Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 5 June - 11 June 2023 (Weekly update)

Situational report

BLUF: On Thursday, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched the long-anticipated attacks in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. Attacks occurred along two new axes (Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka) and one already existing south of Vuhledar. The presence of seven brigades near Velyka Novosilka translated into some tactical successes, allowing Kyiv to liberate around 60 sq km within four days. Attacks near Orikhiv resulted in some Ukrainian losses and weren’t as successful. Ukrainian units are some 8 km from the first line of Russian defences.  While they can reach it this week, the Ukrainian ability to pierce through Russian fortifications is yet to be tested.  

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• Ukrainians launched the main phase of the counteroffensive spanning across the frontlines in the Zaporizhihia and Donetsk Oblasts; So far, Kyiv employed approximately ten brigades, but only one confirmed with Western-made equipment; Operations during the first four days allowed Ukrainians to liberate more than 60 sq km of territory;

• Russian attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast delivered no frontline changes;

• The Luhansk Oblast continued to be deprioritised as well; Russian attacks in this region were repelled; Russian sources claimed some successes in Bilohorivka, but no evidence was provided to support these claims.

• Ukrainian units reportedly conducted limited but successful counterattacks on Russian positions south and north of Bakhmut; However, no visual evidence was presented to confirm territorial gains; The deployment of Storm-Z troops into Bakhmut indicates low potential for conducting effective ground attacks towards Chasiv Yar;

• Ukrainian units continued ground attacks south of Vuhledar, but their progress in this area is unclear.

• The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam allowed Russians to redeploy some capabilities towards the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, some of which were interdicted by Ukrainian HIMARS systems;

• We expect the Dnipro flow to stabilise this week;

• No changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces were recorded; Minsk deployed its newly-received S-400 battery probably near the Minsk airport;

• Russian missile and drone attacks were limited last week and have had no impact on the tactical, let alone operational, picture of the battlefield;

Before we start, there are two housekeeping points:

1. We changed the structure of this document. As we consider attacks in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk Oblast to be interconnected, we have changed the title of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast section to the Southern Ukraine Direction. This will encompass all areas, from the Dnipro River in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast to Vuhledar in the Donetsk Oblast. This section is now divided into three subsections: the Vuhledar axis, the Velyka Novosilka axis, and the Orikhiv axis.

2. We are changing the publication date from Monday to Friday. The next update will appear on 16JUN.

Executive summary

**The reader should be aware that due to the Ukrainian communication blackout, most information about Ukrainian/Russian gains/losses comes from Russian sources. These sources are inherently biased and often spread propaganda and mis/disinformation. On Sunday, Ukrainian sources began reporting on some frontline changes. But still, most information comes from the other side. The key issue is visually verifying data provided by either side, but at the current stage, this is not always possible**.  

Last week, we started the executive summary by quoting the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, who said Ukraine was ready for the counteroffensive. And indeed, on the night of 7/8JUN, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched the largest assaults on Ukrainian positions since the summer/autumn operations in the Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts. The main phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive began. In our view, he also highlighted a lack of combat aircraft as a factor contributing to increased Ukrainian losses during the upcoming offensive. We will come back to this point later on.

As stated in previous UCM analyses, we believe that the offensive has been ongoing for several weeks. Some may say the Russian Volunteer Corps attacks in the Belgorod Oblast or counterattacks on Bakhmut flanks or near Vuhledar had a “battle-shaping” character. The reality is that it sought to fulfil the same objective: cause confusion in the Russian command and force it to contend with a dilemma as to which operational direction to support more, especially given reports of an impending counteroffensive in the Zaporizhihia Oblast.

Opening new axes of advance in the Zaporizhihia Oblast created such dilemmas. Ukrainians attack along three main axes: Orikhiv, Velyka Novosilka, and Vuhledar. This is a more than 150 km long front, but in reality, given how localised these attacks have been, the front is actually around 80 km long, the longest one near Orikhiv. But it is near Velyka Novosilka where Ukrainians achieved the biggest successes, pushed through the Russian forward line of troops and liberated a few villages.

Despite this, we still do not know which axis is the main. The Orikhiv one clearly aims at Tomak (and then presumably Melitopol), the fastest way to break the land bridge to Crimea. Recognising the importance of this area, Russians heavily fortified approaches to Tomak and erected at least three defensive lines north of the city. Fortifications appear less complex south of Velyka Novosilka. Still, at the same time, the route to Mariupol is the longest and exposes Ukrainian left flanks to Russian counterattacks south of Donetsk. That is why the Vuledar axis is important for Ukrainians, as it allows Kyiv to maintain pressure on the Russians near the city of Donetsk and fixes their forces there, preventing redeployment.

