Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 29 July – 4 August 2023 (Weekly update)
Situational report from the war in Ukraine
Key takeaways from last week’s developments:
No frontline changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast, where Russian ground attacks continued;
Ukrainians reportedly retook two villages, while Russians captured one in the Luhansk Oblast;
Russians reportedly conducted a successful, small-sized attack near Vesele (Avdiivka area), while Ukrainians made some gains near Nevelske and south of Avdiivka; Ukrainians also made some limited gains south of Vuhledar;
The frontline in southern Ukraine remained static for most of the week; Ukrainians entered an operational pause during which they regrouped and strengthened their positions; Ukrainian capacity to alter the frontline remained very limited;
No changes were reported in the Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainians maintained positions on Dnirpo’s left bank; Ukrainians conducted successful missile attacks on Russian ground lines of communications north of Crimea, but they are unlikely to cause long-term disruptions to Russian logistics supplies in the region;
Moscow continued Shehed strikes on port infrastructure in Odesa, resulting in 40,000 tons of grain damaged; Missile strikes were minimal;
Ukrainian maritime drone attacks on a Russian naval base in Novorossiysk highlight ongoing problems with the provision of security to key infrastructure facilities and deficiencies in ISR;
Executive summary
Let’s start by looking at what we wrote a week ago. The 9th Corps was rotated out and replaced by fresh units subordinated to the 10th Corps. We also stated that the entire 9th Corps was probably pulled back, which was not entirely accurate. Battlefield pictures and videos showed M2A2 Bradley IFVs fighting in the Orikhiv axis, which confirmed that the 47th Mechanised Brigade (9th Corps) was still committed. The Ukrainian command probably hoped to achieve a higher tempo of attack and increased crew survivability and reach the first line of Russian defences. While the first two objectives were met, the last was not.
On Friday (04AUG), Hanna Maliar, the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence, reportedly said that “in southern directions, Ukrainian units have already broken through the first line of defence of the Russian troops in some places and moved to the intermediate line.” However, not only is there no evidence to support such claims, but Ukrainians started what appears to be an operational pause early in the week, which significantly decreased the scope and intensity of their attacks. This pause has been “used” to regroup and probably reinforce, presumably in anticipation of a larger-scale attack coming soon.
As such, the reality is that Ukrainians made no confirmed gains in the south last week, although some small and unreported advances were possible. The same pertains to Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, where Ukrainians occupy nearby heights but cannot make a decisive push to capture the settlement.
It has been over eight weeks since the counteroffensive’s start, and Ukrainians have yet to reach the first line of defences. They have chosen an attritional approach to degrade Russian logistics (where possible) and artillery capability to hinder their ability to support forces near the frontline or strike Ukrainian targets farther away. Indeed, Ukrainian soldiers confirmed to us in early July that they enjoyed the preponderance of artillery (gun) fire, but Russians fired more MLRS rounds. Ukrainians have also targeted Russian counterbattery radars to further limit Moscow’s ability to fire back accurately (although, based on my experiences from Ukraine, Russian counterbattery fire still works, and I felt it).
The expectation is that ground attacks and a preponderance of artillery fires will lead to the steady erosion of the Russian capacity to maintain their forces in entrenched positions and the subsequent collapse of the front (or a part of it). There are, however, several problems with such an approach. Firstly, Ukrainian resources are finite. Financial Times reported this week that Ukrainians fired 8,000 artillery rounds daily, a third the US produces a month. The current tempo of Ukrainian artillery attacks was achieved thanks to the 500,000-600,000 rounds the US borrowed from South Korea and donated to Ukraine. Although US cluster munitions will allow to decrease the conventional shell usage, at the current rate, Ukrainians are fastly approaching the end of their available stocks: with 600,000 shells earmarked for the counteroffensive, Ukrainians could maintain the current pace for 75 days.
Equally important are barrels for the guns. A high rate of fire means faster barrel wear down and the necessity to provide replacements. This will be another choke point. The Ukrainian focus on artillery strikes at the current stage can leave them dangerously exposed in the long term.
Lastly, manpower. Counterattacks on well-prepared Russian positions are costly, and Ukrainians lose more men than Russians. Such an approach is also not sustainable over the medium term. Although Ukrainians could send replacements (and they probably are), they are likely, not well-trained, which, in turn, will only exacerbate the losses.
