Very interesting. A lot of very sharp information. I especially applaud the forecast at the end, especially given, say, Michael Koffman's policy of never providing a single forecast about anything.

Several questions/comments.

"These losses, respectively, represent 15%, 2%, 14%, 5%, and 50% of Western vehicle types supplied to Ukraine..." This means they lost 50% of their western-supplied mine clearing kit? Or of that type of vehicle specifically? If the latter, what % of all mine-clearing equipment did they lose, and what % of all infantry fighting vehicles have they lost?

Some rumors of Ukrainian armor in Kharkiv. Just rumors? Or, now that the Russians are pinned down in Zaporizhzhia, and the Storm-Z troops have left Kharkiv, might they not attack there? Could they try to bypass the mine fields by first turning in to Russia, and then going east/south around the flanks?

Also, some dumb layman questions. You wrote that Ukrainian offensive threats in the Kherson direction are now effectively nill for 4-8 weeks, allowing Russia to reposition troops to Zaporizhzhia. But, (1) is there really no threat for Ukrainian teams to take advantage of the flooding, sneak troops across and either (a) have sniper or "partisan" cells on the east bank, or (b) actually take a bridgehead somewhere as just a fixing action to tie Russian troops down in the area? If the Kinsburn split has been made an island, couldn't some recon units take it now. (2) With the waters receding in the reservoir, is there really no possibility for Ukraine possibly do an end-around the Surovikin line there?

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Great report.

I'm curious what percentage of Ukrainian forces, especially the NATO equipped brigades and formations, are currently in action in Zaporozhye or Donetsk, as well as how many Russian reserves have been engaged. There seem to be varying views on whether the Ukrainian offensive has begun or if the current operations are more accurately described as probing attacks.

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