Much appreciate your analysis, as always! Some general thoughts:
"comments on social media claim that as many as 14 Ukrainian battalions were lost during the defence of Soledar and subsequent pullback from the city."
According to militaryland.net reports, there have been right about that number of UKR brigades operating along the Bakhmut front for weeks now. Since Ukraine apparently (I think you noted this on a previous post) maintains one of three battalion-strength groups on the front line and rotates them frequently, I bet in the real world this translates to around 14 UKR battalions engaged in heavy fighting.
Assuming Ukraine is taking ~100 casualties per day in the sector (German estimate I think), approximately 2,000 casualties in a month sounds about right. Also tracks with the 10-30k RU casualties estimated for the period, given the Wagner forlorn hope style tactics.
That hurts, but isn't the same as 14 battalions whole lost. Still not sure the tradeoff there was worth it, given that the heights to the west make a better defensive line that can interdict Russian units crossing the Bakhmutova and make controlling the ruined cities along it absolutely brutal.
I remain convinced that the proven difficulty of bashing through prepared defenses means Russia *has* to open a new front, possibly between Kharkiv and Sumy, that tries to reach the Dnipro behind Ukraine's main defensive positions in Donbas. Unless Russia can cut off resupply to UKR units fighting on the front, even taking all of Donbas now won't matter when the big UKR counterattacks start this summer.
Probing attacks in Zaporizhzhia, the supposed movement of a division-strength unit towards Kharkiv, and the lack of sustained missile/Shahad drone strikes over the past couple weeks... feels like a classic Russian misdirection campaign before a surprise move somewhere else. The winter freeze can be relied on to last until the end of March, right? And in spring, Ukraine deploys lots of new toys in force.
Could Russia have worked out a way to hit suddenly in a relatively quiet sector only covered by territorial guard troops without tipping its hand? Small assault teams backed by overwhelming airpower could *theoretically* mass around Grayvoron, punch towards Poltava while securing key rail/highway junctions west of Kharkiv, and pave the way for a punch by heavy armor.
Helps that UKR air defenses are likely still dispersed.
Has the US picked up a signal? Is that why the CIA director was in Kyiv last week, and partners are *finally* sending modern armored vehicles? Remote sensing at high fidelity ought to be able to pick up any sustained movement of forces into Belgorod district. And there would have to be some comms traffic, given the lack of discipline on the part of Russian soldiers.
I *hope* I'm totally off base, but have to keep plugging the theory until proven wrong, given the stakes. Just seems dangerous to assume Russia will keep acting so dumb and wasteful with resources that will become scarce sooner or later.
Hey Andrew! Thanks for your comment. Generally, I agree with you in that the main Russian thrust can come from between Kharkiv and Sumy. Russians need peace to accumulate their forces. HIMARS guarantee this does not happen in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Russians can, however, concentrate either in Belarus or between Klintsy-Valyuki. I think an attack from Belarus is unlikely, so the only viable area is the latter.
Much appreciate your analysis, as always! Some general thoughts:
"comments on social media claim that as many as 14 Ukrainian battalions were lost during the defence of Soledar and subsequent pullback from the city."
According to militaryland.net reports, there have been right about that number of UKR brigades operating along the Bakhmut front for weeks now. Since Ukraine apparently (I think you noted this on a previous post) maintains one of three battalion-strength groups on the front line and rotates them frequently, I bet in the real world this translates to around 14 UKR battalions engaged in heavy fighting.
Assuming Ukraine is taking ~100 casualties per day in the sector (German estimate I think), approximately 2,000 casualties in a month sounds about right. Also tracks with the 10-30k RU casualties estimated for the period, given the Wagner forlorn hope style tactics.
That hurts, but isn't the same as 14 battalions whole lost. Still not sure the tradeoff there was worth it, given that the heights to the west make a better defensive line that can interdict Russian units crossing the Bakhmutova and make controlling the ruined cities along it absolutely brutal.
I remain convinced that the proven difficulty of bashing through prepared defenses means Russia *has* to open a new front, possibly between Kharkiv and Sumy, that tries to reach the Dnipro behind Ukraine's main defensive positions in Donbas. Unless Russia can cut off resupply to UKR units fighting on the front, even taking all of Donbas now won't matter when the big UKR counterattacks start this summer.
Probing attacks in Zaporizhzhia, the supposed movement of a division-strength unit towards Kharkiv, and the lack of sustained missile/Shahad drone strikes over the past couple weeks... feels like a classic Russian misdirection campaign before a surprise move somewhere else. The winter freeze can be relied on to last until the end of March, right? And in spring, Ukraine deploys lots of new toys in force.
Could Russia have worked out a way to hit suddenly in a relatively quiet sector only covered by territorial guard troops without tipping its hand? Small assault teams backed by overwhelming airpower could *theoretically* mass around Grayvoron, punch towards Poltava while securing key rail/highway junctions west of Kharkiv, and pave the way for a punch by heavy armor.
Helps that UKR air defenses are likely still dispersed.
Has the US picked up a signal? Is that why the CIA director was in Kyiv last week, and partners are *finally* sending modern armored vehicles? Remote sensing at high fidelity ought to be able to pick up any sustained movement of forces into Belgorod district. And there would have to be some comms traffic, given the lack of discipline on the part of Russian soldiers.
I *hope* I'm totally off base, but have to keep plugging the theory until proven wrong, given the stakes. Just seems dangerous to assume Russia will keep acting so dumb and wasteful with resources that will become scarce sooner or later.
Hey Andrew! Thanks for your comment. Generally, I agree with you in that the main Russian thrust can come from between Kharkiv and Sumy. Russians need peace to accumulate their forces. HIMARS guarantee this does not happen in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Russians can, however, concentrate either in Belarus or between Klintsy-Valyuki. I think an attack from Belarus is unlikely, so the only viable area is the latter.