Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 30 January – 5 February 2023 (Weekly update) (Free access)

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;

• According to the Ukrainian General Staff data, the number of Russian artillery strikes hovered around 90 last week. However, the latter half of the week saw a decline. It remains to be seen whether this is a temporary reduction or a beginning of a new trend;

• There were no frontline changes in the Kharkiv Oblasts. Both sides limited their activity to positional battles. Ukrainians reportedly increased the readiness of their territorial defence battalions deployed near the frontline in the oblast.

• Russians probably captured some territory west of Kreminna in the Luhansk Oblast but also extended their attacks further west towards the Zherebets River; No other changes occurred in this oblast; battles which took place daily did not alter the frontline;

• There were no changes in the broader Donetsk Oblast. Russian attacks did not deliver any frontline shifts; Russians were likely pushed back from their positions southeast of Vuhledar;

• Russians made incremental gains north of Soledar and inched towards capturing Krasa Hora south of the city;

• Russians also made minimal gains in Bakhmut;

• Southwest of the city, for the second week in a row, Russians were not able to capture Ivanivske and thus sever the main supply route to Bakhmut;

• Russian attacks in the Zaporizhihia Oblast decreased substantially as their offensive potential was probably exhausted; No changes occurred in this direction last week;

• There were no changes in the Kherson Oblast;

• The exercise tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained high, but we saw no changes in the Belarusian Armed Forces’ posture.

General outlook

Last week did not deliver any operational or strategically-relevant changes on the battlefields in Ukraine. Ukrainian attacks in Luhansk Oblasts decreased and were replaced by an increased Russian offensive posture. Russians remain firmly committed to assaulting Ukrainian positions in the Donetsk Oblast. However, despite this, last week, only one village was confirmed to have been captured, while near Vulhedar, Russians were pushed back to their initial positions. Zaporizihia and Kherson Oblasts saw no changes.

The demise of Wagner PMC combat potential could explain a slower tempo of Russian advances in the Soledar-Bakhmut area. Russian airborne formations reportedly stepped in, so the attackers’ operations will likely be more thought through.

On Thursday, 2FEB, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov claimed that Moscow had mobilised its forces for an imminent offensive. Such an attack is to take place in either eastern or southern Ukraine. He added that Russia had mobilised 500,000 personnel. Before that, on 31JAN, Kyrylo Budanov, the Head of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), stated that 326,000 men were fighting on the Russian side. An additional 150,000 that were not committed to the battle were training in various ranges in Russia. Assuming 300,000 Russians were mobilised (it is possible that fewer were called up), Russian pre-mobilisation presence near and in Ukraine involved around 180,000 men. It is unclear to us where the 500,000 figure claimed by Reznikov comes from. It may refer to the joint number of already deployed forces and those still training in Russia (and Belarus), which gives a total of 476,000 soldiers.

Nevertheless, something else in this statement struck us. Reznikov stated that the attack could happen either in the eastern or southern part of the country. We assess that Kyiv has a very good understanding of the Russian force posture in specific parts of the front. Thanks to the entire spectrum of Western intelligence collection capability, Ukrainians are highly likely able to track any large-scale deployments and movements of Russian forces. Consequently, Moscow is unlikely to achieve strategic surprise with any large-scale attack. As we have stated many times before, we also believe that the Russian ability to launch any sizable attack will be significantly degraded due to the HIMARS threat. Indeed, over the past two months, the number of HIMARS strikes in the Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhihia Oblasts has seemingly decreased. This reduction could be either explained by hindered Ukrainian access to high-precision ammunition (unlikely) or Russian adjustment efforts that force them to deploy their forces in dispersal (likely). Or in other words, Ukrainians are running out of targets to hit. The fact that Russians stopped all Ukrainian attacks in the Luhansk Oblast and captured some territory near Kreminna suggests that rear services and combat units adjusted to the threat. Of course, whether Moscow can mount any large-scale attack in the current environment is still debatable.

From the open-source perspective, we cannot presently confirm that a Russian offensive is imminent or whether concrete steps have been taken to prepare for such an event. We have no satellite imagery showing Russian sizable deployment areas beyond the HIMARS range. It is also unclear whether Russian reservists are leaving training areas in mass. We believe that Russians will not be able to move 150,000 men near and into Ukraine unnoticed. Reservists’ presence will be crucial if Moscow plans to start capturing the territory in the first six months of 2023.

