Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 22 July – 28 July 2023 (Weekly update)

Situational report from the war in Ukraine

BLUF: Ukrainian forces made marginal gains over the past seven days. The operational focus remained unchanged as battles continued near Bakhmut, Velyka Novoselivka, and Orikhiv. To revive the attacks in the south and relieve the 9th Corps, Ukraine committed its second echelon forces to the battle, which delivered small territorial gains. The key aspect of Ukrainian operations is their ability to sustain a sufficient tempo of operations to exert continuous pressure on Russian forces. In the north, Moscow continued offensive operations in the Luhansk Oblast, where they also progressed.

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• Russian forces continued ground and artillery attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast, but they delivered no frontline changes;

• On the border between Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblasts, Russians launched counterattacks, which reportedly allowed them to capture almost 60 sq km and three villages;

• Russian forces successfully crossed the Zherebets River southwest of Svatove and continued offensive operations, probably towards Borova in the Luhansk Oblast;

• The frontline in the wider Donetsk Oblast remained unchanged; The scale and intensity of Russian attacks decreased;

• In the Bakhmut area, Ukrainians made progress near Klishchiivka and Andriivka and, as of late week, were on the verge of capturing the former;

• In the Velyka Novosilka in the southern direction, Ukrainians were confirmed to have captured Staromaiors’ke, a village which had reportedly been liberated two weeks ago; Ukrainians also extended attacks towards Urozhaine;

• The Orikhiv axis, however, remained the priority, which was confirmed by the deployment of the 10th Corps; As a result of this change, Ukrainians progressed a few kilometres, but the sustainability of advance is a big concern;

• No changes were reported in the Kherson Oblast; Ukrainians maintained their positions near the Antonovsky Bridge as Russians attempted to dislodge them;

Executive summary

Last week delivered the most significant change in Ukrainian operations since the main phase of the counteroffensive started in early June. By Wednesday, Ukrainians rotated (probably the entire) 9th  Corps from the battlefield and replaced it with fresh 10th Corps. Some described this development as the main phase of the counteroffensive, but we will caution against using such a description. The 9th Corps had been in the battle for more than seven weeks, and its offensive potential was likely exhausted. To revive the counteroffensive and regain the initiative, at least in the short term, the Ukrainian high command had to deploy new and fresh forces to battle. However, by looking at the scale of Ukrainian losses so far (click here and here), they mostly included Soviet-era equipment, such as BMP-1s infantry fighting vehicles and some T-64 and T-72 main battle tanks. It thus appears that the corps is equipped chiefly with legacy assets, which, as the early June push showed, significantly reduce crew survivability. This, in turn, may significantly impact the tempo of attacks, especially since at least 16 BMP-1s were lost/damaged/abandoned. Russians, too, lost at least seven tanks but only two BMPs, which is not surprising given that the attacking side typically loses more manpower than defenders.

One aspect of the employment of the second echelon force is the scale of the attack. Various reports over the past couple of days suggested that the mechanised attack involved between 30 to 80 vehicles. The former figure suggests three companies, while the latter three battalions. Based on conversations we had in Ukraine a few weeks ago, we learnt that the initial push in June was conducted using reinforced companies as Ukrainians could not coordinate battalion-level (and above) operations. It is thus highly likely that even if Ukrainians suffered losses near Robotyne, they should still have enough manpower and equipment (and reserves) to keep attacks going.

However, operationally, the commitment of the 10th Corps changes a lot. Initially, Ukrainians wanted to establish three corps, but a lack of equipment delivered only two. They ultimately became the first and second echelon forces. The deployment of the 10th Corps means that Ukrainians do not have operational reserves earmarked for this operation. There is no third echelon force that would be a dedicated formation to reinforce or rotate the first two corps. It thus remains to be seen how Ukrainians will deal with this issue. We believe that fresh replacements will now be sent to the 9th Corps to reinstate their manning levels, but their training and overall preparedness level could be subpar. Regardless, most of the force allocated to the counteroffensive has now likely been committed.