We assess, perhaps wrongly, that Ukraine will not be able to focus on two axes equally. As a result, one axis will be the main and two will be auxiliaries.

Over the course of the first four days, Ukrainians sustained some losses. According to Oryx, the initial attacks cost Kyiv 17 M2A2 Bradley IFVs, one Leopard 2A4 and three 2A6s, two AMX-10 RC fighting vehicles, and three Leopard 2R Heavy Mine Breaching Vehicles. These losses, respectively, represent 15%, 2%, 14%, 5%, and 50% of Western vehicle types supplied to Ukraine. Particularly concerning is the loss of Bradleys and mine breaching capabilities in such quantities so early in the counteroffensive. It undoubtedly limited the 47^th Mechanised Brigade’s manoeuvrability and breaching capability. On the other hand, Oryx believes that out of 17 Bradleys lost, only five were destroyed, and the rest was damaged and abandoned. Perhaps these vehicles could be salvaged. The same goes for Leopard 2Rs. We also understand that most of these Bradley and Leopard losses occurred during one unsuccessful attack north of Robotyne early when the counterattack happened. No other large-scale losses have been reported since, indicating that Ukrainian adapted to the Russian threat: after the initial failure, no additional assets were deployed to carry on attacking along this axis.

Risks are high. As Ukraine has no air superiority over the area, its SHORAD air defence capabilities also appear inadequate. Russians published a video last week reportedly showing a Ka-52 attack helicopter engaging a Ukrainian column (Bradleys) using the 9-A-4172K Vikhr-1 anti-tank missile. Ukraine thus needs to bring closer to the front its SHOARD assets, such as 9K33 Osa, to be able to follow advancing forces and detect and engage low and slow-flying Russian targets. Thus, Zelensky’s comments about a lack of air superiority and consequent high losses partly came true.

So far, the Ukrainian deployments have been relatively limited. The attacks near Orikhiv are conducted by at least three brigades (only one newly-formed with Western-made equipment), while the Velyka Novosilka axis includes seven. Kyiv thus has sufficient reserves to commit to battle to keep the momentum going. The main push also likely has not started yet.

So far, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been relatively successful. As stated in previous UCM analyses, we expect this attack to look more like the summer Kherson offensive rather than what occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast. It will likely be a prolonged campaign spanning weeks if not months. Ukrainian units are around 8-10 km from the first lines of Russian fortifications in both the Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka axes. It is in these areas where Ukrainians can face stiff resistance.

Ukraine battle map

Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv direction

The overall situation in the Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged as last week delivered no frontline shifts in the region.

Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that battles near Masiutivka continued, but Moscow’s units failed to make any gains in the area for another week in a row. Some skirmishes also occurred near Hryanykivka and Krohmalne but achieved no results. A Russian source asserted that Russian units managed to capture Ukrainians’ fortified positions near Novomlynsk and crossed the Oskil River. This information, however, remains unverified. Late in the week, a Ukrainian source claimed that Russians withdrew Storm-Z troops from the Masiutivka area. If this information is confirmed, the likelihood of a further breakthrough in this area will diminish.

Russians continued to conduct artillery strikes on population centres in the region. Among others, last week, they hit Sotnytskyi Kozachok, Veterynarne, Strilecha, Synelnykove, Starytsa, Vovchansk, Udy, Zarichne, Novomlynks, Dvorichna, and Zapadne, Masiutivka and Lyman Pershyi.

According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, on Monday, Russians also hit the ammonia pipeline in Zapadne. The pipeline was not operating when the attack, but some technological residues remained in the pipe. The same site was hit again on Tuesday. However, based on official Ukrainian statements, ammonia concentration levels near Masiutivka were not exceeded.

The Russian MoD continued to provide information about Russian activities in the Kharkiv Oblast. The ministry stated that Russian units disrupted five Ukrainian rotation attempts, while the 6th Combined Arms and 1st Tank Army elements destroyed four reconnaissance groups. Russian aviation hit concentration areas of the 14^th and 92^nd Mechanised Brigades and other locally-based territorial defence forces.

The TOS-1 heavy-flamethrower system fired on the concentration area of the 103^rd TDF Brigade near Novoselivske.

Luhansk direction

Last week delivered no frontline changes in the Luhansk Oblast. We assess that the area will continue to be deprioritised as Ukraine and Russia conduct operations near Bakhmut, Vuhledar in the Donetsk Oblast and the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

On 5JUN, the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that his forces conducted a successful counterattack in the Svatove direction, adding that the 92^nd Mechanised brigade advanced 400 meters in the process. He may have referred to the prior week’s Ukrainian attacks, which delivered minimal gains in this direction. However, not only were these gains not independently verified, but also Ukrainians achieved no additional successes near Svatove last week. As such, their offensive, tactical potential petered out relatively quickly.

