Konrad, I think you scored your prediction harshly: "unlikely they will capture more than one village next week". They only captured one village, so technically, you were correct. Only reason this should maybe be a .5 is the tone.
In your view, do you think Ukraine is actually trying to counter-attack with full force, or might they wait for additional capabilities like ATACMs, F-16s, cluster munitions, Abrams, and Polish naval missiles before doing so?
How much a barrier to an offensive is late fall/winter weather? Even with these new capabilities, would things like cutting through a mine-field be more difficult in the snow? (slash fall/early winter mud?)
Let's assume Ukraine continues to make slow gains in July. A village a week in Donetsk + Zaporizhzhia. 200-400 meters a day around Bakhmut, and say they take back Bakhmut itself. Let's say they consolidate minor gains around Antonovsky, but just as a fixing operation. And Ukraine continues to take basically unsustainable losses and use unsustainable amounts of munitions. What is the probability that they then declare victory on this offensive with Bakhmut in hand, and stop the offensive and wait for F-16s, ATACMs, etc. etc.?
Another follow-up question: "Kyiv does not possess the capability to intercept Kh-55 successfully due to its high velocity." This means Russia can strike anything in Ukrainian territory at will?
Konrad, I think you scored your prediction harshly: "unlikely they will capture more than one village next week". They only captured one village, so technically, you were correct. Only reason this should maybe be a .5 is the tone.
In your view, do you think Ukraine is actually trying to counter-attack with full force, or might they wait for additional capabilities like ATACMs, F-16s, cluster munitions, Abrams, and Polish naval missiles before doing so?
How much a barrier to an offensive is late fall/winter weather? Even with these new capabilities, would things like cutting through a mine-field be more difficult in the snow? (slash fall/early winter mud?)
Let's assume Ukraine continues to make slow gains in July. A village a week in Donetsk + Zaporizhzhia. 200-400 meters a day around Bakhmut, and say they take back Bakhmut itself. Let's say they consolidate minor gains around Antonovsky, but just as a fixing operation. And Ukraine continues to take basically unsustainable losses and use unsustainable amounts of munitions. What is the probability that they then declare victory on this offensive with Bakhmut in hand, and stop the offensive and wait for F-16s, ATACMs, etc. etc.?
Another follow-up question: "Kyiv does not possess the capability to intercept Kh-55 successfully due to its high velocity." This means Russia can strike anything in Ukrainian territory at will?
I had thought the Patriot system could shoot down Russia's much-vaunted hypersonic missiles: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraine-and-the-kinzhal-dont-believe-the-hypersonic-hype/
" targets inside of Russia (probably Crimea excluded)," - very bad phrasing, that suggest that Crimea is part of the Russia.