Mechanised attacks showed they could deliver some tactical results. The 10th Corps pushed the frontline a couple of kilometres south near Robotyne as Ukrainians slowly approached the main Russian defensive lines. Some sources indicated that Ukrainians could be as far as south of the village, but this information has not been independently verified. It will nevertheless be difficult for Kyiv to maintain momentum as fortifications will become increasingly denser and probably better manned. Russians will always have new positions to fall back on to steadily degrade the Ukrainian tempo of attacks, their manpower and equipment. Ukrainians also suffer from mobility problems further compounded by Russian artillery and ATGM attacks.

The next few days will answer how the 10th Crops is progressing and what we can expect in the next couple of weeks.

Elsewhere, in the Velyka Novosilka axis, Ukrainians finally captured Staromaiors’ke. But this axis undoubtedly has an auxiliary role in the offensive as most forces and capabilities are deployed to the Orikhiv area. We have generally seen no significant shifts in how the battles near Velyka Novosilka were developing as progress is plodding.

South of Bakhmut, Ukrainians will likely capture Klishchiivka next week and extend attacks on Russian positions south of the city. As such, reports about a Ukrainian operational encirclement of the city are incorrect. While undoubtedly Ukrainian formations possess capabilities to strike Russian ground lines of communications around Bachmut, it does not mean that such attacks are occurring (very likely not due to a lack of barrels) and are cost-effective. Ukrainian artillery is predominately tasked with supporting ground attacks, which have been given priority. But to exert pressure on Russians in Bachmut, Ukrainians must restart attacks on the northern flank and push towards Soledar. So far, Kyiv places bigger importance on Bachmut’s southern areas.

Lastly, Russians have been conducting attacks southwest from Svatove in the Luhansk Oblast for over a week. Multiple Russian sources claimed rather significant territorial gains, some of which were confirmed by Ukrainian sources. However, no visual evidence was provided to substantiate these changes. Only on Friday (28JUL) did geolocated images surface, confirming Russian advances. Their units crossed the Zherebets River, which served as a natural barrier hindering Russian offensive actions. It is possible that Moscow may now build on these successes and deploy more forces into combat. We should also remember the context of these attacks. Ukrainian official military sources claimed that Russians gathered 100,000 troops between Kupyansk and Lyman, supported by more than 900 tanks and 370 MLR systems. Yet despite this, we assess that Russian gains were achieved by deploying a much smaller force. More importantly, the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army is predominantly stationed near Svatove and has not been sent to combat. If it is, Russian gains may accelerate.

Ukraine battle map

Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv/Luhansk direction

We continued to see no significant changes in the overall operational situation in the Kharkiv Oblast. No Russian ground attacks were recorded near the state border, although cross-border artillery attacks continued.

In terms of ground attacks, Russians remained committed to tactical assaults near Masyutivka, Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka. During the past weekend, a Russian source said that Russian forces had captured several positions near the first two settlements.

According to Hanna Malyar, the deputy Ukrainian Minister of Defence in the Kupyansk direction, Russians had actively been conducting assault operations to push Ukrainians over the Oskil River. However, these attempts were not successful.

Although we could not confirm these developments, a Russian source claimed on Monday that the Ukrainian activity near Kupyansk was high, indicating preparations for an offensive. Reportedly, elements of the 95th Air Assault Brigade were observed near Synkivka. Indeed, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that the Ukrainian 95th Air Assault Brigade launched a counterattack near Masyutivka and Petropavlovka, indicating that Ukrainians conduct limited ground assaults in the region.

Our views on the current situation in the Kupyansk axis are obstructed by a near-total lack of visual evidence confirming any frontline changes. In general,  we have seen no significant changes in the commitment of Russian forces in the Kharkiv Oblast and therefore anticipate no significant changes in Russian operations in the Kupyansk direction. But, on the other hand, we must stress that a lack of available evidence does not mean that no such preparations are ongoing.