We think it is incorrect to talk about the Russian offensive in this context. Instead, we should focus on the entire Russian spring campaign. Whereas with the deployment of reservists, Russians can still open up one or two main lines of advance, they will launch splinter attacks (support attacks) to force Ukrainians to contend with attacks across the front. While attacks in Zaporizhihia and  Vuhledar were unsuccessful, they may still be a prelude to what may come late in the winter and early spring: many attacks, fairly sizable, across the entire front.

Looking at available images and videos, Russian attacks are small because of manpower shortages. These assaults include platoons, sometimes companies, and hardly ever battalion-level formations. With reservists, Russians can permanently return to a company- and battalion-level formation as the key fighting component.

Situation in Belarus

Below is the summary of last week’s events in Belarus, placed into a broader context of the war in Ukraine. A full description and analysis of the military activity in Belarus are further down.

The situation in Belarus remains unchanged. The tempo of Belarusian military activity remains increased, but this does not translate into any actions that would herald an immediate deployment of Belarusian forces near the border with Ukraine or into Russia. In fact, as long as Belarusians are training, they will not attack. A very ominous sign would be the cessation of training activity, which would probably indicate the reestablishment of readiness of the armed forces as a whole before large-scale deployment.

Last week was particularly heavy for the 120^th, 11^th, and 6^th Mechanised Brigades. Mechanised and engineer-sapper battalions from the 6^th Mechanised Brigade practised near Grodno. The 11^th Mechanised Brigade deployed logistics, two mechanised, and an artillery group for an exercise. Two mechanised battalions from the 120^th Mechanised Brigades continue training activities.

Particularly noteworthy was a readiness check of the 2657^th Fuel and Lubricants Base. This drill may have been linked to the one undertaken by the logistics battalion of the 11^th Mechanised Battalion, which trained to provide the fuelling capability for 16 tanks.

Regarding the number of Russian servicemen stationed in Belarus, we can still not confirm Ukrainian reports about the drawdown. On Sunday, we acquired satellite imagery from the training range in Baranovichi, where a sizable Russian contingent was deployed. We will post these images early this week as they will provide some answers about the reported withdrawal.

Weather forecast

Next week will see temperatures drop below zero degrees Celsius, where they will stay at least until the end of the week.

The coldest weather is expected in the Svatove-Kreminna area on Tuesday when the temperatures are expected to drop to -10°C (14°F) at night and -5°C (23°F) during the day. Freezing temperatures within the range of -8°C (18°F) and -10°C (14°F) at night are expected throughout the entire week.

Bakhmut will experience slightly colder weather, with temperatures dropping to -11°C (12°F)   at night Wednesday. After that, the weather will gradually improve, with 0°C (32°F) expected during the day on Saturday.

Freezing temperatures are expected near Vuhledar, mostly at night, with the lowest dropping to -11°C (12°F) on Wednesday. During the day, the temperature will hover around 0°C (32°F).

The forecast for Zaporizhihia sees slightly warmer weather. The coldest spell will also arrive mid-week (-8/-9°C – 16-18°F at night) and after an increase is expected. During the day, however, the temperatures will remain mostly unchanged between-2°C and 1°C (28°F-33°F).

Given the forecast, whereas the temperatures during the nights are sufficient to keep the ground frozen, it will probably be too warm during the day to experience the same effect. As such, if the weather significantly contributes to a decision to start an offensive, it is unlikely that any major attack will occur next week.

As such, the current weather forecast does not indicate that any window of opportunity will arrive next week. Temperatures around 0 degrees Celsius also guarantee muddy terrain that will hinder the movement of armoured vehicles.

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 382 aircraft (+1), 206 helicopters (+2), 3,023 UAVs (+43), 403 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 7,750 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+80), 1,007 MLRS launchers (+13), 4,003 field artillery guns and mortars (+47), as well as 8,272 units of special military vehicles (+54).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 131,290 personnel (+5,130), 3,220 tanks (+23), 6,405 armoured combat vehicles (+39), 2,226 artillery systems (+31) and 460 MLRS (+7), 227 anti-aircraft systems (+6), 294 aircraft (+1) and 284 helicopters (0), and 1,958 UAVs (+11), 5,091 vehicles and fuel tanks (+54), 796 cruise missiles (0), 18 warships and boats (0) and 203 pieces of special equipment (+4).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russians continue to use more than 5,000 men weekly. However, last week saw a significant decline in other losses. For instance, two weeks ago, Russians lost 52 tanks, compared to 23 last week. A significant reduction was also seen in armoured vehicles (98 vs 39), artillery systems (51 vs 31), UAVs (75 vs 11), and vehicles and fuel tanks (191 vs 54). We do not know what may have caused this drop, but the most apparent explanation is decreased intensity of Ukrainian attacks and operations in general.