So is this approach working to lead to the collapse of Russian forces? Based on our conversations in Ukraine, the only indication that Russians were suffering from logistics issues pertained to their limited artillery use. Apart from that, no source asserted that Russians were becoming increasingly weak and unable to fight. On the contrary, their ISR capability was solid, strikes precise (using Lancets, ATGMs), EW working, and logistics largely uninterrupted. Although it is possible that we did not get the whole picture and that the situation may have changed since early July, we do not assess that the situation for Russians is dire or that the current Ukrainian concept of operations will lead to such a point over the next two months.
In the meantime, Ukraine will try to attack Russians asymmetrically. Drone strikes on a business district in Moscow or a Ropucha-class large landing ship in Novorossiysk play a vital PR role and continue to highlight that Russians are unable to protect critical infrastructure. But they will not impact Russian operations in Ukraine. Undoubtedly, there are trade-offs as low-impact, harassing strikes facilitate disproportionate Russian response, such as missile strikes on civilian areas.
Russians also continued to attack Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Odesa Oblast. Last week, they, among others, targeted Izmail, a grain port positioned on the north bank of the Danube River opposite Romania. On the one hand, such strikes could lead to an escalation vis-à-vis NATO, but using Shaheds in the strike meant that Moscow managed the risks to an extent, especially if we compare the size of warheads between cruise missiles and Shaheds (450 kg for Kalibrs vs 40 for Shahed 136).
To summarise, the last week proved to be largely uneventful. Ukrainians decreased the tempo of ground attacks to regroup in the south, while Russians continued air attacks to degrade Ukrainian ability to export agricultural products. The next seven days will likely not deliver significant changes either.
Ukraine battle map
Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.
The situation at selected axes and directions
Kharkiv/Luhansk direction
No changes were reported in the Kharkiv Oblast over the past seven days.
Although the frontline remained stable, Russians conducted numerous attempts to increase territorial control. As in previous weeks, Russians attacked Ukrainian positions near Synkivka but brought no gains.
Positional battles continued near Lyman Pershyi. Likewise, no changes occurred in Masyutivka.
But Russians extended attacks from the Novoselivske area. They assaulted Ukrainian units near Berestove with the goal of cutting off the P07 road and bypassing the UAF stronghold in Novoselivske from the north. No information was released about the success of this attack, although Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, said that Russian attacks were repelled near Berestove.
Novoselivske was reportedly taken a few weeks ago, but the information provided above by the Russian source indicates that this is inaccurate (or no longer accurate).
During the week, Russians continued to strike settlements in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Chuhuivsky, Iziumsky and Kupiansky districts. In particular, Russians hit Ivashky, Huriv Kozachok, Udy, Strilecha, Zelene, Okhrimivka, Kolodyazne, Dvorichna, Zapadne, Kozacha Lopan and Tykhe, Ohirtseve, Vovchansk, Borysivka, Starytsya, Pershotravneve, Petropavlivka and Kupyansk.
Apart from these strikes, Russians also launched missiles against Ukrainian facilities in Kharkiv. Russian sources claimed that the subject of the attack were terminals and hangars of the Kharkiv International Airport from where Ukrainian drones were launched. A metal mesh factory in the Novobavarskiy district, which was used as a drone assembly workshop, was also targeted. Ukrainian sources, however, dispute such claims. Reportedly, Russians fired missiles from S-300 complexes, which hit commercial warehouses in the Novobavarskiy district, wounding one civilian. If these systems were indeed used to strike Kharkiv, then the objective was not to degrade Ukrainian drone production and maintenance facilities but, due to inherent inaccuracies of S-300 missiles used in ground-attack roles, to cause damages to unspecified urban areas (area strike).
According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, in the Kupyansk direction, during the week, Russian Ka-52 and Mi-35 attack helicopters and Su-25 aircraft carried out 30 air strikes against Ukrainian concentration areas of the 14th Separate Mechanised Brigade and territorial defence units. Also, the Russian Su-34 aircraft carried out two air strikes in Pishchane on a deployment point of the 103 Territorial Defence Brigade and near Stelmakhivka on the command post, a concentration area of the 68th Separate Jaeger Brigade. Two air strikes near Berestove were made against a forward command post and manpower concentration areas of the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade.