Another constant development is Russian artillery strikes on Ukrainian civilian areas. Over the past seven days, Moscow again shelled settlements in Bohodukhivsky, Kharkivsky, Chuhuivsky, Kupyansky, Lozivsky and Iziumsky districts. In particular, Russians struck Kupyansk, Vovchansk, Huriiv Kozachok, Hraniv, Bochkove, Krasne Pershe, Dvorichna, Zapadne, Pervomaisky, Vilcha, and Kozacha Lopan. Kucherivka, Perropavlivka and Cherneshchyna were also hit.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), Russians continued striking Ukrainian concentration and deployment areas using combat aircraft and MLR systems. For instance, on 25JUL, a Russian Su-34 medium-range fighter-bomber/strike aircraft carried out two air strikes on the 14th and 43rd Mechanised Brigades concentration areas near Petropavlivka and Vilcha. Another similar attack occurred a day later. Another deployment point of the 43rd Mechanised Brigade was hit by an MLRS fire near Bohuslavka. The 14th Mechanised Brigade was also targeted during the past weekend.

Interestingly, on Monday, two Iskander ballistic missiles were launched against deployment points of the Ukrainian 1st Armoured Brigade near Honcharivske (?). The results of these strikes are unknown.

Luhansk direction

Our views on the situation in the Luhansk Oblast also continue to be obstructed by a lack of confirmed and verified data confirming reported Russian gains in the region. To recap, over the past few weeks, Ukrainians warned that Russians had deployed 100,000 men, supported by more than 900 tanks and 370 MLR systems, in the Luhansk and Kharkiv directions. At the same time, Russians tightened control over residents of the occupied territories in the Luhansk Oblast to prevent them from passing information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) on the movement of Russian forces. Additional checkpoints appeared in the Svatove district, and the movement between villages was restricted.

In this context, Russian sources reported that Serhiivka and Nadiya had been captured on 25JUL. Russians also achieved a breakthrough of eight kilometres wide and seven kilometres deep. The source added that if Russians were to capture Kopanky, two kilometres away from the frontline, they would gain control of all the dominant heights. The next objective would be Borova – the most important logistical centre of the entire Ukrainian grouping in the Lugansk direction.

A Ukrainian source said that while some stability was achieved on the southern flank near Karmazynivka, the Russians indeed seized Serhiivka and Nadiya. The source also added that Novojehorivka was under Russian control (these changes are reflected on a Ukrainian map), although the exact details of the current situation near Novojehorivka were unclear. Some Russian sources claimed that Russians crossed the Zherebets River near Novojehorivka and expanded the bridgehead. Ukrainians said that the UAF launched counterattacks throwing Russian units back. However, only on Friday evening did the first geolocated images appear, confirming some Russian gains over the past few days.

Another Russian source claimed that the Russian units captured 59 square kilometres during the week near Karmazynivka, adding that the Ukrainian 25th Airborne Brigade could not hold their defensive lines. The source also claimed that Ukrainians had problems with their reserves, but it is unclear what exactly this involved.

The overall situation in these sectors thus remains unclear. On the one hand, these reports clearly indicate some Russian progress, which the Ukrainian source confirmed. But on the other hand, we cannot independently verify these reports. Official Ukrainian sources also did not confirm any changes either. Speaking to CNN, the spokesman for the Eastern Grouping of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Serhii Cherevaty, said, “We do not confirm this. The tactical line there has not changed much”.

According to a Russian source, the Russian offensive ran along the entire line between Synkivka – Torske, but from our point of view, the focus is more on the northern part of this front.

Moving further south, Russian claims on the capture of Novoselivske were not confirmed, although the Ukrainian source said that Russian operations were focused on Stelmakhivka. Another Ukrainian source said that, near Novoselivske, which has already changed hands more than ten times, the Russians conducted local attacks on foot at night but without success.

No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka areas. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any near Terny, Yampolivka and Nevske.

In the Kreminna area, positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest. Although Russians reportedly (and here) made some gains therein, no detailed information was provided about these developments

No changes were reported in the Bilohorivka area.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts, 22-28JUL 2023

(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Brady Africk).