Artillery strikes

Frontlines in Ukraine with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 30JAN – 5FEB2023

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, last week saw a decrease in Russian artillery attacks. A decline was particularly evident in the Zaporizhihia and Kherson Oblasts. The fall in the former probably confirms the cessation of Russian offensive operations in this direction. Another notable change occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast, where Russians increased artillery attacks.

Development of reported shellings since June 9 (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Generally, the upward trend in the average number of Russian artillery strikes continued. It reached a high point on 2FEB when the average hit 93 strikes over the previous seven days. However, since then, there has been a gradual decrease in the number of areas hit. On 4FEB, “only” 72 settlements were struck, bringing the average down to 89. The next week will see whether this drop is short-lived or is falling back to a long-term average in the number of strikes, which is between 70-90 hits per day.

Ukrainian General Staff reported shellings by city and oblast for the past seven days (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Heatmap with reported shellings, past seven days (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Military situation in Belarus

On the surface, the situation in Belarus did not significantly change over the past seven days. Activities of military-political representatives were reduced considerably, which, at a stretch, could be an indicator heralding a change in the overall military posture. Indeed, the tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces exercises increased compared to the previous week. On top of that, last week, Belarusians showcased what is reported to be a recently acquired Iskander surface-to-surface missile system. Russian operations were visibly reduced and were mainly related to aviation drills.

Last week, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko participated in several foreign visits. Thus, his involvement in domestic affairs was limited. No information about important presidential actions/comments affecting Belarusian Armed Forces was released.

Similarly, the engagement of the highest Belarusian military representatives was limited. On Tuesday, the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, visited the Ruzhansky Training Ground, where he met with Belarusian and Russian participants of an ongoing joint tactical-flight exercise. The Commander of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces, Col. Andrey Lukyanovich, and the Commander of the Russian Air Force, Lt. Gen. Sergey Dronov, accompanied him.

They watched practical episodes of the drills that included the suppression of the enemy’s air defences (SEAD) and close air support (CAS) missions. After them, Volfovich talked with journalists and answered their questions. He stated that pilots of both countries successfully carried out their tasks and presented a high level of interoperability. He also highlighted the defensive and transparent character of the exercise. According to the Secretary of the State Security Council, all practical actions were widely commented on in Belarusian media and were planned according to the international transparency rules.

All participants of the exercise were awarded by the Commander of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces a day later. The event was held at the 51st Mixed Aviation Base, where Col. Lukyanovich noted the high professional level of service members from Belarus and Russia.

When it comes to other activities of the Belarusian officers, on Tuesday, a Belarusian delegation from the International Military Cooperation Department visited the Serbian 72nd Special Purpose Brigade as a part of the Vienna Document confidence-building measures. Subsequently, the General Staff Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy hosted a working visit of the Kazakhstan Border Guards representatives, which was connected to the prospects of future bilateral cooperation between institutions.

A day later, the Belarusian MoD officially confirmed the induction of the Iskander missile system to the Belarusian Land Forces. Belarusian soldiers reportedly underwent theoretical training in Russia, but practical training was organised in Belarus. According to the Chief of Missile Forces, Col. Ruslan Chechov, Iskander is a modern and potent missile system characterised by high accuracy, durability, and simplicity of use. Its characteristics, combined with a sufficient number of the complex’s missiles, allow the Belarusian Armed Forces to conduct any tasks.

The Wednesday press release claimed that Iskanders were delivered after successfully completing training courses in Russia. Based on available footage, Belarusians received both the ballistic (9K720) and cruise missile (9M728) variants. We still do not know how many launchers Belarus received. A typical Russian 9K720-equipped missile brigade fields 12 MZKT-79305-based 9P78-1 TELs, 12 MZKT-79306-based 9T250 transport and loading vehicles, 11 KamAZ-43101-based 9S552 command vehicles, 14 KamAZ-43118-based 9T248 troop and accommodation vehicles, one KamAZ-43101-based 9S920 fire-control vehicle, and one KamAZ-43101-based 9Y91 calibration and engineering vehicle.

Journalists from Arsenal, which is an official Belarusian MoD programme, claimed on Sunday (5FEB) that Belarus received the Iskander-M variant, not Iskander-E (export variant). We can thus assume that missile ranges for the Belarusian system go to 500 km.

Indeed, the acquisition of Iskanders will significantly improve the long-range fire capabilities of the Belarusian Army, which are currently provided by the Polonez MLR system (300 km range), as well as Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles (70 km range). Now, the latter system is deployed within the 465th Missile Brigade (three battalions). Thus, the deployment of Iskander may result in Tochka being phased out.

