Among the big unknowns for me is the amount of reserves on both sides. How solid is the knowledge that Ukraine doesn't have additional reserves aside from what it just committed? Several days ago, the ISW wrote: "Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if the US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust. Even accepting the high estimate of three battalions as the Ukrainian force offered by the Russian MoD, three battalions comprise a single brigade, whereas Ukraine is known still to have in reserve multiple uncommitted brigades readied for the counteroffensive." Is the ISW optimistic here?
Also, how well do we know that behind the front-line troops in the south, Russia has more well-echeloned troops waiting? A number of indicators push in the other direction (1) Popov's critiques about a lack of rotations and about staffing levels and counter-battery fires (2) VDV troops on the frontline in Bakhmut, (3) the raw fact it's been almost a year since the first mobilization, (4) the US estimate of 100,000 Russian casualties from Jan. thru May 1st (if Russia was too lightly staffed pre-mobilization, then given casualties a year in, they are likely close to being back to being undermanned again), (5) the fact that Putin waited too long to enact the first mobilization and appears to be dragging his feet on the 2nd, which (6) is now rumored to be coming next month are all indications that maybe Russia doesn't have a ton of reserves. That Russia is still going on the attack may be an indication that in fact they do have plenty of reserves, or that the decision makers are fairly removed from facts on the ground, which wouldn't be the first time in this war given the reporting that Putin likes to hear good news and Shoigu as a consummate court power operator well understands this.
Also, as a side point/question, it seems strange Ukraine would use its last major reserve forces to attackin Orikhiv. They had much more success south of Velika Novosilka. The ISW map w/ Russian defenses mapped only really show one true main defensive line in that area. The ignorant layman in me wonders why that area was not enforced instead...
I guess, if these are Ukraine's last reserves, then is continuing this offensive potentially a mistake for Ukraine? If this turns into a multi-year attritional battle, Russia has more men after all. Simply defending (with occasional counter-attacks) seems the way forward to achieve a long-run stalemate rather than potential collapse.
Very interesting.
Among the big unknowns for me is the amount of reserves on both sides. How solid is the knowledge that Ukraine doesn't have additional reserves aside from what it just committed? Several days ago, the ISW wrote: "Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if the US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust. Even accepting the high estimate of three battalions as the Ukrainian force offered by the Russian MoD, three battalions comprise a single brigade, whereas Ukraine is known still to have in reserve multiple uncommitted brigades readied for the counteroffensive." Is the ISW optimistic here?
Also, how well do we know that behind the front-line troops in the south, Russia has more well-echeloned troops waiting? A number of indicators push in the other direction (1) Popov's critiques about a lack of rotations and about staffing levels and counter-battery fires (2) VDV troops on the frontline in Bakhmut, (3) the raw fact it's been almost a year since the first mobilization, (4) the US estimate of 100,000 Russian casualties from Jan. thru May 1st (if Russia was too lightly staffed pre-mobilization, then given casualties a year in, they are likely close to being back to being undermanned again), (5) the fact that Putin waited too long to enact the first mobilization and appears to be dragging his feet on the 2nd, which (6) is now rumored to be coming next month are all indications that maybe Russia doesn't have a ton of reserves. That Russia is still going on the attack may be an indication that in fact they do have plenty of reserves, or that the decision makers are fairly removed from facts on the ground, which wouldn't be the first time in this war given the reporting that Putin likes to hear good news and Shoigu as a consummate court power operator well understands this.
Also, as a side point/question, it seems strange Ukraine would use its last major reserve forces to attackin Orikhiv. They had much more success south of Velika Novosilka. The ISW map w/ Russian defenses mapped only really show one true main defensive line in that area. The ignorant layman in me wonders why that area was not enforced instead...
I guess, if these are Ukraine's last reserves, then is continuing this offensive potentially a mistake for Ukraine? If this turns into a multi-year attritional battle, Russia has more men after all. Simply defending (with occasional counter-attacks) seems the way forward to achieve a long-run stalemate rather than potential collapse.