Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 16 January – 21 January 2023 (Weekly update)

Key takeaways:

·        Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;

·        There were no frontline changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. But Russian artillery strikes continued to harass Ukrainian civilians across the region;

·        Ukrainians may have made some territorial gains in the Luhansk Oblast. However, no changes were independently verified;

·        Following the capture of Soledar two weeks ago, Russian attacks commenced north and south of the city. Yet, the impact on the frontline was rather limited;

·        Russians inched closer to Bakhmut's city centre;

·        Southwest of the city, Russians extended their territorial control and, soon, will probably be looking at severing the GLOC between Bakhmut and Konstantinovka;

·        In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russians reportedly captured several settlements. However, they were probably very thinly manned and thus easy to seize. These development are not a prelude to a larger offensive;

·        There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast;

·        We saw no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces. However, the exercise tempo again significantly increased compared to the previous week.

·        Whereas some Russian troops may have left Belarus, the incoming traffic was undoubtedly higher than outgoing;

·        The number of Russian artillery attacks increased last week, averaging 83 strikes per day;

General outlook

*You may not be interested in attrition, but attrition is interested in you*

Last week did not bring any operationally and strategically important events on the battlefields in Ukraine. Except for the Bakhmut-Soledar area, the frontline was deadlocked as neither side could extend their territorial control. There were tactical changes, especially in the Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia Oblast, but no changes were independently verified.

In the Luhansk Oblast, Ukrainians reportedly captured two settlements, while in Zaporizhzhia, Russians benefited from thinly spread Ukrainian formations and captured several villages. Apart from that, the situation remained relatively stable but also followed a medium-term trend of continued positional battles and artillery exchanges.

But let's focus on the battle for Soledar and Bakhmut and its wider implications.

Last week we noted that "the fall of Soledar changes nothing". We maintain this assessment. Although Russians made some progress near Soledar and south of Bakhmut over the last week, these gains continue to be slow and incremental. The situation near Bakhmut is gradually deteriorating, but it remains unclear whether Ukrainians will deploy their available resources to defend the city. Especially given that areas west of Bakhmut and Soledar are more defendable due to their elevated positions. Our sources in the area claim that Ukrainians "did not sustain heavy losses" during the battle for Soledar and that a similar approach will be applied as long as Russians bleed out. Ukrainians appear confident that the current Russian methods, which mostly focus on frontal assaults, are not sustainable over the following weeks and that their offensive potential will fizzle out due to heavy losses. The main question is how much it costs Kyiv to maintain such an approach. Whereas our sources claimed that losses were not heavy, other comments on social media claim that as many as 14 Ukrainian battalions were lost during the defence of Soledar and subsequent pullback from the city. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. But it appears that, at least in this direction, Moscow wants to bring Kyiv into a war of attrition that Kyiv cannot win. Ukraine cannot outspend Russia in terms of manpower numbers and in Russian willingness to sacrifice many men in tactically dubious assaults.

Concurrently, over the recent weeks, while Russians were deploying expendable Wagner fighters into the fight, Ukrainians deployed their operational formations, some of them elite, to stall Russian advances. So, in other words, the fall of Soledar had a limited impact on Russian operational units, which cannot be said about Kyiv's forces.

As long as Wagner presents itself as a viable force, Moscow will seek to force Ukraine into a war of attrition. Not only will Ukraine devote its men to defending the frontline, but it may also prevent them from mounting a large-scale offensive later.

Given the rather lax approach to how Russians treat their personnel, it would not be surprising if similar methods were repeated when a large number of Russian reservists enter Ukraine. So far, it seems that Kyiv does not seem to have an answer on how to respond to Moscow's attempts to impose how this phase of the war will be fought.

Kyiv opted out from conducting another wave of mobilisation in repose to the Russian call-up and stated that they had enough manpower to tackle 300,000 Russian reservists. However, the current phase of the war is very artillery- and infantry-centric; from Ukraine's perspective, it is unsustainable.

Rotation in Belarus   

In the last week's update, we placed information about a probable rotation of Russian forces in Belarus into a separate chapter. Last week's events showed that whereas some units may have left, more undoubtedly come. Consequently, the number of Russian forces in Belarus increased. We cannot talk about any drawdown or replacement of troops. Given that the number of ranges where Russians can train in Belarus did not magically increase, it is safe to assume that Russians are additional forces to units already deployed to training areas across Belarus.

A Polish journalist, who has been covering the east for years, told us last week that Belarus and Russia are creating joint crews to operate armoured and mechanised equipment. This provides further evidence that a regional grouping of forces is indeed being prepared.

Deliveries of equipment from Ukraine's partners

Last week Ukraine's partners met at the Ramstein Air Base to discuss support for Kyiv under the Ukraine Defense Contact Group initiative. 

Altogether, 11 countries pledged to deliver the following pieces of equipment. Here is an abbreviated list of what will be handed over:

Latvia will hand over additional Stinger MANPADS, two M-17 helicopters, machine guns with ammunition, several tens of UAVs and spare parts for M109 howitzers.

Lithuania will hand over dozens of L-70 anti-aircraft guns with tens of thousands of ammunition and two Mi-8 helicopters.

The United Kingdom support package, among others, includes a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks with armoured recovery and repair vehicles, some 30 AS90 self-propelled 155mm guns (around 30 per cent of the total SPH force), 600 Brimstone anti-tank missiles, and 100,000 artillery rounds.

