Ukraine Conflict Monitor - Impressions from the visit to the frontlines in Ukraine + weekly update
Ukraine Conflict Monitor - Impressions from the visit to the frontlines in Ukraine + weekly update
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
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Key takeaways from last week's developments
Last week, continued to deliver mostly positional battles, where both sides attempted to make tactical gains; Russian centre of gravity remains firmly placed on the Avdiivka axis, but despite the preponderance of equipment and manpower, Moscow’s forces made marginal gains;
Russian air and missile strikes remained subdued and involved sporadic launches; the intensity of Shahed strikes increased, but still, it is far from early October figures;
The overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged as Russians continued to strike Ukrainian civilian areas with artillery; Russian SOF penetrated the border with Ukraine in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Cherkhiv Oblasts;
Russians maintained attacks in the northern parts of the Luhansk Oblast Direction (formally Kharkiv Oblast) but made no confirmed gains in the area; The frontline in other parts of the direction also remained unchanged;
The frontline near Avdiivka only saw minimal changes; the overall situation in this part of the Donetsk Direction also stayed the same as Russians continued their attempts to encircle the city; No further changes in the Donetsk Oblast were reported;
Marginal frontline changes occurred in the Southern Direction, where both sides captured some terrain;
Ukrainian units maintained their bridgeheads on the Dnipro’s left bank; They made no progress in land;
Executive summary
As you may know, I spent the past week in Ukraine with Michael Kofman, Rob Lee and Franz Stefan Gady. We spent a couple of days in Kyiv, but most of the time, we devoted to meeting troops in the south and east. We conducted many interviews, and undoubtedly, it was the most productive trip since the first one we took a year ago. We have a lot of food for thought, and I think we have a good idea of where the war currently stands.
Below, you will see my impressions from this latest study visit. I am stressing that these are my views. Undoubtedly, Mike’s, Rob’s and Stefan’s will be somehow different. Given that this post is behind the paywall, I will also allow myself to be more honest. Please ping me beforehand if you are a journalist who wishes to use excerpts from the points I make below.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive ended without achieving its primary or secondary objectives; It is good that General Zaluzhny made it clear in the Economist article that there will be no breakthrough; Ukrainian operational potential in Zaporizhihia is exhausted;
From my point of view, the discrepancy between tactics and strategy was too big and consequently, Ukraine’s approach during the counteroffensive (small unit) tactics could not deliver the expected objectives;
But the downside to Zaluzhny’s article was one of the words he used: stalemate. I think (and this is purely my own interpretation) that Zelensky’s approach centres around exerting continuous pressure on Western partners to provide Ukraine with equipment. In this context, a stalemate, a cessation of activities, or the freezing of the frontline has strong 2015 vibes and could result in the freezing of the war in general. Ukrainian political leadership wants to avoid such an outcome as it may encourage some Western partners to seek to go “back to business as usual” with Russia.
That’s why Zelensky quickly hit back to Zaluzhny’s words, saying there was no stalemate. But Zelensky nevertheless dismissed the commander of Ukrainian SOF behind Zaluzhny’s back;
It is, therefore, clear that the relationship between both men is strained;
Personally, I heard nothing about the issue of “negotiations with Russia”;
I expect Ukrainian attacks in the south (Kherson and Zaporizhiia) to continue over the coming weeks and months, even though they can only deliver tactical gains.
For weeks, we warned (Rochan) that the Ukrainian intensity of operations would need to decrease due to shortages of artillery munitions (we predicted late September-early October). Ultimately, we were slightly off. Ukrainian access to artillery munitions is limited, resulting in significantly decreased intensity of artillery strikes. With Ukraine’s land forces being very artillery-centric, it is hard to imagine any major(ish) offensive actions over the next six months. A lot will depend on the Western supply of artillery munitions. Still, with the US and Europe not fulfilling their production objectives, Ukraine may limit their offensive operations throughout the entire 2024.