Donetsk Oblast Direction

Ukrainian Armed Forces continued attacks in the Bakhmut area, which remained the centre of gravity for both sides. Again, based on social media reports, they made some progress south of the city, but these claims have not yet been independently verified.

Let’s take a closer look at the frontline. In the north, no changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka.

In the previous update, we noted that the Russian press reports indicated Ukrainian operations in the Lysychansk direction. Over the past seven days, reports about Ukrainian attacks there continued to surface. Yet, Russians presented no evidence confirming any major Ukrainian activities near Lysychansk.

No changes occurred in Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, and Vesele. According to the Russian source, on 22 JUL, Ukrainians pushed the Russian troops back to Khromove while repulsing a Russian counterattack near Hryhorivka. Small-scale Russian counterattacks also occurred near Bohdanivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka.

No changes were reported in the Bakhmut area. However, it was south of the city where Ukrainian continued to engage Russian forces. According to Hanna Malyar, the UAF conducted successful attacks in this sector and advanced gradually and steadily. On Monday, she claimed four sq kilometres of territory had been liberated in the Bakhmut sector over the previous seven days. In total, Ukrainians retook 35 sq km south of Bakhmut (probably since mid-May).

Russian forces launched limited counterattacks towards Ivanivske, but these actions delivered no results. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Bila Hora.

Battles near Klishchiivka continued. Latest reports suggest that Ukrainians captured Hill 197 and moved into the centre of the village, but the northern part of it was still under Russian control.

According to the UGS, the Ukrainian forces made progress in advancing near Andriivka. On Monday, Andriy Kovalyov, a spokesman for the General Staff, claimed that Ukrainians almost approached the settlement. Still, on Tuesday, a Ukrainian source said that Russians had been pushed out of some parts of the village.

Moving further south, no changes were reported in other parts of the oblast. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Novokalynove, Vesele and Kamyanka.

The same pertains to areas which previously saw heavy battles, such as Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Severne, Vodyane and Nevelske. This lack of any developments came despite Malyar’s comments that Russian forces continued attacks to encircle Avdiivka. She also added that the intensity of combat operations is similar to what Ukrainians experience in Bakhmut.

Russian attacks near Mariinka and Krasnohorivka continued but decreased in intensity over the past seven days.

Likewise, no changes occurred near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian fortifications, 22-28JUL 2023

Southern Ukraine direction

The frontline remained static for most of the week. However, on Wednesday, Ukrainians committed elements of the 10th Corps in the Orikhiv axis. This development probably marked a rotation of the 9th Corps elements, which offensive potential was exhausted following seven weeks of heavy battles. Available data shows that the Ukrainian forces progressed south and captured several Russian strongholds and trenches east of Robotyne. They have not yet reached the first defensive line, and their further progress hinges on whether they can sustain the forward momentum.

Ukrainians are thus committed to their attacks towards Tokmak.

However, let’s first start with the Velyka Novosilka axis.

Velyka Novosilka axis

The overall situation there did not undergo any significant operational changes. Ukrainians attacked carried on their attacks and gradually moved towards Staromaiorske. On Wednesday, they reportedly gained a foothold in the village and took it on Thursday. This development marks the first village liberated since 12JUN when Makarivka 26JUN when Rivnopil was recaptured. We understand that following the liberation of Staromaiorske, Ukrainians subsequently tried to advance towards a nearby Urozhaine, but no information about the situation in this village was published

Ukrainian 3^rd Special Purpose Regiment captured some personnel from the Russian 247^th Air Assault Regiment (7^th Air Assault Division) in the village, which was reportedly very undermanned. Russian sources also claimed that Russians deployed elements of the 60^th Motor Rifle Brigade to this area. The deployment of an airborne (VDV) unit to defend the frontline is noteworthy as, typically, VDV is held in reserve to respond to any contingency scenarios. We don’t know whether Staromaiorske is one such case. But, at the same time, near Bachmut, VDV fulfils frontline infantry roles, so they may have also been assigned similar tasks in the south. If that’s the case, Russians may suffer from wider manpower shortage problems.