There are many things we need to confirm when it comes to Iskanders. For now, we do not even know whether they are fully Belarusian systems. In one of the videos posted by the Belarusian MoD, a Belarusian soldier attached a Belarusian sticker flag on an Iskander TEL. Vehicles bore no tactical signs, markings, or license plates that would identify them as Belarusian-owned platforms. Videos released on Sunday did not deliver any answers as to which unit fielded the system. Indeed, some footage showed Russian systems in use. What’s more, the Belarusian MoD showed footage that a colleague of ours @Obronny2 found on YouTube that was posted initially on 10JAN, showing ‘Z’ clearly marked on a Russian Iskander TEL preparing to launch a missile. Belarusians later blurred the same ‘Z’ out of the image.

In contrast, the Belarusian Armed Forces published updated health requirements for conscripts. Currently, citizens with weight up to 100kg (90kg earlier), near-sightedness up to 8.0 dioptre, II-grade obesity and some degrees of flat feet will be “fit” for military service. Undoubtedly, the MoD is increasing the pool of available reservists.

As already stated, the training tempo of Belarusian military units was very high last week. However, practically all training events might be divided into three categories: joint training actions, combat readiness checks or field exits and “other” (standard) exercises.

In the first category, we can include the last part of the joint tactical-flight exercise and the start of the joint staff training. Most Belarusian air bases were involved in technical maintenance drills at the beginning of the week. On Monday, elements of the 51st Mixed Aviation Base were likely engaged in search and rescue actions (SAR). At the same time, service members of the 116th Assault Aviation Base (Lida) conducted several training flights using Yak-130 trainers for CAS missions. A day later, aviation activity was focused on CAS and SEAD actions. Fighter aircraft from the 61st Fighter Aviation Base provided air cover, while An-26s from Machulischy Air Base served as radio relay platforms. Moreover, elements of the 38th Air Assault Brigade, with Russian Mi-8 helicopter crews, worked out issues of searching, blocking and neutralising enemy sabotage groups.

At the same time, Belarusian MoD informed about the start of joint-staff training, which is meant to work out the planning process of using the combined force component. Generally, the training can be considered as direct preparation for the Union Shield-2023 exercise, which will be held in Russia in SEP23.

Referring to the second category of the Belarusian training actions, several combat readiness checks (or field exits) occurred last week too. They mainly involved support subunits of the mechanised formations or standalone support formations (artillery, air defence):

• Monday:

• Reconnaissance battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (combat readiness: CR);

  • A logistic battalion of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (field exit: FE);

  • 350th Artillery Group of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (CR);

  • Unspecified air defence battalion of the 377th Air Defence Regiment (FE);

• Thursday:

  • 2657th Fuel and Lubricants Base (CR);

  • Engineering-sapper battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (FE);

• Friday:

  • Unspecified subunit of the 51st Artillery Brigade (FE);

Interestingly, one of the Belarusian fuel bases was directly involved in the drills. On Thursday, it provided about 150 tons of fuel for a logistic battalion of the 11th Mechanised Battalion, which underwent a combat readiness check.

Regarding the other training actions of the Belarusian Armed Forces, they mainly pertained to mechanised formations and were generally connected to fire training. They were especially visible on Wednesday (202nd Mechanised Battalion, 339th Mechanised Battalion, as well as 5th Spetsnaz Brigade and 36th Road and Bridge Brigade), Thursday (105th Mechanised Battalion, 40th Mechanised Battalion, 841st Artillery Group, 38th Air Assault Brigade, as well as 358th Mechanised Battalion) and Friday (5th Spetsnaz Brigade, tank battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade and 105th Mechanised Battalion). Belarusian Air Force components were also active on Thursday.

Last week, the number of transfers, including Belarusian military equipment, was relatively small. The majority of movements were linked to the abovementioned drills. However, the transfer of the Belarusian Tor-M2K air defence system and the military echelon carrying five BTRs marked with red stars (Friday) was observed. Moreover, the presence of Belarusian military helicopters was reported near the so-called SITE 400 (DOME) near Volma, which is likely used as a Russian HQ in Belarus.

Regarding the presence of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus, their air components were particularly active last week. At least two flights of A-50 AEW&C aircraft were made,  escorted by about five MiG-31K fighters (in total). Moreover, two Russian transport aircraft also landed in Belarus. They included a Tu-134AK (RF-66053) that landed on Monday and an Il-76 (RF-76572) that arrived on Friday. On the ground, Russian presence was usual. A significant number of various military vehicles was observed between Thursday and Friday.