Western supplies of artillery ammunition are not only limited but also occur irregularly, which makes it very difficult to plan fire missions; Likewise, Ukrainians would like to understand the logistics of any system in the long term perspective so that they could plan operations accordingly over a longer period;
With small exceptions (Kherson and Orikhiv), Ukrainians are now on the defensive along the entire front, which will likely necessitate the creation of fortified lines on the Ukrainian side; This, combined with mobilisation (see below), would significantly decrease pressure on Ukrainian forces needed (also its quality) to defend the frontline;
The aftermath of the counteroffensive will likely force Kyiv to rework its theory of victory. I think that pushing Russia out of Ukraine (even to pre-FEB22) border will be an incredibly difficult task. As stated, the initiative has shifted. Russia is now on the offensive, and with its economy or war footing, it can produce more of everything compared to Ukraine. Its economic potential can sustain the war, and I expect Russians to conduct several attempts to break the frontline deadlock from now until the end of 2024;
Ukraine suffers from shortages of almost everything, although its industry is working hard to plug some gaps. For instance, Ukraine plans to produce hundreds of thousands of drones next year, which can not only improve its ISR but fill some gaps caused by an insufficient number of artillery shells;
The deficit of 152 mm shells is huge, but ideally, over the next few years, Ukrainians would like to make the full switch to NATO’s 155 mm standard;
Ukrainians cannot scale production as fast as the Russians, leaving them vulnerable in many areas (artillery production, armour, drones, missiles); Another interesting, although not necessarily surprising, idea is to push a lot of funding from the government to the private/NGO sector; Ukrainian companies made great quality products and are more cost-effective and flexible in fulfiling military needs; They also respond to changes in requirements quicker;
Some gaps will be more difficult to address. For instance, many Ukrainian soldiers we spoke to spoke highly of M113s APCs and asked for more; No one asked for ATACMS, but almost everyone asked for M113s; Request for ATACMS was political rather than military driven, although again, everything depends on the numbers; My view is that if Ukrainian soldiers were to choose between hundreds of M113s and 20 ATACMS, they’d choose the former;
Tanks are neither obsolete nor heading for obsolescence; They are used regularly, and Ukrainians asked for more; They continue to offer a high degree of manoeuvrability, firepower and protection;
The war is also very drone-centric. There could be 20 drones flying near the frontline along the 10 km wide front. Neither side has the ability to achieve a tactical surprise unless an attack is launched in drone adverse weather (rain with very heavy winds); Readiness to respond to ground attacks is very high. We saw Russian troops (a platoon) walking towards the frontline. Once they were detected, they were engaged by mortars within 30 seconds and by artillery cluster munitions after an additional four minutes. Both sides have capabilities to ISR opposing forces’ tactical depths;
As you are hopefully accustomed to how we report frontline changes (The situation at selected axes and directions), we want to make it clear that probably 90% (if not more) of attacks conducted by both sides involve squad/platoon formations. Company-level attacks are a rarity; That’s why initial Russian attacks near Avdiivka were so unusual, as they involved the concurrent deployment of battalions/regiments, something we have not seen since MAR2022;
Ukrainians suffer from the lack of battalion commanders. That’s many in some brigades, battalions were expanded to include new companies;
Morale is high, but troops are also exhausted; Many have been in the fight for months or, in some cases, more than a year. Legislation has been introduced now to allow 40-day of vacations a year, something which was welcomed by soldiers on the ground;
The bulk of Ukrainian forces are deployed in or near the front, which makes it very difficult to train and regenerate formations. In this context, I believe that Kyiv’s current approach to mobilisation (ongoing but hidden) is insufficient to build up forces necessary for force regeneration, let alone future large-scale counteroffensives;
Although the initial training has been extended from 30 to 60 days, it still fails to address manpower gaps. Even partial mobilisation would allow currently deployed troops to be rotated, retrained and regenerated, which should improve their survivability (decrease losses) and increase combat effectiveness;
Although it has already been reported in the Polish press, we confirmed that Polish 155mm Krab SPHs are very versatile. The manufacturer recommends changing the barrel every 1,500 fires. Some Ukrainian guns fired more than 6,000 rounds. As a result, some barrels can now fire 157 mm rounds;
Russians don’t conserve glide bombs;
Russians continue to operate Ka-52s with three usually on standby; if a target pops up, one helo lights it with a laser and two engage with missiles; They have a new missile with 11-12 km range.
