Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 10 April – 16 April 2023 (Weekly update)

(From 8MAY we will be making some changes to the UCM. Please click here to learn about them)

Situational report 10 April – 16 April 2023

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• The frontline remained largely unchanged last week; Russians made marginal progress in Bakhmut, but their attacks in other parts of Ukraine were repelled;

• Russians made no territorial gains in the Kharkiv Oblast last week; They also did not undertake any ground attacks from Russia proper; Artillery and missile strikes continued;

• Unconfirmed reports suggested that Russians advanced slightly near Makiivka in the Luhansk Oblast, but in general, they made no progress was made in the region; Geolocated footage confirms the presence of TOS-1 and T-90s near Kreminna, which indicates the presence of airborne formations;

• Russians made no confirmed gains in the broader Donetsk Oblast; The situation near Avdiivka was stabilised, and the threat of envelopment is minimal; Russians also made no gains near Vuhledar, which is now a low-priority area;

• Russians made small gains in Bakhmut; We also need to add that some reports about their gains in the city were retracted; Concurrently, reports surfaced suggesting that Wagner forces could be suffering from manpower shortages, putting into question their capacity to advance; Russians continue to hold around 70 per cent of the city;

• The situation in the Zaporizhihia Oblast remained unchanged; Ukrainians launched a couple of ground attacks, but they did not alter the frontline;

• No frontline changes occurred in the Kherson Oblast;

• As part of the ongoing Belarusian Armed Forces readiness exercise, the 11^th Mechanised Brigade of the Belarusian Ground Forces had its manning increased to a wartime level, which marks the first instance such a step was taken in the post-1991 Belarus; The unit will undergo a brigade-level exercise this week, which is also unprecedented as contemporary Belarus has never conducted a full brigade level drill;

• The weather forecast shows warm temperatures this week across Ukraine, but precipitation will be high; A 30-day forecast shows a possible window of opportunity for offensive actions between 5-20MAY;

  

  Frontline in Ukraine

General outlook

The frontline situation in Ukraine remained unchanged compared to two weeks ago. Russians made only marginal gains in Bakhmut, while all attacks in other parts of Ukraine were pushed back. We continued to wait for the counteroffensive as Ukrainians stepped up their PSYOPS.

Last week, a couple of videos appeared online showing hundreds, if not thousands, of Ukrainian forces marching, presumably from or to training for the upcoming attack. However, it quickly became apparent that at least one video was a few years old and was made years before the FEB22 attack. Another video showed Ukrainian soldiers leaving a base in the UK where they had been undergoing training. These videos caused quite a stir on Russian social media channels, with multiple concerns raised about whether Russian units could hold their ground, especially if Ukrainians were deployed en mass. However, as stated last week concerning Ukrainian PSYOPS, we expect Kyiv to continue disseminating various propaganda materials to degrade the Russian will to fight and influence Moscow’s military decision-making. Undoubtedly, hopes are running high as are getting closer to Ukraine’s D-Day.

From the weather point of view, there will be a window of opportunity between 5-20MAY when the rainfall will be minimal, and temperatures are expected to rise above 20°C (68°F). Now, however, we have seen no evidence to show that Ukrainians are bringing their forces closer to the front (which does not mean it is not happening). We also expect that in order to prevent Russian high-precision strikes, Ukrainians may “concentrate their forces in dispersal”, meaning that they will be scattered across a large area, and only when moving to staging areas will these forces combine into a larger unit. Such an approach may hinder Ukrainian operations, especially if interdicted earlier. But, the reality of the current war is that those who could manage dispersal effectively have better chances of survival and winning. Russians learnt about it the hard way during the early days of the HIMARS deployment.

Last Monday, we stated that it was too early to call the culmination of Russian attacks in Bakhmut, but we also added that two weeks without gains would tell us that Russians had reached this point. Last week, Wagner forces were reportedly reinforced with Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) personnel. Russian airborne forces also had also reportedly started protecting Wagner’s flanks. These reports suggest that Wagner as a standalone organisation may have reached the apex of its offensive capacities and that without significant support from elsewhere, Wagner may find it difficult to advance. Indeed, last week, Russians only made marginal gains in Bakhmut, and we understand they were not linked to the regrouping or rotation of forces.