No changes were reported near Novoselivske and Kuzemivka and Serhiivka, and Raihorodka. Likewise, the situation remained stable near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka.

Russian attacks near Terny, Torske and Nevske were pushed back, but concurrently, it seems that the tempo and intensity of Moscow’s assaults in these areas decreased last week.

Positional battles continued near Dibrova and in the Serebryansky forest. While it is possible that some frontline changes occurred in the latter, their impact on the battlefield and the overall operational situation was minimal.

All Russian attacks on Bilohorivka were also repelled. On Friday, Rodion Miroshnik, a former LPR official, stated that Russian forces controlled most of the village. However, he presented no evidence to confirm this view. He was also the only source who made such a claim, so it is highly unlikely that his assessment was accurate.

Last week, Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, provided some patchy data on the intensity of Russian artillery attacks in the Luhansk Oblast. He stated that on 8JUN, Russians fired 612 times, compared to 400 times on 4JUN. Thus, the trajectory of Russian artillery strikes likely went up throughout the week. Nevertheless, this data suggests that the Lyman-Kupyansk area was heavily shelled again. After the start of Ukrainian counterattacks in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, we are unsure whether the region remained the heaviest-shelled area in Ukraine. Still, the overall strike intensity was comparable to previous weeks.

Aleksandr Savchuk, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, said Russian units thwarted multiple attacks by Ukrainian 63^rd, 66^th, 67^th Mechanised, 81^st Airmobile and 5^th National Guard Brigades using MLR systems and aviation.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts, 5MAY-11JUN 2023

(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Brady Africk).

Donetsk Oblast Direction

Battles in the Donetsk Oblast remained confined to Bakhmut and Vuhledar areas, where Ukrainians reportedly made some progress. However, much evidence about Ukrainian advances still hinges on conjecture as very little information, let alone confirmed and verified, indicates Ukrainian advances in the region.

Starting from the northern parts of the oblast, no changes occurred near Spirne, Vekhnokamyasnke and Vyimka, although some offensive actions occurred near Spirne, where Russians attempted to attack Ukrainian positions. Unless Kyiv plans to conduct a counterattack, we expect no frontline changes in this area over the summer. Both sides are presently preoccupied with defensive/offensive operations in other parts of the country and are unlikely to have spare capacities to throw into this part of the frontline.

The situation near Ivano Darivka also remained unchanged.

Russians, nevertheless, maintained some pressure on Ukrainian forces near Vesele and conducted several unsuccessful assaults in this direction.

Ukrainians reportedly managed to advance near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and take the heights near the M03 road. The source said that Ukrainian units sought to reach Paraskovyivka to attack Bakhmut from the north.

What is clear and confirmed is that Ukrainians continued to launch attacks on Russian lines near Berkhivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka, but their progress in this area is unclear. But in this axis, Russians reportedly deployed significant artillery forces and reserves to repel Ukrainian attacks. On Monday, Yevhenii Prihozhyn, the Wagner PMC head, said that part of the Berkhivka settlement was lost, and Russian troops retreated from their positions (last week, we only made minor changes to the frontline in our Scribble Map as little evidence emerged confirming territorial shifts).

Russians have significant reserves in Paraskoviivka, allowing them to defend and conduct local offensives. Ukrainians may have extended their attacks towards Yahidne.

When it comes to Bakhmut, the situation is stable. Wagner forces rotated out and were replaced by regular Russian army formations and probably Storm-Z troops (former inmates formally incorporated into the army structures). But the key is that no attacks were made from Bakhmut towards Chasiv Yar, and we don’t expect this situation to change over the following weeks. Ukrainians continue to maintain that they hold a small part of town in the southwestern parts of Bakhmut, which means that Russians do not fully occupy the city.

Russians tried to counterattack towards Ivanivske, but this attempt was repelled.

Ukrainians were visibly active south of Bakhmut, where battles continued near the Siversky Donetsk-Donbas canal and near the dominant heights north of Klishchiivka. Early in the week, Hanna Malyar, the Deputy MoD Minister, said that despite the Russian resistance and attempts to hold their lines and positions, Ukrainian units advanced in several directions during the fighting: Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Paraskoviivka from 200 to 1600 metres Ivanivske, Klishchiivka from 100 -700 metres.

