Ukrainian operations in the Zaporizhzhia and Bakhmut areas. So far, we have seen no indications suggesting that the Zaporizhzhia Direction was being drawdown to reinforce northern parts of the front.
According to Ukrainian bloggers, battles for the height 190.8 continued near Novojehorivka, where Russians reportedly suffered heavy losses and made no gains as of Thursday (14SEP).
No changes occurred near Svatove.
Battles also continued near Novoselivske, but no frontline changes occurred in this area. Russian sources said that Ukrainians held their positions.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. The same perains to Terny, Torske, Yampolivka and Nevske.
In the Kreminna area, positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest. Russian units tried to attack in the Serebryanka direction, but we understand that these attempts were futile.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes near Bilohorivka.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian air strikes and artillery hit the 68th Separate Jaeger Brigade and the 14th, 30th, and 32nd Mechanised Brigades near Novohorivka, Synkivka and Zahoruykivka in the Kupyansk area.
Russian assault groups of the 20th Combined Arms Army captured a Ukrainian stronghold and four dugouts. Russian Motorised 1st Tank Army units supported by air and artillery fire repelled two attacks by elements of the 25th Airborne Brigade near Berestove. To restore lost positions, the Ukrainian 95th Airborne Assault Brigade, supported by armoured vehicles, conducted three counterattacks on Russian positions near Kovalivka but failed due to Russian artillery fire. Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters carried out 24 missile and bombing strikes against Ukrainian concentration areas of the 14th Separate Mechanised Brigade and territorial defence units near Synkivka, Berestove, and Ivanivka. An ammunition depot of the Ukrainian 103rd Territorial Defence Brigade was destroyed near Tabaivka. A command and observation post of a unit of the 106th Territorial Defence Brigade was hit near Novenke in the Sumy region, and an ammunition depot of the 118th Territorial Defence Brigade was destroyed near Hrem’yach in the Chernihiv region.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, 15 attacks by Ukrainian assault groups of the 21st, 63rd, 67th Mechanised Brigades, 12th “Azov” Special Forces Brigade, and the 5th Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard near Torske, Kuzmyne and the Serebryansky forest were repelled by Russian units with aviation and artillery support. Russian aviation also carried eight strikes with guided bombs against two Ukrainian command and observation posts and two deployment sites near Zarichne and Serebryanka.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Although Ukrainians made some gains in the region, they only carried a tactical significance without a big impact on the frontline. The state of equilibrium in the Donetsk Oblast Direction continued.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
The same goes for Vesele Vasiukivka and Fedorivka. According to Russian sources, position battles continued near Berkhivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka, but no changes were reported. According to Ilya Yevlash, the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group spokesman, near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Russians had 50,000 troops, more than 120 rocket and 150 artillery systems, more than 1,000 armoured vehicles, and 2,500 tanks. While the number of personnel and artillery systems could be correct, we find it highly unlikely that Russians possessed so much amour near this village or even the entire Donetsk Direction.
Hanna Malyar wrote on Monday (11SEP) that Russians tried to stop the Ukrainian offensive in the Bakhmut sector. Russians also unsuccessfully attempted to break through Ukrainian defences near Zaliznyanske, Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka. In turn, Ukrainian troops continued to advance near Klishchiivka and Andriivka. They pushed the Russians out (of some areas) and consolidated their positions. Over the past week (04 – 10 SEP), Ukrainians recaptured two square kilometres in the Bakhmut sector.
No changes were recorded in Bakhmut. According to a Ukrainian source, the “Ghost” group of the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky Separate Presidential Brigade operated near Monument Aircraft (Chajkovskogo St, 105). The group commander claimed that Ukrainian soldiers periodically made raids into the city to “destroy” Russian forces.
Ukrainians continued to push Russians back from Klishchiivka and near Andriivka. Russian journalists said on Monday (11SEP) that Ukrainian troops entered Andriivka, but Russian units continued to counterattack near Klishchiivka, and the AFU switched to defence in this sector. A Ukrainian soldier who fights in the Bakhmut direction said that heavy battles for Andriivka were ongoing when the abovementioned claim about the village’s liberation was made. He also claimed that in Klishchiivka, the Russians were tasked with regaining control of the lost positions, so they pulled up reserves.
