Very interesting. A lot of very sharp information. I especially applaud the forecast at the end, especially given, say, Michael Koffman's policy of never providing a single forecast about anything.

Several questions/comments.

"These losses, respectively, represent 15%, 2%, 14%, 5%, and 50% of Western vehicle types supplied to Ukraine..." This means they lost 50% of their western-supplied mine clearing kit? Or of that type of vehicle specifically? If the latter, what % of all mine-clearing equipment did they lose, and what % of all infantry fighting vehicles have they lost?

Some rumors of Ukrainian armor in Kharkiv. Just rumors? Or, now that the Russians are pinned down in Zaporizhzhia, and the Storm-Z troops have left Kharkiv, might they not attack there? Could they try to bypass the mine fields by first turning in to Russia, and then going east/south around the flanks?

Also, some dumb layman questions. You wrote that Ukrainian offensive threats in the Kherson direction are now effectively nill for 4-8 weeks, allowing Russia to reposition troops to Zaporizhzhia. But, (1) is there really no threat for Ukrainian teams to take advantage of the flooding, sneak troops across and either (a) have sniper or "partisan" cells on the east bank, or (b) actually take a bridgehead somewhere as just a fixing action to tie Russian troops down in the area? If the Kinsburn split has been made an island, couldn't some recon units take it now. (2) With the waters receding in the reservoir, is there really no possibility for Ukraine possibly do an end-around the Surovikin line there?

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Mike does do forecasts, but they are more long-term.

As far as your questions go:

1) They lost (abandoned) 50% of Leopard 2Rs to be more precise. Are you asking about all mine-clearing equipment/IFVs or only Western-supplied kit?

2) I am not sure whether this is any capacity to deploy more forces into the Kharkiv Oblast. Plus, to what purpose? If they wanted to push Ukrainians out, Russians would be better placed to push towards Lyman and enter the Donetsk Oblast from the north. I assume Moscow has some reserves in the Luhansk Oblast, probably centered around the 1st Guards Tank Army.

3) For threats you listed, you don't need artillery, but National Guard, Storm-Zs, reservists, special forces and some regular units. Russians nevertheless highly likely left some artillery pieces behind to continue striking civilians on the Dnipro's right bank.

When it comes to the hydrological situation, to be honest I don't know. I prefer to wait it out and see how the Dnipro flow will stabilise. Based on that, we will be able to start building scenarios on possibile military operations by both Russians and Ukrainians.

Hope this helped,


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Konrad, thanks for the detailed response.

For 1), I guess both are useful. What fraction of western provided mine-clearing equipment, IFVs, and of all, were lost?

2) Interesting, thanks. What I read was that Ukraine was threatening a counter-offensive in Kharkiv. It might be a feint. It maybe didn't happen. And, in my view, the only point of attacking in Kharkiv/Luhansk would be if the Russian forces there are relatively much easier to push back than in the south. Otherwise, cutting the land bridge also looks like a priority for me. But, if you can route the Russians in Khakiv/Luhansk, and maybe capture a bunch of equipment, take prisoners, and affect morale on both sides, it would still be worth it, imho.

My wife is dragging me to the gym but I'll have a link later about the hyro situation;)

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So, Trent Talenko has this thread, on possibilities in Kherson. https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1668344659175960577

Curious what you think.

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It is highly speculative and with no evidence to support such claims. I would prefer not to comment on that further.

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Great report.

I'm curious what percentage of Ukrainian forces, especially the NATO equipped brigades and formations, are currently in action in Zaporozhye or Donetsk, as well as how many Russian reserves have been engaged. There seem to be varying views on whether the Ukrainian offensive has begun or if the current operations are more accurately described as probing attacks.

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