Wagner’s operations this week will confirm whether the organisation has exhausted its offensive potential.

Weather forecast

(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days unless otherwise stated)

It appears that the weather in Ukraine has stabilised. This week will deliver temperatures in the mid-teens, but precipitation will be high.

In the Kreminna area, the temperatures will hover around 14-17°C (57-62°F) for the whole week. Nights will also be relatively warm within the 6°C-9°C (42-48°F). However, rain is forecasted between Wednesday and Saturday.

The Bakhmut area will follow a similar pattern. Although days are forecasted to be slightly colder (11-16°C (51-60°F)), nights will deliver the same amplitudes 6°C-9°C (42-48°F). Light rain is expected on Wednesday and Thursday, but showers will appear on Friday and Saturday.

The Zaporizhzhia region will experience slightly warmer temperatures. They will peak on Monday and Tuesday when temperatures climb to 17°C (62°F), followed by a slight decrease to 13-15°C (55-59°F) between Wednesday and Saturday. The next Sunday will again see temperatures rise to 17°C (62°F). The temperatures will be stable at night: 7-9°C (44-48°F). Rain is expended from Wednesday until Sunday.

While the 30-day weather forecast no longer predicts a cold spell for early May. Instead, in late April, the temperatures could drop to 9°C (48°F) in some parts of the country during days. However, drops below 8°C (46°F) at nights are not expected. Precipitation will remain relatively high until the first week of May. After that, Ukraine may experience very warm weather, with temperatures reaching 25°C (77°F) in the second half of the month with minimal rainfall. Such weather will last for around 15 days, between 5-20May.

We assess that if Ukraine plans to conduct a counteroffensive during a period of good weather, then 5-20May will present such an opportunity.

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 407 aircraft (+1), 228 helicopters (0), 3,760 UAVs (+119), 415 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 8,689 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+96), 1,086 MLRS launchers (+8), 4,600 field artillery guns and mortars (+57), as well as 9,542 units of special military vehicles (+155).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 182,070 personnel (+3,920), 3,657 tanks (+21), 7,083 armoured combat vehicles (+59), 2,795 artillery systems (+55) and 538 MLR systems (+5), 284 anti-aircraft systems (+2), 308 aircraft (+1) and 293 helicopters (+1), and 2,339 UAVs (+27), 5,658 vehicles and fuel tanks (+56), 911 cruise missiles (0), 18 warships and boats (0) and 326 special vehicles (+17).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)

Number of Russian ground attacks as reported by the Ukrainian General Staff

Military situation in Belarus

Over the past seven days, there were no major changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces. However, political and military representatives made some hawkish statements. The training activity of the Belarusian Army remained heightened, although, quantitively, the number of training events decreased. It also applies to the activity of the Russian Armed Forces – despite the decline in the number of transport aircraft arrivals, the air component’s operations were still visible.

From a political point of view, the visit of the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergey Shoigu, was the most important event of the week. It took place on Monday when the Russian official met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Officially, the talks pertained to the growing defence collaboration between Russia and Belarus and sought to concretise verbal agreements made by Lukashenko and Putin during their last meeting (5-6APR).

When speaking about the meeting with Shoigu, Lukashenko noted the necessity of revisioning bilateral agreements with Russia. According to him, a new interstate legal act ensuring the security of Belarus should be signed. It should guarantee a Russian military response in case of an armed attack on Belarus. He added that the new document should also include an economic dimension, which is necessary due to the Western sanctions.

The Belarusian leader also thanked the Head of the Russian MoD for the presence of “several thousands” of Russian soldiers in Belarus. As stated, the Belarusian Armed Forces were involved in their training. He again accused Poland and Lithuania of conducting belligerent policies towards Belarus.