Ukrainians cannot effectively counter this threat;
There are concerns that Russians may finally push to reach the Osikl River in the Kharkiv Oblast (they have the capacity); However, at the same time, troops told us that some Russian actions appeared to have a fixing character; We cannot presently assess the likelihood of a Russian large-scale attack in this area;
The situation in Kupyansk is interesting in that Russians have the capacity to reach the Osikl River; If attacks are successful, Russians may again begin to hit Kharkiv with artillery;
This is it. As you can see, the overall situation does not look great, both on the frontlines and internally in Ukraine. Russia will likely maintain the initiative, while Ukrainians may focus on defensive operations, some limited ground attacks, and drone attacks on targets across Russia, especially if Moscow starts attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure. A reported redeployment of S-400s (pending IMINT confirmation) from the Kaliningrad Oblast to southern Russia indicates that Moscow could be preparing for such a scenario.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units for which we don’t know their current whereabouts. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides as well.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
(This section only covers ground developments in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian artillery strikes across the entire region).
No changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past seven days.
According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Vovchansk, Budarky, Kupyansk, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Pletenivka, Nesterne, Stroivka, and Topoli.
A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Monday (13NOV) that many Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered the northern parts of the country daily. Although we cannot substantiate the scale of these actions, during our trip to Ukraine, one source confirmed that Russians indeed penetrated the Russia-Ukraine border in the Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts regularly.
On Wednesday (16NON), a Russian source asserted that Russian troops struck Ukrainian facilities in Chuhuiv in the Kharkiv Oblast. Oleh Synehubov claimed that Russians hit buildings of an educational institution and a private residential building with S-300 missiles.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
Russians continued attacks on the northern parts of the direction, but they brought no frontline changes.
On Sunday (12NOV), the Ukrainian source claimed that battles continued near Lyman Pershyi, Synkivka and Orlianka. The source also added that Russians were deploying new reserves to further pressure Ukrainian lines near Kupyansk.
On Tuesday (14NOV), the same source said that battles continued near Pershotravneve, Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka. Moreover, Ukrainians said that Russians enjoyed a significant manpower advantage in places they chose to attack, allowing them to advance up to 1-2 positions daily.
Indeed, the Russian source claimed on Wednesday (15NOV) that Russian troops had been on the outskirts of Synkivka. The same added that the Ukrainian command planned to rotate the 32nd Mechanised Brigade due to critical losses and replace them with the 115th Mechanised Brigade. Reportedly, as a result of high losses, Ukrainians were also forced to create combined groups from different brigades. Near Ivanivka, Russian units captured a stronghold on the approaches to the settlement. So far, we have seen no visual evidence confirming these changes.
When it comes to frontline changes in other parts of the region, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Kyslivka, Ivanivka and Krohmalne, Dvorichna, Svatove, Novoselivske, and Stelmakhivka.
According to the Russian source on Monday (13NOV) Ukrainian troops tried to counterattack near Raihorodka. No detailed information about this development was provided. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks. Also, no changes occurred near Nevske, Terny, Yampolivka and Torske.
No changes occurred In the Kreminna area. On Monday (13NOV), the Russian source claimed that positional battles continued near Dibrova and Serebryansky foreset.