Secondly, we are unaware of any ongoing rotations of Ukrainian forces sighting in the Velyka Novosilka axis. Attacks are still conducted by units involved in the counteroffensive since the start. If no additional forces are deployed, Ukrainian offensive potential, already significantly stretched, could culminate.

Ukrainian units also attacked Russian positions near Pryyutne, but no information appeared in open sources confirming any territorial gains near the settlement.

Orikhiv axis

As stated above, as of Friday, Kyiv committed the 10th Corps to attacks east of Robotyne to reinvigorate their attacks in the Orikhiv axis.

On Wednesday, Ukrainians launched a major mechanised push south of Orikhiv. This was the largest use of armour since the counteroffensive began in early June. The Russian MoD assessed that the attack was carried out by three battalions reinforced with tanks. To recap, the initial attack undertaken by the 47^th Mechanised Brigade involved three reinforced companies. A Russian blogger claimed Ukrainians deployed 80 armoured vehicles, others said 30, although the extent to which either claim is true is unclear.

From the frontline perspective, Ukrainian units managed to advance northeast of Robotyne. They advanced to the east of the village, meaning some Russian defensive lines were breached, although Ukrainians still had not reached the first main Russian line. Russians also still maintain positions in Robotyne. The deployment of the 10th Corps probably triggered the commitment of the 1429^th Motor Rifle Regiment into the area to stall Ukrainian attacks.

The unit was involved in defending against the initial Ukrainian push on 8JUL.

More on that, to hinder Ukrainian ability to advance, Russians claimed to have hit an ammo depot of the 128^th Mountain Assault Brigade, as well as the command post of the 65th Mechanised Brigade and the fuel depot of the 33^rd Mechanised Brigade, all in an attempt to degrade Ukrainian attack tempo.

When the counteroffensive occurred, the 10th Corps was held in reserve and was presumably to be deployed to exploit gaps in Russian defensive lines when the first echelon forces (9th Corps) achieved a breakthrough. As no such thing happened, the 10th Corps remained uncommitted. The deployment of the corps can bring multiple dividends. The unit is fresh, equipped with western-made equipment, and its command (including the Southern Operational Command) had the time to reflect on the initial days of the campaign when the 9th Corps was stopped after a brief advance. On the other hand, the 10th Corps in combat means that the Ukrainian command does not expect a sudden breakthrough as no large forces are held in reserve. In general, a lack of available reserves could also hinder Ukrainian operations over the medium term. It is safe to assume that the 9th Corps will now have 6-8 weeks to rebuild its combat power before being redeployed to the frontline.

Almost no direct fighting occurred in the western part of the Orikhiv axis. Some offensive attempts appeared on Tuesday but did not change the frontline. In general, Ukrainians again suffered from Russian artillery, aviation and helicopter attacks. Ukrainian forces presumably deployed artillery assets of the 116^th Mechanised Brigade to the area to counter Russian fire advantage.

Frontlines in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast with Russian fortifications, 22-28JUL 2023

Kherson direction and Crimea

The situation in the Kherson Oblast did not undergo any significant changes over the past seven days. Russian forces continued routine artillery strikes on Kherson and Ukrainian positions north of the Dnipro River.

On the other hand, Ukrainians maintained their positions near the Antonovsky Bridge. The Russian source asserted that Ukrainians were present near and that Ukrainian special forces were probing Russian Defences near Hola Prystan and Krynky. Such a claim indicates that Ukrainians extended their territorial control south of the bridge and extended horizontal attacks on Russian positions on the Dnipro’s left bank.

Russian sources claim to occasionally intercept Ukrainian landing craft as they attempt to deliver men and supplies to their troops on the river’s bank. On Monday, three small boats were destroyed near the bridge.