In these areas, the Russian 57^th Motor Rifle Brigade reportedly lost positions on the western bank of the Siversky Donetsk-Donbas canal and were pushed back along a 1,200 m wide front and 180 m deep on Thursday. The same source added that Ukrainians were 3.5 kilometres from Andriivka as of Friday. This largely corresponds with our understanding of how the frontline shapes in this area.

It is in this area where the Ukrainian 3^rd Assault Brigade (former Azov) operates. One of its soldiers stated that on Thursday, the unit advanced one kilometre (he likely referred to the abovementioned 1,200 m push). The following day he added that Russians enjoyed a preponderance in artillery, manpower and availability of aviation in the Bakhmut direction. The source also claimed that Ukrainians were fighting Storm-Z troops in this area, presumably making it easier to advance.

According to Serhiy Cherevaty, the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman, on 08 JUNE, in the Bakhmut direction, Russians fired 368 times from various artillery systems (mortar, gun, tube). Russians also conducted 15 ground attacks and five air strikes. Cherevaty also repeated the same claim about the one-kilometre advance. Still, he justified this progress by saying that Ukrainians attacked Russians when rotation was ongoing and the new units were not fully prepared to fight.

Late in the week, Russian troops attacked towards Pivnichne, but the assault was probably repelled as neither side even hinted about Russia’s progress in the area.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Krasnohorivka, Novokalynove, Keramik, Stepove, Berdychi, Kamyanka and Kruta Balka.

Likewise, the situation in the Avdiivka area remained unchanged as no reports surfaced about Russian progress in this sector. As stated many times previously, we continue to maintain that Russian offensive potential near Avdiivka completely petered out chances are very slim for them to restart assaults on the city successfully.

However, supported by artillery, Russians sustained ground attacks on Pervomaiske. As of Friday, all attacks were reportedly pushed back.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Tonenke and Severne. According to the Ukrainian bloggers, battles continued near Vodyane, but no further information about these battles was published. The same source also said that Ukrainians succeeded partially in the Sukhyi Yar gully near Nevelske.

The Russian source asserted that Ukrainians counterattacked in Mariinka. No further information was provided about this development. It is also unclear whether this signals a shift in Ukrainian operations in the area, which have been inherently defensive for months.

The situation near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka did not change.

Ukrainians maintained attacks on Russian positions near Vuhledar. On Monday, the Russian source asserted that Ukrainians attacked towards Novodarivka, Rivnopil and Neskuchne. In addition, the UAF crossed the Shaitanka River and entered Novodonetske. The same source claimed that Leopard tanks were involved in the attack on Novodonetske, but neither development was confirmed. However, by week’s end, Ukrainians were pushed back from the village, which is currently a no man’s land.

Another Russian source said that on Monday, Kyiv’s forces resumed assaults on Russian positions near Vremivka and attacked in two directions: near Novodarivka and Rivnopil.

Storozheve may have been liberated.

On Friday, Ukrainians again attempted to push towards Neskuchne but were probably pushed back.

The Russian MoD claimed that Bradley IFVs were engaged in operations around Vuhledar, but this claim also remains uncorroborated.

Ukrainian sources stated that no battles were ongoing for Velyka Novosilka as of Friday. Most kinetic operations occurred along the Novodonetske – Neskuchne – Levadne line, while heavy battles also continued from Lobkove to Mala Tokmachka. The same Ukrainian source said that Russian reinforcement units arrived in Staromlynivka. In this direction, too, Ukrainians noted the presence of Storm-Z troops. The question is whether Moscow decided to employ former convicts to wear Ukrainians out first before committing more valuable (operational) reserves or whether hastily assembled Storm-Z units are the only reserves. It appears that the former is presently more likely.

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian fortifications, 5MAY-11JUN 2023

Southern Ukraine direction

On the night of 7-8JUN, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched large-scale probing attacks on Russian positions south of Orikhiv in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. These attacks added to already ongoing operations south of Velyka Novosilka, Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Although kinetic operations proceeded with Ukrainian high-precision strikes on Tokmak on 7 and 8JUN, we must stress that before 8JUN, Ukrainians conducted no major operations to prepare the battlefield for the offensive actions. No major air campaign (lack of aircraft) or artillery strikes were reported before Thursday.

Vuhledar axis

Ukrainian operations in this area were limited last week to conducting limited attacks around Pavlivka and Mykilske, but we understand that they made no progress in this sector.

Velyka Novosilka axis

Ukrainians deployed a few brigades, which allowed them to make some territorial gains. They captured Novodonetske, but this gain was quickly reversed due to a Russian counterattack. However, the commitment of additional brigades pushed the frontline south.

By Monday, Ukrainians are confirmed to have liberated Neskuchne, Novodarivka, Storozheve, and Blahodatne.

