Ukraine Conflict Monitor - Weekly update 26 December 2022 – 1 January 2023
Key takeaways
Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;
Ukrainians remain offensively active in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast. They inched closer to Kreminna while many areas remained strongly contested. Russians counterattacked many times, but they also did not manage to alter the frontline;
The situation in the Donetsk Oblast remained largely unchanged. Following Ukrainian gains two weeks ago, Russians recaptured some territories south of Bakhmut; The city remains firmly under Ukrainian control;
There were no confirmed changes in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts;
In both regions, Ukrainians continued to conduct high-precision strikes against Russian concentration areas. As a result of one such strike, Russians reportedly lost between 50 and 600 men.
Last week, Russians also launched massive air strikes on Ukraine, but the impact on the power grid was limited. On a couple of occasions, all Kamikaze drones aimed at Ukraine were shot down;
We saw no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces, although the exercise tempo remains heightened;
Last week also saw an increase in the movement of Russian assets into Belarus. Several heavy transport aircraft landed late in the week, but it remains unclear what they brought. That said, we continue to estimate that the total number of Russian reservists deployed to Belarus does not exceed 10,000 men. No indications suggest that an attack from the north is imminent.
General outlook
Last week delivered no major frontline shifts in Ukraine. Strategically and operationally, the situation remains unchanged. Both sides limit their operations to artillery strikes with limited ground attacks. Ukrainians try to push Russians deeper into the Luhansk Oblast, but the overall progress has been incremental at best. Despite some forward movement near Kreminna, the frontline in Luhansk Oblast is largely deadlocked. The number of Russian counterattacks in this direction also increased, but the impact on the frontline situation was non-existent.
Following the loss of Opytne near Bakhmut two weeks ago, Russians launched a counterattack, which probably allowed them to recapture most of the settlement. Although some tactical gains were made, Moscow’s operations in the Donetsk Oblast are characterised by fruitless, small-scale assaults, which have no chance of fundamentally altering the battlefield.
The situation in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions did not change either. Russians enhanced their defensive posture by creating additional fortifications on approaches to major cities. At the same time, Ukrainians carried on high-precision attacks on Russian concentration areas and high-value targets in the rear. Despite various Ukrainian and Russian claims on social media over the past couple of months, there was no information indicating that either side was preparing for a large-scale attack in either direction. On the other hand, these trends confirm that Russian posture is inherently defensive and Moscow is preparing for a possible Ukrainian attack, especially from Zaporizhzhia. At the same time, Kyiv shapes the battlefield by slowly degrading the Russian ability to supply and command their forces in southern parts of Ukraine.
On 29DEC, Bloomberg reported that Washington was considering sending Bradley Fighting Vehicle as a part of the new military support package. Many questions remain unanswered. Firstly, the final decision has not yet been made, and it is unclear when it will be made, if at all. Secondly, we do not know which Bradley variants could be donated and when deliveries could occur. It seems Washington is looking for ways to counter an alleged Russian plan to conduct a large-scale attack during springtime and significantly upgrade the Ukrainian inventory to allow Kyiv to withstand Russian attacks and liberate lost territories. Bradley would undoubtedly prove to be a major addition to Ukrainian mechanised forces. The vehicle’s 25 mm gun and TOW missiles allow it to face not only Russian BMP-2/3 equivalents but also T-72s or older generation tanks. Equally important, Kyiv is establishing a couple of corps (each consisting of 3-4 brigades), so additional equipment is needed to make this plan reality. The number of Soviet-era pieces of equipment that could be realistically donated to Ukraine appears very low, so the westernisation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces needs to continue if Kyiv is to push Moscow to pre-February borders.
Russian artillery ammo supplies
On 31DEC, Kyrylo Budanov, the Chief of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (military intelligence), held a presser where he spoke about various issues about the Russian Armed Forces and their operations in Ukraine. One of the items discussed pertained to Russian artillery ammunition stocks. Budanov stated that Moscow was experiencing a significant degradation in available stocks and that problems would continue to exacerbate until March 2023. Budanov claimed that Russians currently fire 19,000-20,000 shells per day, compared to 60,000 at some unspecified date. This significantly impairs the Russian ability to support its manoeuvre and inflict damage on defending and attacking Ukrainian forces. Budanov also added that to support its operations in Ukraine, Russians had also removed all remaining artillery ammunition from storage sites in Belarus.