Shoigu said that Minsk provided five fully equipped training grounds (Osipovichi, Obuz-Lesniovsky, Lepelsky, Losvido and Brestsky) to train Russian reservists as the elements of the Union State regional grouping of forces. The minister also stated that the scope of Russian presence might be expanded.

Four days later, the Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, provided similar statements when he visited one of the Belarusian training grounds. During his visit, Khrenin initially spoke about the issue of nuclear weapons deployment in Belarus. According to him, such a decision can only be made by the Commander-in-Chief (President) and will be based on the assessment of the current regional security situation. Nonetheless, he stressed that the structure of international military security is “de facto destroyed”, and Belarus could no longer believe in the statements of Western politicians. He mentioned that Polish leadership declared the desire to host American nuclear weapons and cancelled the conventional arms treaty with Belarus. Khrenin even noted that Belarus would consider the deployment of Russian strategic nuclear assets if necessary. These statements indicate that Lukashenko’s mind is already made up and that he would push for deploying nuclear warheads to Belarus.

On the other hand, the Head of the Belarusian MoD underlined that tactical warheads potentially deployed in Belarus would be a “last resort” weapon meant to provide strategic deterrence and “cure sick heads” who want to talk with Belarus from a position of strength. He said he believed that nuclear weapons should be held under Belarusian control, which we assess is highly unlikely to happen. Moreover, he noted that the Belarusian Armed Forces had already prepared aircraft to carry out such weapons (the end of pilot and engineering personnel training was officially announced by the Belarusian MoD on Friday) and acquired modern Iskander missile systems, which also have this capability. The training of Iskander personnel to use nuclear weapons will be finished this week.

It must be noted that the Belarusian Minister of Defence indicated the possibility of a Polish military attack on Belarus. According to Khrenin, the aggressive attitude of the Polish leadership is expressed both in the statements and decisions. After referring to the expansion plans of the Polish Armed Forces (aimed at reaching 300,000 active military personnel), Khrenin stated that Poland increased its military and intelligence activity against Belarus, which indicates possible preparations for the military conflict.

During the conference, Khrenin also provided some details linked to the ongoing combat readiness check. He underlined the large scale of the event and pointed out that more such events would occur in the future. The exercise could be divided into a few phases. The first one included the induction of reservists and removal of military equipment from storage that ultimately increased the 11^th Mechanised Brigade manning level to a wartime structure of 6,000 personnel. Officially, reservists presented a high level of understanding and motivation during the process. The second phase referred to the deployment of brigade elements to the training ground(s), where practical training would be carried out. Both phases were finished by the end of the last week, and subunits were preparing to participate in the brigade-level tactical exercise.

Khrenin noted that the practical part of the exercise would be analysed with great attention, allowing for fixing potential errors. He also confirmed that Belarusian service members would celebrate Victory Day (9MAY) at home, meaning the drill must end over the next fortnight.

Last week, the highest representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces personally attended several training events. On Wednesday, the Secretary of the State Security Council (Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich), the Minister of Defence (Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin), the Chief of General Staff (Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich) arrived at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground to observe training actions of the ongoing command-staff exercise at the Borisovsky region Territorial Defence Forces.

A day later, the Secretary of the State Security Council visited the Brestsky Training Ground, where the final episode of the ongoing battalion-level exercise of the 38th Air Assault Brigade was held. Notably, Volfovich also met with the heads of the higher education institutions on Monday. During the event, he pointed out that the struggle for young people’s hearts and minds was ongoing worldwide and pointed out the possibility of student conscription. However, he noted that a decision on whether to implement student conscription would depend on the judgment of higher education institutions. We assess that it is unlikely that such a decision will be made at a high education level. Indeed, judging by how Belarus works, it will be made within the MoD or the General Staff and accepted by Lukashenko. The higher education institutions will only have to accept it, which they likely will without hesitation. The fact that Volfovich even mentioned this idea suggests that the conscription of students is indeed being considered.

Last week, the 11th Mechanised Brigade continued practical actions carried out as a part of the combat readiness check of the Belarusian Armed Forces. On Monday, unspecified brigade subunits received stocks of material assets and departed from the home garrison. A day later, a reinforced anti-air battalion carried out the field exit. The elements of the 841st Artillery Group started their practical training on Thursday. Notably, on Friday, reserve servicemen of the Tank Battalion underwent practical T-72 tank firing classes.