The Russian source added that apart from infiltration actions, Ukrainian forces had increased the intensity of their artillery fire. Whereas they fired 25-30 times on average during the previous week (we assume 25-30 strikes per day), this number exceeded 40-45 as of Monday. Objectively speaking, if these numbers are correct, the scale of Ukrainian artillery attacks is too small to deliver significant effects of degrading Russian logistics, destroying equipment, killing manpower, or preparing the ground for larger troop deployments. We consider Ukrainian artillery attacks to have a primarily harassing character.

A Russian source stated that in July, Ukrainians lost 880 men near the Antonovsky Bridge.

Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 22-28JUL 2023

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 457 aircraft (+1), 244 helicopters (+1), 5,308 UAVs (+154), 427 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 11,010 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+221), 1,140 MLRS launchers (+1), 5,646 field artillery guns and mortars (+99), as well as 11,939 units of special military vehicles (+152).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 244,830 personnel (+4,140), 4,190 tanks (+57), 8,161 armoured combat vehicles (+81), 4,775 artillery systems (+165) and 698 MLR systems (+6), 458 anti-aircraft systems (+18), 315 aircraft (0) and 311 helicopters (+1), and 4,007 UAVs (+74), 7,240 vehicles and fuel tanks (+95), 1,347 cruise missiles (+49), 18 warships and boats (0) and 709 special vehicles (+23).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)

Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine

The past week saw a decreased intensity of Russian missile attacks on Ukraine. Two weeks ago, Russians fired at least 78 various missiles, compared to the reported 62 over the past seven days. Equally important is the fact that previous attacks occurred almost daily between 18 and 23JUL (only 22JUL strike-free). But last week, Russians launched only two major attacks. The first occurred on 23JUL and involved five P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, three Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles fired from submarines, five Iskander cruise missiles, and two Iskander ballistic missiles, totalling 19 missiles. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down only four Kalibrs and five Iskander cruise missiles.

On Wednesday (26JUL), Russians launched the third-highest wave of missiles since early March. They fired 43 missiles, including three Kalibrs, 36 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and four Kinzhal Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed to have shot down three Kalibrs and 33 Kh-101/Kh-555. No Kinzhals were officially intercepted.

The attacks were again aimed at Odesa and its port infrastructure. The latter strike hit a cargo terminal and a guardhouse, killing one person. As such, Russian attempts to prevent Ukrainian agricultural products from being exported continued. But we assess that Russians will not be able to sustain such heavy strikes on Odesa over the coming weeks.

The number of Shaheds employed also decreased last week. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 13 vehicles, compared to 67 during the prior week. Assuming that the interception rate stands at 80%, Russians may have fired 16 UAVs this week, compared to 80 a week before.

Since early July, Russians have increased the use of Shahed 131/136 kamikaze drones. This uptick in their activity was especially visible over the past few days when they were also used for attacks on targets in the Odesa Region. We, too, assess that Moscow will not be able to sustain such a high pace of attacks (20 vehicles used per attack) over a five-day period.

But, on the other hand, Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, said this week Russians were launching Shaheds that had been assembled in Russia. This is evidenced by the markings on the remains of the UAVs that were found after the latest attacks. If this is indeed the case, then we expect that Russians will be able to increase the pace and intensity of their Shaheds attacks over the coming months.

Number of Russian attacks in July (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Russian missile strikes on Ukraine (Shaheds excluded)  (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

The number of Shehed 131/136 kamikaze drones interceptions (Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command)

Outlook for the week of 29JUL-4AUG

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.

To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Previous forecast

“We expect to see no significant changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Russian ground attacks will highly likely continue, and with the level of currently deployed forces, it is unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more. That said, the advances can be potentially rapid if Moscow commits a part of its 100,000 force.” Based on available footage, Russians made no confirmed territorial gains last week in the region.

Score: 1/1

“The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. We expect no significant changes if the scale of Russian operations remains the same. But the increased troop deployments could tilt the tactical balance in Moscow’s favour and deliver territorial gains.” This assessment was not correct. Footage that emerged on Friday confirmed that Russians crossed the Zherebets River and may have indeed captured some villages.