Interestingly, a popular Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov visited Belarus on Saturday. According to information published on his Telegram channel, Solovyov met with Belarusian soldiers and service members of the State Guards. He had an opportunity to talk with Iskander and Polonez missile system crews and checked the training process of the joint Union State grouping. The details of his visit are about to be published shortly.

Please click here to access Belarusian Armed Forces training data.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv/Luhansk direction

Last week did not deliver any operational changes in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts. Despite many Russian attacks, Ukrainians held the line. The exception is Kreminna, where the defenders were pushed back slightly. However, based on official and open-source reports, it seems that Russians are beginning to take the initiative in the Luhansk Oblast and gradually increase the number of attacks.

However, starting from the beginning, last week Russians launched no ground attacks on the Kharkiv Oblast territory from mainland Russia. The threat of such attacks persists, even though the last raid happened in DEC2022.

The scale of Russian artillery bombardments increased. Russians continue to strike Ukrainian (primarily civilian) areas in the Kupyansky, Chuhuivsky and Kharkivsky districts. Sometimes these strikes are launched from field artillery systems, such as BM-21s and heavier BM-27s/30s. However, often, Russians resort to missiles fired from S-300 air defence systems for indirect or indiscriminate fires. We do not expect these stikes, especially the ones targeting the civilian population, to decline substantially.

Positional battles continued east of Dvorchina. Both sides deploy reconnaissance and sabotage groups into this area to reconnoitre opposing forces’ manning levels and intentions.

Russian sources claimed last week that due to increased Russian military activity in the Hryanykivka-Syn’kivka-Petropavlivka line near Kupyansk, Ukrainians increased the combat readiness of two battalions (territorial defence). Although this is plausible, we have not been able to confirm this development independently.

Last week, Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, claimed that heavy fighting continued in the Svatove and Kreminna axis. He added that Russians had not yet created a strike group for a  big offensive, but they regularly brought new equipment and personnel into the Luhansk Oblast. The attackers also reportedly probed Ukrainian defensive lines in many different areas, trying to find weaknesses and gaps in Ukrainian front coverage. Haidai also claimed that the number of Russian artillery strikes had increased in the oblast recently. As stated in the introduction, we are also looking to find any evidence to confirm a build-up of Russian forces or to find any indications that the Russian troops in the Luhansk Oblast have a clearly-stated offensive intent. So far, we cannot confirm that the build-up is occurring.

However, Russians stepped up the pressure near Kreminna, where as stated last week, Russians deployed elements of two airborne divisions. Their deployment into the battle had an immediate impact. At some point three weeks ago, Ukrainians captured Dibrova and headed towards Kreminna. Currently, only were Ukrainians pushed back from Dibrova, but Russians captured more territory north of the village and started threatening Ukrainian positions around Yampolivka. This push definitely does not resemble any large-scale operation many are talking about. So far, as stated above, these attacks have a mostly probing nature. Russians capture territory when they achieve superiority in numbers, equipment, and artillery support.

A Russian source claimed that Russian units, including those recently mobilised, were successfully and slowly moving forward while simultaneously repulsing UAF attacks. A Ukrainian blogger stated that Russians heavily saturated areas near Kreminna with manpower. They have the initiative and are continually attacking Ukrainian positions.

We saw no frontline changes in other parts of the Luhansk Oblast. Novoselivske remains heavily contested; neither side probably made any progress in this area last week. The same goes for Chervonopopivka, where Ukrainians made no progress. The frontline also remained stable near Makiivka and Ploshchanka. Russian efforts to push Ukrainians from the former failed.

A Ukrainian source stated last week that Russian forces cut off mobile Internet in the Luhansk region. No Russian explanation behind this decision was published. Still, the source speculated (and we agree with this assessment) that this will prevent the locals from providing information about the presence and the strength of Russian army units traversing the oblast. It may also suggest that Russians are preparing for more offensive actions. Indeed, tightening operational security (OPSEC) is one of the indicators of a possible uptick in Russian military activity.

There were only two reported HIMARS strikes last week. On 31JAN, a Russian troop concentration area was hit in Kadiivka, while on 4FEB, an industrial facility was struck in Svatove.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 30JAN – 5FEB2023

Donetsk Oblast Direction

There were no operational changes in the Donetsk Oblast last week. Despite constant Russian attacks across the broader frontline, especially around Bakhmut and Soledar, Moscow made incremental gains and inched closer to achieving its goal of capturing the entire Donetsk Oblast. However, the path to this objective will be long. It does not mean that Ukrainian positions have improved. Near Bahkmut-Soledar, Russians captured some villages, and they could now fire control all ground lines of communications leading to the city. However, on Tuesday, the Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, stated that despite Russian attacks in the Bakhmut area, Ukrainian forces in the city can still be supplied with necessary items, including weapons, ammunition, food, and medical resources. Cherevaty also confirmed Ukrainian plans: preserve personnel and gradually withdraw while inflicting as much damage to Russian units as possible.