Denmark will continue to train Ukrainian troops. Moreover, on Thursday, Copenhagen announced it would hand over 19 French-made Caesar howitzer artillery systems (not all have been produced yet). The delivery will come at the expense of Denmark's procurement programmes as it seeks to rebuild depleted stocks of equipment previously donated to Ukraine. The US package is too long to list here, but key items include additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), Eight Avenger air defence systems;  59 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) with 590 TOW anti-tank missiles and 295,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition and 90 Stryker armoured personnel carriers (APCs) with 20 mine rollers. More information about this package is available here.

Poland will hand over S-60 anti-aircraft guns with 70,000 pieces of ammunition. It is unclear whether Warsaw will donate S-60s or deeply modernised S-60MBs. On top of that, the country's defence minister stated that Poland would transfer a brigade's worth of equipment to Ukraine. The statement suggests Ukraine may receive a brigade-worth of equipment (30-40 T-72 MBTs and 80-100 BMP-1 IFVs). At the same time, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs stated on Sunday evening that Berlin would not oppose Poland's delivery of its Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Poland is capable of donating 14 vehicles. It is unclear whether this is an official position of the German government, but given various conflicting information coming from Berlin in recent weeks, it is worth waiting a few days for more official statements from the chancellery.

Given all the announcements on Western support that surfaced over the last few weeks, we may conclude that Ukraine will receive: around 170 MBTs, 190 artillery pieces, 880 personnel carriers, and almost 500 IFVs.

This is sufficient to stand up almost six tank battalions, five artillery battalions (we are not adding S-60s), and 16 mechanised battalions.

When speaking to the Economist in December, General Valery Zaluzhny, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stated that Kyiv needed "300 tanks, 600-700 IFVs, 500 Howitzers (..) to get to the lines of February 23rd". As such, the latest packages provide around half of Ukraine's needs.

After the Ramstein meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General Mark A. Milley, stated that the "training, in addition to the equipment, will significantly increase Ukrainians' capability to defend itself from further Russian attacks and to go on the tactical and operational offensive to liberate the occupied areas." In other words, Milley does not expect Ukrainians to conduct strategic-level offensives with the current capabilities, so the prospects of the war ending this year are small. People, of course, make mistakes. We make mistakes, and so does Milley. In early November, Milley stated that it would take a few weeks for Russians to leave the northern parts of the Kherson Oblast. The withdrawal concluded a few days after this statement. We do not mean to pick up on this particular general and his views, but as Mike Kofman says, war is contingent and dependent on many factors. The numbers cited above are important, but Ukraine needs a sustained, long-term support package to keep its forces capable of conducting combined-arms operations over the next years, not months.

Weather forecast

The temperatures in the Svatove-Kreminna area have stabilised recently and are expected to hover around 0 degrees Celsius during the day for the entire week. There will be a drop in temperatures at night when they reach -6 degrees Celsius, but their impact on the battlefield will be minimal. 

The weather in Bakhmut is to follow a very similar pattern, although it will be slightly warmer (+1 degree Celsius) in this part of the Donetsk Oblast.

However, Zaporizhzhia is to see an increase to 4 degrees Celsius on Friday-Sunday. There too, the temperatures at night will drop to subzero numbers.

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 376 aircraft (+4), 203 helicopters (+3), 2,931 UAVs (+49), 401 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(0), 7,601 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+76), 985 MLRS launchers (+3), 3,887 field artillery guns and mortars (+51), as well as 8,144 units of special military vehicles (+92).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (killed) 120,760 personnel (+5,470), 3,145 tanks (+39), 6,268 armoured combat vehicles (+85), 2,144 artillery systems (+50) and 445 MLRS (+18), 220 anti-aircraft systems (+3), 287 aircraft (+1) and 277 helicopters (+1), and 1,872 UAVs (+20), 4,846 vehicles and fuel tanks (+86), 749 cruise missiles (26), 17 warships and boats (+1) and 193 pieces of special equipment (+6).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, since the start of January, Russians (which most likely includes all proxy forces)  lost (were eliminated) around almost 10,000 soldiers. Whether eliminated in the UGS releases means only dead or general casualty, which needed to be evacuated from the battlefield, remains a mystery. Nevertheless, despite such heavy losses, Russian defensive operations in the Luhansk Oblast and offensive in the Soledar-Bakhmut area are ongoing.

Based on information acquired from “American intelligence sources”, UK’s Daily Mail claimed that Russia suffered 188,000 casualties since the war began (the figure reportedly includes the military and Wagner forces). The article journalists probably confused the death rate with the casualty rate. But even if we assume that highly unlikely 1:1 ratio (KIA to WIA/MIA), Russians lost 94,000 men since the war began. Significantly less than what the USG reports, assuming “eliminated” means killed.

Frontlines in Ukraine with Russian artillery strikes – 16 JAN – 22 JAN 2023

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, last week saw an increase in the number of Russian artillery attacks. A particular rise was visible in the Donetsk and Kherson Oblasts, where the number of strikes increased by 30. An upsurge was also reported in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. On the other hand, UGS noted a decrease in the Luhansk and Sumy Oblasts. The latter, in particular, saw a significant reduction.