Russians also claimed to have disrupted Ukrainian rotation attempts. This pertained to the 32nd Separate Mechanised Brigade near the Novoselivske. Similar events occurred near Kyslivka, Stelmakhivka, Novomlyns’k and Lyman Pershyi. However, no brigade numbers were given.
According to the Russian MoD, Ukrainians lost at least two platoons worth of men.
The ministry also said that the 1st Tank Army elements captured eight Ukrainian strongholds and four dugouts and destroyed three machine-gun units. They destroyed up to an infantry platoon from the 32nd Separate Mechanised Brigade and 25th Separate Airborne Brigade south of Popov forest. On Tuesday, the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade also tried to transfer reserves to forward positions near Berestove but failed due to Russian artillery fire.
Due to offensive operations in the Kuzemivka direction, Russian assault groups of the motorised rifle regiment of the Baltic Fleet (unknown unit) captured two Ukrainian strongholds, two observation posts and three dugouts near Novoselivske.
Luhansk direction
No major changes occurred in the Luhansk Oblast last week, although Ukrainians reportedly conducted limited counterattacks, which reversed Russian gains from two weeks ago. Despite these successes, on Wednesday, Artem Lysohor, the Luhansk Oblast Military administration head, said that the past four days had been difficult near Svatove. Russian attacks focused from Karmazynivka and Kuzemivka to Novoselivske and Novojehorivka. Russian units involved in battles include regular army formations and “Storm-Z” troops (former convicts). Lysohor, however, assured that Russians made no gains.
During the weekend, Russians claimed to have continued offensive operations in the northern part of the region. Clearing operations near Novojehorivka, where they reportedly expanded a bridgehead on the left bank of the Zherebets River.
However, Ukrainians conducted counterattacks on Monday and reportedly liberated Nadiya, while Novoyehorivka was partially recaptured. Since then, however, no visual evidence emerged confirming these changes. Mid-week, Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian attempts to regain control over lost positions near Novojehorivka and Karmazynivka were unsuccessful. This statement implies that Ukrainians were indeed conducting counterattacks and Russians were, for now, at least, on the defensive.
The same source, however, added that Russians captured Serhiivka and that they still maintained significant potential in manpower and equipment to continue offensive operations. Yet, since then, no other gains were announced, let alone confirmed.
According to Roman Vlasenko, Head of the Sievierodonetsk District State Administration, newly mobilised Russian reservists are trained for a week before they are sent to the frontline. While Vlasenko spoke about poor training, we would like to highlight that Russians continue mobilising personnel for the war in Ukraine. Based on the conversations we had in Ukraine last month, Russians mobilise 10,000 (five regiments worth of personnel) men a month. This allows them to regenerate badly battered formations and create new ones, especially over a medium term of six to twelve months. The steady influx of men thus exerts constant pressure on Ukrainians strategically and probably “outspends” Ukrainian efforts to achieve the same objectives. It is thus unclear whether Russians will conduct a second wave of mobilisation. The current approach is probably more feasible politically and economically is more manageable.
No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka and Torske, Terny, Yampolivka and Nevske. Although we must stress that Ukrainians launched counterattacks near Torsk’e and Balka Zhuravka(?) early in the week, attempting to retake previously lost positions. No information was provided as to how successful these attempts were. However, neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes in the area.
As always, battles continued in the Serebryansky forest, where both sides were engaged in tactical attacks. Yet, they delivered no confirmed frontline changes. According to Serhiy Cherevaty, almost half of the combat operations in the Luhansk Oblast occur in the forested areas south of Kreminna.
Likewise, the frontline near Bilohorivka remained unchanged.
The Russian MoD narrative about this direction presents a picture where Russian air and missile attacks continue to inflict heavy losses on Ukrainian units deployed in the Luhansk Oblast.
Over the past week, Russians claimed to have disrupted eight Ukrainian attacks conducted by three unspecified mechanised brigades and the 25th Airborne Brigade. Eight Ukrainian strongholds were also captured near Raihorodka and Chervonopopivka during the weekend.
(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Brady Africk).
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The frontline in the Donetsk Oblast underwent no significant changes over the past week. Although most ground attacks again occurred near Bakhmut, neither side made any confirmed territorial gains in this area.
As for the frontline, no changes occurred near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka.
