Ukrainian attack on Russia's Kursk Oblast (initial thoughts)

Good day,

We would like to offer some initial and speculative thoughts on the Ukrainian attack on the Kursk Oblast. There are still a lot of things we don’t know.

Two days ago, on Tuesday, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched an attack on Russian territory and entered the Kursk Oblast, some 100 km from the nearest area of ongoing combat operations in the Kharkiv Oblast.

Ukrainians achieved a surprise on all levels. Some Russian sources reported on Wednesday that local Russian commanders had warned the higher command that Ukrainians were amassing forces opposite Sudzha to launch an attack. These concerns were dismissed as panic sowing.

Ukrainians entered the Kursk Oblast with elements of at least four brigades (22nd and 93rd Mechanised and the 80th and 82nd Air Assault), but the number of formations involved could be higher. Although the Russian MoD reported that the initial attack involved some 200-300 men, we understand it was much larger, perhaps reaching 1,000. Since then, Ukrainians have deployed additional battalions, making it impossible to assess the scale of Ukrainian deployments. We also need to caution the readers that Ukrainians sometimes tend to split their brigades into battalions to scatter them across the front (sometimes, a brigade would deploy its battalions on the opposite parts of the front). So by saying that Ukraine deployed elements of four brigades, we mean that battalions from these brigades are involved in combat, not the entire brigades.

The first obvious difference between the current operation and previous attacks on Russian territory (May 2023, March 2023) is that the ongoing operation is organised and commanded by the Ukrainian General Staff and involves conventional forces. Previous HUR-organised (HUR: Military Intelligence) raids were just that. They involved mostly lightly equipped units centered around RDK and PDK (Russian and Polish Volunteer Corps). The purpose of these attacks was to infiltrate the border, capture POWs, obtain intelligence, and inflict a PR blow on the Russian political-military leadership. But forces involved could not make these attacks move beyond short-lived raids.

The current operation involved tank and mechanized subunits, supported by artillery, air defense, and EW capabilities. The most obvious consequence of this change was a much higher tempo of advance. On Thursday, Russian sources reported the presence of Ukrainian troops in Anastasevka, some 27 kilometers from the border. We have not been able to confirm this development. Secondly, although Russian forces did have fortifications near the border, a relatively large-scale troop deployment coupled with thinly manned strongpoints resulted in these fortifications being quickly overrun.

Map 1. Ukrainian assessed advances as of Thursday (08AUG).

Looking at the current operation, we see striking similarities to the 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv Offensive in which General Syrsky was also heavily involved. A surprise attack on poorly manned Russian lines, a very high tempo of advance in a combined arms operation. In Kharkiv, Ukrainians used vanguard units in a fast maneuver to sow confusion about the scale of their presence and the tempo of the advance, further compounding the collapse of Russian presence in Ukraine. A strong PSYOPS (disinformation) effort was also applied across Russian Telegram channels. The current operation could thus be called Kharkiv 2.0 regarding surprise attained, capabilities used (HIMARS excluded), and tempo achieved.

But it should also be understood that currently, we are significantly behind the curve when it comes to information about the attack and its scope. There is plenty of room for disinformation from both sides. We advise caution.

Ukrainians remain tight-lipped about the operation. We also don’t know what the objective is. We will need to speculate*, but given that they continue pushing (as of Thursday), it appears Ukrainians want to capture as much Russian territory as possible, probably dig in, and force Russians to fight for it. There also could be an expectation that some forces would be redirected from other areas, such as Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts. In this context, Kyiv could be conducting a „reverse-Kharkiv” (Russian May attack) operation to force Russians to spread their forces and ease pressure elsewhere.

We continue to maintain that the Russian center of gravity is firmly based in the Donetsk Oblast (Chasiv Yar, Niu York, and Pokrivsk directions). Consequently, if no troops are available in mainland Russia, Moscow would be more inclined to move forces from other parts of the front to ensure that its attacks toward Pokrovsk continue. Especially given that the Russian tempo of advance in this area is relatively stable, mostly due to poorly manned Ukrainian units. But, it is also clear to us that retaking parts of the Kursk Oblast will be a priority for Russians. This will operation will suck up resources (artillery, aviation, reinforcements, and replacements), perhaps decreasing the tempo of Russian attacks elsewhere.

This brings us to the last point: Given Ukrainian manpower problems in the Donetsk Oblast, would it not be better to deploy currently involved units in the Kursk operation to the Donetsk Oblast to stall Russian forward movement there? We will only know the answer to this question in hindsight. If the Ukrainian operation is successful, decreases Russian attacks in Donetsk, creates dilemmas for Moscow, allows Kyiv to maintain a presence in the Kursk Oblast, and offers a better negotiating position in the future, then Syrsky will be a victor.

If Ukrainian troops, however, are pushed back from the Russian territory without any tangible results with high losses and if Russians continue moving towards Pokrovsk, then Syrsky will be the main culprit.

There is no middle ground here. The operation is daring. Let’s see what the next few days bring.

*We would like to offer an alternative scenario. It suggests the period of Ukrainian fast-paced conventional attacks across the northern parts of the border to force Russians to man the border properly, which should negatively impact the intensity of their attacks across the front. However, again, this is very speculative.