On Tuesday (12SEP), a Ukrainian blogger claimed that the Ukrainian forces continued clearing Klishchiivka as Russian forces pulled back and took up defensive positions behind the railway line. However, on Wednesday (13SEP), another Russian source claimed that after the UAF gained a foothold in the southern part of Klishchiivka and tried to move towards the northern part, but Russian troops counterattacked and cleared part of the settlement.
Unofficial information posted on Friday (15SEP) alleged that Klishchiivka had been liberated.
On Thursday (14SEP), Malyar asserted that Ukrainians liberated Andriivka, an assessment that Ukrainian soldiers fighting near the village vehemently denied. On Friday (15SEP), however, the Ukrainian General Staff and the 3rd Assault Brigade confirmed the liberation, but so far, we have seen no visual confirmations of this development.
From a topographical point of view, the Ukrainian liberation of Kurdyumivka would present more opportunities for advancing Ukrainian forces as it would give them access to heights north of Horlivka and better positions towards the T-0513 road linking Horlivka with Bakhmut.
Moving further south, no changes occurred near Bila Hora and Ivanivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novokalynove, Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Vesele and Kamyanka.
In Avdiivka, no changes occurred. Russian units continued to attack from Kruta Balka but made no progress.
According to Vitaliy Barabash, head of Avdiivka Military Administration, Ukrainian troops entered Opytne. However, as of Friday (15SEP), it is still difficult to confirm whether Ukrainians gained a permanent foothold in the village. Russian sources also confirmed that Ukrainian troops advanced near Opytne but added that Kyiv extended the attack towards Spartak.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Severne, Vodyane and Nevelske.
According to Russian sources, Russian units continued to attack Ukrainian positions in Mariinka but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes. In the Mariinka area, Ukrainians reportedly utilised cluster munitions.
According to the Russian source, on Tuesday (12SEP), Russian units resumed their attack near Novomykhailivka, but no further information on this development was provided. Ukrainian sources did not report changes. No changes occurred near Pobjeda and Vuhledar. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian aviation destroyed Ukrainian attacking units and armoured vehicles in the Lysychansk, Soledar-Bakhmut, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Avdiivka and Mariinka directions. In cooperation with aviation and artillery, Russian units repelled 13 Ukrainian attacks of the 3rd Assault Brigade, 59th Motorised Brigade, 80th Air Assault Brigade,110th Mechanised Brigade and the 101st Security Brigade near Avdiivka and Mayorsk. The Russian operational-tactical aviation struck Ukrainian concentration areas of the 114th UAF Territorial Defence Brigade and command and observation posts of the 77th and 93rd Separate Airmobile Brigades near Nove. The Russian missile strikes destroyed a command and observation post of the Ukrainian 110th Mechanised Brigade in Avdiivka and a deployment point of units of the 28th Mechanised Brigade in Kostyantynivka. Also, an ammunition depot of the 28th Brigade was destroyed near Dyliivka. Solntsepek’s heavy flamethrower systems inflicted fire damage on the Ukrainian concentration area of the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade in Klishchiivka and Maloilinovka(?). Also, the Russian artillery destroyed three strongholds, a command and observation post and a deployment point near Klishchiivka, Ivanivske, Kurdyumivka and Zvanivka. The temporary deployment point of the unit of the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade in Paraskoviivka was also destroyed.
Southern Ukraine direction
Ukrainian attacks continued across all axes in the Southern Direction. However, despite this, Kyiv’s forces made minimal progress over the past two weeks.
Velyka Novosilka axis
Last week, both Russians and Ukrainians displayed
Last week, both Russians and Ukrainians displayed offensive actions in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
Both sides actively attacked in the western part of the axis (near Pryuutne) but also east of the Velyka Novosilka (Novodonetske-Novomayorske line).
The first Ukrainian attacks occurred on Friday (8SEP) when Ukrainians faced the Russian 37th Motor Rifle Brigade near Novodonetske. According to a Russian source, Russians repelled Ukrainian attacks. At the same time, the Ukrainian General Staff informed about the unsuccessful Russian counterattack near Prestichivka on the same day.