Looking at the frontline situation, each day, Russians attacked Spirne, Verkhn’okam’yans’ke, Vesele, and Rozdolivka. Despite these efforts, they made no progress in this sector. It nevertheless shows that Russians are determined to push towards Spirne, even though these efforts have delivered no results.

Moving towards Soledar-Bakhmut, early in the week, Russians captured Sakko and Vantsetti (for those interested in historical trivia, here is who Sacco and Vanzetti were). It allowed Russians to extend attacks on Fedorivka along the T0513 road leading to Siversk. Concurrently, there were also attacks on Vasyukivka. Currently, we don’t know which axis of advance is prioritised or whether Russians can push along both (north and west). However, looking at recent Russian progress in this area, it seems that the main push is on Bakhmut and Klishchiivka, while other axes are given secondary roles. Secondly, Ukrainian sources claimed last week that Wagner PCM fighters are being replaced by Russian operational units, especially airborne forces. We have not been able to verify this information independently. However, it does seem that the intensity of Russian attacks decreased over the last two weeks. It is unclear what caused this, whether it resulted from Wagner losing its capacity to engage in direct combat missions (through the tactics they pursued in Soledar) or whether the force is being rotated out. The second explanation, however, is less likely given the ease with which many Wagner fighters were sent into the battle to conduct tactically dubious missions. We assess that if Wagner was sent to battle in the manner they did, the company’s leadership was probably not concerned about the wellbeing of its soldiers and the need to recuperate and decompress after Soledar had been taken. Regardless, if Wagner can no longer be a significant contributor to the war effort in this sector, it is indeed highly likely that Russian attacks will be more cautious and slow.

Going back to the frontline, Krasna Hora is still under Ukrainian control. However, the capture of Blahodatne and knocking on Paraskoviivka’s door from the south mean that Ukrainian positions in the village are increasingly challenging to hold.

On Saturday, a Polish press correspondent noted that Russians were progressing north of the city. He added that some Russian units are well-equipped, including UAVs with night-vision capability, and their attacks are heavily supported by artillery.

The situation in Bakhmut probably slightly changed. Russians may have captured some territory in the southern and eastern parts of the town (residential areas), but territorial gains, in general, were minimal. Nevertheless, the progress appears to be steady.

We continue to maintain that unless there is a Ukrainian counterattack, which is unlikely, Bakhmut will probably fall within the next two months. Russian determination and employment of resources are clear, while Kyiv does not wish to match the effort needed to fully exhaust Russians in this direction. Such an approach allows the UAF to bleed Russians and increase manpower costs. We are still unsure how many Ukrainians die daily. As such, it is unclear how big a trade-off Kyiv is making to slow Russians near Bakhmut.

Southwest of Bakhmut, Russians captured slightly more territory west of Klischiivka. Attacks north towards Ivanivske did not impact the frontline. Consequently, the main goal of physically severing the T0504 road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka was not achieved yet.

The operational situation in the Bakhmut-Soledar line

There were no changes in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast. Russian assaults on Ukrainian positions near Krasnohorivka and Kamyanka, Pervomaiske, Vodyane and Nevelske brought no results. The situation in Mariinka also remained unchanged. The control over the village is roughly split in half. Russians again tried to attack Ukrainian positions in Pobieda and Krasnohorivka to increase pressure on Mariinka defenders. However, these attempts were also fruitless.

Russian attacks on Vuhledar appear to have fizzled out as well. A Russian blogger wrote on Thursday that active offensive operations near Vhledar were suspended, but heavy battles were ongoing near the settlement. This statement can probably be translated into Russians losing their offensive potential, but still, they are too strong to be fully pushed back. Ukrainian forces have redeployed reinforcements into the area.

A Ukrainian soldier claimed that Vuhledar was under Ukrainian control and battles were ongoing in Mykilśke, which indicates Russians had been pushed back to initial positions.

According to Kostyantyn Mashovets, a Ukrainian military observer, between Novomaiors’ke and Volodymyrivka, Russians deployed elements derived from the 42^nd Motor Rifle Division of the 58^th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District). He placed their strength in one regimental tactical group, which translates into three battalion tactical groups. On top of that, two combined groups (probably BTGs) from the 40^th and 155^th Naval Infantry Brigades (Pacific Fleet) and one BTG from the 136^th Motor Rifle Brigade (58^th Combined Arms Army) are stationed there as well.