The same pertains to Rozdolivka, Vasiukivka, Fedorivka and Vesele. According to a Russian source, the Ukrainian offensive potential northwest of Bakhmut had been largely exhausted without making any significant gains near Dubovo-Vasylivka, Yahidne and Berkhivka. The source could be correct. Ukrainians have made no progress in this area for weeks as any attempts to alter the frontline are repelled by Russian units. Ukrainians clearly favour attacks south of Bakhmut, and without the redeployment of significant forces north of the city, they are highly unlikely to make any progress.
The situation in Bakhmut did not change either. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported no major developments within the city.
Tactical battles continued near Kurdyumivka and Klischchiivka. Ukrainian attacks near these settlements have been largely repelled. Last week, we assessed that the fall of Klischchiivka was a matter of time. This view was wrong. Ukrainians could not generate sufficient force to create a breakthrough and capture the village, even though they still controlled neighbouring heights and tried to degrade Russian logistics in the area. But still, the assault groups are simply too small and thus easily repelled. On the other hand, this failure could be partly explained by the continuous deployment of Russian reserves to the area.
No changes were reported near Ivanivske and Bila Hora.
The Russian source claimed that a Russian ground attack near Vesele had been successful, and several Ukrainian positions had been captured. This information, however, has not been independently verified. Ukrainian sources did not report any changes in this area.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Novokalynove, and Kamyanka.
However, on Tuesday, Pavlo Kovalchuk, the spokesman for the Ukrainian General Staff, said that Ukrainian assaults captured unspecified positions south of Avdiivka. Kovalchuk, however, failed to provide any specifics about this development, while neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any changes in the area.
No changes occurred near Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Sjeverne and Vodyane. A Ukrainian counterattack pushed Russians back near Nevelske.
Ukrainian positions near and in Mariinka were again the subject of Russian ground attacks supported by artillery. But, as expected, Russians made no gains in the area. Likewise, no changes occurred near Pobieda. However, near Novomykhailivka, the Russian source asserted that Ukrainians attempted to advance. So far, however, no frontline changes were confirmed in this area.
The situation near Vuhledar was quiet for most of the week. But, on Wednesday, Ukrainian bloggers claimed that Ukrainians launched a counterattack from the Vuhledar area towards Mykylske, which resulted in Russians being driven out from the Mykilski Dachi area. It is unclear what the source meant by saying “the Mykilski Dachi area”, but its maps suggest that Ukrainians captured a few sq kilometres northwest of the city.
Coordinated attacks of the 72nd Separate Mechanised Brigade and the 79th Separate Air Assault Brigade resulted in Ukrainian gains near Solodke.
The Russian source believed that the primary Ukrainian goal was to eliminate the Russian bridgehead on the left bank of the Kashlagach River and try to break through to Volnovakha, a major logistics hub for Russian forces defending this part of the front.
It remains to be seen whether Ukrainians will focus their operations south and southeast of Vuhledar, especially since their operations in western Donetsk Oblast and Zaporizhihia have effectively stalled.
Southern Ukraine direction
Over the past seven days, Ukrainians made no confirmed gains, which could be attributed to the decrease in Ukrainian ground attacks. We are thus seeing similarities between the 9th and 10th Corps attacks. After initial (small) tactical successes, the frontline quickly stalled as Russians strengthened their defensive lines in areas where Ukrainians attacked. As Ukrainian attacks continued to be small in size (primarily platoons), they lacked sufficient force to achieve a breakthrough. Ukrainians are thus focused on making small gains, but such an approach is not sustainable over the long term.
Early in the week, Russian sources informed about a visit of Chief of Russian General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov. He arrived at an unspecified command post of the Russian grouping in Zaporizhzhia direction and listed to battlefield reports on the current frontline situation. Interestingly, unofficial data based on the video analysis (unblurred part of the background) seems to indicate that it was recorded on 19JUL.
The Velyka Novoselivka axis
In the Velyka Novoselivka axis, Ukrainians reinforced Staryomayorske with the 38th Naval Infantry Brigade and attempted to push towards Urozhayne. Russians reportedly counterattacked with elements of the 218th Tank and 114th Motor Rifle Regiments (127th Motor Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Central Military District). However, neither action brought any frontline changes in this axis over the past week.
It appears that no major operations occurred in the area in the latter part of the week. Ukrainian and Russian sources suggested that Ukrainians entered an operational pause as their attacks declined.