Looking at the number of artillery strikes reported by the UGS, we have seen no decrease in Russian artillery strikes. On the contrary, there was an increase in several locations last week. Although this could have been related to New Year’s celebrations and the desire to keep Ukrainians in shelters on 31DEC, the number of artillery strikes has roughly been maintained since October. The data provided by the UGS certainly does not support Budanov’s comments.
Attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure
Last week, Russians launched two attacks on critical infrastructure targets in Ukraine. On 31DEC, over 20 cruise missiles and ten Shahed-131/136 kamikaze drones. Reportedly 12 missiles and all UAVs were intercepted.
Two days earlier, on 29DEC, Moscow conducted a much larger attack. Altogether, 69 missiles (both air- and sea-launched: Kh-101/Kh-555, Kalibr, Kh-22, Kh-32, and Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles) and 23 drones were launched, of which Ukrainian air defence units shot down 54 missiles and 11 UAVs. The targets included facilities in Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Donetsk Oblasts. Nevertheless, ten critical infrastructure targets and 28 civilian buildings were damaged. Initially, these strikes caused widespread disruptions to energy, heating, and water supplies, but interruptions were quickly addressed, and the overall impact on Ukraine’s power grid was relatively limited.
Weather forecast
Next week will deliver mixed weather in Ukraine. The first part of the week will see temperatures firmly above zero. The forecast shows temperatures in Kharkiv between -1 and 9 degrees Celsius. However, a cold spell is expected from Friday onwards, when the temperatures are forecasted to drop to -10 degrees Celsius. This freezing weather will also bring snow showers.
A slightly warmer weather is expected in Bakhmut (-8 degrees Celsius), while the cold spell in Zaporizhzhia will see temperatures drop to -5 degrees Celsius coupled with rain and snow showers.
Consequently, looking only through the weather forecast’s prism, only the Kharkiv situation could facilitate an offensive operation. That said, the freezing spell is to be short-lived. Temperatures are expected to return to around 0 degrees Celsius by the start of the following week (9JAN)
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 355 aircraft (+3), 199 helicopters (+7), 2,779 UAVs (+55), 399 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 7,350 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+110), 957 MLRS launchers (+17), 3,756 field artillery guns and mortars (+48), as well as 7,859 units of special military vehicles (+112).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (killed) 106,720 personnel (+4,670), 3,031 tanks (+20), 6,084 armoured combat vehicles (+74), 2,021 artillery systems (+30) and 423 MLRS (+5), 213 anti-aircraft systems (+1), 283 aircraft (0) and 269 helicopters (+2), and 1,792 UAVs (+86), 4,720 vehicles and fuel tanks (+85), 16 warships and boats (0) and 181 pieces special equipment (+3).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russians suffered heavy personnel losses. Russians lost 4,670 men compared to 3,370, 4,140, and 2,990 soldiers two, three, and four weeks ago, respectively. These losses are probably exaggerated. We also do not fully understand where they may have come from. The current phase of the war is very artillery-centric, which undoubtedly negatively impacts Russian (and Ukrainian) casualty rates. Russian medical support is also worse than Ukrainian, which also influences Russian death rates. That said, it is unlikely that the bulk of these deaths was caused by artillery strikes alone. Last week, Russians conducted several counterattacks in Kharkiv/Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. A vast majority of them were repelled. But here, too, we do not think that these attacks were large enough to cause so many deaths.
Based on the locations of Russian artillery strikes provided by the Ukrainian General Staff, last week saw an increase in Russian artillery strikes across Ukraine, especially in Zaporizihihia Oblast. However, an uptick was also visible in Sumy, Donetsk and Kherson Oblasts. Indeed, the above-shown map shows many cross-border attacks in the Sumy Oblast, which were not visible for months.
Artillery strikes averaged 81 per day, higher than in previous weeks. On 31DEC, Russians struck Ukraine 101 times, which is above the average of 50-100 strikes that were maintained since October. The question is whether the geographical scope of these strikes will be sustained over the following weeks. The increase in late December could be attributed to Moscow’s desire to inflict as much damage as possible on Ukraine in the days leading to the end of 2022. As such, this rise could be short-lived.
One of the biggest unknowns we are dealing with is the intensity of these attacks. On the other hand, the geographical scope of strikes is growing, but on the other, we do not know how many missiles are fired in each strike. One point on the map could only involve one projectile (rocket) exploding, not an entire BM-21 volley fired on targets in Ukraine.