No changes were recorded in the Bilohorivka area. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, over the past week, Russian units, supported by aviation and artillery fire, repelled 33 attacks by Ukrainian assault groups of the 30th, 54th, 67th Mechanised Brigades and 57th Motorised Brigade of the UAF near Synkivka, Tymkivka(?) and Zagoruykivka(?) in Kharkiv region. Due to combat operations in the Kupyansk area, Russian aviation carried out missile and bombing strikes on Ukrainian temporary deployment points, company and platoon strongholds of the 57th Motorised Infantry Brigade, the 14th Mechanised Brigade and the 67th Mechanised Brigade near Kalynove, Synkivka and Tymkivka. The Russian heavy flamethrower systems struck a Ukrainian concentration area of the 32nd Mechanised Brigade near Zagoruykivka. The Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters carried out air strikes against concertation areas, weapons and military equipment of the 25th Airborne Brigade, the 32nd and 41st Mechanised Brigades, 68th Jaeger Brigade and Territorial Defence units near Stelmakhivka, Novojehorivka, Ivanivka, Synkivka, Berestove, Kyslivka and Radionovka. In addition, heavy flamethrower systems struck the Ukrainian concentration area of the 68th Jaeger Brigade in the Serhiivka.
According to Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Lyman direction, Ukrainian assault groups of the 24th, 47th, 63rd, 67th Mechanised Brigades, the 12th "Azov" Special Forces Brigade, the 15th National Guard Regiment and the 1st Special Purpose Brigade of the UAF launched 21 attacks near Dibrova, Kreminna and the Serebryansky forest. All assaults were reportedly repelled.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon)
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Russians sustained attacks on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area but made no confirmed territorial gains. The frontline in other parts of the direction remained unchanged.
No changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka. The same pertains to Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka and Vesele.
On Saturday (11NOV), Volodymyr Fitio, spokesman at the Ground Forces Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, stated that the Russians had come out of the deadlock and were attacking the Ukrainian Armed Forces' positions with renewed vigour. A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Saturday (11NOV) that Russians continued to put heavy pressure on Berkhivka and Khromove in the Bakhmut area and gradually pushed the UAF from their positions near the settlements. On Sunday (12NOV), the Russian source asserted that Russian troops with artillery support tried to attack near Dubovo-Vasylivka but were unsuccessful. Further, the Ukrainian bloggers also claimed on Sunday that Russians put heavy pressure on Yahidne, intending to advance towards Chasiv Yar, a task (movement forward) reportedly partly achieved on Monday (13NOV). Russian tempo of attacks clearly increased in the area over the past week.
The Russian source also confirmed these changes on Tuesday (14NOV), adding that Russian forces had significantly expanded the zone of control near Berkhivka towards Bohdanivka.
The Ukrainian source said on Tuesday (14NOV) that while Ukrainians "dominated" in areas south of Bakhmut, the situation north of the city was challenging.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bohdanivka.
In Bakhmut, no changes accrued. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Positional battles continued along the Klishchiivka - Andriivka – Kurduymivka line. Russian journalists on Sunday (12NOV) claimed on Sunday and Monday (12 and 13NOV) that Russian troops, supported by artillery, counterattacked near Andriivka and Klishchiivka but were unsuccessful.
No changes occurred near Ivanivske, Bila Hora and Niu York. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.
Ukrainian sources claimed on Thursday (16NOV) that Ukrainian forces entered the Donetsk People's Republic-occupied (DPR) areas around Horlivka, which has been under DPR's control since 2014. This report was reportedly made in response to changes Deep State made to their map, which showed minor changes in control near the city. However, we have not been able to confirm this development. Secondly, this event, even if it happened, will not impact the operational situation in this region.
Moving further south, the battle for Avdiivka continued. On Sunday (12NOV), Russians launched multiple attacks out of Krasnohorivka, either towards Novokalynove, Stepove, Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant, or Ocheretyne. The main objective of these attacks was to find weaknesses in Ukrainian lines that could be later exploited. However, these attempts brought no frontline changes.
Another Ukrainian source claimed on Sunday that the UAF repelled a massive Russian attack near Stepove with Bradley's infantry fighting vehicle.
On Monday (13NOV), a Russian source claimed that the Russian units had expanded their zone of control near Stepove, gaining a foothold on the outskirts of the village. Heavy battles also continued west of the slag heap and near the Coke Plant. In mid-week, Russians remained active near the slag heap, the Avdeyevskiy Coke Plant and near Krasnohorivka, forcing the Ukrainians to transfer additional units.