The deputy Ukrainian defence minister, Anna Malyar, claimed that Makarivka had also been liberated on Sunday, but this statement remained unverified.

We assess that Ukrainians now operate seven brigades in this axis, but they were not committed in their entirety.

Orikhiv axis

Most kinetic operations occurred along the Novodonetske – Neskuchne – Levadne line, while heavy battles also continued from Lobkove to Mala Tokmachka. Russian reinforced Staromlynivka. In this direction, too, Ukrainians noted the presence of Storm-Z troops. The question is whether Moscow decided to employ former convicts to wear Ukrainians out first before committing more valuable (operational) reserves or whether hastily assembled Storm-Z units are the only reserves.

Initially, Ukrainians reportedly pushed through Russian initial defensive lines, but many gains were quickly erased due to Russian counterattacks. It was also near Malaya Tokmachka, where Ukrainians initially lost eight M2A2 Bradley IFVs and one Leopard 2A6. It is unclear how many vehicles were have been salvaged, but the initial days of the counteroffensive saw Ukraine lose 15 Bradleys (five destroyed, ten damaged and abandoned), one Leopard 2A4 (destroyed) and two Leopard 2A6 (one destroyed and one damaged and abandoned). Two France-supplied 2 AMX-10 RC(R) vehicles were also abandoned.

But Ukrainians achieved some successes along the T0408 road linking Novodanylivka with Robotyne, advancing some 5 km towards the latter. Also near Robotyne, Ukrainians destroyed a Russian TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system.

Probably around this area, Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters engaged the Ukrainian armoured column. Other Russian reports suggested that Leopard tanks were attacked prior to these events, but these targets turned out to be harvesters and other agricultural machines.

Ukrainians also launched attacks southwest of Orikhiv and captured Lobkove.

So far, Ukrainians have lost a tank company and more than two AFV companies.

We also assess that in the Velyka Novosilka and Orikhiv areas, Ukrainians progressed 5 km into Russia-controlled territory.

On Saturday, Ukrainians released a video showing strikes on a Russian column in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The column in question probably belonged to the 291st Artillery Brigade of the 22nd Army Corps or the Black Sea Fleet. Indeed, in the Thursday assessment of the military situation in the Kherson Oblast, we highlighted the possibility that Russians would deploy some of its forces from Kherson to the Zaporizhzhia. The video confirmed this development. Secondly, and more importantly, the video was made by Polish-made FlyEye UAV, operating more than 60 km from the frontline or 30 km from Ukrainian-held territory on the Dnipro’s northern bank. It means that Ukraine is trying to isolate the battlefield in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, at least regarding possible reinforcements from the Kherson Oblast area or the deployment of operational reserves.

Pro-Ukrainian sources also stated that Ukrainian partisans destroyed a rail bridge in Yakymivka (?) and Crimea, limiting Russian ability to deploy reinforcements into the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Both strikes, however, remain unconfirmed.

Frontlines in southern Ukraine with Russian fortifications, 5MAY-11JUN 2023

Units involved in combat, 11JUN 2023

Kherson direction and Crimea

Please click here to read our analysis of the situation in the region following the dam’s destruction.

The Nova Kakhovka Dam’s destruction overshadowed all events in the Kherson Oblast last week. On Friday, we published a short piece assessing how the Dnipro overflows will impact the military situation in the region in the near term of 2-4 months. If Kyiv planned to conduct a river crossing operation in the region, these plans would now need to be put on hold. On the one hand, it allows Ukrainians to move some of its forces from the area to more pressing areas of the front. However, the same pertains to Russians. Specifically, we are looking at elements of the 7th Mountain Air Assault Division and the 22nd Army Corps that can be shifted to the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and serve as an operational reserve.

All Ukrainian gains in the Dnipro Delta islands were erased due to the flooding. The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration said that 32% of the flooding was concentrated in the right bank (Ukraine-controlled), while 68% was concentrated in the left (Russia-controlled). At the same time, as of Sunday, water was gradually receding from the region. The territory flooded decreased from 139 sq km at its peak to 77 sq km.

This week, until Dnipro flows stabilise, we are thus likely to witness some artillery exchanges and Ukrainian deep strikes on targets in Crimea north of the peninsula. But once this happens, we expect Russians to resume regular artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian areas north of the river.

On Friday, Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk said Russian forces had withdrawn between five and 15 kilometres from the Dnipro River due to flooding of their frontline positions.

Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 5MAY-11JUN 2023

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Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 442 aircraft (+10), 238 helicopters (+2), 4,571 UAVs (+98), 426 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+2), 9,382 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+518), 1,122 MLRS launchers (+10), 5,084 field artillery guns and mortars (+88), as well as 10,885 units of special military vehicles (+229).