On this day (8SEP), Russian sources noted the concentration of Ukrainian forces near Staromlynivka (35th Naval Infantry Brigade) and Pryyutne (23rd Mechanised Brigade).
On Saturday (9SEP), Ukrainian sources claimed that the battle for Novomayorske commenced. A Russian drone recorded Ukrainian successfully crossing the Shaitanka River, while Russian artillery strikes targeted Ukrainian forces in the northern part of the settlement, so the source claimed that the Russians were pushed back at least to the centre of the village. The Russian source provided a video presenting the “road of death” used by Ukrainian forces in the area.
Two days later (11SEP), a Russian source said that Ukrainian units continued to pressure Russians near Novodonetske and Novomayorkse but added that the attackers made no progress. However, visual evidence suggests that Ukrainians made some progress north of the latter.
The same Russian source claimed on 10SEP that Ukrainian 23rd and 31st Mechanised Brigades were withdrawn to Mezhova and Heorhiivka in the Dnepropetrovsk region to restore combat capability.
Positional battles continued near Urozhaine and Staromaiorske, but Ukrainians were unable to progress south.
Last week, Ukrainian sources reported that Russians regained control of a forest area near Pryyutne. However, on Sunday (10SEP), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians failed to gain a foothold in the area. On the other hand, a Russian source claimed that after a counterattack, Russian troops regained some positions near the settlement. However, no detailed information about this development has been provided since.
The Orikhiv axis
Last week, fighting in the central part of the Orikhiv axis was more intense than concurrent battles in the Velyka Novosilka area.
In response to Ukrainian attacks west of Verbove, Russians launched a counterattack from the Novofedorivka, probably seeking to reach the rear of the Ukrainian troops advancing on Verbove and Novoprokopivka. In the previous UCM issue, we warned against such a development. Yet, despite some reports about Russian advances in the area, we have not been able to confirm any territorial gains.
On Friday (8SEP), Ukrainians used elements of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade to attack Russian positions near Verbove. Russian MoD informed about five such attacks on that day.
According to Russian sources, Ukrainians subsequently deployed forces of the 80th Air Assault Brigade to the frontline.
A day later (9SEP), Russians significantly increased their activity. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, they conducted up to 10 counterattack attempts near Robotyne. Notably, they involved the most capable formations of the Russian airborne forces.
Probably in response to these attacks, the 71st Jaeger Brigade elements were put into battle following restoration. They now operate with the 82nd in attacks towards Verbove. On top of that, the 65th Mechanised Brigade was also recommitted, but south of Robotyne.
The 13th National Guard Brigade reportedly arrived in Vozdvyzhivka, Verkhnya Tersa and Dolynka due to heavy losses within the 15th National Guard Brigade, which indicates that the latter could be soon withdrawn from the frontline. A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian troops captured a major Russian army stronghold on the first line of defence west of Verbove, but no detailed information was provided.
Also on Saturday (9SEP), Ukrainian elements of the 46th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades attacked near Verbove, while elements of the 46th Air Assault and 47th Mechanised Brigades pushed east of Robotyne, which reportedly resulted in heavy losses (46th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades, 132nd Reconnaissance Battalion lose 850 personnel combined).
On Sunday (10SEP), Ukrainians reported that Ukrainian tanks of the 116th Separate Mechanised Brigade were operating near Novoprokopivka. Another Ukrainian source also said that Ukrainian Forces advanced east of Novoprokopivka, close to the “dragon’s teeth” and the Russian Forces’ defensive lines. Russian sources claimed that all Ukrainian attacks were unsuccessful as Ukrainians would not break through the front line there.
On Monday (11SEP), Ukrainian General Staff confirmed another Russian offensive attempt in the central part of the Orikhiv axis as they counterattacked near Robotyne and Novodanylivka.
The Russian BOBR subunit provided several videos showing attacks on Ukrainian forces, which reportedly resulted in losing at least 3-4 pick-up trucks near Robotyne.
Unofficial sources reported that the Russian 1430th Motor Rifle Regiment (mobilised) practically ceased to exist due to the heavy losses and was subsequently replaced by the 1152nd Motor Rifle Regiment.
On Tuesday (12SEP), Russians still pushed near Robotyne and Novodanylivka. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the number of attacks exceeded ten.