Development of reported shellings since 9JUN (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Artillery strikes averaged 83 per day, increasing from 74 a week ago to 65 three weeks ago. The lowest number of locations hit occurred on 19JAN, when 61 settlements and cities were hit. Apart from this, the trend was upward. Indeed, on 18JAN, 97 locations were struck, the highest point last week.

Based solely on this data, we see no significant reductions in the scale of Russian artillery strikes.

Ukrainian General Staff reported shellings by city and oblast for the past seven days (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Military situation in Belarus

The last seven days did not bring serious developments in the military situation in Belarus.
For another week, the activity of the Belarusian military-political representatives remained low. Nonetheless, despite the reduced number of official events, the tempo of Russo-Belarusian military cooperation remained high. This refers to increased joint training actions and the growing presence of Russian forces deployed in Belarus.

From a political point of view, the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Belarus was probably the most noteworthy event that occurred last week. On Wednesday, Sergey Lavrov landed at the Minsk National Airport and participated in the joint board of the Russian and Belarusian Ministries of Foreign Affairs a day later. Lavrov and his Belarusian counterpart Sergey Alenik made a few official statements during the event. Russian Minister informed that Russia and Belarus signed a memorandum on strengthening the security of the Union State. According to him, these actions were made to counter the threats coming from western countries. However, no additional details about the document were provided.

A few hours later, Lavrov met personally with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Officially, both officials discussed dozens of topics, from trade to bilateral cooperation in foreign policy. During the talks, Lukashenko spoke about the ineffectiveness of the western sanctions that were unable "to strangle" Russia (and Belarus) and even strengthened the economies of both states. He also commented on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. After expressing support for the Russian actions, Lukashenko noted that Belarusian diplomats sought to support the potential peace talks during their contact with their western counterparts. Referring to the situation in Ukraine, the Belarusian President once again blamed the so-called collective West for trying to bring Ukraine into the conflict with Belarus. He also stated that, surprisingly, "Ukraine is not falling into that trap".

Generally, despite hawkish-sounding statements, talks between Lukashenko and Lavrov did not bring any major change in bilateral relations. Published video materials showed the quite visible distance between the two officials, evident in Lukashenko's statements.

As stated in the beginning, the reduced activity was also observable among the Belarusian military leadership.

Undoubtedly, the phone call of Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoigu, was the most significant event. It took place during Shoigu's visit in Minsk. Officially, Khrenin and Shoigu talked about bilateral military cooperation and the implementation of strategic deterrence measures. As noted by the Belarusian MoD, the status of a joint grouping of forces was also discussed. No additional details were provided.

Last week, Belarusian military officials were involved in two working meetings. They related to the methodological meeting of officers responsible for the implementation of the international arms control treaties held under the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Valery Revenko (Wednesday), as well as the gathering of Belarusian personnel officers held under the Deputy Minister of Defence, Maj. Gen. Andrey Zhuk (Friday). The first event was meant to prepare officials from all branches, commands and various military units to ensure the proper functioning of the foreign inspection groups on Belarusian soil (Open Skies and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaties), while the second was aimed at summarising activities of the personnel officers in the Belarusian Armed Forces and improving the personnel policy system in 2023.

Referring the actions of Belarusian military representatives, it should be added that on Friday, the representative of the 432nd Main Military Clinical Center, Lt. Col. Svetlana Kashura, informed about the ongoing work of the Belarusian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Health aimed at adjusting the physical requirements for Belarusian citizens to military service.
Kashura stated that the Belarusian MoD is aware that some requirements are too high and do not allow young citizens to connect their lives with the military.
This is mainly caused by the development of high-technology military equipment that decreases the physical demands of its operator. Kashura mentioned light visual impairment, as well as heavy body (muscle) mass, among the "illness" that should not impede citizens from serving in the Belarusian Army in the future.

Last week, the number of Belarusian Armed Forces training activities was substantial. Despite the continuation of a few combat readiness checks, several new events began. Moreover, most of them had a joint character (with the Russian Armed Forces), and the recently started tactical-flight exercise is the best example of this development.

Air exercises officially started on Monday under the Commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces, Col. Andrey Lukyanovich. According to official sources, they aim to increase the compatibility of the joint air component of the Union State.
To fulfil these objectives,  several Russian air assets (4x Su-30, 4x Su-34), and 12 various helicopters arrived shortly before the beginning of the practical actions. They were joined by two
Su-24 bombers (RF-54408, RF-54409) on Thursday.

Throughout the week, the joint aviation component was involved mainly in the following activities:

·    Russian A-50U AEW&C aircraft patrol flights supported by Russian and Belarusian combat aircraft;

·    Close air support (CAS) and destroying the air and anti-air assets of a mock enemy by using bomber aircraft and attack helicopters;

·    SAR-related activities and dispersion of air assets to other airfields. The latter pertained to  Russian Mi-8-MTV-5 and Mi-24 helicopters.

During the exercise, the Russian Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Sergey Dronov, was present at an HQ in Belarus. Also, one of the MiG-31K fighters involved in the drills reportedly suffered engine failure (RF-95194), while another transported X-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic aero ballistic missile (RF-92215).

Regarding the ground activity, the 72nd Joint Training Center continued the combat readiness check. On Tuesday, service members of the centre (which is the main mobilisation component of the Belarusian Army) carried out a 60-kilometre march using vehicles that were removed from the base. It is known that the training actions were continued presumably until Thursday when soldiers returned to the home garrison.