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainians lost more than 500 tanks and armoured vehicles last week, compared to 60 the week before. These alleged Ukrainian losses began to mount quickly when the counterattack commenced, yet no evidence was provided to substantiate such claims. Other losses remained largely in line with existing reporting trajectories.

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 215,640 personnel (+5,700), 3,926 tanks (+89), 7,631 armoured combat vehicles (+119), 3,736 artillery systems (+181) and 601 MLR systems (+18), 362 anti-aircraft systems (+18), 314 aircraft (+1) and 299 helicopters (+1), and 3,300 UAVs (+125), 6,461 vehicles and fuel tanks (+156), 1,183 cruise missiles (+51), 18 warships and boats (0) and 509 special vehicles (+30).

Last week saw a steep increase in the number of reported Russian tank losses. The average daily losses increased from three before 6JUN to 13 by the week’s end. These losses clearly stem from the ongoing offenisve, but their scale is impossible to verify independently.

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)

Russian tank losses (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Russian artillery losses (MLRS excluded) (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

The past week showed an increased tempo in the number of destroyed Russian artillery systems (MLRS excluded). The moving average increased as a result too. In total, Ukrainians claimed to have destroyed more than 180 artillery systems and now average around 25 platforms per day.

Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine

The past week continued to deliver subdued employment of both missile and kamikaze drones. On Tuesday, Ukrainians claimed to have shot down 35 out of 35 fired Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles. On Friday, Kyiv shot down another four and on Saturday additional two. It is unclear how many missiles exactly Moscow fired, but the interception rate was likely high as few reports surfaced about damages sustained in these strikes. Secondly, even after the Ukrainian counteroffensive commenced, Russians could not increase the tempo and intensity of their attacks to degrade Ukraine’s rear support or strike troop presence near the border. Whether this is an intelligence (ISR) issue or suggests a low ammunition stock is unclear. But it is certain that Moscow cannot effectively rely on deep, high-precision strikes to alter the conflict in any way.

Interestingly, according to Air Force Command, Tuesday’s attack was directed at Ukraine’s capital, indicating that no attempt was made to interdict the movement of Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast on the day when the large-scale ground attacks started.

The Shahed 131/136 attacks were also limited. Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted 36 UAVs that came in three waves: on Friday, Saturday and Sunday. The first strike involved at least ten Shaheds, the second 20, and the last one only six. Notably, there were no coordination strikes involving Shaheds and cruise/ballistic missiles to saturate Ukrainian air defences and decrease their survivability.

Last week, the Ukrainian Air Force Command intercepted 36 Sheheds, compared to 29 and 71 two and three weeks before.

Lastly, when looking at the USG’s data on the number of Russian attacks (ground, missile, air, MLRS), the number of air strikes on 10JUN  was the second highest (92) since the USG started providing such data (The highest number was reported for  29MAY (97)). Besides that, last week saw a decrease in missile and MLRS strikes.

Number of Russian attacks in June (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

The number of Shehed 131/136 kamikaze drones intercepted (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine (Shaheds excluded)  (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Military situation in Belarus

BLUF: Last week delivered no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Many units undertook mobilisation classes. Belarus also deployed its S-400 system near Minsk. The deployment of nuclear warheads is expected to occur after 7-8JUL.

The military situation in Belarus remained stable. While the activities of the military-political leadership representatives were usual, the Belarusian Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies presented heightened training activity.

The activities of the Belarusian President mostly had an international character. On Thursday, Alexander Lukashenko took part in the meeting with the secretaries of the Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) member states, where he spoke about the current military-political situation in the region. He stated that the entire international and regional security architecture had collapsed while the military-political situation in Eastern Europe was tense to the limit. West is to blame. The president proposed to develop a concept of the CSTO Collective Security Strategy until 2035, pointing out the necessity of further work on coordinating approaches and developing appropriate proposals for the future security architecture of the Eurasian continent. He highlighted the need for negotiations in the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war, which was the only way to settle the situation in Ukraine. Lukashenko emphasised that it was essential to set aside discussions about the reasons for the conflict and focus directly on stopping the hostilities. Lukashenko reaffirmed that Belarus’s stance was pro-peace.

Notably, a few hours later, the Belarusian President departed for Sochi to meet with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. The actual meeting took place on Friday and had an informal character. It reportedly pertained to economic issues. There, Lukashenko spoke about Russo-Belarusian relations. He noted that both countries were moving forward and deepening their cooperation, despite the Western sanctions, which seemed less effective than both leaders thought.