Nonetheless, Ukrainians also reported that they could increase controlled territory near Robotyne, but it is unclear what this involved.
On Wednesday (13SEP), Ukrainian officials confirmed Ukrainian gains near Robotyne. According to the Ukrainian General Staff Spokesman, Andrey Kovalev, Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified “partial success” in this area.
Last week, the situation in the western part of the Orikhiv axis remained unchanged.
No direct battles occurred. Moreover, Russians decreased their fire activity.
They usually struck one/two villages daily. Kamyanske remained heavily shelled. Pyatchatki (8SEP) and Stepnohirsk (11SEP) were also struck.
On Tuesday (12SEP), the Russian source claimed that Ukrainians advanced between Robotyne and Verbove and tried to attack towards Novoprokopivka.
According to the Ukrainian Centre for National Resistance, Russia brought soldiers to Tokmak and strengthened fortifications as the Ukrainian Armed Forces counterattacked. According to the source, more anti-tank hedgehogs, checkpoints and defensive structures were established in the city.
On Monday (11SEP), Malyar stated that Ukraine liberated 4.8 sq km in the Zaporizhihiza Direction over the past week. Such small gains carry very limited tactical significance and have no operational or strategic impacts on the war.
According to Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Brigadier General, Commander of the Tavria (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts) Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, on Friday (09SEP), Ukrainian troops managed to advance about one kilometre in the Tavria sector.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units repelled five Ukrainian attacks conducted by the 38th Marine Brigade and 128th Territorial Defence Brigade near Novodonetske and Prechystivka. Russian artillery hit Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Pryyutne. The deployment points of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade of the UAF in Vodyane and places of accumulation of manpower of the 37th and 38th Marine Brigades near Urozhaine and Novodonetske, as well as temporary deployment points of the UAF 37th and 38th Marine Brigades in Novodonetske, Urozhaine, Zolota Nyva and the 79th UAF Airborne Assault Brigade in Novomikhailivka were also struck. Russian bomber, attack and army aviation struck Ukrainian concentration areas near Prechystivka, Staromaiorske and Urozhaine.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
According to the Russian source, on Tuesday (12SEP), Ukrainians landed on Kozatsky Island with two reconnaissance groups from the 131st Separate Reconnaissance Battalion with eight men each. No further information about Ukrainian operations appeared in the media or open sources about developments on the island.
Ukrainians also reportedly rotated the “Thunder” tactical group and the 126th Territorial Defence Brigade on Alyoshkinsky and Alekseevsky islands, where they reportedly stood up observation points. On Wednesday (13SEP), Russian sources stated that Ukrainians maintained positions near the Antonivsky Bridge.
On Wednesday night, Ukrainians carried out an attack that targeted a Russian S-400 battalion near Yevpatoria. It appears it was a double-tap attack. First, according to Ukrainian SBU, drones hit a radar degrading battalion’s ability to detect air threats, and then the site was hit by two(?) Ukrainian R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missile. Satellite imagery appears to confirm damages to the radar station and one TEL.
Undoubtedly, the most important event, which can potentially have operational consequences, was the Ukrainian cruise missile attack on the Black Sea Base in Sevastopol on Wednesday (13SEP). The attack probably targeted a dry dock in Sevastopol, which, at that time, was used to maintain the large Russian landing ship, Minsk (Project 775, Ropucha-class) and the diesel-electric submarine Rostov-on-Don (Project 636.3, Varshavyanka-class). Available footage showed significant damages to the Minsk. The status of Roston-on-Don is unclear. A reported satellite image appeared online on Wednesday evening, showing the site of the attack. Still, based on this image alone, we cannot conclude whether the vessel was at all hit, let alone conduct a battle damage assessment.
According to Russian sources, the attack was conducted with 10 Storm Shadow cruise missiles and three unmanned maritime vehicles. Russians claimed to have intercepted seven missiles and destroyed three drones.
A day before the attack, Ukrainians launched an operation on the Black Sea, which retook control of several gas and oil offshore drilling platforms close to Crimea. These rigs were under Russian control since 2015, following Moscow’s annexation of the peninsula.