This allowed them to regroup and rotate their forces, which reportedly delivered assault groups (based on the 36th and 37th Naval Infantry Brigades) in Termirovka, Novopil and Velyka Novoselivka.
Following the loss of Staryomayorske, Russians withdrew the 247th Air Assault Regiment (7th Air Assault Division) to the rear to restore its combat potential. Russian artillery attacks, however, continued. Russian MoD claimed to have destroyed a command post of the Ukrainian 35th Naval Infantry Brigade (Monday) and the ammo depot of the 38th Naval Infantry Brigade (Tuesday). On Wednesday, Russian artillery also destroyed two Ukrainian ammo depots in Temirovka and near Pryyutne.
To weaken Russian defences, Ukrainians may seek their lines of advance from Pryyutne to Novodonetske. However, to achieve this objective, they would need to deploy more forces to the area, and we are unsure to what extent this will occur
The Orkhiv axis
Ukrainians slightly intensified their activities in the western parts of the Orikhiv axis. However, two small attacks towards Pyatchatki (Tuesday and Wednesday) were insufficient to provide any frontline changes. Russian ISR and subsequent fires successfully targeted Ukrainian vehicles, stopping their advances.
On Monday, Ukrainians deployed at least three companies (of the 56th, 417th and 423rd Battalions of an unspecified brigade) to Kamyanske, which might indicate attempts to open up a new axis of advance. However, such forces will likely be insufficient to provide any major breakthrough. Shortly after information about their deployment was published, the Russian MoD announced that concentration areas of these battalions were shelled.
In the central part of the Orikhiv axis, Ukrainians conducted a few attacks towards Robotyne throughout the week. At least one major attack occurred over the weekend, but it failed and resulted in one mechanised platoon lost. According to Russian sources, Ukrainians may have lost even up to 15 tanks, BMPs and BTRs during this attack.
Ukrainian attacks early in the week were hindered by heavy rainfall. Nevertheless, on Monday, Ukrainians attacked with at least two Bradley IFVs destroyed by Russian ATGM fire.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainians presumably conducted a single attack outside this direction (towards Yablonevoye) on Tuesday, however, without notable results. The Russian MoD officially confirmed the presence of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade near Robotyne. Unofficial sources also confirmed that the BARS-8 (army reserve) subunit was also deployed to this area.
On the other hand, Russian sources informed that Ukrainians deployed 14 AMX-10 armoured fighting vehicles/light tanks from the MAROON tactical group near Polohy (an area of responsibility of the 108th Territorial Defence Brigade). Ukrainians also created UAV companies in the 33rd, 47th and 65th Mechanised Brigades to support their efforts in the axis. According to unofficial data, elements of the Ukrainian 78th Regiment (Air Assault Forces) are also located near the frontline. Moreover, elements of the 14th National Guard Brigade arrived in Krasnaya Krinitsa.
Later in the week, Rybar informed about the arrival of an unspecified brigade of the 10th Army Corps and the presence of engineering assets of the 48th Engineering Brigade, which might directly suggest that Ukrainians will restart attacks on this axis.
Kherson direction and Crimea
The past seven days marked no significant changes in the Kherson Oblast. The overall situation remained stable.
However, noticeable were Ukrainian missile attacks on Russian troop concentration areas and logistics routes. On Saturday (29JUL), Ukrainians claimed to have hit the Chonhar bridge between Crimea and Kherson Oblast. On the same day, the Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo said that Ukrainians used 12 Storm Shadow cruise missiles hit the bridge, but all missiles were intercepted. The only other Russian source to comment on the strikes was a local Russian news Telegram channel, which amplified alleged claims from Russian tourists in the area about the bridge being closed to traffic.
It was the second strike on the bridge over the past two months. The first attack occurred on 22JUN, but the road part of the bridge suffered limited damages. At that time, the bridge carried some 70% of the military and civilian traffic to and from Crimea.
A couple of images confirmed the successful strike. Saldo was thus incorrect in saying that the bridge escaped unscathed, and neither did Ukrainians likely launch 12 missiles. Nevertheless, we assess that the impact of this strike on the Russian ability to move supplies via this rail link will not have long-term consequences as the bridge will likely be repaired over the next couple of weeks.