Score: 0/1

“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are likely to liberate some territory, especially around Bakhmut, near Orekhovo-Vasylivka and Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka). 3) There is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will recapture one village or more.” This prognosis was also correct. Russians made no territorial gains in the Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainians captured no villages either, but they progressed near Klishchiivka.

Score: 1/1

“Moving onto the southern direction, it is impossible to predict frontline changes in this part of the country. The deployment of new units to the Orikhiv axis could potentially revive and increase the tempo of the Ukrainian attack, especially if we consider that Ukrainians started using cluster munitions. The progress will undoubtedly be slow, and we believe it is unlikely that Ukrainians will capture one village or more (excluding  Staromaiors’ke) across the entire direction.” This prediction was correct, but with hindsight, we need to caveat our assessment of these views. Firstly, we were right in expecting that the deployment of new units to the battle could renew Ukrainian attacks. We were also right in expecting that Ukrainians would not capture one village or more. But this prognosis failed to anticipate a coordinated Ukrainian attack that occurred on Wednesday, which ultimately involved three companies/battalions. Based on the 9th Corps performance in early June and what we learnt during the study trip in Ukraine, we were unsure to what extent such an operation was feasible.

Score: 0.5/1

“We expect no frontline changes in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainians are highly likely to maintain their presence north of Oleshky along the Dnipro’s bank. Reconnaissance and sabotage operations will also be continued, but the probability that Ukrainians will try to push south is very low. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Ukrainians will try to conduct a river-crossing operation over the next seven days.” Ukrainians made no confirmed gains in the region last week

Score: 1/1

Final score: 3.5/5 (70%)

The forecast for the week of 29JUL-4AUG

The forecast below again shows high uncertainties about the current situation in Ukraine and our gaps in the assessment of both the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces. In general, we do not expect that the overall levels of commitments will change next week. But, at the same time, we understand that the situation is very fluid and can change swiftly. This especially pertains to the Kharkiv Oblast and the southern direction, but in general, we assess the likelihood of Russian gains in the Kharkiv Oblast to be higher than Ukrainian in the Zaporizhihia region.

Based on last week’s reports, we expect that visual evidence will emerge over the next seven days confirming reported Russian gains in the Kharkiv Oblast. Secondly, Russian ground attacks will likely continue. We also expect Russian sources to claim further territorial gains, but we assess that there is a roughly even chance that Moscow will capture one village or more. That said, the advances can be potentially rapid if Moscow commits a part of its 100,000 force.

The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. We expect no significant changes if the scale of Russian operations remains the same. But the increased troop deployments could tilt the tactical balance in Moscow’s favour and deliver territorial gains.

We will also not change our forecast pertaining to the Donetsk Oblast. Firstly, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the region. Their capacity, even for smaller gains, seems very limited. Ukrainians are likely to capture Klishchiivka and/or Andriivka. In general, if Kyiv is to make any gains, they will likely be achieved in the Bakhmut area.

Moving onto the southern direction, in the Velyka Novosilka axis, there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will capture one village or more. In this context, we are particularly looking at Urozhaine. The situation in the Orikhiv axis will depend on the Ukrainian ability to sustain momentum following Wednesday’s counterattack. Based on Ukrainian operations to date, it is likely that the momentum will peter out by the end of the week and that the progress will be very limited from Monday onwards.

The deployment of new units to the Orikhiv axis could potentially revive and increase the tempo of the Ukrainian attack, especially if we consider that Ukrainians started using cluster munitions. The progress will undoubtedly be slow, and we believe it is unlikely that Ukrainians will capture one village or more (excluding  Staromaiors’ke) across the entire direction.

We expect no frontline changes in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainians are highly likely to maintain their presence near the Antonovsky Bridge. While the horizontal scope of their riverine (deployment of sabotage and reconnaissance groups) operations could increase, we expect to see no significant changes in the scope of the territory Ukrainians control on Dnipro’s left bank.