Besides, a combat readiness check was initiated at the 6th Mechanised Brigade's garrison on Wednesday. Initially, the drills involved at least one mechanised company. But presumably, on Friday, at least one artillery battery of the brigade took part in the practical actions.
A similar inspection of combat preparedness occurred among the 51st Artillery Brigade personnel on Tuesday. A logistic subunit of the 11th Mechanised Brigade started its readiness drill three days later.

For almost the whole week (until Saturday), the 120th Mechanised Brigade subunits were heavily engaged in training activities. This pertains to the 339th and 358th Mechanised Battalions that, for several days, continued their combat training classes at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground (339th Mechanised Battalion returned to the home garrison on Saturday). Also, the same range hosted fire classes of the brigade's 2S1 Battalion elements on Thursday.

On Friday, an unspecified subunit of the 103rd Airborne Brigade started a control-tactical exercise with live ammo firing. At the same time, the officers of the 36th Road and Bridge Brigade took part in practical driving classes. Moreover, the personnel of the 2288th Radiotechnical Battalion (49th Radiotechnical Brigade) took part in firing training classes.

Despite this heightened exercise tempo, the number of observed Belarusian transfers of military equipment over the past seven days was limited. Despite the movement of the abovementioned 339th Mechanised Battalion's column, including about 50 BTRs (Saturday), there were no noteworthy transfers. Nonetheless, the presence of Belarusian air defence assets among the moving vehicles should be mentioned. On Friday, the whole battalion set of the S-300/S-400 system was spotted on the move (Barysaw>Zhodino>Starobin>Mikashevichy), as well as the single Buk air defence system moving on a trailer (in Baranovichi) was reported. In addition, the movement of the 40V6 mast was spotted a day later in the vicinity of Mikashevichy.

Conversely, the number of Russian assets on Belarusian soil was very high.
Even excluding the airframes that arrived to participate in the joint tactical-flight exercise, the arrival of another six cargo planes was reported. This pertains to An-12 (RF-12560, 2x RF-93586), An-26 (RF-90319, ??????), and An-72 (RF-72949) aircraft.
Moreover, unofficial sources reported the movement of about 17 military echelons with dozens of KAMAZ trucks and towed MSTA-B howitzers.

Some of them also included BMPs, MT-LBs armoured vehicles, and several personnel cars likely filled with additional Russian soldiers.

On Wednesday, Radio Svoboda released satellite imagery of the Lepelsky Training Ground. It revealed that about 150 various military vehicles and 50 tents were deployed near Zaslonovo Railway Station at the beginning of the month.
Moreover, their increased presence was reported in the vicinity of Prybitki Air Base.

Summary of main Belarusian training activities in January 2023

21JAN: End of the combat readiness check (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, the 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

21JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Baranovichi, Machulischy, Luniniets air bases,  both Belarusian and Russian fighters and helicopters, as well as Russian and A-50U AEW&C aircraft);

20JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Baranovichi, Lida, Machulischy, Luniniets and Osovtsy air bases, as well as 210th Aviation Training Ground, both Belarusian and Russian fighters (Su-30SM, MiG-31K, Su-34), helicopters (Mi-8, Mi-24) and Russian an A-50U AEW&C aircraft);

20JAN: Continuation of combat readiness check (presumably Gozhsky Training Ground, at least one mechanised company and an artillery battery of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);

20JAN: Continuation of combat readiness check (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

20JAN: Start of the combat inspection (the unspecified location(s), unspecified logistic subunits of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);

20JAN?: Control-tactical exercise (Losvido Training Ground, unspecified element of the 103rd Airborne Brigade);

20JAN: Practical driving classes (unspecified location, officers of the 36th Road and Bridge Brigade);

19JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Baranovichi, Lida, Machulischy, Luniniets and Osovtsy air bases, both Belarusian and Russian fighters (inc. MiG-31K), helicopters (Mi-8, Mi-24) and Russian an A-50U AEW&C aircraft).

19JAN: Continuation of combat readiness check (presumably Gozhsky Training Ground, at least one mechanised company of the 6th Mechanised Brigade)

19JAN: Continuation of combat readiness check (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, 339th and 358th Mechanised Battalions and 2S1 battalion’s elements of the 120th Mechanised Brigade)

19JAN: Possible ending of the combat readiness check (home garrison, 72nd Joint Training Center)

18JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (Belarusian airspace, no exact data);

18JAN: Possible combat readiness check (unspecified location, at least one mechanised company of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);

17JAN: Continuation of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (All Belarusian air bases and Air Force training grounds, unspecified number of Belarusian airframes and presumably 12 helicopters and eight fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces);

17JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness inspection with a 60-kilometre training march  (unspecified location, 72nd Joint Training Center);

17JAN: A sudden check of the combat readiness (home garrison, unspecified elements of the 51st Artillery Brigade);

17JAN: Continuation of the combat training classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, 339th and 358th Mechanised Battalions of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

17JAN: Fire training classes (various locations, Communications Battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade and elements of the 120th Air Defence Brigade);

16JAN: Start of the combat training drills (Brestsky Training Ground, unspecified elements of the 38th Air Assault Brigade);

16JAN: Start of the Russo-Belarusian tactical-flight exercise (All Belarusian air bases and air force training grounds, unspecified number of Belarusian airframes and presumably 12 helicopters and eight fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces);