Despite the limited coverage from the Belarusian side, more data was published in the Russian infosphere. The Rybar military channel claimed that the Russian President informed that deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus would start after the end of preparations (7JUL-8JUL).

From the military-political perspective, a day later when, the Belarusian Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, visited the likely deployment area of the 6th Air Defence Battalion (15th Air Defence Brigade), fielding a set of S-400 air defence systems.

Officially, Khrenin assessed the process of unit preparations for combat duty and the readiness of personnel and equipment. He stressed that introducing the S-400 system meant protecting the Union State border and not only Belarus. Such defences are now crucial due to the deteriorating military-political situation and the increasing military potential of Poland and the Baltic states. The deployment of an S-400 battery near Minsk aligns with how Russia converted its S-300s to S-400s: initial S-400s were also deployed around Moscow to protect the leadership. Once the capital was protected, conversions started occurring in other prioritised parts of Russia, such as the Kaliningrad Oblast. It thus remains to be seen whether additional S-400 batteries will be deployed to Belarus to enhance Minsk’s air defence umbrella. We assess that it is possible.

Satellite imagery analysis

Airbus imagery acquired 21APR shows the disassembly of the S-300 system and preparations for redeployment. In addition, the 40V6MR mast on which the 30N6E “Flap Lid” was probably previously installed is being prepared for transport. One 5P85 TEL was spotted leaving the area, only two S-300 twin missile reload packs remained at the base. A 36D6 “Tin Shield” radar was deployed on a mast.

Below are images from the site, which now houses S-400s. The images were taken in April. We are waiting for newer ones.

The Belarusian Hajun project also informed about the construction of a military camp (town) for the Belarusian SOF formation in the Gomel oblast. The facility is near Novaya Buda, a few kilometres west of Gomel. This information might suggest that Belarusian MoD will create a new SOF formation or transfer an existing one to the Southern Operational Command structures.

On Wednesday, the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich participated in the CSTO working group meeting on electronic warfare (EW). The event occurred in Minsk, where representatives of the organisation members and the Joint CSTO Staff discussed using EW means in modern armed conflicts. During its course, Gulevich claimed that electronic warfare remains the most effective and quick-to-implement means that allow neutralising the tactical advantage of the enemy.

Besides, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation representatives also participated in staff talks held in Brest. Between Tuesday and Thursday, they discussed the organisation and conducting of joint exercises – Interaction-2023, Search-2023, and Barrier-2023 planned for SEP23.

Regarding international events, it should be noted that Myanmar Military, Air and Naval Attaché to Belarus, Brig. Gen. Mo Zhuo was officially accreditated in Belarus. The official ceremony occurred on Thursday when the diplomat met with the Head of the Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department, Col. Valery Revenko.

Over the past seven days, several military units underwent multiple training classes, mainly related to combat and mobilisation readiness.

The first such drills started on Tuesday in the 11th Mechanised Brigade. Firstly, they engaged only conscripts. Starting from Wednesday, the entire unit was probably involved in the drill. It sought to maintain combat and mobilisation readiness at a sufficient level and increase the coherence of military C2 bodies. Personnel also conducted an air defence exercise.

Throughout the week, combat or mobilisation readiness classes also occurred in the following units:

• 38th Air Assault Brigade,

• 120th Mechanised Brigade,

• 111th Artillery Brigade,

• 465th Missile Brigade,

• 49th Radiotechnical Brigade,

• 1st Air Defence Regiment,

• 16th Electronic Warfare Regiment.

On Thursday, the Luniniets Region Executive Committee started an inspection of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) in the area. Officially, drills will be conducted until 29JUN and involve about 100 reservists.

According to the Belarusian Hajun, 7,606 reserve servicemen will have undergone military drills during the JAN-JUN period. Interestingly, the Belarusian MoD earlier stressed that 9,000 reservists would be involved in such training for the whole of the year 2023.

Besides, between Monday and Thursday, the Belarusian KDB (KGB) conducted anti-terrorist exercises in the Gomel Oblast. Near Lamavichy, law enforcement agencies stood up several checkpoints and patrolled the area. The drills probably did not involve armed forces’ components. However, there are reports about the use of helicopters and UAVs.

On Friday, the 51st Artillery Brigade hosted instruction-methodological classes with officers linked to the combat coordination measures.