Stepove is in the "grey zone", while as of Thursday (16NOV), Russian forces advanced near Novokalynove. Another Russian source also confirmed on Thursday that Russian assaults continued in the north along the railway, and Russians achieved some success. So far, we have not been able to validate these claims about recent gains north of Avdiivka.
South of the city, on Sunday (12NOV), Russian troops reportedly tried to attack the southern approaches to the city but were unsuccessful. On Tuesday (14NOV), the Ukrainian source claimed that Russian troops conducted assault operations west of Kamyanka. But Ukrainian positions along the entire Avdiivka front were engaged with long-range weapons. Yet, despite this, the line of contact did not change significantly.
On Sunday (12NOV), Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Russians were trying to improve their tactical position near Voidane. Ukrainian units in Pervomaiske were also targeted by FPV drones, which Russians had been deploying into the area.
The Russian source said on Sunday (12NOV) that Russian troops tried to attack near Sjeverne but failed. The same source added on Wednesday (16NOV) that Russian troops continued to conduct assaults near Pervomaiske and Sjeverne and that they had the initiative.
Vitaliy Barabash, the Head of the Avdiivka City Military Administration, claimed on Monday (13NOV) that Russian losses in Avdiivka had already exceeded their losses in Vuhledar and Bakhmut. This means at least 3,000-4,000 killed, 7,000-8,000 thousand wounded, and more than 400 pieces of equipment lost. We assess that Russian combined personnel losses in Bakhmut and Vuhledar were bigger.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke, Opytne and Nevelske.
No changes occurred near Mariinka. On Sunday (12NOV), the Russian journalist said that Russian troops continued to conduct attacks near the city but were unsuccessful. A day later, the same source asserted that Russian troops achieved some tactical success near Mariinka. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks. We were also not able to substantiate these claims.
On Sunday (12NOV), a Russian source claimed that Russian troops attempted assaults on Ukrainian positions near Novomykhailivka but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Pobieda and Vuhledar.
According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk direction, Russian units of the Southern Group of Forces repelled 19 Ukrainian attacks and near Bilohorivka, Vasyukivka, Razdolivka, Kurduymivka and Klishchiivka. The Ukrainian 79th Airborne Assault Brigade was struck by Russian artillery near Novomykhailivka. In addition, the 28th Mechanized Brigade, 77th Airmobile Brigade and the 241st Territorial Defence Brigade were hit near Kurdyumivka, Rozdolivka and Bohdanivka.
Southern Ukraine direction
The past week delivered no frontline changes in the region.
Velyka Novosilka axis
No changes in the Velyka Novosilka axis occurred over the past week.
On Monday (13NOV), a Russian source said that the Ukrainians had resumed attacks near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske. The battles occurred in the villages' northern parts. The source said that although Ukrainian attacks failed, positional battles continued. The source also added that the Russian Forces remain active north of Pryyutne and Urozhaine. However, no changes on the frontline were recorded.
On Wednesday (15NOV), the Russian source claimed that Russian troops tried to attack near Staromaiorske but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian sources did not report changes/attacks.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.
Orikhiv axis
Battles in the Orikhiv axis continued, but they, too, brought no frontline changes.
On Sunday (12NOV), Ukrainian forces reportedly moved to systematic attempts to retake the initiative. With the support of long-range weapons, they seek to advance near Rivne and Verbove.
The source added that from the direction of Novofedorivka, the Russian forces tried to counterattack, it is unclear whether this delivered expected results. On Sunday, the Ukrainian source claimed that battles occurred near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, while Russians said the same about Robotyne on Tuesday.
On the eastern flank, Ukrainians continued to attack Russian positions northwest of Verbove and towards Novofedorivka. The Russian source said neither side could turn the situation around. The weather and forces deployed by both sides meant the frontline remained unchanged. Ukrainian source also claimed on Tuesday (14NOV) that battles continued near Robotyne. A day later, attacks were expanded to include areas near Kopani, Rivne, Novoprokopivka and Verbove. Neither was reportedly successful. These attacks include armoured vehicles, while artillery preparation involves the employment of cluster munitions.