From Thursday/Friday, brigade elements were likely accompanied by the personnel of the Special Purpose Detachment of the 432nd Main Military Clinical Medical Center, which deployed a field hospital to support troops involved in the drills.

On Wednesday, the Belarusian Armed Forces Communications Troops started their joint staff training. Officially meant to work out the use of forces with the experiences of modern armed conflicts. Subsequently, elements of the 38th Air Assault Brigade were involved in a battalion-level tactical exercise held at the Brestsky Training Ground. Three days later, the 259th Mobile-Recovery Railway Battalion (30th Railway Brigade) constructed the pontoon crossing in Beshenkovichi.

The MoD also provided some information about the completed special-tactical exercise of the 36^th Road, and Bridge Brigade (bridge battalion) held between 10-12APR near Bolshoye Stakhovo. Personnel restored a bridge crossing in the area where opposing forces sabotage and reconnaissance groups operated.

We assess that all last week’s exercises fell within the ongoing armed forces readiness test to make the entire undertaking as comprehensive as possible.

The air assets of the Belarusian air components were also quite “busy” on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.

Over the past seven days, Belarusian military transfers were limited, mostly involving trucks and BTRs. Notably, about ten GAZ-66 trucks removed from the storage of the 1888th Artillery Base were also spotted on the move. In addition, a military echelon with the 120th Mechanised Brigade’s equipment (several T-72 tanks, BMP-2s and MT-LBs) was observed on Friday. However, it was likely unloaded a day later.

Last week, at least seven Russian aircraft arrived to Belarus. This refers to four passenger/cargo airframes (Tu-154M – RA-85041; An-12- RF-90787, ??-?????; An-72 – RF-90318), and two unspecified fighters and the Su-34 bomber (RF-813853). Moreover, around four Mi-8 training flights were also conducted. Helicopters were mainly seen near the training grounds, where the Russian service members trained.

The ground activity was generally limited, with only one Russian echelon being loaded at Kozenki Railway Station on Monday.

Below is the summary of Belarusian training activities since 10APR. Click here to access all training data since 1JAN. 

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv direction

The frontline remained deadlocked in the Kharkiv Oblast as neither side conducted any major ground attack. Russians assaults centered around Hrayanykivka, Masiutivka and Krohmalne, but all attacks were pushed back. A Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategic noted last week that Russians captured Lyman Pershyi, but we understand that the village had been under Russian control for weeks.

Russians continued artillery and missile attacks on Ukrainian military and civilian targets across the region, but undoubtedly the focus was more on the former.

Luhansk direction

There were no confirmed frontline changes in the Luhansk Oblast last week. However, we did notice an uptick in the number and intensity of Russian ground attacks in one area of the front. Secondly, based on Ukrainian officials’ pronouncements, the Lyman-Kreminna axis continued to be the heaviest shelled area in entire Ukraine, even compared to Bakhmut.

So far, these developments did not translate into any operational changes.

The pattern of Russian strikes did not change compared to the previous week. Most of the military activity again occurred along the Ploshchanka – Bilohorivka line.

Looking at specific settlements in the region, despite conducting assaults, Russians made no confirmed progress near Stelmakhivka, Novoselivske and Kuzemivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. However, Russian and Ukrainian sources reported about their numerous attacks towards Makiivka. On Wednesday, a Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) asserted that Russians captured unspecified Ukrainian positions near the settlement. We understand that Russians did not enter Makiivka, and their advance east of the village was marginal.

Russians also persistently attacked Ukrainian units near Torske and Nevske, combining ground assaults with air and artillery support. Nevertheless, we did not notice any frontline changes in this part of the oblast. It thus seems that last week, Russians horizontally extended their attacks. Previously, their focus was on the Torske-Nevske line, so the addition of Makiivka further north either shows the deployment of reinforcements allowing to open a new axis of attack or the redeployment of existing forces due to a failure to advance near Torske.