It has been suggested that attacks on Chonhar and Armiansk Road Bridge are a part of the deliberate strategy to degrade Russian logistics from Crimea. While it is likely true, these attacks occur too rarely, and their intensity is too small (too small damages per strike). Secondly, Ukrainians cannot entirely cut off the Zaporizhihia Oblast from Russian logistics as most deliveries can still be delivered via the land bridge linking Zaporizhihia with Donetsk Oblast. Although, in this case, delivering supplies will be less cost-effective, Moscow can easily sustain its operations even if the Chonhar bridge is out of service for several weeks.
Another strike occurred on Tuesday when HIMARS reportedly struck a Russian training camp on Dzharylhach Island in Kherson Oblast. It is unclear what damages Russians sustained in these strikes.
Apart from that, no frontline changes occurred in the region. Ukrainians sustained their presence near the Antonovsky Bridge but did not expand their territorial control south of the bridge. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continued to operate on the Dnipro, but attempts to cross the river were repelled.
Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 28JUL – 04AUG 2023
Summary of losses
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 458 aircraft (+1), 245 helicopters (+1), 5,308 UAVs (+188), 428 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 11,113 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+103), 1,142 MLRS launchers (+2), 5,746 field artillery guns and mortars (+100), as well as 12,057 units of special military vehicles (+118).
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 248,490 personnel (+3,660), 4,228 tanks (+38), 8,249 armoured combat vehicles (+88), 4,911 artillery systems (+136) and 704 MLR systems (+6), 466 anti-aircraft systems (+8), 315 aircraft (0) and 311 helicopters (0), and 4,104 UAVs (+97), 7,392 vehicles and fuel tanks (+152), 1,347 cruise missiles (0), 18 warships and boats (0) and 724 special vehicles (+15).
(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)
Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine
According to the Ukrainian Air Force Command, Ukrainians did not intercept a single missile (cruise, anti-ship, ballistic) over the past week, although the scope of of such strikes was visibly reduced. On 31JUL (Monday), Ukrainian sources reported that two Iskander missiles were used to strike Kryvyi Rih from Crimea, killing at least six people and injuring 75. However, based on images of the strike’s aftermath, the apartment was unlikely to be hit by two missiles. Iskander is a precision capability, so Russians were likely aiming at this particular building. Notably, the attack on Kryvyi Rih occurred a day after a Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow’s business district that damaged buildings housing Russian government ministries. In this context, the Kryvyi Rih strike could have been revenge on Ukrainians, particularly Zelensky, as he was born in Kryvyi Rih.
The number of Shahed 131/136 employed increased last week. Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 42 vehicles, compared to 13 during the prior week. In July, Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 199 vehicles in 15 attacks, compared to 166 UAVs in 18 attacks in June.
The largest attack occurred on 2AUG (Wednesday). It is unclear how many UAVs were launched, but Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 23 vehicles. Some passed Ukrainian air defences and hit port infrastructure in Izmail, damaging 40,000 tons of grain destined for Africa, China and Israel. The port is just across the river from the Romanian Danube river bank.
Since the end of the grain deal, Russians have targeted 26 port facilities and damaged 180,000 tons of agricultural products designed for export. We expect Russians to continue making such strikes.
Although Russia threatened to halt maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports, this has not occurred so far. Several ships (Israeli, Greek and Turkish) passed through the “blockade”, entered the mouth of the Danube, and safely reached Ukrainian ports.
Although Russian ground attacks remained subdued, the latter half of the week saw an increase in Russian air strikes (battlefield strikes), reaching 89 on Wednesday. It is the highest number of airstrikes since we started tracking this data in March this year. Russians also maintained a relatively high tempo of MLRS strikes, averaging 59 strikes per day over the past week.
Outlook for the week of 29JUL-4AUG
In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.
To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.
Previous forecast
“Based on last week’s reports, we expect that over the next seven days, visual evidence will emerge confirming reported recent Russian gains in the Kharkiv Oblast. Secondly, it is highly likely that Russian ground attacks will continue. We also expect Russian sources to claim further territorial gains, but we assess that there is a roughly even chance that Moscow will capture one village or more. That said, the advances can be potentially rapid if Moscow commits a part of its 100,000 force.” This forecast was not accurate. Not only did we not see any evidence confirming Russian gains, but Ukrainians conducted counterattacks which reportedly allowed them to recapture some previously lost territories.