In this light, it is challenging to assess Ukraine’s claims about Russia running low on artillery ammunition.
Military situation in Belarus
Over the past seven days, there were no significant changes in the political situation in Belarus. Nevertheless, several noteworthy developments related to the military sphere occurred. They pertained both to the training activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces and as well as to the deployment of additional Russian assets. Allegedly, a Ukrainian air defence missile also fell on Belarus, raising concerns about a possible Belarusian response to the incident.
Last week started with the visit of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to Russia, which was related to the informal summit of the Commonwealth of the Independent States members. The amount of information linked to the visit was generally limited. It is known that on Monday and Tuesday, Lukashenko met with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and discussed dozens of issues officially connected to the economic issues. As stated by the Belarusian President, both meetings were very productive and forced both leaders to work late hours.
On Thursday, a Ukrainian SAM missile was allegedly shot down over Belarus. According to Belarusian MoD, a Ukrainian missile fired from an S-300 air defence complex was intercepted around 10 AM in the Belarusian air space. Its remainings fell near Harbacha. Shortly after the incident, a few Belarusian officials commented on this affair, but their statements were somewhat cautious. Nonetheless, the Head of the Anti-Air Missile Forces, Col. Kirill Kazantsev, claimed that the deliberate provocation of the Ukrainian Army couldn’t be excluded.
Ukrainians also commented on the situation. The Spokesman of the Ukrainian Air Force, Col. Yuri Ignat, stressed that such a situation could happen due to the high activity of the Ukrainian air defence assets. However, an official MoD statement noted that the accident could have been provoked by Russians, who purposely planned such a missile route to activate Ukrainian S-300 systems deployed near the Belarusian border.
During the past week, the activity of the Belarusian military leadership representatives was modest. Generals were involved in informational events rather than practical actions. On Friday, an interview was published with the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich. There, he referred to the current situation around the state and provided some details about the amendments protocol to the joint Russo-Belarusian agreement (signed by both Ministers of Defence on 3DEC). According to Volfovich, the situation near Belarus remains tense. However, the updated document allows both states to create a regional forces grouping with any number of troops and actively react to changing circumstances. During his interview, the Secretary of the State Security Council blamed Ukraine for its desire to provoke military conflict and Poland for its “far-reaching geopolitical plans” that might even be combined with the possibility of Polish involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
On Monday, Maj. Gen. Leonid Kasinsky also spoke about the potential of a spillover of the war. He stressed that any military aggression against Belarus would be answered with a massive retaliatory strike, which would include Russian strategic (nuclear) assets. Kasinsky also stated that Iskander and S-400 systems bought by the Belarusian Armed Forces were already on combat duty, while the Belarusian pilots were actively training to use special (nuclear) munition. We have no evidence to confirm the fielding of S-400s and Iskanders within the Belarusian Armed Forces.
It is worth noting that several Ukrainian-Belarusian military bilateral agreements were terminated recently. They were related to the control of military activities (up to 80 kilometres from the border), mutual weapon supplies and service provision for military needs. According to the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Valery Revenko, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers terminated these agreements, which were probably dead letters.
The remaining actions of Belarusian officers were linked to somewhat irrelevant ceremonies.
On Wednesday, the Chief of Belarusian General Staff (Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich), jointly with the Commanders of the Special Operation Forces (Maj. Gen. Vadim Denisenko) and North-Western Operational Command (Maj. Gen. Alexander Naumenko), were involved in the celebrations of the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade’s 60th anniversary of establishment. At the same time, the Deputy Minister of Defence for the Rear (Maj. Gen. Andrei Burdyko) and the Head of the Transport Support Department (Maj. Gen. Yuri Shaplavsky) took part in the opening ceremony of the new sports hall of the 30th Railway Brigade a day later.
Over the past seven days, the Belarusian Armed Forces were heavily involved in training activities. On Tuesday, the Minsk Military Commandant’s Office started a sudden check of combat and mobilisation readiness, during which it was transferred to the wartime mode of operation. Moreover, several 50-kilometre training marches were carried out.
The following units were involved in these marches:
11th Mechanised Brigade, 111th Artillery Brigade and 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion (Tuesday),
6th Mechanised Brigade, 557th Engineering Brigade, 74th Communications Regiment, 117th Navigation and Topographic Unit and the Military Commissariat of the Grodno region (Wednesday),
Minsk Military Commandant’s Office and Belarusian Military Academy (Thursday).
