Key takeaways: Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine; Both sides conducted limited attacks in the Kherson Oblast. However, the frontline remained largely unchanged; Ukranians did not move closer to Svatove, while near Kreminna, they may have inched closer to the city;
Does anyone have insight into Russian force concentrations inside RU borders? The potential deployment of the ~200k reservists likely undergoing intensive training and outfitting since October remains concerning.
Working theory: rumors of limited artillery supplies in Donbas, continued limited use of Russian tactical aviation, reliance on Wagner mercenaries on active sectors, lack of committment of armor near Soledar, and major UKR forces remaining tied down near Bakhmut is setting the stage for a new front to open later in January.
Given Ukraine's US-mandated restrictions on using HIMARS on RU territory, were I the Russian commander I'd be building up forces near Belgorod and Kursk for a sudden attack towards Poltava. Likely preceded by a concerted effort to secure air superiority over the new front line relying on saturating UKR defenses with Shahed drones.
Objective: get as close to the Dnipro as possible to threaten UKR supply lines supporting the fight in Donbas. If Kharkiv can be cut off from Kyiv through winter while a new round of mobilization prepares replacements for the additional ~100k casualties RU forces will suffer, RU might believe this will push Kyiv into talks.
If correct, obviously the solution is to give Ukraine more and better weapons faster. An exposed Russian spearhead cut off and forced to surrender could be the final turning point... one can only hope.
Thanks for not being one of those outlets that parrots the US line on everything. You've been *far* more reliable than certain DC-based think tanks this past year.
Analysis much appreciated!
Does anyone have insight into Russian force concentrations inside RU borders? The potential deployment of the ~200k reservists likely undergoing intensive training and outfitting since October remains concerning.
Working theory: rumors of limited artillery supplies in Donbas, continued limited use of Russian tactical aviation, reliance on Wagner mercenaries on active sectors, lack of committment of armor near Soledar, and major UKR forces remaining tied down near Bakhmut is setting the stage for a new front to open later in January.
Given Ukraine's US-mandated restrictions on using HIMARS on RU territory, were I the Russian commander I'd be building up forces near Belgorod and Kursk for a sudden attack towards Poltava. Likely preceded by a concerted effort to secure air superiority over the new front line relying on saturating UKR defenses with Shahed drones.
Objective: get as close to the Dnipro as possible to threaten UKR supply lines supporting the fight in Donbas. If Kharkiv can be cut off from Kyiv through winter while a new round of mobilization prepares replacements for the additional ~100k casualties RU forces will suffer, RU might believe this will push Kyiv into talks.
If correct, obviously the solution is to give Ukraine more and better weapons faster. An exposed Russian spearhead cut off and forced to surrender could be the final turning point... one can only hope.
Thanks for not being one of those outlets that parrots the US line on everything. You've been *far* more reliable than certain DC-based think tanks this past year.