In the Kreminna area, positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest and near Dibrova. The Russian source stated that Russian troops pushed Ukrainians back from several positions in the forest southwest of Shypylivka. On Wednesday, CDS claimed that elements of the Russian 76^th Air Assault Division supported by a TOS-1A heavy flamethrower system (the presence was independently verified) captured  Ukrainian positions around 5 km south of Kreminna in the  Serebryansky forest. However, no visual confirmation was provided to support these Russian and Ukrainian assertions. Ukrainians, on the other hand, made a general comment that Russians continued to build pressure on Ukrainian positions in the Serebryansky forest. Despite this, the frontline there remained essentially unchanged in these areas throughout the week.

Geolocated footage showed Russian 2S9 Nona self-propelled mortar (SPM) and T-90 tanks south of Kreminna. Pre-war, the SPM was fielded in the naval infantry and airborne forces. Given numerous reports (including the above one) claiming that the 76^th Air Assault Division operates in the Kreminna area, it is highly probable that the 2S9s and T-90s showed in the video also belonged to this division.

Russian attacks near Kreminna are not cost-free. According to Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, due to losses sustained in combat, Russians started employing the Chechen forces (specifically from one of the “Ahmat” battalions) in the Lyman and Kupyansk sectors. Based on Cherevaty’s figures provided throughout the week, Russians lost 179 men and 439 wounded between Monday and Saturday. They also fired 2,162 artillery shells.

No changes were reported in the Bilohorivka area.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts with Russian fortifications, 10APR – 16APR 2023 (Apologies for the image not being fully loaded on the right side, but Scribble Maps had some server issues)

Donetsk Oblast Direction

The situation in the Donetsk Oblast remained largely unchanged. The biggest difference compared to the previous week was a decrease in Russian gains in Bakhmut. Whether this heralds a culmination of the Russian offensive in the city is too early to say. This week will be important in assessing the Russian ability to make further gains in the city. Russian attacks in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast delivered no confirmed territorial gains.

On Friday, a Russian source claimed three UAF company strongholds were destroyed near Zvanivka. It is unlikely that these strongholds were destroyed in ground combat as the frontline is located around 8 km from Zvanivka. Thus, if the event occurred, Ukrainians were likely hit with artillery.

No changes occurred near Verkhnokamyanske and Vyimka. However, Russian sources informed about a Russian assault near Spirne, where Ukrainians recently managed to capture new positions. However, there were no further updates about the situation in this area.

The frontline remained unchanged in Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, and Vesele. Wagner PMC fighters tried to push toward Bohdanivka but failed. There were also some Wagner ground assaults north of Sakko and Vansetti, but a Ukrainian counterattack stabilised the frontline.

Russian forces, probably Wagner, also attacked Ukrainian lines near Khromove but achieved no progress in getting closer to the supply road linking Bakhmut with Chasiv Yar. From the Ukrainian perspective, flanks around Bakhmut are stabilised, and their collapse and thus, the envelopment of Bakhmut is a low-likelihood scenario. In the city, however, Russians made (minimal) progress. In this context, comments made by an advisor to the DPR Head, Jan Hahin, who claimed that Ukrainian troops were practically blocked on the city’s western outskirts, were untrue.

Firstly, there were a lot of discussions last week about the central rail station in Bakhmut. Some Ukrainian sources claimed the site had been captured, but these assessments were withdrawn. The same goes for the grain elevator. The situation is similar on Chaikovskoho Street. Despite constant attacks, Russians fail to make any progress in these sectors. Heavy battles also occurred near Avangard Stadium and the park. The situation is very fluid, with a lack of confirmed sources regarding the situation in the city.

It also appears that withdrawing Ukrainian soldiers mine buildings in Bakhmut, which, once occupied by Wagner forces, get demolished.