Besides, the readiness review of the duty company of the 11th Mechanised Brigade occurred on Monday. Fire control classes combined with live ammo firing were also carried out by the BM-21 battery of the 51st Artillery Brigade two days later.
The Belarusian Air Force’s significant activity was observed throughout the week.
During the week, the Belarusian Armed Forces adopted modernised BM-27 (Uragan-M) MLR systems and VOSTOK-3D radars. As stated by the State Military Industry Committee, both systems were practically tested and will seriously increase the combat capabilities of the Belarusian Army. We are trying to confirm which units received these pieces of equipment. When it comes to the upgraded Uragan, there are several choices. The system supports operational command-level formations and can be found with the 111th Artillery Brigade (Western Operational Command) and 231st Artillery Briagde (Northwestern Operational Command). However, Uragan is also fielded by the 51st Artillery Brigade, directly subordinated to the General Staff.
Last week, more transfers of Belarusian military equipment were reported. This was undoubtedly linked to the ongoing drills and rotation of defence assets involved in the country’s air space protection duty. Currently, elements of the 15th Air Defence Brigade and the 2288th Radiotechnical Battalion cover the Belarusian air space.
Most notable equipment movements included a significant number of trucks (Monday), four BM-30 launchers (Tuesday), three TOR-M2K air defence systems, as well as five BM-21 launchers and four electronic warfare complexes (Wednesday) were the most sophisticated pieces of equipment observed on the move. It might be mentioned that unofficial sources reported the movement of a civilian truck carrying the so-called “dragon’s teeth’ on Friday in Gomel.
Last week also brought a massive increase in the activeness of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus. Firstly, at least two joint flights of Russian A-50U AEW&C (RF-93966) were spotted (Tuesday and Wednesday). Secondly, the arrival of at least 13 various cargo planes was reported throughout the week. Seven of them arrived on Friday. It is unclear what equipment they brought. They, jointly with the abovementioned A-50U aircraft, departed to several Russian bases (Mozdok, Pskov, Sesha, Orenburg) a few hours after their arrival.
On the ground, dozens of trucks and light vehicles were also spotted. Some convoys consisted of almost 30 vehicles. Although most of these vehicles were trucks, Russian towed artillery (Giatsint-B), MTU-20 bridge-laying trucks, BTS-4 tractors and REM-KL vehicles were also observed.
Summary of main Belarusian training activities in December
29DEC: A 50-kilometer march (unspecified location, servicemen of the Minsk Military Commandant’s Office and the Belarusian Military Academy)
29DEC: Firing and tactical medicine classes (unspecified location, sniper platoon of the 40th Mechanized Battalion (11th Mechanized Brigade)
27DEC: Fire control classes with live ammo firing (location unspecified – Osipovichi Training Ground?) – an MLRS battery of the 51st Artillery Brigade;
27DEC: A 50-kilometre march (various locations, new drivers of the 6th Mechanised Brigade, 557th Engineering Brigade, 74th Communications Regiment, 117th Navigation and Topographic Unit, Grodno Region Military Commissariat);
27DEC: Sudden check of combat and mobilisation readiness (presumably permanent deployment area, Minsk Military Commandant’s Office);
27DEC: 50-kilometer training marches (various locations, drivers of new replenishment from 11th Mechanised Brigade, 111th Artillery Brigade and 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion);
27DEC: Night firing exercises with BMP-2 and small arms (location unspecified, elements of the 19th Mechanised Brigade);
20DEC: Joint Russo-Belarusian combat readiness drills (Brestsky Training Ground, unspecified elements of the Union State grouping involved);
19DEC: The end of the readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces;
19DEC: Firing exercises combined with tactical medicine classes (unspecified location, 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);
17DEC: Continuation of the combat and mobilisation readiness (7th Tank Battalion worked out three defensive episodes on the Gozhsky Training Ground – defence against enemy attack, defence against enemy reserves, and defence against air means, while the elements of the 19th Mechanised Brigade likely continued their firing drills at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground. It pertains presumably to the SPH battery, grenade launchers operators and mechanised subunits);
16DEC: Continuation of the combat and mobilisation readiness classes
(Mechanised elements of the 19th Mechanized Brigade conducted firing exercises on the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground, while the 2S3 Battery of the 191th Artillery Group performed direct firing exercises at an unspecified location. The elements of the 7th Tank Battalion (11th Mechanized Brigade) presumably continued their drills at Gozhsky Training Ground);
15DEC: The snap combat readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces continued.