On Monday (13NOV), the Russian journalist claimed that the Russian Forces had become more active near Pyatykhatky and seized several new positions. However, the source said there were no serious attempts to break through the Ukrainian defensive positions here.
On Saturday (11NOV), the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (military intelligence) reported that three Russian officers had been killed in Melitopol in an explosion at their headquarters. The Russians set up their headquarters in the Nova Poshta delivery company's office premises. The attack on the headquarters occurred during a meeting of Russia's Federal Security Service and National Guard (Rosgvardiya) officers.
According to Oleg Chekhov, a Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the South Donetsk direction, the Russian operational-tactical and army aviation, missile troops and artillery forces hit concentration areas of the Ukrainian 72nd, 79th Mechanised Brigade and the 129th Territorial Defence Brigade near Mykylske and Pryyutne. With artillery support, Russian units disrupted six attempts to rotate UAF units near Novomykhailivka, Staromaiorske, Malynivka and north of Pryyutne.
Kherson Direction and Crimea
Ukrainians maintained their presence on Dnipro's left bank but made no confirmed progress deeper inland. We assess that Ukrainians do not have the capacities available for a larger push towards Crimea.
On Sunday (12NOV), Ukrainians attacked Russian positions near Poima and Pishchanivka, meaning that they made no progress in this area for weeks.
In turn, Russians were trying to dislodge Ukrainian units from their bridgehead in Krynky, where, according to Ukrainian bloggers, battles continued.
A Ukrainian soldier also claimed on Sunday (12NOV) that battles occurred along the entire Dnipro coast on the left bank, and the UAF were trying to advance everywhere. He added that Ukrainian marines had made significant progress over the past few weeks, a claim that remains unsubstantiated with visual evidence. Another Ukrainian source added that Ukrainian marines were present on the island near Bilohrudove.
Battles continued on Monday (13NOV) near Poima, Pishchanivka, Pidstepne and Krynky. The source also said that Russian forces achieved some partial success near Krynky, but he did not provide details as to what this could have involved.
Another Russian source claimed on Monday that for the past two days, Ukrainians had been rotating their forward operating units operating in Krynky. Due to intense Russian artillery fire, the Ukrainian Navy's assault units were forced to reinforce the bridgehead with additional forces. Ukrainian combined groups of the 35th, 36th and 38th Marine Brigades were moved into the central part of the Krynky village. Two detachments of the 36th Brigade were sent to the forest area adjacent to the village.
On Monday, Russian press services TASS and RIA Novosti reported that Russian troops were moving (withdrawing) troops to "more favourable positions" east of the Dnipro River. The story was quickly removed from both services' websites. The Russian MoD called the story a provocation. So far, we have seen no significant changes in Russian force dispositions and their operations in the Kherson Direction.
Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, asked on Tuesday (14NOV) for "information silence" so that they could report on "great successes" later. She noted that the Russians were actively defending because they knew the Ukrainian units were advancing. The Russians could not calculate from which direction to expect danger, so they were trying to activate heavy artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems and tactical aviation. Humeniuk added that the Ukrainian Forces were pushing back the Russians on a frontline between 3-8 kilometres wide, and the situation was "quite dynamic".
On Wednesday (15NOV), a Russian source claimed that battles continued near Poima, Pishchanivka and Krynky. Russian troops continued to strike Ukrainian positions with the support of all possible means. A Ukrainian soldier from the 36th Marine Brigade said on the same day that everything was going well for Ukrainians at Krynky.
Natalia Humeniuk asserted on Thursday (16NOV) that Russia had already amassed more than 800 missiles in Crimea to strike at the Ukrainian energy sector during winter. Humeniuk noted that the Russians had deployed a powerful hub of military resources in Crimea, in particular, Kalibr and Oniks missiles. According to her, the air-launched missiles are concentrated where they will be loaded onto aircraft.