According to Ukrainian sources, the Wagner numbered about 40,000 men at its peak after its recruitment push among prisoners. Currently, according to various estimates, this force amounts to between 10,000 and 20,000. If the lower estimate is accurate, then Wagner will find it increasingly difficult to push further. Indeed, DPR’s forces were sent into the city to reinforce the group. This deployment could indicate a manpower problem on the Wagner side or a Russian sense of urgency to capture Bakhmut.  Indeed, Russian forces in Bakhmut now include the 51^st and 137^th Airborne Regiments of the 106^th Airborne Division, elements of the 98^th Airborne Division, and the 57^th Motor Rifle Brigade. The source stated that the reason behind the redeployment of the 98^th Airborne Division from Luhansk to Bakhmut was that the frontline there was oversaturated with Russian units.

On the other hand, given that Russians made no progress near Kreminna, where the division elements are still deployed, it seems that the Lyman direction was at least briefly deprioritised. We also understand that while airborne forces are tasked with protecting the flanks, the 57^th Motor Rifle Brigade could be fighting on the streets of Bakhmut. This view was partly shared by Serhiy Cherevaty, who stated that the deployment of paratroopers to Bakhmut stemmed from massive Wagner losses. He added that the Russian paratrooper units fighting in the city had already suffered losses and had been reinforced by mobilised troops.

Russians control around 70 per cent of Bakhmut.

Frontline in Bakhmut placed on the city’s administrative border

According to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the PMC Wagner head, the UAF continued to pull up reserves and deploy them into the city. It is too early to talk about the complete encirclement of Bakhmut, but more than 80 per cent of the town was under Wagner’s control. He also added that in Soledar and Bakhmut, Ukrainians lost 32,000 men.

Speaking of Wagner, the organisation’s representative spoke about the overall situation around Bakhmut and claimed that 80,000 Ukrainians in Wagner’s area of responsibility (AOR) and that Kyiv was forming strike groups to conduct a counterattack north and south of Bakhmut to alleviate the pressure on the city. We cannot confirm the veracity of this claim now, but we can say that one cannot independently acquire satellite imagery around Bakhmut. The data is highly restricted and only available to national security clients. So while we cannot confirm the deployment of 80,000 men in the area (although the figure appears significantly exaggerated), we cannot exclude a possibility of a Ukrainian build-up near Soledar-Bakhmut.

Here is a map with Ukrainian concentration areas based on the abovementioned comments.

Regarding areas south of the city, no changes were reported along the Predtechyne – Ivanivske line. Still, according to a Polish journalist near the frontline, the scale of destruction in Chasiv Yar is already similar to Bakhmut.

Russians made no gains in other parts of the oblast.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Keramik, Novokalynove, Berdychi, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, and Kamyanka. Positional battles and artillery exchanges in these areas continued. A Ukrainian source stated that the Russians were pulling up reserves and trying to gain a foothold on the road west of Novobakhmutivka (near the H20 highway).

Supported by artillery, Russians also tried to push towards Avdiivka from Opytne and Kruta Balka, but these assaults failed. No changes near Avdiivka came despite one Russian blogger claiming that UAF posture north of the city was “experiencing problems”.

Indeed, no changes were recorded near Stepove, Novokalynove, Orlivka and Lastochkyne.

Battles continued east of Pervomaiske, but Russians made no gains there despite numerous attacks.

The same pertains to Mariinka. Throughout the week, Russian sources claimed that the attackers were engaging Ukrainian positions in the city’s western parts with artillery, air strikes and ground attacks. However, no information surfaced confirming their advances in the town. We understand that Russians did not capture any new ground in Mariinka or near the city, such as near Pobieda.

Late in the week, information surfaced about the resumption of Russian assaults near Vuhledar, but no reports were made confirming Russian progress. We assess that the likelihood of Russian progress in this sector is minimal. The attackers do not possess the manpower and equipment levels to alter the frontline in this part of the oblast.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian fortifications, 10APR – 16APR 2023

Zaporizhzhia direction

No frontline shifts were recorded last week in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainians organised a couple of ground attacks, and although they brought no frontline changes, they probably heralded a change in Ukrainian behaviour in this part of the country.