Presumably, two mechanised companies of the 19th Mechanized Brigade crossed the Berezina River and went to the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground. The 7th Tank Battalion of the 11th Mechanized Brigade arrived at the Gozhsky Training Ground. The engineering formations (7th Engineering Regiment and 557th Engineering Brigade) finished participating in the check. This presumably also pertains to the elements of the 38th Air Assault Brigade, which had already returned to their home garrison);
14DEC: Continuation of a sudden combat readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces
(7th Tank Battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade marched towards the Gozhsky Training Ground through the bridge crossing over the Neman River prepared by the elements of the 557th Engineering Brigade, while the presumably company-sized mechanised element of the 19th Mechanised Brigade departed from the home garrison towards water crossing created by subunits of the 7th Engineering Regiment and presumably towards the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground);
14DEC: Fire Control Exercises combined with a field exit (elements of the 51st Artillery Brigade, unspecified location – Osipovichi Training Ground?);
13DEC: Start of a sudden combat readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces (various locations, elements of the 38th Air Assault Brigade, 7th Engineering Regiment, 557th Engineering Brigade and presumably 103rd Airborne Brigade);
13DEC: Possible continuation of the 120th Mechanised Brigade combat readiness exercises (227th Combined Arms Training, elements of the 339th Mechanised Battalion involved)
??? – 13DEC: End of the UAV operators gathering (held at the 11th Mechanised Brigade, attended by UAV operators from the Belarusian Army and other power agencies);
10DEC: Continuation of the combat readiness classes (?) (103rd Airborne Brigade);
10DEC: A field exit (230th Combined Arms Training Ground, 2S3 battery of the 11th Mechanised Brigade) – related to the combat readiness classes (?);
9DEC: Continuation of the combat and mobilisation readiness classes (?) (72nd Joint Training Center, 111th Artillery Brigade);
8DEC: Continuation of scheduled combat readiness classes (various unspecified locations, 11th Mechanised Brigade, 19th Mechanised Brigade, 38th Air Assault Brigade, 51st Artillery Brigade, 250th Security and Maintenance Battalion, Airfield and Material Support Battalion of the 61st Fighter Aviation Base);
(???) 8DEC: A field seminar (location unspecified, personnel of the 1134th Military Clinical Medical Center);
7DEC: Continuation of scheduled combat readiness classes (339th Mechanised Battalion, Technical Maintenance Battalion of the 50th Mixed Aviation Base, elements of the 11th Mechanised Brigade and 72nd Joint Training Center);
6DEC: Start of scheduled combat readiness classes (no data).
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv/Luhansk direction
Last week saw no significant changes in the Kharkiv/Luhansk Oblasts. Ukrainians remained firmly focused on attacking Russian positions. However, the latter also launched several counterattacks to push Ukrainians out. Despite this, the frontline barely moved.
There were no ground attacks into Kharkiv Oblast from Russia proper last week, although the threat of such assaults remains. We continue to maintain that currently, it is unlikely that such attacks could develop into a large-scale offensive that would threaten Kharkiv or Ukrainian positions around the city. The main objective is to fix Ukrainian positions near the border and prevent Kyiv from deploying these forces towards the frontline. We also assess that most, if not all, of these Ukrainian forces deployed near the border include territorial defence units rather than operational formations.
Moving south, since the Ukrainians captured Kyslivka, we saw no major frontline changes near Dvorchina. Kyiv’s forces tried to push towards Nyzhnia Duvanka, but these attempts brought no frontline changes. Russians have been expecting a larger Ukrainian push towards Nyzhnia Duvanka for weeks, yet no such event has occurred.
Both sides have also been fighting for Novoselivske for weeks now. Russians probably control the settlement, but it is safe to assume that the entire area around the R-66 road is heavily contested.
Last week, Ukrainians made no progress towards Savtove. There were some attempts to push Russians out near Kolomyichykha and Dzherelne. However, we understand that these assaults did not bring any frontline changes west of Svatove.
It appears that Ukrainians are inching closer to Kreminna. Their presence in the heavily forested area south of the city is confirmed and they may be on the outskirts of Kreminna on this axis. We also understand that Ukrainians control Chervonopopivka, although this remains to be officially confirmed.