16JAN: Field exit combined with combat training classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, likely 339th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

16JAN: Possible continuation of the combat training classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, 358th Mechanised Battalion of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

13JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness review (various locations, 72nd Joint Training Center);

12JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness check of the 19th Mechanised Brigade (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, elements of the 4th Tank Battalion);

12JAN: Continuation of the field exit (Losvido Training Ground, Peacekeeping Company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade);

12JAN: End of the field exit (home garrison, at least one mechanised company of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);

12JAN: Off-road driving classes (Osipovichi Training Ground, drivers of the 336th Reactive Artillery Brigade);

12JAN: Readiness review (likely home garrison, 1st and 2nd battery of the SPH Battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);

12JAN: Tactical and combat training classes (unspecified location, elements of the 339th Mechanised Battalion);

11JAN: Field exit of OSA air defence subunit combined with the start of combat duty (unspecified location, presumably elements of the 147th or 740th Air Defence Regiments);

11JAN: Combat readiness check (unspecified training ground, at least one mechanised company of the 11th Mechanised Brigade);;

11JAN: Combat readiness check (likely home garrison, the 72nd Joint Training Center)

11JAN: Field exit combined with tactical exercises (Losvido Training Ground, Peacekeeping Company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade);

11JAN: T-72 firing classes (Gozhsky Training Ground, tank crews of the 6th Mechanised Brigade);

11JAN: Practical gathering of SOF officers (garrison of the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade, battalion level commanders, chief of staffs, and deputy commanders of the Belarusian SOF);

11JAN: Annual gathering of military divers (garrison of the 188th Engineering Brigade, military divers from various military formations);

11JAN: Practical gathering linked to the UAV use (unspecified location, UAV operators from the 40th Mechanised Battalion);

10JAN: Continuation of the combat readiness check of the North-Western Operational Command formations (unspecified area near Berezina River, 4th Tank Battalion, and elements of the 7th Engineering Regiment and 740th Air Defence Regiment involved);

9JAN: Combat readiness check of the North-Western Operational Command formations (227th Combined Arms Training Ground and Berezina River area, 4th Tank Battalion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade and 7th Engineering Regiment involved);

5JAN: Gathering dedicated to the organisation of combat training measures (Brest, Belarusian SOF subunit commanders);

4JAN: BTR-82A and BMP-2 firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, cadets of the 72nd Joint Training Center);

4JAN: T-72 indirect firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, tank crews of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

3JAN: Engineering training classes (unspecified location, elements of the 40th Mechanised Battalion of the 11th Mechanized Brigade);

3JAN?: Field exit combined with live ammo firing (230th Combined Arms Training Ground, 2S1 Battalion of the 841st Artillery Group of the 11th Mechanised Brigade).

4JAN: BTR-82A and BMP-2 firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, cadets of the 72nd Joint Training Center);

4JAN: T-72 indirect firing classes (227th Combined Arms Training Ground, tank crews of the 120th Mechanised Brigade);

3JAN: Engineering training classes (unspecified location, elements of the 40th Mechanised Battalion of the 11th Mechanized Brigade);

3JAN?: Field exit combined with live ammo firing (230th Combined Arms Training Ground, 2S1 Battalion of the 841st Artillery Group of the 11th Mechanised Brigade).

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv/Luhansk direction

Last week did not conduct any decisive operations in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast, and, as such, the frontline remains essentially unchanged compared to the previous week. Although reports about the Russian deployment of additional formations east of Kreminna were not confirmed, the attackers nevertheless made slight gains in the area. However, even from a tactical point of view, pushing Ukrainians up to two kilometres west and not following the attack with other operations can hardly be called a significant development.

Reportedly, Ukrainians made some gains. However, the stress here is on the first word as no independently verified confirmed frontline changes occurred last week in this direction.

For the fourth week in a row, there were no ground attacks on the northern part of the Kharkiv Oblast from Russia. Despite this, the threat of such attacks is real, and it cannot be excluded that such attacks will occur next week. We continue to maintain that for the time being Russian threat posed by its forces on the Russian side only seeks to distract the UGS from more critical areas, such as the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.

Russians continued to conduct artillery strikes on border areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and areas north of Kupyansk. Russians partly use BM-21 and other MLR systems but mostly use missiles fired from S-300 air defence systems. This imprecise fire mode hardly engaged military targets and most often hit civilian infrastructure and residential areas. As such, the impact of the increased number of artillery strikes on the frontline is minimal.

There were no ground attacks on Ukrainian positions north of Kharkiv (third week in a row). Russians deploy some units near the border (on the Russian side) and continually threaten attacks to force Ukrainians to contend with another possible attack on the oblast. However, we continue to see no larger build-up on the Russian side to suggest that an offensive operation is being prepared.

We saw no changes near Dvorchina. The Russian MoD reported several times last week that Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage groups operated in areas east and southeast of the city. It is likely that such activities were ongoing, but we do not attach particular importance to Russian MoD claims about the destruction of such groups. Nevertheless, probing and reconnoitring of OPFOR’s positions likely has a permanent character and occurs from both sides.