The ground activity of the Belarusian military vehicles remained standard.
Noteworthy transfers included:

• Three TOR-M2K launchers with two trucks and MZKT headed towards Salihorsk from Mikaschevichy – Tuesday;

• A single S-300 launcher (without missiles) was moving from Barysaw towards Zhodino – Tuesday;

• A single MAZ-537 trailer with T-72B tank (TN:539) were moving on the N8951 highway towards Radoshkovichi – Wednesday;

• A single Polonez MLRS with loading vehicles and a launcher of the BM-30 (336th Reactive Artillery Brigade) were moving near Osipovichi – Friday;

In addition, four unspecified tracked vehicles were observed at Ozerische Railway Station on Monday. They were tightly covered with tarpaulin (marked with a red cross) and likely waiting for loading onto a train.

Russian aviation was active in Belarus last week. It involved Mi-8 helicopter flights (Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday), Su-30SM fighters and Su-34 bombers (Wednesday and Thursday). Last week, Russian IL-76 (RF-76545) arrived in Belarus three times – on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday.

Also on Tuesday, unofficial sources reported the presence of a likely Russian echelon with six BM-21s at the Osipovichi-1 Railway Station. 

Outlook for the week of 12JUN-18JUN

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.

To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Last week’s forecast

“Last week, we slightly exaggerated the impact of Storm-Z troops on the situation in the Kharkiv Oblast. Although the tempo of ground attacks near Masyutivka was maintained, Russians made no progress in this area. Consequently, we assess that it is unlikely that they will make any progress in the region this week (capture one village or more).” This forecast was correct. Russians made no progress in the region.

Score: 1/1

“We are also decreasing the likelihood of Russian progress near Bilohorivka. It is unlikely that they will advance near the settlement. The situation in other parts of the Luhansk Oblast is unlikely to change (Russians are unlikely to make any progress in the region).” This prognosis was also accurate as the frontline in the Luhansk Oblast remained unchanged.

Score: 1/1

“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains, but we do not anticipate Moscow to capture one village or more. However, it is likely that Ukrainians will liberate some territories. We are primarily focused on the frontline situation near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka, where Ukrainians reportedly pushed Russians back southwest and southeast of the settlement.” This forecast was correct. Russians made no progress in the Donetsk Oblast as its posture became increasingly defensive as the week progressed. We were also correct in anticipating more Ukrainian gains near Velyka Novosilka.

Score: 1/1

“Regarding the Bakhmut area, we do not expect Russians to commence ground attacks towards Chasiv Yar (or in the western direction in general) this week. However, the intensity of Russian artillery attacks will possibly be high. We share the same view on the Ukrainian posture. While some ground assaults will probably occur, we expect no bigger Ukrainian push on Bakhmut flanks this week.” We were right in anticipating no big Russian push towards Chasiv Yar. However, the scope of Ukrainian counterattacks is unclear. Officially, Kyiv is progressing, but no visual evidence exists to support such claims.

Score: 1/1

“We continue to foresee no changes in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Limited Ukrainian and Russian ground attacks will likely continue, but it is unlikely that the frontline will shift this week. It is unlikely that the Ukrainian counterattack will begin this week.” Ukrainians launched the main phase of the long-anticipated counteroffensive in the region.

Score: 0/1

“We assess that it is likely that Ukrainians will continue conducting operations on islands in the Dnipro Delta in the Kherson Oblast, and there is roughly even chance that they will advance in these areas. We anticipate no large-scale operations in this direction this week.” Ukrainians conducted various missions in the Dnipro delta, but the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka Dam erased all their gains and forced them to cease all ground activities.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 5/6 (83%)

The forecast for the week of 12-18JUN

We will not change the forecast for the Kharkiv Oblast. We continue to maintain that Russians are inherently unable to make any substantial gains in the region, and the deployment of former inmates (probably in small numbers anyway) does not tilt the balance in their favour.

We also foresee no larger changes in the Luhansk Oblast, near Kreminna and Bilohorivka. It is unlikely that Russians will advance in the region and near these settlements.

When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, there is a roughly even chance that Russians will progress slightly in the region, but we do not expect them to capture one village or more. But, when it comes to Ukrainians, they are highly likely to liberate some territories. Still, we would not like to speculate how far the advance near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka may progress.

Regarding the Bakhmut area, it is highly likely that Ukrainians will continue to conduct offensive operations on the flanks, and there is a roughly even chance they will recapture some areas. Without the deployment of additional forces, including armoured units, Kyiv is unlikely to achieve a breakthrough in this sector.

With Ukraine launching the main phase of the counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, we assess that they are highly likely to recapture some territories. However, as in the Donetsk Oblast, we would not like to speculate how successful Ukrainians can be as it is impossible to get an accurate picture of the battlefield.

We expect a short-term lull in operations in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainians are highly likely to cease operations in the Dnipro Delta until the river’s flow fully stabilises. Russians are highly likely to continue shelling civilian areas.