Although the city’s fall, which is unlikely to occur next week, will be a significant tactical victory for Kyiv, we do not assess it would have a significant operational impact. This area is rather heavily urbanised. There are Rubizhne, Lysychansk and, most importantly, Severodonetsk, which pose a considerable challenge to Ukrainians fighting in this direction. Ideally, Kyiv would want to surround these cities from Rubizhne to Borivske, while the Siversky Donetsk River would limit Russian depth and therefore manoeuvre. A concurrent attack from Spirne towards Borivske would then cut off Russian forces in the Lysychansk-Sverodonetsk area. This is just one of the probable scenarios Kyiv may follow. So far, Ukrainians have not hinted at their plan for the Luhansk Oblast. Whether they will focus on the Severdonetsk area or maybe push deeper towards Svatove. Battles in the Luhansk Oblast have had an attritional character as neither side can gain operational advantage. Indeed, Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated last week that Russian forces were transferring more equipment and personnel to the Kreminna area, including a substantial number of Wagner PCM personnel.
Ukrainians have been trying to tilt the balance in their favour by conducting high-precision strikes on Russian targets in the rear. Last week they struck Alchevsk (barracks), Kadiivka, Bryanka (equipment warehouses), Hirske (?), and Polovynkyne (manpower concentration area).
Donetsk Oblast Direction
Russians continued to maintain the initiative in the Donetsk Oblast last week, although this did not translate into any major successes on the battlefield. Operationally, the situation remains unchanged.
Russians maintained the overall pressure in the Siversk direction by attacking Verkhnokamianske and Spirne. The capture of Spirne would allow Moscow to cut off Ukrainian forces near Bilohorivka. However, even at the height of their artillery attacks during summer and after the fall of Lysychansk, Russians did not manage to approach Siversk. We expect to see no changes in this regard. Although, we need to add that Russians tried to horizontally expand their attacks towards Siversk in attempting to break Ukrainian defences near Vesele towards Vyimka. However, last week, they made no gains in this area, and the frontline remained unchanged.
The attack on Vesele was facilitated through the capture of Yakovlivka, which is interesting. Yakovlivka allows Russians to either push north towards Vesele or west, north of Soledar. So far, it seems that Moscow chose the first option, but they will likely diver their forces to another axis if attacks north do not bring desired results.
Speaking of Soledar, we recorded no changes on this axis last week. The city remains firmly under Ukrainian control.
Bakhmutske is probably contested, although Russian commentators claimed that the settlement was partly under their control.
Last week, the same commentators also claimed that Russians captured some strongholds in Pidhorodne, however, it is unclear what areas exactly were captured. They also did not produce any visual evidence to confirm their territorial gains in the area.
When it comes to Bakhmut, we must admit we overestimated Ukrainian capabilities and underestimated Russian determination to keep the pressure on the city. Around President’s Zelensky trip to the city, Ukrainians made some gains and pushed Russians out of Opytne and Bakhmut. Whereas we did not expect to see a major Ukrainian counterattack developing in this direction as a result, but we assessed that the balance in this area tilted in Kyiv’s favour. Last week, Russians recaptured most of Opytne, and they are now closing in on the Artwinery, from which they were pushed back two weeks ago. The situation thus went back to what it was in mid-December.
Neither side is thus able to break the deadlock. But last week confirmed that Russians’ resolve to capture Bakhmut is strong, and its combat potential in this area is not exhausted.
Indeed, last week, Russians also repeated attacks towards Klishchiivka, probably seeking to reach Krasne and sever the ground line of communication towards Bakhmut. This objective has been pursued for several weeks now, but no progress has been made since Zelenopillia.
Russians also remained offensively committed to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. They attacked Avdiivka almost daily, while artillery attacks on the city were regular. Yet, the frontline in this area did not change.
There were attacks on Vodyane, Mariinka, Pobieda, Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Novomykhailivka.
Despite ongoing battles in Mariinka, the situation in the city barely changed. Although the situation is fluid, it is fair to assume that the control over the town is split in half.
Despite maintaining a high intensity of attacks, Russians made no confirmed territorial gains. Some reported advances were announced around Bakhmut, but they were incremental and insignificant to the ongoing battles for the city.