According to Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, in the Kreminna – Svatove direction, the situation is stable, and UAF were moving forward (Haidai never provides any evidence to support such claims). However, he added that Russians constantly transferred reserves into the Luhansk Oblast. Russian paratroopers sent to Kreminna are trying to improve defensive lines and fortify the city. Of course, the more time they will have, the more difficult it will be for Ukrainians to pierce through Russian lines near the town.

Most intense fighting took place around Novoselivske and Kuzemivka. The latter was being fought over for weeks, with neither side being able to pierce through OPFOR’s defences. However, a Pro-Ukrainian source claimed on Thursday that the village had been liberated and that Russians pulled back to Kuzemivka. Around the same time, an undated video was published on social media, reportedly showing a Russian TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system fire on the village. Employing a system with such a devastating force would imply that Novoselivske was indeed liberated and that Russians were determined to take it over.

Moreover, late in the week, reports started surfacing about an ongoing battle for Kuzemivka. This came after two videos appeared online on Monday, reportedly showing a battle in the village (or what was left of it) and a Russian T-90 tank allegedly destroyed by an AT4 shoulder-fired recoilless anti-tank weapon near it. According to a Ukrainian source, in addition to the 60th separate Motorised Rifle Battalion “Vitirany”, the 27th separate Motorised Rifle Brigade also arrived in Kuzemivka to reinforce the Russian presence there. It also adds credence to the reports that Ukrainian progress in the Novoselivske-Kuzemivka area was tangible.

But again, the impact on the overall battle for the Luhansk Oblast is limited. Ukrainians are not employing sufficient capabilities in this area to break the deadlock and decidedly pierce through Russian defences.

There were some positional battles in the  Makiivka–Ploshchanka area, but they did not impact the frontline. The frontline runs between these two villages, and for the past few weeks, Russians have been trying to dislodge Ukrainians from Makiivka and push them over the Zherebets River. However, despite continued attempts, no such objectives have been achieved.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts with Russian artillery strikes, 16 JAN – 22 JAN 2023

Donetsk Oblast Direction

Two weeks ago, the Russian MoD claimed that its forces had taken over the control of Soledar. The Ukrainian General Staff, or other official authorities, deny that the city is under a complete Russian control. It is likely that if there are any ongoing battles, they are being fought near the Sіlj train station, which administratively belongs to Soledar. However, we believe that what is being discussed is largely semantics. The fact is that not only did Wagner fighter capture 99% of Soledar, but they also managed to extend their attacks north and south of the city.

The current Ukrainian positions rest on the T0513 road that links Bakhmut and Soledar with Siversk and on the Bakhmutka River.

From Sil, Russians tried to capture Krasnopolivka, but this ambition did not materialise last week. That said, there were some reports last week, which indicated that Russians were attacking Ukrainian positions in Rozdolivka, but it is unclear whether assaults there occurred from Sіlj or the Yakovlivka.

Moving south, Russians had some successes near Krasna Hora, where they probably managed to surround Ukrainian forces defending the village from north, east, and south. The settlement plays a role in supplying Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut from Slovyansk using the northern route. However, given the proximity of the frontline and Russian fire control over it, it is highly likely that the road no longer presents itself as a viable ground line of communication.

Topography around Bakhmut and Soledar

From the Russian point of view, the control over Krasna Hora is important as it allows Russians to extend their attack towards Berkhiva (local highest point) and Bohdanivka with the aim of cutting off supplies to Bakhmut. This axis forms the northern prong attack toward Bakhmut. The southern one involves operations in Klishchiivka and Bila Hora. There were many conflicting reports about the status of the former last week. Ukrainians reportedly lost control over the village at least once, but their counterattacks repelled Wagner forces storming the settlement. According to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner PMC head,  his forces established full control over Klishchiivka.

It is safe to assume that the village is contested, but Russians maintain the overall initiative. An equally difficult situation is southwest of  Klishchiivka where Russians crossed the canal and started assaulting Ukrainian positions in Bila Hora, Oleksandro-Shultyne and in areas west of Klishchiivka. They also attempted to reach Dyliivka, but we understand that this attempt was not successful.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s objective is to reach the T0504 road linking Bakhmut with Konstantinivka, probably between Stupochky and Krasne Ivanivske. This attack combined with an assault from Krasna Hora seek to completely cut Bakhmut off from supplies and force Ukrainian withdrawal from the city.

From the Ukrainian point of view, their defences have been established on elevated positions near Chasiv Yar, which increases their chances of successful defensive operations in denying Russian access to the T0504 highway.

When it comes to Bakhmut, Russians made an incremental gain in the city. They extended their territorial control to several streets, but Ukrainians defensive positions remain viable and we saw no indications that would portend a collapse of Kyiv’s defensive lines in Bakhmut.

Soledar-Bakhmut axis

Soledar-Bakhmut axis

Apart from these attacks and Russian successes, the situation in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast did not change. Despite many attacks, Moscow’s forces did not manage to alter the frontline and all of its attacks appeared to have been repelled. In the northern parts of the oblast, attacks on Spirne and Verkhnekamenskoe were unsuccessful.

Russian attacks on Avdiivka alternate between artillery strikes and ground assaults. Yet, despite maintaining a sustained effort to break Ukrainian defences in this area, they have made any progress near Avdiivka for weeks.

Russians continued to attack Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Vodyane. According to a Ukrainian source, without success, However, a Russian source claimed that they made a foothold in Vodyane. This information remains unverified.