Score: 0/1
“The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. We expect no significant changes if the scale of Russian operations remains the same. But the increased troop deployments could tilt the tactical balance in Moscow’s favour and deliver territorial gains.” Russians made no confirmed gains in the Luhansk Oblast, and the overall operational situation remained unchanged.
Score: 1/1
“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region. 2) We assess that Ukrainians are likely to liberate some territory, especially around Bakhmut, near Orekhovo-Vasylivka and Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka). 3) There is roughly even chance that Ukrainians will recapture one village or more.” This forecast was largely incorrect. Although we were right in anticipating no Russian advances, we expected Ukrainians to make some gains in Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka, which did not materialise.
Score: 0/1
“Moving onto the southern direction, it is impossible to predict frontline changes in this part of the country. The deployment of new units to the Orikhiv axis could potentially revive and increase the tempo of the Ukrainian attack, especially if we consider that Ukrainians started using cluster munitions. The progress will undoubtedly be slow, and we believe it is unlikely that Ukrainians will capture one village or more (excluding Staromaiors’ke) across the entire direction.” We correctly predicted a lack of Ukrainian progress across the direction.
Score: 1/1
“We expect no frontline changes in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainians are highly likely to maintain their presence north of Oleshky along the Dnipro’s bank. Reconnaissance and sabotage operations will also be continued, but the probability that Ukrainians will try to push south is very low. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Ukrainians will try to conduct a river-crossing operation over the next seven days.” We were correct in anticipating no major changes in this part of Ukraine.
Score: 1/1
Final score: 3/5 (60%)
The forecast for the week of 5JUL-11AUG
The forecast below again shows high uncertainties about the current situation in Ukraine and our gaps in the assessment of both the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces. In general, we do not expect that the overall levels of commitments will change next week. But, at the same time, we understand that the situation is very fluid and can change swiftly. This especially pertains to the Kharkiv Oblast. The previous update also highlighted southern Ukraine in the context of possible quick changes. However, we now believe that this is unlikely. We continue to maintain that the likelihood of Russian gains in the Kharkiv Oblast is higher than Ukrainian in the Zaporizhihia region.
We expect that the situation in the Kharkiv Oblast will remain unchanged next week. Without the deployment of reserves, Russians are unlikely to make any gains in the region.
The same goes for the Luhansk Oblast, including Kreminna and Bilohorivka areas. We expect Ukrainian attacks to focus on retaking previously lost territories (southwest of Svatove), but there is a roughly even chance they will succeed. Nevertheless, we assess that Russians will continue conducting ground attacks and will likely capture one village or more next week.
When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, let’s divide the forecast into possible Russian and Ukrainian courses of action. 1) Based on the overall Russian performance and troop deployments, it is highly unlikely that Russians will capture one village or more in the entire region. 2) We assess that there is a roughly even chance that Ukrainians will advance in the Kurdiumivka-Klishchiivka axis. We expect no major changes (one village or more captured) in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.
Moving onto the southern direction, the likelihood of significant changes is minimal. Operationally, the deployment of the Ukrainian 10th Corps changed little, and the overall situation forced Kyiv to take an operational pause in the Orikhiv axis. Unless Ukraine commits more forces, we struggle to anticipate any changes in territorial control over the next seven days.
We expect no frontline changes in the Kherson Oblast next week. Ukrainians are highly likely to maintain their presence north of Oleshky along the Dnipro’s bank. Reconnaissance and sabotage operations will also be continued, but the probability that Ukrainians will try to push south is very low.
Also, this guy on twitter, Thomas C. Theiner, keeps writing about extra Ukrainian reserves available to enter the fight. BS?
https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1689297620601044997
Excellent writeup and analysis, as always.
Yesterday, Ukraine hit an oil tanker in the Black Sea. For me, the way to really bring Russia to the negotiating table would be to hit oil and gas pipelines with drones. (Aren't most of these above-ground? And go on for thousands of kms?) Why have they not done this yet?
My first thought is for political reasons. You hit the gas pipelines into China, and China may well supply more aid to Russia. Possibly, they may have hit Nordstream. But, I was thinking about, why not hit a smaller gas pipeline that feeds Moscow or St. Petersburg instead? Your thoughts on the probability of this strategy?