Looking at the oblast as a whole, it is unclear what the Russian objective might be. They launch daily attacks on Ukrainian positions. However, they are very small-sized assaults, which are highly unlikely to change the frontline, let alone have an operational or strategic impact on the overall battlefield. Moscow cannot accumulate their forces near the frontline due to the HIMARS threat. Therefore, they need to fight in a dispersal, which negatively impacts their effectiveness. The access to equipment and artillery is now also likely limited, which, at least for now, puts into question their ability to capture the remaining parts of the oblast and thus fulfil the objectives of the second phase of the war. In fact, without significant reinforcements, Russians are unlikely to change the course of the battle for Donetsk, which will likely remain attritional.
We have maintained for many weeks that Russians need to be dispersed to avoid HIMARS strikes. On Sunday, reports surfaced about a HIMARS strike on a school in Makiivka, which housed Russian mobilised reservists. The dead count is impossible to verify. However, Russian sources claim that 50-600 soldiers died in the attack. With presumed access to Western intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) and with lax operational security in the rear, Russian forces are very susceptible to such strikes. There is also a question of a commander who decided to place so many men into one building. This event highlights why we think dispersal is one of the most important factors in allowing Russians to survive in Ukraine.
Zaporizhzhia direction
We continued to see no confirmed frontline changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast last week. Again, military activity was limited to artillery exchanges across the frontline and positional battles on the ground-level. We have seen no indications to suggest that either side is preparing for a large-scale attack to break the deadlock in this direction.
Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed on Saturday that its forces had captured Dorozhnyanka. However, this information has not been verified. Ukrainians claimed the village was shelled, but no breach of their defences occurred in this area.
According to the Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces, Yevhen Yerin, Russian forces in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts are continually being moved and rotated to prevent Ukrainian strikes from degrading their capabilities further.
Yerin also stated that Russians might be forming new units in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, but they are unlikely to be used offensively. It may indicate that the Russian posture in this direction is inherently defensive, and no major attacks will be conducted by Russian units this winter.
To reiterate our previous assessments, two long-term developments are occurring in this direction. The first one involves Russian defensive measures in anticipation of a Ukrainian ground attack, while the second one involves Ukrainian high-precision attacks on Russian targets in southern Ukraine.
Last week saw some reports about both of these advancements.
Firstly, Russians began to construct fortifications Rozivka, on approach to Mauriupol.
Secondly, Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets continued. According to UGS, a missile strike destroyed an anti-aircraft missile complex, an ammunition depot, and five pieces of military equipment near Polohy and Velyka Bilozerka. There was also a missile strike on an S-300 missile system in an unspecified area in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, which destroyed various pieces of equipment and wounded 150 personnel.
Social media posts claimed that a Russian reservist base in Tytove was also hit, while the UGS claimed that a missile strike near Novobilozerivka wounded up to 100 Russian service members, 15 of whom served in the FSB.
Kherson direction
As in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, last week delivered no changes in the Kherson Oblast. Our assessment of the developments in this direction remains unchanged. No indicators suggest that either side is preparing a large-scale operation. Russian forces in this area are too weak and too dispersed to undertake a high-complex river crossing operation. Such an operation is beyond Russian capabilities at this stage, and nothing indicates that the situation will change over the winter.
Reports surfaced last week suggesting that Russian operational formations deployed in the Kherson Oblast were rotated out and replaced by Russian reservists. If confirmed, this highlights a low priority given to this direction by Russian military leadership. Secondly, Moscow does not expect a Ukrainian attack in the short term either.
In the meantime, Russians focus their operations on patrolling islands on the Dnipro River and conducting artillery strikes on Ukrainian military and civilian targets north of the river. Russians regularly shell Kherson, Nikopol, Oleshky and Ochakiv in southern Ukraine.
According to the Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces spokesperson, Nataliya Humenyuk, Ukrainians continued combat operations on Kinburn Spit. At the same time, Russians used the area to strike Ukrainian maritime infrastructure targets in the Mykolaiv Oblast. There were no updates about the situation on the spit.
Last week, Ukrainian artillery was active too. According to the UGS, a missile strike near Fedorivka(?) killed 200 Russian service members. Other Russian concentration areas were hit in Chaplynka, Velyka Lepetykha, Kakhovka, and Radensk. The UGS claimed that an attack on a manpower concentration area in an unspecified location killed 50 Russians and injured 100.