Ukrainian positions in Mariinka were held despite Russian attacks. A video appeared on social media reportedly showing a Ukrainian soldier in the city centre. If confirmed, it shows that Ukrainians control half of the settlement. However, Russian sources asserted on Thursday that Ukrainians were pushed to the western parts of  Mariinka. The source also claimed that Russian units broke through Ukrainian defences near Pobieda. So far, no Ukrainian sources have confirmed these developments.

Nevertheless, the focus on Pobieda and Krasnohorivka probably stems from plans to cut off a section of the road that links Mariinka with Pobieda. So far, this objective was not achieved.

According to a Ukrainian source, the situation is difficult on the eastern outskirts of Krasnohorivka, where Russian attacks are very heavy. Yet, no reports surfaced about any changes in this sector.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian artillery strikes, 16 JAN – 22 JAN 2023

Zaporizhzhia direction

Last week saw some frontline changes after months of artillery exchanges and positional battles. According to Russian sources, Russian units with artillery support attacked the UAF positions in Stepove in order to reach an important section of the road leading to Orikhiv. To the southeast of this city, they tried to move towards Mala Tokmachka. Prior to that, Russians claims to have captured Novoandriivka, Bilohirya, Novodanylivka, Mali Scherbaky, Lobkove, Kamyanka. Heavy fighting was also ongoing near Scherbaky. These villages were reportedly captured by elements of the 5th and 58th Combined Arms Armies.

So far, Ukrainians have not confirmed these losses. In fact, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian attacks were repelled near Stepove and Mala Tokmachka.

Two weeks ago, we noted that “Russian sources claimed to have captured Dorozhnyanka, some seven kilometres south of Hulajpole” and that “the attack on Dorozhnyanka was reportedly preceded by a 10 km Russian raid from Myrne, indicating that Russians could move around their formations without detection near the frontline.” We understand that these alleged Ukrainian losses from last week were incurred in areas where Ukrainian military presence was scarce, which Russians used to their advantage. Indeed, with hindsight, the reported raid from Myrne towards Dorozhnyanka (as stated above) confirmed that the Ukrainian presence in Zaporizhihia was limited, and so was its ability to track the movement of Russian forces in the oblast. It is also likely that Russians attacked with reduced force size as high-precision weapon systems would have struck any larger troop concentration areas.

We assess that these ground attacks are opportunistic and do not forecast a more significant Russian push in the Zporizhihia Oblast. Russian reported successes are the effects of Ukrainians being spread too thin and their focus on other parts of the front. We also understand that Russian attacks are very infantry-centric and lack appropriate artillery and mechanised/armour support.

It is possible that recent Russian successes in the area were partly achieved thanks to the deployment of pro-Russian volunteers from Serbia, who, according to the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky, recently arrived in this part of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the mood among (pro)Russian sources and politicians is that Russian posture in the Zaporizhihia Oblast is defensive in nature and that no major offensive operations could be undertaken given their limited force presence in the area.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian artillery strikes, 16 JAN – 22 JAN 2023

Kherson direction

As expected, last week delivered no changes in the frontline situation in the Kherson Oblast. Both sides continued their previous activities of shelling each others’ positions, while Russians also, as usual, conducted strikes on civilian targets in the Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts.

Posturing on both sides remains defensive, as nothing indicates that any larger military operations are being planned. It does not mean that there were not any developments in the region.

Firstly, while posturing is defensive, it is also weakened. Major military formations have been withdrawn from the Kherson Oblast, while Russians and Ukrainians focus on ground operations in other parts of Ukraine, predominantly the broader Donbas.

Secondly, in Crimea, beyond the HIMARS range, Russians continue to train personnel later deployed to Zaqporizhihia and Kherson Oblasts. It is not surprising as all major Russian training activities, logistics centres, and concentration areas are deployed in areas where HIMARS cannot engage them.

To inflict bigger damage on the Ukrainian population, Russians not only resort to artillery strikes but also to strikes using incendiary munitions. Since the start of 2023, Russians have launched three strikes on the city of Kherson, and more will likely come over the next few weeks.

Thirdly, both sides conduct limited reconnaissance (and perhaps sabotage) operations on the banks of the Dnipro River. Last week, Russian sources claimed that a Ukrainian landing on the southern bank of the river was prevented using artillery strikes. Rochan’s sources stationed near Kherson confirm that such infiltration actions occur more or less regularly, but in many cases, they are not reported in the media. Their main objective is to test and reconnoitre OPFOR’s defensive lines and acquire data for artillery strikes.

Next, Russia continues to improve its logistics infrastructure and the systems of fortifications to move its forces faster and defend against Ukrainians better. According to the head of Kherson Oblast (Russian occupation administration), Vladimir Saldo, the Henichesk-Arabat Spit bridge was restored, which opened up another route for the movement of Russian troops into the Kherson Oblast (the other two passed through Armyansk and Medvedivka). Also linked to logistics, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin claimed last week that all four spans of the Kerch Brigade would be fixed by the end of February. The bridge’s reopening should positively impact the Russian ability to logistically support their forces in the Kherson Oblast and western parts of the Zaporizhihia Oblast. Currently, all supplies are transported by trucks on a ferry between Port Kavkaz and Kerch.

Saldo, also stated that Russians almost completed the construction of modern fortifications on the east bank of Dnipro. He added that these fortifications had an emergency nature and were temporary because Russians will be back in Kherson in 2023.