Ukrainians conducted attacks near Robotyne and Dorozhnyanka, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any frontline changes in these sectors. It is thus possible that these assaults had a probing or reconnaissance-in-force character. Near Novodanylivka, Ukrainians managed to capture one Russian stronghold.

Ivan Fedorov, the Ukrainian head of Melitopol, claimed on Thursday that a heavy explosion occurred in the centre of Melilopol, but it remains unclear what caused it. The city is beyond the range of known, fielded artillery systems. If there indeed was a missile strike, then it may have been conducted by the Hrim-2 system, which Ukrainians started deploying in 2021. So far, the system has been used sparingly, probably due to a lack of missiles. But given that we recently heard of explosions in Melitopol or Byrdiansk, it is likely that as Ukrainians increased the ammunition stockpile, we will see an increased tempo of such attacks, especially as we get closer to the upcoming counteroffensive. On 30MAR, the Russian MoD claimed they shot down an HRIM-2-fired missile in the Donetsk Oblast.

On 9APR, Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Spokesperson, claimed Russian forces were intensively equipping and mining defensive positions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. They had also concentrated 113 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in anticipation of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, compared to 206 deployed in the Donetsk Oblast. A typical pre-war BTG has 700-900 men. According to the leaked US documents, 23,350 personnel in the Zaporizhihia Oblast were deployed as of 1MAR, which gives some 33 BTGs assuming each unit has 700 men. However, we assess that Russian BTGs are understaffed, and their strength is 50-60%. Secondly, we must remember that a BTG could operate effectively if its personnel were well-trained, commanded and equipped. The current Russian units probably display none of these things.

Russians also do not fight with battalions. For instance, videos and images from Vuhledar showed reinforced companies, sometimes platoons trying to pierce through Ukrainian lines. Russians are unlikely to achieve any breakthrough with such attacks, but at the same time, nothing indicates they are capable of conducting larger-scale, combined arms attacks. Consequently, any ground attacks will likely remain confirmed too small unit attacks.

According to the Ukrainian source, Russians are preparing for evacuation from Zaporizhzhia NPP. The blogger stated that collaborators and Russian Rosatom workers had been warned that forced evacuation might soon begin. We are unsure about the reliability of such reports. Last week, the evacuation notice in Byrdiansk also did not seem untrue. Ukrainians could design such undertakings to influence Russian perception and willingness to fight.

Frontlines in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast with Russian fortifications, 10APR – 16APR 2023

Kherson direction and Crimea

Last week did not deliver any fundamental changes in the Kherson Oblast. Both sides continued cross-river artillery strikes and reconnaissance missions on the Dnipro delta islands. However, the intensity of the latter remains visibly reduced.

Ukrainians’ attempts to push Russians 20-30 km from the river through artillery strikes continued. On Tuesday, Natalia Humeniuk, Ukraine’s Southern Command spokesperson, claimed that Russian troops had been withdrawing from the line of contact to remain out of the range of Ukrainian artillery. However, the reality is that we do not know how successful Ukrainians have been in attaining this objective. Russians can also undertake masking activities simulating a withdrawal, but in reality, their presence may be strengthened. Indeed, on Thursday, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that newly-mobilised Russian units had recently arrived in Skadovsk, where they are housed in various educational institutions across the city.

A Ukrainian journalist posted an image of a reported Russian notice to civilians living in Kakhovka, urging them to be prepared for urgent evacuation. Russians may attempt to forcefully remove locals from their homes soon. At the same time, assuming that the notice is real, it shows a genuine Russian concern about Ukrainian cross-river operations in the area.

The journalist claimed that there were explosions near an area where the Russian military personnel were stationed at a training range in Crimea. On the other hand, a Russian source stated that a Russian strike destroyed a Ukrainian base near the Dnipro River. We could not confirm either occurrence as no visual evidence exists to support these claims.

Nevertheless, we continue to assess that Ukrainian artillery strikes are battle-shaping activities. On the one hand, a river-crossing operation in the Kherson Oblast would be challenging to conduct. At the same time, we could not notice that a lot of equipment Kyiv recently obtained had amphibious capability (BMP-1s and Rosomak vehicles from Poland).

Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 10APR – 16APR 2023

Outlook for the week of 16APR-23APR

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.

We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Last week's forecast

"We expect to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast and will thus retain last week's assessment. Russians will certainly continue to conduct daily artillery strikes on Ukrainian military and civilian targets across the region, while ground attacks are highly unlikely to deliver any frontline changes." This forecast was correct. No frontline changes occurred in the oblast as Russians continued their artillery strikes across the area.

Score: 1/1

"We also do not expect to see any changes in the Luhansk Oblast, including the Kreminna area. We have seen no indications suggesting the deployment of reserves into combat, and without them, Russians are unlikely to progress further." This prognosis was also correct. The frontline in the Luhansk Oblast remained deadlocked.

Score: 1/1

"When it comes to the broader Donetsk Oblast, we assess that it is unlikely that Russians will progress near Avdiivka. It is highly unlikely that they will advance in other areas within the region, Bakhmut excluded." Russians reportedly made some merginal gains near Novobukhamtivka, but we were unable to confirm their territorial gains independently. Regardless, the impact of these gains on the frontline situation was minimal. Russians did not progress near Avdiivka.

Score: 1/1

"Regarding Bakhmut, it is unlikely that Russians will progress in areas north and south of the city. But, Russians will highly likely advance within the city's limits and continue to push Ukrainians out. But last week's tempo is maintained, we still think it is unlikely that defenders will withdraw. However, as we stated many times before, the decision to defend the city is political, making any assessment about the Ukrainian "will" to defend the city very difficult to make. If Zelensky changes his mind, the pullback to Chasiv Yar could be abrupt." This assessment was spot on. Russians made no gains around Bakhmut and inched closer to the city's western parts. Ukrainians held around 20 per cent of the city as of Sunday, and nothing indicated a pullback was in the works.

Score:1/1

"We do not foresee any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks will almost certainly continue. Ukrainians will likely start conducting more ground attacks this week." No significant changes occurred in the oblast last week, but Ukrainians indeed made some limited attacks on Russian positions in the region. The frontline, however, remained unchanged.

Score: 1/1

"We forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue but without an impact on the frontline. Both sides will certainly conduct artillery strikes across the Dnipro River." This prognosis was correct. No major events occurred in the oblast last week.

Score: 1/1

We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week. This assessment was correct. Apart from the ongoing armed forces readiness exercise, no major event occurred in Belarus last week.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 7/7 (100%)

Next week's forecast

We continue to anticipate no significant changes in the Kharkiv Oblast this week. There is no information available suggesting that Russians are reinforcing the area. Without additional forces, Russians will not be able to achieve a breakthrough. While artillery attacks will undoubtedly continue, Russians are unlikely to capture new territory.

The same pertains to the Luhansk Oblast, including the Kreminna area. Some tactical fluctuations will highly likely occur, but from an operational point of view, the situation will likely remain the same.

We maintain our view on the broader Donetsk Oblast. We assess that it is unlikely that Russians will progress near Avdiivka. It is highly unlikely that they will advance in other areas within the region, Bakhmut excluded.

Regarding Bakhmut, we assess that Ukrainians cover the flanks pretty well, and therefore, a Russian breakthrough north or south of the city is unlikely to occur this week. In Bakhmut, however, we think it is highly likely that Russians will continue to make progress and make some progress towards the western parts of the city. So far, we have seen no indications to suggest that a Ukrainian pullback is being prepared. Given the ongoing commitment to maintaining a presence in Bakhmut, we assess that Ukrainians will unlikely abandon the city this week.

We do not anticipate any major changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Positional attacks and artillery will almost certainly continue. No indications suggest a Ukrainian counteroffensive will occur in the oblast this week.

We also forecast no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue but without an impact on the frontline. Both sides will certainly conduct artillery strikes across the Dnipro River.

We have decided to remove Belarus from forecasting as we currently do not anticipate Minsk participating in the ongoing war. We will add Belarus again if the situation changes.