Artillery also reportedly hit an army-level command post in an unspecified area in the Kherson Oblast. UGS also claimed a Russian HQ was struck in Zabaryne, reportedly during a high-level meeting of Southern Military District (SMD) officers. The strike allegedly wounded up to 70 Russian service members.
Outlook for the week of 2JAN – 8JAN
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.
We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Last week’s forecast
“When it comes to the Kharkiv Oblast, Russians are unlikely to capture any territory, although they may undertake limited offensive actions (raids, assaults). There are ongoing concerns about their ability to launch cross-border raids and assaults, but this week do not attach a probability score to such events. There is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will liberate villages in the oblast. We are particularly looking at areas northwest of Svatove and Kotlyarivka.” Russians indeed did not capture any territory in the Kharkiv Oblast, while Ukrainians inched closer to Kreminna.
Score: 1/1
“While Russians will likely conduct some limited counterattacks, we assess that they are unlikely to recapture territories in the Luhansk Oblast. We estimate that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will progress near Kreminna. The city is unlikely to be liberated next week, but Ukrainians may reach it.” Both forecasts turned out to be correct.
Score: 1/1
“Moving south, we believe that from the operational point of view, Russians are unlikely to change. Their assaults across the front will undoubtedly continue, and there is roughly even chance they will capture some small chunks of territory. However, with counterattacks near Bakhmut, the balance in this axis at least temporarily changed. However, we are unsure how Russians will react (apart from sending more troops) to losing ground in this area. We nevertheless assess that it is likely that Ukrainians will liberate villages around Bakhmut, especially south of the city.” Russians did respond to the loss of Opytne by sending forces to retake the city. They were successful. Ukrainians remained under pressure in the wider Bakhmut area.
Score: 0/1
“It is highly unlikely that Russians will capture Bakhmut, Soledar and Vuhledar.” This forecast was accurate.
Score: 1/1
“There are no indications that Russians or Ukrainians are now creating a ground force presence large enough to conduct a large-scale attack in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Likely, next week will again feature positional battles and artillery exchanges. Ukrainians will also likely continue to strike Russian units, concentration areas and storage facilities within the HIMARS range.” This forecast was accurate.
Score: 1/1
” The same goes for the Kherson Oblast. We expect to see no major changes in this direction next week. The chances are remote that either side will conduct a river crossing operation. However, Russians are almost certain to continue striking civilian infrastructure targets in the city of Kherson and other settlements in the region. Likewise, Ukrainians will highly likely continue shelling Russian positions south of the Dnipro River. The scope of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes will continue to be reduced due to Russian attempts to disperse their forces.” This forecast was accurate.
Score: 1/1
” Regarding the situation in Belarus, it is almost certain that Belarus will not join the war next week or that there will be no attack on Ukraine from this direction. Although, training exercises will likely continue. Russians may also move some forces near the border as a “show of force”. This forecast was accurate.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 6/7
Next week’s forecast
When it comes to the Kharkiv Oblast, we continue to maintain that the Russians are unlikely to capture any territory. There is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will liberate villages in the oblast. We are particularly looking at areas northwest of Svatove.
While Russians will likely conduct some limited counterattacks, we assess that they are unlikely to recapture territories in the Luhansk Oblast. We estimate that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will progress near Kreminna. It is likely that Ukrainians will reach Kreminna next week, but the city is unlikely to be captured.
Moving south, Russians maintain an offensive posture across the entire Donetsk Oblast. Apart from Opytne, they made no progress there last week. We largely expect this to be the case also next week. It is unlikely that Russians will make significant gains, but there is a roughly even chance that some villages will be captured.
It is highly unlikely that Russians will capture Bakhmut, Soledar and Vuhledar.
We do not expect to see any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The frontline is highly unlikely to change. We see no indications that either side is preparing for a large-scale attack. Likely, next week will again feature positional battles and artillery exchanges. Ukrainians will also likely continue to strike Russian units, concentration areas and storage facilities within the HIMARS range.
The same goes for the Kherson Oblast. We expect to see no major changes in this direction next week. The chances are remote that either side will conduct a river crossing operation. However, Russians are almost certain to continue striking civilian infrastructure targets in the city of Kherson and other settlements in the region. Likewise, Ukrainians will highly likely continue shelling Russian positions south of the Dnipro River.
We also do not expect to see any changes in Belarus. It is highly unlikely that Belarus will join the war next week, although its military exercises will highly likely be ongoing.