Lastly, during the previous week, Ukrainians reportedly hit Russian concentration areas in Ahaimany and Velyka Lepetikha. Ukrainians also harassed Sevastopol using UAVs. According to Russian authorities, at least 10 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over the city last week. No footage is available to confirm the successful strikes of these UAVs.

Frontlines in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast with Russian artillery strikes, 16 JAN – 22 JAN 2023

Outlook for the week of 23JAN - 29JAN

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.

We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Last week's forecast

This is what we forecasted last week:

"Starting with the Kharkiv Oblast, it is unlikely that the frontline situation will change in this direction. Russian attacks likely occur, but they will highly likely be too small to alter the territorial control." This forecast was correct. No frontline changes in this direction occurred.

Score: 1/1

"There is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will inch towards Svatove, but the reality is that Ukrainian offensive potential in this area petered out. But we believe that this is by choice rather than necessity. Russian counterattacks will almost certainly continue, but here again, we assess that they are unlikely to alter the frontline in a significant way (the capture of a few villages)." This forecast is a mixed bag. On the one hand, Ukrainians may have captured Novoselivkse, but this has not been independently confirmed. On the other hand, apart from this probable development, no other changes occurred, despite daily Russian counterattacks.

Score: 0.5/1

"The same goes for Kreminna, Ukrainians will likely continue their forward movement, but the pace of this advance will be small. Whereas they may reach the city next week, the chances are remote that the city will be captured." Again, too many things remain uncertain to give us one full point here. Ukrainians may have made some progress near Chernopopivka, but this has not been confirmed. Kreminna remains firmly Russian.

Score: 0.5/1

"When it comes to Donetsk Oblast, we maintain our view from the last week. Apart from the Svatove-Bakhmut areas, Russian ability to alter the frontline is currently non-existent. Of course, a village or two could be captured, but it would hardly be a noteworthy success. With the bulk of capability (air power, artillery, and manpower) deployed to Soledar and Bakhmut, we believe that Russian attacks will be sustained in this area next week. There is a real prospect that Bakhmut will be surrounded from the east, south, and north. We are unsure to what extent Russians will be able to move their forces from Soledar and resume ground attacks on Bakhmut next week. If this happens fast enough, then it is likely that Russians will capture some territory in Bakhmut. However, it is highly improbable that the city will fall next week." We were correct in this assessment. Apart from the Bakhmut-Soledar axis, Russians made no progress in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast. They extended their territorial control near Soledar and Bakhmut. Pidhorodne fell, and probably so did Klishchiivka. Russians also slightly extended their control lines in Bakhmut. We did not anticipate the Russians continued to attack up north from Svatove. We expected the bulk of the most to be directed at Bakhmut.

Score: 1/1

"Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, we forecast no changes. Although there were some reports late in the week about deploying Russian forces into the oblast, we assess that this is not a preparation for a large-scale attack. The situation on the ground is highly unlikely to change." Although there was no large-scale attack in this area, Russias claim to have captured four villages in the oblast.

Score: 0/1

"Lastly, the same can be said about the Kherson Oblast. Chances for an amphibious assault over the Dnipro River are remote. Battles for islands on the river will certainly continue. Russians will also certainly attack Ukrainian civilian areas north of the river, while Ukrainians will target Russian force and equipment concentrations north of Crimea. "This forecast was correct.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 4/6

Next week's forecast

We continue to forecast no changed for the Kharkiv Oblast. We do not anticipate a large-scale move by either side, although both will likely continue limited attacks along the line of contact.

The same can be said about the Luhansk Oblast. The situation is very unclear concerning who controls which village. It is thus difficult to forecast any changes. Nevertheless, we foresee no significant changes based on last week's operations. Ukrainians are more likely to capture an additional settlement or two than Russians. Russian operations near Svatove will likely be predominantly based on active defence, while near Kreminna, there is roughly even chance they will move forward. The same pertains to Ukrainians. Their attacks near Svatove lack the power to change the frontline, but they remain heavily committed near Kreminna. Likewise, there is roughly a 50 per cent chance they will move towards the city next week.

Regarding the Donetsk Oblast, our prognosis will not undergo significant changes. Firstly, we maintain our view from previous weeks that the Russian ability to alter the frontline apart from the Svatove-Bakhmut area is non-existent. We thus expect to see no changes in the broader region.

However, when it comes to the Soledar-Bakhmut sector, we assess that Russians will likely extend their territorial control south of Soledar. There is roughly even chance that Krasna Hora will fall. They are unlikely to be successful in their attacks north of Soledar. Russians will likely make some progress in Bakhmut by capturing several streets, but it is highly unlikely that Bakhmut will fall next week. The most critical situation is near Klishchiivka. Likely, Russian attacks in this sector will be increased. Russians may inch towards Ivanivske.

Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian attacks will continue. It is also likely that they may seize other villages. That said,  they are highly unlikely to lead to more considerable territorial gains. We continue to assess that this is not a preparation for a large-scale attack.

In the Kherson Oblast. Chances for an amphibious assault over the Dnipro River are remote. Battles for islands on the river will certainly continue. Russians will also certainly attack Ukrainian civilian areas north of the river, while Ukrainians will target Russian force and equipment concentrations north of Crimea.

We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue to train, while more Russian units will arrive in Belarus.