Mashovets also speculated that up to three battalions from the 36^th and 37^th Motor Rifle Brigades (36^th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) could be present in the area.

According to Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies, the Russian presence near Vuhledar includes 20,000 men, 90 tanks, 180-200 IFVs, and around 100 artillery pieces.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 30JAN – 5FEB2023

Zaporizhzhia direction

For the second week in a row, Russians made no gains in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. Although their offensive intent is clear, they never really had the capacity (manpower and equipment) to alter the frontline in a significant way. We thus assess that Russian offensive potential in this direction petered out, and whereas their territorial gains are possible, they will only be incremental without impacting the overall operational picture.

We do not consider recent attacks in Zaporizhihia to be a prelude to a broader Russian offensive. We continue to see no indicators to suggest that Russians are preparing such a scenario in southern Ukraine, including Vuhledar. This assessment is, of course, subject to change if we acquire any evidence showing a Russian build-up of forces.

Indeed, Nataliya Humenyuk, the Chief of the Joint Coordination Press Office of the Security and Defence Forces in the South of Ukraine, asserted last week that surprising “secondary” attacks in the Zaporizihihia Oblast are possible.

Mostly positional battles took place near Orikhiv, Hulyaipole, and Charivne. No frontline changes in this direction were recorded last week.

The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian troops were on the defence but did not elaborate further. Russian artillery hit Novoandriivka, Orikhiv, Novodanylivka, Charivne, Hulyaipole, Chernove, Malynivka and Poltavka. Ukrainians again launched a high-precision missile strike on Svitlodolynske (unclear target following a 29JAN strike on a brigade in the settlement)

Frontlines in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 30JAN – 5FEB2023

Kherson direction

As expected, the situation in the Kherson Oblast was stable throughout the week. Both sides continued their routine activities, which included artillery strikes and reconnaissance missions across the Dnipro River.

As stated above, reconnaissance and sabotage activities continued. Apart from typical reece tasks, such missions also serve to fix both sides’ forces in the Kherson Oblast to prevent their redeployment to other more pressing areas. However, we assess that these forces are already significantly drawdown, and neither side can alter the current frontline. Indeed, last week, Nataliya Humenyuk stated that no special forces of high-readiness units concentration areas had been observed in Russia’s controlled territory. She added that Russians could not capture and hold Dnipro’s northern bank and are unlikely to rebuild their positions in this part of Ukraine in the future.

The UGS reported on 31JAN that Ukrainian forces destroyed five boats carrying Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams.

Last week, Ukrainians launched at least two attacks on Russian positions on islands in the Dnipro delta. One occurred on 31JAN near the city of Kherson, but its objectives are unclear. Russian sources, however, claimed that Russian artillery fire pushed Ukrainians back, and their mission was ultimately unsuccessful. Secondly, between 2-3FEB, Ukrainians reportedly landed on Dolgiy and Kruhlyi Islands, but this information is unverified.

One of the most covered topics was Ukrainian artillery strikes on what appeared to be the Russian Tor-M2DT short-range air defence missile system. The system combines the Tor-M2 missile launcher station and the DT-30PM-T1 tracked articulated tractor. The addition of the DT-30PM tractor makes it suitable to operate in harsh weather conditions, and indeed, in this shape, it was designed to operate in the Arctic. The 80th Motor Rifle Brigade of the Northern Fleet reportedly fielded the system.

The footage showing Tor-M2 being hit was released on 2FEB, but a day later, another video was posted showing a second Arctic-variant of the Tor-M2DT hit by Ukrainian artillery (Excalibur shell?). Both strikes reportedly occurred in the Kherson Oblast.

There were no reported Ukrainian HIMARS strikes on targets in Russia’s rear in the Kherson Oblast.

Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 30JAN – 5FEB2023

Outlook for the week of 6FEB – 12FEB

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.

We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Last week’s forecast

This is what we forecasted last week:

“We expect to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Both sides will highly likely continue positional battles and artillery strikes. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.” This forecast was correct, as no frontline changes occurred in this part of Ukraine.