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 536 aircraft (+11), 254 helicopters (0), 8,960 UAVs (+648), 441 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 13,426 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+291), 1,184 MLRS launchers (+7), 7,121 field artillery guns and mortars (+154), as well as 15,312 units of special military vehicles (+628).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 316,760 personnel (+13,490), 5,415 tanks (+150), 10,132 armoured combat vehicles (+231), 7,712 artillery systems (+384) and 895 MLR systems (+41), 585 anti-aircraft systems (+19), 323 aircraft (+1) and 324 helicopters (0), and 5,709 UAVs (+214), 1,563 cruise missiles (+12), 22 warships and boats (+2), submarines 1 (0), 10,077 vehicles and fuel tanks (+386), and 1,086 special vehicles (+52).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a fortnightly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
Russian use of missiles remained limited. Over the past two weeks, Russians conducted five missile strikes, which involved at least 11 missiles (Ukrainians did not provide the number of fired missiles for one of the strikes, but it involved at least three missiles). Out of this number, Kyiv claimed to have shot down seven missiles. The type of projectiles was mixed and included Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missiles, 9K723 and 9K728 Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles, Kh-31, Kh-35, and P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles.
The number of Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones fired against targets across Ukraine started increasing in early November. In late October, Russians averaged seven vehicles per strike (past seven strikes average). As of late this week, this number rose to 13, although it is still smaller compared to early October when it stood at 23. Ukrainian interception rate over the past two weeks stood at 74%. But we believe this number does not fully reflect Ukrainian air defence performance. Although this may be a far-fetched conclusion at this stage, it appears that Ukrainians may be struggling when Russians employ a large number of Shaheds. For instance, the 11NOV strike involved 31 vehicles, of which 19 were shot down (61%). The 6NOV strike involved 22 drones, of which 68% were intercepted. Although we need to add that on 16NOV, Russians fired 18 Shaheds, and Ukrainians shot down 16 (89%).
The intensity of Russian ground attacks reached a short-term low on 30OCT when Russians launched 30. Since then, this figure has gradually risen and peaked on 10NOV (87). So far, these attacks have not translated into any tactically significant territorial gains.
Outlook for the week of 18NOV-24NOV2023
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Although the previous forecast was made two weeks ago, let’s reflect on it to see what changed.
Previous forecast
“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.“ This assessment was correct.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely to continue. It is unlikely that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” Indeed, despite ground attacks over the past two weeks, Russians made no confirmed territorial gains in this direction. Ukrainians remained on the defensive.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, even then, we believe they are unlikely to progress in this part of the front. 2) We assess that Russians are likely to make gains in the Avdiivka axis. There is a roughly even chance that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.” Ukrainians made no gains in the region, while Russians progressed slightly near Stepove, northwest of Avdiivka.
Score: 1/1
“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. But, we also assess that there is a roughly even chance that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis.” The frontline remained mostly static in this direction over the past two weeks.
Score: 1/1
“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance that they will capture some land, but we think they will unlikely capture a village or more.” While attacks indeed continued, it is unclear whether Ukrainians at all progressed. No visual evidence surfaced confirming permanent gains.
Final score: 5/5 (100%)
The forecast for the week of 18NOV-24NOV2023
In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.
Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region.
When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk axis are highly likely (no change) to continue. It is unlikely (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) We continue to assess that Ukrainian attacks will only be limited to the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area. Still, even then, we believe they are highly unlikely to progress (decrease in probability) in this part of the front. 2) We assess that Russians are likely (no changes) to make gains in the Avdiivka axis. There is a roughly even chance (no changes) that they will progress in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka area.
Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that Ukrainians are highly unlikely (no changes) to progress, let alone capture a village in the entire region. But, we also assess that there is a roughly even chance (no changes) that Russians will reclaim some territory in the Velyka Novosilka axis.
In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no changes) to continue (ground) attacking Russian positions on Dnipro’s left bank and may deploy additional forces. There is a roughly even chance (no changes) that they will capture some land, but we think they are highly unlikely (decrease in probability) to capture a village or more.