According to Ukrainian reports and platforms, Ukrainians captured ammunition, fuel for helicopters and Neva-B Land Surface Surveillance Radar.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 467 aircraft (+1), 249 helicopters (+2), 6,800 UAVs (+507), 437 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+3), 11,865 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+278), 1,150 MLRS launchers (+3), 6,394 field artillery guns and mortars (+232), as well as 13,019 units of special military vehicles (+417).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 271,440 personnel (+7,950), 4,612 tanks (+153), 8,814 armoured combat vehicles (+201), 5,972 artillery systems (+442) and 774 MLR systems (+39), 521 anti-aircraft systems (+21), 315 aircraft (0) and 316 helicopters (0), and 4,714 UAVs (+293), 8,492 vehicles and fuel tanks (+483), 1,455 cruise missiles (+10), 20 warships and boats (+2), submarines 1 (+1), and 889 special vehicles (+58).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a fortnightly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Russian missile strikes were again limited last week. According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, the only missile attack occurred on 6SEP and involved seven Kh-101/Kh-505/Kh-55 cruise missiles and one 9K720 Iskander ballistic missile. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down all projectiles.
Regarding the use of Shaheds 131/136 kamikaze drones, the past two weeks saw a significant increase in the scale and number of their use. Within 12 days (03-15SEP), Russians fired 263 vehicles, and Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 188. This places the interception rate at around 77%, which is plausible. But to place the number of units launched into perspective, assuming the 77% interception rate, Russians previously launched 269 drones between 13JUN and 30AUG. In other words, within 12 days, Russians fired more drones than for six weeks from mid-July until the end of August. Likewise, ten attacks occurred within 12 days. Previously, ten attacks took place within 26 days.
Last week, the largest attack occurred on Wednesday (13AUG) when 44 vehicles were launched and 32 intercepted.
This can potentially indicate an increased tempo of their use over the coming weeks. An overage number of platforms used in the past seven attacks is also high and now stands at 20 drones, more than double what Russians were delivering in late August.
Outlook for the week of 16SEP-22SEP
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
Previous forecast
(Although our last forecast pertained to the week of 2SEP-8SEP, we will still reflect on it below).
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.” This forecast was correct.
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. Still, we expect no significant changes as a result of these actions. While Moscow could make tactical gains, given the current force commitments, they are unlikely to capture a village or more across the entire direction.” This prognosis was correct as well. Russians made no significant gains over the past two weeks (captured one village or more), suggesting their commitment level has not changed.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. Gains IVO Klishchiivka are possible. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are also unlikely to liberate any villages in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.” This assessment was correct (ish). Last week, Ukrainians entered Opytne, and unconfirmed reports indicated a liberation of Avdiivka.
Score: 0.5/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. There is roughly even chance that Ukranians will capture Verbove, but Kyiv’s success in this sector depends on the quantity of reserves Russians pulled up to the area. Apart from Verbove, we expect that Ukrainians are unlikely to liberate another village in the entire direction.” This forecast was correct. Ukrainians made no further gains besides liberating some areas southwest of Verbove, south of Robotyne, and near Novomayorske.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank IVO the Antonivskyi Bridge. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.” This assessment was correct.
Final score: 4.5/5 (90%)
The forecast for the week of 16SEP-22SEP
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. Still, we expect no significant changes as a result of these actions. While Moscow could make tactical gains, given the current force commitments, they are unlikely to capture a village or more across the entire direction. We expect no Ukrainian gains.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region over the next seven days. 2) We assess that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, it is highly unlikely that they will capture a village or more. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we maintain that the Ukrainian progress will highly likely continue to be very slow. Ukrainians are unlikely to capture Verbove or Novoprokopivka.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians will highly likely retain their forces on Dnipro’s left bank. They are also highly likely to continue conducting harassing attacks across the Dnipro, but these riverine operations are highly unlikely to develop into a major offensive operation in the region.
As an FYI, I checked with Jerome over at Militaryland.net - 80th air assault is only operating near Bakhmut according to his info. Shows up on your map along the Orihiv axis.
Minor curiosity. Me, I still think Ukraine forms 3-4 battle groups out of each brigade to rotate on/off the line every few months. Some might sustain two on the line at once sometimes. Not sure how else you keep a brigade at the front for a year or more.