Score: 1/1

“Based on last week’s operations, it is likely that no significant changes will occur in the Luhansk Oblast. Whereas some tactical fluctuations are highly likely, neither side can turn these into operational successes. We continue to see no evidence to suggest that Russians or Ukrainians are building up their forces for an offensive. That said, the deployment of elements of two airborne divisions near Kreminna is a noteworthy development, and if there was a Russian push, it could happen from this sector. It is highly unlikely that Ukrainians will capture Kreminna, but positional battles in this area will continue.” This prediction was also correct. Russians made minimal gains near Kreminna, while the frontline in other parts of the Luhansk Oblast remained stable.

Score: 1/1

“When it comes to the broader Donetsk Oblast, we expect to see no significant changes. Russian attacks will likely be repelled, as the attackers do not currently possess enough equipment or firepower to mount a sizable offensive force. There is roughly even chance that Vuhledar will fall, especially if no Ukrainian reinforcements are deployed.” We were correct in anticipating no major changes in the Donetsk Oblast. However, while we focused on Russian chances to capture Vuhledar, the opposite happened. Russians were pushed back from areas they controlled southeast of the settlement.

Score: 0.5/1

“However, as far as the Soledar-Bakhmut sector goes, we assess that Russians will likely extend their territorial control in this sector. They are likely to enter Krasna Hora and push towards the road linking the village with Bakhmut to the south. There is roughly even chance Russians will make progress north of Soledar.” Russians made some progress near Krasna Hora. Although some reports indicated Russians entered the village, we saw no visual confirmation of this development. Russians made small gains north of Soledar by capturing Sakko i Vantsetti and extending attacks onto Rozdolivka and Fedorivka.

Score: 0.5/1

“In Bakhmut, unless Ukrainians start withdrawing, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains. Currently (next week), it is highly improbable that Ukrainians will pull back from Bakhmut. However, such a possibility exists. Everything will depend on the situation southwest of the city. If Ukrainian defensive positions crumble on the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka (especially near Ivanivske), the Ukrainian ability to defend Bakhmut effectively will be significantly degraded.” This forecast was spot on. Russians indeed made incremental progress near Bakhmut while Ukrainians maintained control over the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka.

Score: 1/1

“Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian attacks will continue. There is roughly even chance that they will seize other villages. That said, we maintain that Russians are highly unlikely to turn these potential gains into operational ones.” Russian attacks did continue in the first part of the week, but battles were subdued in the second half. Russians also did not capture any villages.

Score: 0.5/1

“We foresee no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but they primarily seek to test and probe defences and reconnoitre OPFOR positions. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River.” This prognosis was correct.

Score: 1/1

“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue its increased exercise tempo. Unless we have a visual confirmation about a pullback of Russian forces from Belarus, we would like not to make any predictions on whether or not more Russians will arrive therein. However, chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” This forecast was correct as well.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 6.5/8 (80%)

Next week’s forecast

We expect to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Both sides will highly likely continue positional battles and artillery strikes. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.

Based on last week’s operations, it is likely that no significant changes will occur in the Luhansk Oblast. We continue to maintain that tactical fluctuations are highly likely, but neither side will be able to turn these into operational successes. Despite reports about the upcoming Russian offensive, we see no evidence confirming Moscow is building its forces in the Luhansk Oblast.

Ukrainians lost the attacking initiative near Kreminna, and their chances of capturing the city are currently remote. On the other hand, Russians will highly likely continue pressing Ukrainians west of Kreminna. Further territorial gains in this sector are likely.

We do not foresee major changes in the Donetsk Oblast. Russian attacks will highly likely persist, but their ability to capture new territories is limited. We see no evidence to suggest Russians are preparing for a broader offensive in this direction. Unless Russians commit reserves to the battle, it is unlikely that Vuhledar will fall next week.

Russians are likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. Firstly, they will likely extend territorial gains north and northwest of Soledar and approach Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka.

The current operational picture is that Krasna Hora is indefensible. The settlement will fall, but we are not sure when this will happen. It is possible that such a development can occur next week.

Regarding Bakhmut, we will maintain our last week’s prognosis. Unless Ukrainians start withdrawing, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains within the city. Currently, it is highly improbable that Ukrainians will pull back from Bakhmut. The situation in Bakhmut is strongly linked to what is occurring southwest of the city. The fall of Ivanivske, unlikely to happen next week, could have a domino effect and force Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut.

Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian positional attacks will continue. A possibility exists that they will capture some territory, but their gains will be nevertheless minimal. We expect no sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine.

We foresee no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but they primarily seek to test and probe defences and reconnoitre OPFOR positions. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River, including with incendiary ammunition.

We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue its increased exercise tempo. Unless we have a visual confirmation about a pullback of Russian forces from Belarus, we would like not to make any predictions on whether or not more Russians will arrive therein. However, chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.